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“Our fathers worshiped in this mountain ; and ye say, that in Jerusalem is the place where men ought to worship.” * * *

“The hour cometh, when ye shall neither in this mountain, nor yet at Jerusalem, worship the Father. * * * But the hour cometh, and now is, when the true worshipers shall worship the Father in spirit and in truth : for the Father seeketh such to worship Him. God is a Spirit : and they that worship Him must worship Him in spirit and in truth.” (John iv. 20, 21, 23, 24.)

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I.—ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF OPINION IN THE
EARLY CHRISTIAN CHURCH, AS INDICATED BY
A COMPARISON OF THE DIFFERENT BOOKS OF
THE NEW TESTAMENT.—I.*

Two assumptions have been widely prevalent in the Protestant mind, which hinder a just conception of the origin and design of the different books which compose the New Testament: 1st, that in their authors there was a conscious purpose of writing for the instruction of future times, instead of being simply the organs of the belief of their own age; and 2ndly, that all these books must be self-consistent throughout in representing one view of historical fact and expressing one type of doctrinal opinion. Both these assumptions rest on a broader one—the plenary inspiration of the Bible; they are, in fact, inevitable inferences from such a premiss. The second of these two assumptions I shall endeavour to shew, in this and an ensuing lecture, is disproved by facts, not to be gainsaid, which meet us on every side in an analysis of the contents of the New Testament. The first is sufficiently confuted by the intrinsic evidence of the books themselves, supported by every record which has come down to us of the first age of the Church—that the early Christians were fully persuaded of the ap-

* This paper—with another to appear in the next number of the Review—was found among the papers of the late Rev. J. J. Tayler. It appears to have been a lecture, addressed not so much to students of theology, as to a more general audience; and we have left the phraseology, which indicates the fact, unchanged. What were the circumstances under which these lectures were originally delivered, we are not informed.—ED. THEOL. REVIEW.

proaching end of the world, and that, so far from having any thought of writing for a remote posterity (the very possibility of which they could not have imagined), their only care was, by all they said and all they wrote, to maintain in their own minds and in the minds of others, a deep sense and vivid expectation of the solemn judgment which they believed to be impending over humanity. This fact must be kept steadily before us through all our subsequent inquiries ; for it was out of such an atmosphere of belief that the whole of the New Testament literature proceeded. It is the varied witness and expression of that belief.

We will now, if you please, as a preliminary basis for more general observations hereafter, take the different books of the New Testament in the order in which they are exhibited in our Received Version, and briefly inquire what evidence we can obtain of their origin and composition, and what indication they themselves furnish of their governing idea and of the purpose with which they were written.

Matthew.—It is fortunate that for Matthew we possess a very ancient witness in Papias, who was bishop or head pastor of Hierapolis in Phrygia in the first half of the second century, and from whose work entitled, “An Exposition of the Lord’s Oracles,” Eusebius has given us some curious extracts in his Ecclesiastical History (iii. 39). Papias had been the instructor of Irenæus, who was bishop of Lyons in Gaul in the latter half of the same century ; and Irenæus tells us that his master had been a companion of Polycarp, bishop of Smyrna, and a hearer of the apostle John. Whether this is to be taken to the strict letter or not (for Eusebius’s statement differs slightly from that of Irenæus), we cannot be far from the truth in assuming that Papias’s own recollections, and the traditions of which he was the depository, bordered close on the apostolic age. What we learn from him about Matthew’s Gospel is in substance as follows : that Matthew wrote down the discourses of the Lord in Hebrew, that is, in the popular Aramæan dialect then spoken in Palestine ; and that these discourses every one translated or interpreted as he was able. Three things are here noticeable : 1st, that the earliest written record of Christ’s preaching was in the native dialect of Palestine ; 2ndly, that the substance of this record was the discourses of Christ,

the word employed being the same that is used in the Greek Septuagint version to denote the oracles of the old Hebrew prophets. We may further remark, that as all our Lord's discourses were occasional, they required to be set, in order to become perfectly intelligible, in a slight historical frame-work, so that the oldest record would possess from the first something of the disjointed and fragmentary character of our three first Gospels ; 3rdly, that there were early attempts to render this primitive record into other languages, principally, no doubt, Greek, as being the language then diffused over the whole Græco-Roman world. Possibly Papias's own work (*λογίων κυριακῶν ἐξηγήσεις*), and a work with a similar title by Aristion, were among these early attempts to Græcize the Palestinian record, and to put it into a form somewhat approaching that of our present Gospels. The statements of Papias are confirmed by later witnesses. Pantænus, who was afterwards at the head of the catechetical school of Alexandria, when he visited India as a missionary in the latter half of the second century (and under India we must probably comprehend Southern Arabia and the western coast of India, at that time closely connected by commercial intercourse), found the Hebrew Gospel of Matthew, written in Hebrew characters, in use among the Jewish Christians of that country. Eusebius tells us, that when Matthew quitted his own countrymen to evangelize other nations, he left them "his own Gospel, written in their native tongue." Epiphanius, in the fourth century, states that the Nazarenes, a class of Jewish Christians, used the Gospel according to Matthew exclusively, and called it "the Gospel according to the Hebrews ;" and that Matthew was the only writer of the New Testament who wrote in Hebrew. Another form of Matthew's Gospel, Epiphanius says, was used by the Ebionites, a more rigid class of Jewish Christians than the Nazarenes, called also by them, "the Gospel according to the Hebrews." Jerome, who spent a great part of his life, in the second half of the fourth century, in Palestine, where the old Christian traditions were yet rife, and where the representatives and descendants of the earliest believers still subsisted among the Nazarenes and Ebionites, found the Hebrew form of Matthew's Gospel in use among these Palestinian Christians, and what he at first regarded as the

Hebrew original of our Greek Matthew, preserved in the library which Pamphilus had attached to the church at Caesarea. On a further acquaintance, however, he discovered more difference between this Hebrew work and our Greek Matthew, which had already acquired a canonical authority in the church, than he had originally supposed; and fragments that are found in ancient writers of the Gospel according to the Hebrews, shew that such was the case. But this is no reason for doubting that the old Aramæan record mentioned by Papias was the germ of our present Matthew; that from this primitive source flowed in different channels the Gospel of the Hebrews in one line, used by the Nazarenes and Ebionites, and preserving most of identity with the Aramæan original—and our Greek Matthew in the other, enriched with additions from other sources; the two lines of derivation constantly diverging further from each other, as the Catholic Church developed itself, and the old Jewish Christians came to be regarded as heretics; till at length an accumulating tradition passed on both sides into a determinate scripture, and our Matthew assumed the form in which we now possess it. *When* our Matthew was first rendered into Greek, we have no means of determining. The actual genesis of many of the books of the New Testament is involved in great obscurity. We are able to trace through the scattered notices of antiquity a sufficient line of connection between our Matthew and the work mentioned by Papias, to justify our ascription of its substance, the record of our Lord's own words, to an apostolic source, and the retention of the significant title, *Karà Marðāiov*. The work, notwithstanding its passage through Greek hands, still bears very distinct marks of Jewish origin. It is more abundant in proofs of the Messiahship of Jesus from passages of the Old Testament, than any other of the Gospels; and though most of these citations are in the Greek of the Septuagint, yet it has been observed of some, that they have a Messianic application given to them, which is not expressed by that version, and so imply derivation from a source where the Hebrew original must have been used rather than the Greek translation. In the Sermon on the Mount and in some other passages, it is the object of Jesus not so much to repudiate as to enforce the Law, only in a higher spiritual sense, and bringing out its latent spiritual

meaning ; and a collection of the sayings of Jesus through several consecutive chapters, delivered, probably on different occasions, on a hill-side near Capernaum, bears certainly very considerable analogy to Papias's description of the origin of Matthew's Aramæan Gospel. It is observable also, that in our Matthew, the appearances of Christ to his disciples after the resurrection are limited to Galilee. On the whole, then, we may conclude, that in the first of our present Gospels, though it has probably received considerable accessions from Greek sources, we have a representation of the original Palestinian tradition of the preaching and ministry of Jesus.

Mark.—Of the origin of Mark's Gospel, as well as of Matthew's, we also possess a brief notice in the fragments of Papias. Mark, he tells us, was the interpreter of Peter (which implies that Peter could speak no language but his native Aramæan), and took down from Peter's lips in the course of his preaching whatever he heard him say respecting the words and actions of Christ, not, however, in chronological order, for Peter adapted his discourses to the immediate wants of his hearers, and did not aim at giving a complete and connected survey of our Lord's teachings. What Mark thus recorded in the first instance, could only have furnished the rudimentary materials of our present Mark ; for this of all the synoptical Gospels is the most compact and symmetrical in form, at the greatest possible distance from a mere diary or commonplace-book of detached memoranda. In whatever language these original memoranda were written down by Mark, whether in Aramæan or Greek (more probably the latter), they must have stood in somewhat the same relation to our present Mark, as the old Aramæan record, described by Papias, to the completed Matthew of our present canon. Ancient authors mention an early writing which, under the various titles of the "Preaching of Peter," the "Doctrine of Peter," and the "Gospel according to Peter," appears to have had extensive diffusion among the sects that were inclined to Docetism. But of Docetism not a trace can be discovered in our extant Mark. One curious circumstance should be noticed in regard to this Gospel. It is well known that Justin Martyr, about the middle of the second century, though he records at great length, in language closely allied to that of our present Matthew and

Luke, both the actions and discourses of Christ, so that out of his citations alone a tolerably complete history might be made of our Lord's ministry, never quotes his authorities by name, but contents himself with referring generally to the "Memorials of the Apostles." To this, however, there is one remarkable exception, if we interpret his language according to the ordinary rules of construction and the obvious suggestion of the context. In a passage where Justin speaks of Christ's giving Simon the surname of Peter, and calling the sons of Zebedee, Boanerges (a circumstance which is mentioned by Mark alone of all the evangelists), he says, that this is mentioned in *his* Memorials, with a reference that can only fall on the foregoing name of Peter; and if this be so, we have then indirect evidence of connection between our present Mark and an earlier record bearing the name of Peter. Everything goes to prove that there was a great multiplication of Gospels, that is, narratives of the ministry of Jesus, in this age; and that the same collection of original materials, drawn into different lines of development, and gathering in its course fresh accretions both oral and written, passed into the service of different parties, and assumed in its final state a different form. Why may we not, then, suppose that, as the primitive Aramæan record of Matthew underwent a twofold development among the Jewish Christians in one line, and in the Catholic Church in the other, so the materials collected by Mark were moulded into two separate but kindred forms, of which one, with the name of Peter, was adopted by the Docetics, while another has come down to us in our present Mark? When this Gospel assumed the form in which we now have it, it is impossible to say; the most learned men differing so widely in opinion from one another; some regarding it as the earliest, and some as the latest, of all the Gospels. There is still, however, reason to believe that this Gospel bears on it the stamp of Peter's mind, and may be considered as having mediately an apostolic source. It occupies a sort of neutral ground, corresponding to his conciliatory and mediating temper, between the Judaic tendencies still discernible in Matthew, and the more decided Paulinism which we shall find characterizing the writings that bear the name of Luke. Its picturesqueness of style has been thought to indicate an eye-witness of

the facts recorded. It may admit of another interpretation; and the argument would have more weight, if this peculiarity did not equally occur in passages which could not have been affected by the vividness of Peter's memory, as in the account of the baptism of Christ.

Luke.—With respect to Luke's Gospel, we have no external witness of its origin, as in the case of Matthew and Mark; but we learn from the author's own preface that he had drawn his account from a large mass of pre-existing materials; and what we are thus told of Luke, is applicable to the book of Acts, for I need hardly remark that these are only two parts of one and the same work. The implied circumstances of its origin prevent our assigning to it a very early date. We find no decided traces of its existence before the time of Justin Martyr, about the middle of the second century; and the Pauline spirit with which it is so deeply impregnated, and which it is evidently intended to recommend, carries with it clear, internal proof, that it could not have been produced till that spirit had had full time to develop itself and to overpower the Judaic narrowness by which it had been at first so bitterly opposed, and this could hardly have been before the beginning of the second century. The precise date it is impossible to fix. Nevertheless, it is very probable that the author has used materials that had been collected by the followers of Paul. In the Acts we have citations in the first person from a sort of journal kept by a companion of the apostle during his sea voyages. And this may have occasioned, as it still justifies, the use of the title, *Karà Loukän*. Whatever be its date and origin, this Gospel opens to us a new stage in the development of Christianity. In many parts it breathes a spirit very different from that which we meet with in Matthew. The long series of parables and discourses, which it exhibits almost without a break from the 9th to the 18th chapter, contains matter for the most part peculiar to itself. Here occur the beautiful parables of the Good Samaritan, Dives and Lazarus, the Prodigal Son, and some others, to which there is nothing parallel in any of the other Gospels. It has been remarked of two parables that occur in this section of Luke, xvii. 7—10 and xviii. 9—14, that they betray a mental tendency closely allied to Paul's doctrine of justification by faith.

John.—Immense importance attaches to the question of the authorship of the fourth Gospel—that of John; for on its solution will depend our conception of primitive Christianity—not, indeed, of the permanent and essential spirit of the religion, for that is the same under every diversity of presentment throughout the New Testament—but of the mode in which it was first preached, and of the order of events through which it was introduced into the world. We have to choose between the three first or synoptical Gospels and the fourth. Both cannot be conformable to historical fact; both cannot convey a correct impression of the manner of Christ's teaching; for on more points than one—and those not of minor importance—the two are at variance with and even contradictory to each other. Within the compass of a couple of lectures—mainly designed for another object—it is impossible to go into the full criticism of this question. I can only say, that with a strong original prepossession in favour of the apostolic authorship of the fourth Gospel, and after struggling for years to maintain my belief in it, the following facts, which will not be disputed by any one who has fairly considered the subject, have compelled me finally to regard it as at least exceedingly doubtful. (1.) The Gospel and the Apocalypse (both assigned by ecclesiastical tradition to the same apostle) are written in such different Greek, and represent Christianity in so radically different a form, that they cannot both come from the same pen; but the earliest testimony of antiquity to the apostolic origin of the Apocalypse is more distinct and express than can be alleged on behalf of any other book of the New Testament except the Epistles of Paul. (2.) The clear statement of Papias, that in Matthew (with whom, in the order of events and in their description of our Lord's mode of teaching, the two other Synoptics substantially agree) we have a record at first hand of the primitive Palestinian tradition respecting Christ. (3.) The identity of the language ascribed to Christ in the fourth Gospel, with the style of the evangelist himself, as is very evident from a comparison with the first Epistle, which bears internal evidence of being by the same hand as the Gospel. (4.) The confident appeal of the Christians of Ephesus and its neighbourhood in the latter half of the second century to the traditional authority of the

apostle John for their mode of keeping Easter, though that authority is directly at variance with the indications of time contained in the Gospel which bears his name. (5.) The constant alternation between Galilee and Jerusalem as the scene of the teaching of Jesus, and his long argumentations from the first with the Jewish doctors in the latter city (a marked feature in the narrative of the fourth Gospel), which is hardly reconcilable with the universal tradition of the pure Galilæan origin of the religion, and is rendered additionally improbable by the supposition that the priesthood and the Sanhedrim should have been unable through so long a space of time to leave this bold rebuker of their corruptions unpunished, when, according to the very natural representation of the three first evangelists, the first time he came to Jerusalem, attended by his Galilæan followers, he was apprehended and publicly executed. Lastly, the whole tone of the fourth Gospel is not only at variance with all that we know from the New Testament and tradition of the strongly Judaic spirit, approaching narrowness and bigotry, of the son of Zebedee, but implies an advanced and highly developed state of Christian opinion, which, if it come within the limits of the first century at all, can only belong to its extremest verge. Even the controversial antagonism of Paul with the Jewish zealots would seem by this time to have been surmounted. Throughout the Gospel, indeed, the Jews are exhibited in a general attitude of opposition to the teaching of Jesus; but they are referred to in a calm tone of conscious superiority, which seems to imply that the fierce brunt of their original hostility to Christianity was already broken, and that they had fallen into a position where they could no longer do any serious harm. It is true, the constant voice of early tradition must be admitted to have much weight in favour of the apostolic origin of the Gospel. Possibly it may be a later product of the church over which John had once presided at Ephesus; and this, after the notion of those times, would have fully justified the retention of his name. The old Jewish Christianity received a serious blow early in the second century; and, as at Jerusalem in the reign of Hadrian, so at Ephesus even earlier, the original Judaic church may have been, if not superseded, at least replenished, by a large infusion of Hellenic elements with a broader and more

philosophical spirit. Yet Gentile were quite as eager as Jewish Christians to claim an apostolic origin and sanction for their churches and their books. Possibly a hearer of John in his extreme old age may have subsequently passed through this change from a narrower to a broader Christianity, and clothed in this new form some cherished traditions which he had derived from his venerated master. One would not willingly relinquish the belief, that those beautiful discourses of Christ which follow the farewell supper in the fourth Gospel, do indeed contain the essence of recollections which the beloved disciple, ere he passed away, imparted to his own hearers, and which one of their number, catching the spirit of these divine traditions, but ignorant or regardless of historical details, has expressed in the mode in which they had wrought themselves out into the deepest convictions of his own soul, and under the form in which they had most vividly realized themselves to his own conception. Certain it is, that many ideas and beliefs which come to us more or less under a Jewish aspect, concrete and sensuous, in the three first Gospels, have undergone a marked spiritual metamorphosis, and passed into a higher and mystical region of thought in the fourth. Christ himself is here presented under a new form. He is an incarnation of the Divine Word; and this more elevated conception of his nature dominates the whole narrative, and seems to have determined the selection of the incidents of which it is composed. Union of life, through a new spiritual birth, with this incarnate Word is the condition of escape from the judgment impending over a guilty world, and is called a transition from life to death. The grand, final conflict between the powers of good and evil is the *κρίσις* through which the world must pass, in the completion of the divine purposes. For the Palestinian notion of the Messianic kingdom, with its solemn imagery of a trial and a judgment, we have here substituted the simpler idea of "eternal life." The "last judgment" is partially stripped of its objective character, and described rather as something which is to take place within the mind itself. The distinction between the present and the future age, so strongly marked in the first three Gospels, almost disappears in John, where the approaching crisis is simply designated "the last day." There is a wide interval between these two types of

religious thought ; and no theory will satisfactorily explain the phenomena before us which does not allow sufficient time for the development of the later.

Acts.—Of the authorship and design of the book of Acts I have already stated what I think, in speaking of the Gospel of Luke. It is a strong expression of the Pauline spirit ; and in describing the ministry of the great Apostle of the Gentiles, it is evidently animated by a conciliatory purpose, and aims at placing the whole of his career in the most amicable relations with the leaders of the Judaic church who had preceded him in preaching the gospel, and who, there can be little doubt, from divers significant hints in the history and in his own letters, looked with some coldness and jealousy, at least at first, on the broader and bolder sense in which he understood and applied it.

Paul.—I now proceed to Paul. Of the larger and more important letters of this apostle, the authenticity is more clearly established than that of any other portion of the New Testament. The date and occasion of his Epistles to the Thessalonians, the Galatians, the Corinthians and the Romans, may be determined within a few years almost to certainty. They were all written in the most active period of his life, when he was engaged in hot controversy with the Judaizing zealots whom he encountered during his missionary journeys through Asia Minor and Greece, some time in the interval between 50 A.D. and 57 A.D. They bear on their surface the most distinct traces of the time which produced them—in the commencement of the conflict between the Judaic and Pauline tendencies of the primitive church, which shook it to its very foundations. There is no compromise in the apostle's mode of dealing with this great question. He asserts in the most unqualified terms the entire abrogation of the old law, as the exclusive means of salvation, by a broader and nobler dispensation which had its source in the risen and glorified Christ ; that Jew and Gentile stood on precisely the same footing before God, and could only be qualified for the Messianic reign or approaching kingdom of heaven, by the infusion into their nature of a new spiritual principle, which he calls "justification by faith," i.e. the sympathy and concurrence of their whole moral being—will, affection, aspiration and endeavour—with the ideal of a perfect righteousness, the

perfect union of God and man, in Christ. The apostle's soul, in these his earlier letters, is so absorbed in this one great controversy, that he has no time for other questions, and has therefore left several points of Christian belief in a somewhat vague and indeterminate state. For instance, though he clearly held, with all his contemporaries, that the end of all things was at hand, he has nowhere, except in the most general terms, as in the truly sublime conclusion of 1 Cor. xv., given us his own clear impression of the way in which that last crisis would come, and of the mode in which it would operate on the souls of men. We can less clearly realize to ourselves his peculiar view, than we can the grand universal assize of Matthew, and the "eternal life" of John. We might also say, that his mind seems to be in a kind of transition from one conception of the subject to another. The Epistles to Colossians, Philemon, Ephesians and Philippians, I put into a second class, because it is not so easy to fix their date as that of those just mentioned. They were evidently written during some captivity. But what captivity? That of Cæsarea or that of Rome? For reasons which I cannot here specify, I am inclined to refer them to the two years' captivity at Cæsarea, which fell somewhere between the years 57 A.D. and 60 A.D. Perhaps Philippians was written at Rome. From a certain change discernible in these later Epistles, from the introduction of one or two new forms of expression, and from allusion to controversies which seem to imply a more advanced stage of the Church's controversy with heretics, some modern critics have drawn an inference unfavourable to their authenticity. I could never myself feel the force of their objections. The controversies which Paul himself had raised must have given immense impulse to speculation. His own mind, in its contact with men of various opinions in the great centres of Hellenic cultivation and intelligence, cannot have remained stationary, but probably underwent development; and with the adoption of new ideas, he would require new terms to express them. During the enforced seclusion of his two years' imprisonment at Cæsarea, there would be time for these changes to work out their full effect; and the same circumstance will sufficiently account for the more generalized and speculative tone of exhortation pervading these later Epistles—

viewed by some as a presumption against their authenticity—by which they are distinguished from the sharp, pointed and business-like style of the earlier letters, thrown off, as we know they were, amidst the turmoil and excitement of actual contact with the world. It is in these later Epistles—Colossians, Ephesians and Philippians—that we discern for the first time in the writings of Paul perceptible traces of an approach to the Johannine conception of the person of Christ. To such expressions as, “in him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily”—that “by him all things were created in heaven and in earth,” and that “he is before all things, and in him all consist”—that “being in the form of God, he deemed it no assumption to put himself on an equality with God, but emptied himself and took the form of a servant”—to expressions such as these we find nothing exactly parallel in the larger and older Epistles of Paul, though they exhibit an undeniable affinity with the characteristic doctrine of the fourth Gospel, especially where it is most distinctly expressed in the proem. I feel more doubt about the three Pastoral Epistles, as they are called—those to Timothy and Titus—because I can find no place for them within the ministry of Paul, except on the supposition (which is the ground taken by Paley in his *Horæ Paulinæ*) that the apostle underwent a second imprisonment after his first, which is not only in itself improbable, but is wholly destitute of support from external evidence. In fact, the supposition would never have been made but for the difficulty created by these three Epistles. The style of these Epistles is not only distinguished, like the letters last mentioned, by a few peculiar words here and there, but is in its very grain and substance altogether different from the characteristic type of Pauline expression. De Wette has collected a long list of words that occur nowhere but in these Epistles. Moreover, they imply a more developed state of church discipline and organization than we should infer from the book of Acts and the undoubted writings of Paul. Here first, and perhaps in one passage of Philippians (i. 1), do we meet with a clear recognition of the three orders of bishops, priests and deacons. If they are Paul’s, they must belong to the latest period of his life, when the church had assumed a form of which we find no traces in his earlier ministry. Whether directly from the hand of Paul or not

(the mere occurrence of his name in the address will prove nothing to those who are at all acquainted with the literary history of those times), they reflect the spirit of his teaching in a very beautiful form, and furnish instructive evidence of the later growth of the good seed which he early scattered in the church.

Hebrews.—Of that remarkable Epistle to the Hebrews, I have only left myself time to say, that from evidence internal and external, which I cannot here produce, I am convinced it is not from the hand of the apostle Paul. The style and the reasoning are wholly unlike his. It reflects the spirit of the Alexandrine theology, and is a striking and eloquent application to Christianity of the allegorical mode of interpreting the Old Testament, which was carried to such a pitch of refinement in that school. It takes a view of the person of Christ quite as elevated as the Gospel of John, though conceived under a different form. He is the great High-priest of the universe, whose functions and office were anterior to those of Moses, and whose one all-sufficient oblation has superseded all other sacrifices, and opened the gates of heaven to all believers. If there be any name mentioned in the New Testament which suggests a probable author for this Epistle, it must be that of Apollos.—Of the Epistles called Catholic (exclusive of the three bearing the name of John, which to me carry internal signs of coming from the author of the fourth Gospel), while I think they may be accepted as a reliable exposition of the principles of the apostles whose names they bear,—James, whose address to the dispersion has a close affinity in spirit with the practical portions of Matthew's Gospel, and Peter, whose relations with Paul are not obscurely indicated in the second Epistle under his name,—yet I must confess to sharing largely in the doubts of the ancient church respecting their proper authenticity.

Apocalypse.—I come now to the last book in the New Testament, the Apocalypse or Revelation. Rightly interpreted, this is a very interesting and instructive book, full of a wild, grand poetry—which represents in most vivid and striking colours what was the predominant, probably at first the universal, belief of the Jewish section of the Christian church respecting the second advent of Christ (then immediately expected) and his reign of a thousand years with

the saints on earth, followed by a general resurrection of the just and the unjust, and the final, everlasting separation of heaven and hell. It is conceived in the spirit of the book of Daniel and other apocalyptic writings before the Christian era—adopts their imagery, develops their fundamental idea, and applies it to the existing state of the church, about, as I believe, or a little before, the destruction of Jerusalem. It contemplates the approaching fall both of the Jewish hierarchy and of Roman heathendom—the two great hindrances to the spread of the gospel and the triumph of the kingdom of God. My own persuasion is, that the most obvious interpretation of vv. 10, 11 of ch. xvii. fixes the composition of this book to the reign of Galba, 68 A.D., and connects it with the strange delusion, which we learn from Suetonius and Tacitus had at that time taken possession of numbers of the lower class of Roman citizens, that Nero, who had been recently assassinated, would shortly re-appear at the head of a conquering army from the East; and that it is, therefore, next to the Epistles of Paul, the oldest book in the New Testament. It uses very elevated language of Christ, as “the Lamb that had been slain from the foundation of the world” and “stood in the midst of the throne of God;” but I cannot find any clear indication of his pre-existence, and he is throughout, in a manner the most marked and decided, kept subordinate to God himself. A predominant idea is the redeeming and restorative efficacy of the blood of the Lamb, in which men are washed clean from their sins, and clothed with the holiness of saints. The usages of the Lord’s Supper, which was a constant element in the worship of the early Christians, seem to have influenced its language. The rejoicing in the completed kingdom of God is symbolized under the image of a bridal feast at the marriage of the Lamb and the Church. It is another form of the idea of Paul: “Christ our Passover is sacrificed for us.” The Synoptics also have something similar, when they represent Christ as saying at the Last Supper, “I will not henceforth drink of this fruit of the vine, till I drink it new with you in my Father’s kingdom.” The characteristic doctrine of this book, Christ’s reign of a thousand years on earth, passed, under the name of Chiliasm, into the class of heretical opinions, as the Catholic system developed itself. It was so regarded by Eusebius at the

beginning of the fourth century ; yet Lactantius, his contemporary and a tutor in the family of the emperor Constantine, still clung to it. Several of the early Fathers embraced the same doctrine, amongst them Justin Martyr and Irenæus. This millenarian dream seems to have had, in all ages, a wonderful attraction for minds of a certain cast. They yearn for something concrete and definite, to realize their dim vision of futurity. Hence, notwithstanding repeated disappointments, the belief still retains its vitality, and springs up again in some new form, even to the present day. No book has furnished the subject of so many theoretical constructions of the divine order of the world as this. All these systems rest on a common fallacy, that the book relates to their own age, and the future immediately succeeding it, instead of being simply, what an unbiassed criticism will shew that it is, a vivid reflection of the popular belief which produced it—applied exclusively, without a thought beyond, to the events and persons of the time in which it was written.

In this first lecture—as a foundation for what I shall have to say hereafter—I have been obliged to exhibit, and in the briefest possible form, what I believe to be the ascertained results of criticism, as to the date, authorship and design of the several books of the New Testament. In the second, being already furnished with these results, I shall take a broader view of the whole subject, and endeavour to shew, that this idea of the co-existence of different doctrinal views within the limits of the New Testament, together with the admission of a progressive development of them in the order of time, is not only a conclusion forced on us by undeniable facts, but, rightly apprehended, a great help to the true interpretation of Christianity itself—a sure means of substituting its living spirit, its transforming power on the heart and life, for the barren controversies and the interminable war of words which have now for three centuries been the bane and the scandal of Protestantism.

JOHN JAMES TAYLER.

II.—AURICULAR CONFESSION IN THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND.

Tracts for the Day. 1 vol. 8vo. London: Longmans. 1868.

A Help to Repentance. By the Rev. Vernon Hutton. 4th Thousand. London: Longmans.

Pardon through the Precious Blood, or the Benefit of Absolution. Edited by a Committee of Clergy. 22nd Thousand. London: Palmer. 1870.

The Doctrine of Absolution in the Church of England. By a Lay Parishioner of Swinton. Nottingham: Derry. 1870.

The Ordinance of Confession. By William Gresley. 2nd Edition. Masters. 1852.

The Church and the World. Edited by Rev. Orby Shipley. Article, "Thirty Years in the English Church." 1st Series. Longmans. 1866.

The Church and the World. Article VII., "Private Confession and Absolution." 1867.

CERTAIN well-known coarse attempts to "unmask" the Confessional, seem to have effected a purpose very remote from that which their originators can have designed. By fixing the public mind on gross abuses, which no one seriously apprehends to see revived in the hands of English clergymen, attention has been diverted from the real point at issue, namely, the moral or immoral, spiritual or unspiritual, tendency of the practice of Auricular Confession under ordinary and favourable circumstances. In the following pages, I propose to leave aside altogether any consideration of the evils *accidental* to the practice, and to pass no judgment on the narratives rife through Southern Europe, concerning "Priests, Women and Families." I shall attempt to study as candidly as possible the *inherent* moral character of such an act as regular Confession to a priest, and draw such conclusions as may seem warranted regarding the attitude to be observed towards the present revival of the practice. That the inquiry is not untimely may be judged by any one who will take the trouble to

inform himself of what the whole High-church party are now doing in this matter, and to what extent all over the country they are raising a claim to receive the confessions of their flocks as a regular portion of their office.

In a world in which Sin occupies the place it holds to-day on our planet, it would seem rather superfluous to protest against the use of any method which aims at its repression. The evils within and around us are quite great enough to occupy all our energies, without turning our hand against those who are honestly contending against them also, even if they employ tactics which we deem ill-advised and inopportune. "Let us leave these High-churchmen," we are inclined to say, "to make what efforts they please to stem the flood of vice in our great cities. If we do not augur much success for their attempt, at least we honour their zeal, and are fully persuaded that to do anything is better than to do nothing." Such first impressions are even in a certain way deepened if we chance to read the manuals of penitence prepared by our English Father-Confessors, such as those quoted at the head of this article. The serious tone of these books, free from taint of cant, and the exalted standard of morality in word and deed obviously accepted by their authors, claim the highest respect; nor can any reader doubt that it is real sin, not mere ecclesiastical error, which is attacked, and real goodness, not mere sheep-like obedience, which is inculcated.

But whatever be the good intentions, the honesty and the zeal, of the modern revivers of the Confessional in our churches, the question is not altered: Is the practice of Auricular Confession to a priest spiritually or morally expedient? Are its natural results strengthening or weakening to the mind? Must it make a man feel more deeply the burden of his sins, or teach him to cast them off on the shoulders of another? Will it (for this is the crucial question of all) will it bring the sinful soul nearer, in the deep solitudes of the spiritual world, to the One only Source of purity and restoration, and help it to look straight up into the face of God; or will it, on the contrary, thrust a priest always between man and his Maker to intercept even the embrace of the returning Prodigal in his Father's arms?

In the endeavour to find the solution of these questions, it will of course be necessary to leave considerable margin

for differences of moral condition such as exist at all times in a given population—a margin which ought to be still further enlarged when we include in our survey a long period of history and the inhabitants of both barbarous and civilized lands. The practice of which the benefits may outweigh its disadvantages, or which may have few disadvantages at all, when applied to a child or a savage, to lawless mediæval barons or brutish serfs, may do indefinitely more harm than good when used by full-grown and educated people in the nineteenth century. Our object in the present paper being a practical one, we shall limit our scope to the class and nation which the revival of Auricular Confession in England alone concerns, and ask: How is it likely to affect English men and women from the age of confirmation to the end of life, and from the highest social and intellectual rank down to that level of poverty and stupidity against which the waves of clerical zeal break for ever in vain? We must assume average intelligence, average religious feeling, and, especially, average moral condition. The old Church of England principle, that men burdened with any “grievous crime” should seek relief from confession to “any discreet and learned minister of God’s word,” is one whose wisdom we are not at all inclined to dispute; and it is only with the extension of this reasonable rule from the exceptional to the general and universal, that we are now concerned. An elaborate defence of such extension may be seen in one of the books at the head of this article;* but, when it was published, twenty years ago, English High-churchmen had not gone by any means so far in their inculcation of Confession as they do at present; and Mr. Gresley was ready to admit that “in foreign churches where Confession is compulsory and periodical, there is danger of formality” (p. 135); and that women may be led to rely too much on their priests (p. 137), even while he set forth the innumerable reasons why people should renew their confessions and seek “ghostly counsel” again and again. More recent manuals (among which “*Pardon through the Precious Blood*,” edited by a Committee of Clergymen, appears to be most authoritative) take it seemingly for granted that every one needs Confession

* The Ordinance of Confession, by Rev. William Gresley.

as much as they need the perpetual pardon of God ; and the forms recommended for use always refer to the "last Confession," as if the Anglican, like the Romish penitent, made it, as a matter of course, a regular practice. The religious life seems understood by these teachers to commence normally only by a General Confession, just as an Evangelical believes it to commence by "Conversion." The vivid sense of sinfulness (which is the one natural fact of the case) must, as they hold it, rigorously take the shape of Auricular Confession to make it available. "Mere" private contrition of heart and amendment of life, they treat as wholly unsatisfactory and incomplete, carrying with them no promise of Divine pardon. Not to speak disrespectfully, they practically affirm that a man must repent *en règle*—confess to a priest, do penance, and be absolved—or his repentance will still need to be repented of. Thus Confession has ceased to be an exceptional action, and has become the regular practice of a religious life. It is not to be applied as a specific remedy in cases of acute disease. It is to be used like a daily ablution, as the proper means of purification and health.

Putting aside, then, cases of offenders who have committed crimes, such as murder or robbery, rendering them amenable to the laws of their country,—cases in which not auricular but public confession ought to be practised,—we shall suppose the instance of a person of ordinary character and circumstances in the condition of mind desired by the preachers of Confession. He is sensible of his sinfulness, and (a point to which we shall hereafter refer) very much terrified by fear of hell-fire. His pastors instruct him that his private penitence, whatever may be its intensity, affords no sort of security that the benefits of the "Precious Blood" shall be applied to his particular soul, and that to obtain such security he must confess to a priest who has received at his ordination the commission, "Whose sins thou dost forgive, they are forgiven ; and whose sins thou dost retain, they are retained." Goaded by remorse and terror, he is taught further to lash his feelings to excitement by such representations as these : "Look at His sacred body nailed to the cross ; see His flesh torn and mangled, dripping with blood ; this is the work of thy sins. Thy sins have opened His wounds and made them bleed

afresh ; they have torn wider the rents in His hands and feet.”* Finally, he makes up his mind to come to confession and (as he is assured) become “clean” and safe. What are the moral and spiritual results likely to follow such an act?

In the first place, the long and close self-examination which is ordered as a preliminary, may, when first practised by a hitherto thoughtless person, very probably open quite a new view of a man’s own character. In some special cases, it may perhaps even do the invaluable service of teaching a self-satisfied Pharisee that he ought to put himself in the place of the Publican. Some festering secrets of souls may be healed simply by being brought to light, and spectres dissolved into air by being fairly faced. Long cherished hatred may be tracked to its root, and a selfish life looked at for once as a whole in its proper colours. All these good results, we freely admit, may follow from the self-examination which is required before Confession, and which (it may be added) has formed a recognized portion of all *metanoia*, from the days of Pythagoras and David to our own. But how of the Confession itself? What good or harm is to be done to such a mind as we have supposed, by the process of kneeling down in a vestry before a clergyman, making the sign of the cross, and then for about a quarter of an hour (or, in some cases, for five or six hours) going over the events of life *seriatim*: “I accuse myself of” this falsehood, that unkindness, and so on? If the individual be so ignorant of morals as not to know what is sinful and what is innocent, it must be a great benefit to him to receive instruction from his Confessor, provided always that he is—what priests unfortunately, by some twist of mental conformation, seem very rarely to be—a sound and healthy moralist. In such a case, the Confessional may obviously be a useful school of ethics. But it is surely no small disgrace to our spiritual guides if it should be needed as such, and if their flocks have been so little instructed in the principles of uprightness and charity, as not to know beforehand what is right and what is wrong, and to require to wait till they have sinned, to know what is sinful.

* The Precious Blood, p. 20.

That the fear of having hereafter to confess a sin may sometimes possibly keep a man from committing it, is another argument for the usefulness of the Confessional as a moral agent, on which we need not enlarge. Such a motive would, of course, have no ethical value, and as to its deterrent force, may plausibly be balanced against the encouragement (found undoubtedly by Romish criminals, bandits, &c., and possibly, therefore, also by Anglicans) in the assurance of pardon, obtainable at any moment, by priestly absolution. When we have descended to so low a level of motive in the one case, we are called on to do the like in the other.

Lastly, there is a very great and important result of the practice of Confession, which to some of its upholders doubtless appears among its chief advantages, but which I must be excused for classing altogether in another category, namely, the enormous influence given thereby to the priesthood over the minds of their flocks. To treat fully of this matter, and to trace the share of her confessors in building up the vast edifice of the authority of the Church of Rome, would need not a few paragraphs in an article, but several volumes. That the influence of the clergy of the Church of England would ever be as evil as that of their brethren of the Church of Rome, I am far from believing; but with the warning of all history before our eyes, he must be a bold man indeed who should desire to place in the hands of any priesthood on earth a power whose most partial misuse means ecclesiastical despotism, and the mental and moral slavery of all the weaker minds of the community.

Turning now to the disadvantages of the practice of Confession, we may observe three points in particular:

1. The fostering of a materialistic and mechanical view of religion.

2. The enervation of the moral constitution.

3. The desecration of the inner spiritual life by the exposure to a priest of the most sacred recesses of the penitent soul.

1. In nearly every essay and manual on the subject of Confession, the practice is recommended as indispensable to give *reality* to repentance. So long as a man's feelings of contrition are hid in his own bosom, or only poured out in prayer

to God in his chamber, of what avail (it is asked) are they? "To look calmly," says the author of the essay on the *Seven Sacraments* in the *Tracts for the Day* (p. 59), "at the cry, 'Go direct to Christ,' what does it mean? . . . The Protestant directs the penitent to rely wholly and entirely on his own internal feelings; he is not to go out of himself for pardon and grace. From the beginning to the end of the operation, it is something worked out in the mind and heart of the sinner. . . . How different is the faith of the Catholic Church and the practice of the Catholic penitent!" Very different indeed, we may truly echo, since this is as good an illustration as could be chosen of the difference between spiritual and sacerdotal religion. An operation, even the blessed operation of penitence and restoration, is of no value, it seems, in Catholic eyes, if it be merely "worked out in the mind and heart of the sinner." A mere change of mind and heart, from the love of sin to the love of God,—the alpha and omega of religion,—the change for whose accomplishment in the inner man some sanguine Protestants imagine all Catholic machinery to be honestly, though clumsily, designed,—this greatest of all spiritual events, over which Christ thought that angels rejoice in heaven, is, after all, we are told, most unsatisfactory and incomplete, if it be not accompanied by spoken confession to a priest, penance of outward act, and the receipt of duly authorized priestly absolution. A man who only prays in the chamber where Christ told him to pray, does not "go out of himself." It is not "going out of" oneself to pray alone. *That*, we presume, is a mere subjective phenomenon, liable, as the author presently points out, to land us in grievous error. To "go out of" oneself, it is necessary to do a great deal more (at least in priestly view) than only to rise up from the swine's husks in the "far country" and return to the Father's feet. It is necessary to speak to a man—a real, tangible, audible man—not merely to the unseen and silent Spirit. Speaking to God is not properly a real act; and as for listening to His whispers in the soul of reproof or pardon, it is the most dangerous thing in the world. We must speak to the priest, and hear from the priest that we are absolved, and then we may *know* we have repented and are "safe." All other knowledge, whether of the sincerity of our contrition or of the renewal of communion

which God has granted to us, is to be taken as mere illusion, or at best as wholly unreliable. We have not "gone out of ourselves" from first to last. Is it too much to say that this is the true, if not the only infidelity, even the distrust of spiritual and the reliance on physical facts, displayed in dealing with the very crisis of the soul's history?

The same observations apply to the subjects of Penance and Absolution, in which the sense of Repentance is assumed by the same teachers to be visionary till it has done something else beside undoing as far as may be the evil repented of; and the sense of Restoration is disallowed till a form of words has been pronounced over the penitent by the priest.

Again, the usual practice of allotting for penance the repetition of certain prayers, in the Anglican as in the Roman Catholic Church, goes a little further in the direction of the mechanical and the profane. Contemplating such a portent as a clergyman ordering, and his penitent performing, such an act as that of prayer to the Father in heaven as a *punishment*, or (as one of our manuals describes it, as an improvement on this notion) as a "token of obedience to the Church," we are tempted to ask, Do either confessor or penitent know what Prayer means? Do they, who use it, as we know, with so much constancy and reverence in their perpetual services, do they understand that it is something more than a *funzione*, as the Italians say—that it may be life's greatest joy, humanity's highest glory? It cannot be but that such devoted men must know it. How, then, can they endure to make of it a "penance"? Are children punished by sending them to their parents' arms, or made to "shew obedience" to the nurse by seeking their father's face?

Again, the notion of Sin itself is by these Anglicans strangely materialized. They manifestly hold very high and pure conceptions of right and wrong acts and sentiments; but the reasons why the sinner is to regret and abhor his sins are set forth in a way to lead us to imagine that the hatefulness of bad deeds and feelings, and the loss by the sinful soul of that divine light below whose plane it has fallen, are not by any means the sole or worst evils involved. The two great evils, on the contrary, seem to be,

first, that if the soul leaves the body in a state of sin, "it will be driven away from God, and be plunged into a place of darkness and misery for ever;" and, secondly, that the sinner's offences have had a part in causing the sufferings of Christ. "By thine uncleanness," the penitent is advised to say to his soul, "thou hast scourged his body with the most painful stripes. Thy sins have torn wider the rents in his hands and feet. Thou hast had no mercy on his adorable body," &c.* Thus, as usual in the orthodox system, a man's mind is forcibly diverted from his own moral guilt, to vivid images of Christ's physical sufferings, which (even supposing them to have had a mysterious antedated connection with his sins) were certainly not *intended* by him to be aggravated, and therefore are not properly the subjects of his genuine contrition. Having really maliciously injured his neighbour A, or been too selfish to help B, he is advised not to think about his behaviour or feelings towards A or B, but to goad himself to tortures of remorse for having hurt C, who died long before he was born, and who he believes now reigns the King of Paradise; while instead of writhing under the load of his present shame and guilt, he is urged to ponder on the two dangers of exposure at the day of judgment, and of the punishment of his sins in eternity. Always, it is the material consequence to himself or his Saviour, not his own moral guilt, which is insisted upon.

The conception of Sin as a series of definite wrong acts which can be catalogued and rehearsed, rather than as an evil state of the heart which God alone can fully know, is another instance of materialism. Unless in the case of heinous offences, it would seem as if the idea of a general confession of misdoings and omissions were, to an enlightened conscience, something almost absurd. The thing to be confessed above all—the only thing, in fact, which very much concerns us—is just what such a catalogue must omit. Many a man presenting a long list of actual sins to his confessor might obviously be immeasurably better than one who could hardly tax himself with the omission of a single tithe-giving of mint, anise or cummin, but whose heart and will had swerved from God altogether.

* The Precious Blood, p. 20. N.B. This little book is bound in crimson, and is altogether as sensational as typography and literary dress can make it.

Finally, as regards this department of our subject, it ought to be carefully weighed what meaning is attached to the assurance, tendered to the penitent, that he is (in capital letters) "CLEAN NOW." The desire that our sins *should never have been committed*, is of course the very first sentiment of natural repentance; but this being a matter which even God cannot change, no man, it is to be presumed, thinks of asking for it. Again, the desire that God should purify all that is evil in us now, should "give us a clean heart and renew a right spirit within us," is the supreme prayer of every contrite soul; but it is one whose response must come, if it come at all, in a spiritual fact about which we alone may have cognizance, and concerning which a priest's assurance must necessarily go for nothing. If a man find his spirit really "renewed," filled with hatred of the sin he cherished, and of love to God and goodness, it is of the smallest possible consequence to him whether anybody tell him or not that such is the case. On the other hand, if he feel his heart still full of evil passions, it is a ghastly mockery to tell him he is "clean," in any sense such as that which we are now considering. There remains, then, only for the word, as employed in the manuals of confessors, the old sense in which it was used by Hebrews and Brahmins, Romans and Aztecs, the sense of a magical removal of guilt, attainable, as was supposed, by some vicarious sacrifice, a scape-goat, a Soma sacrifice, a taurobolia, a human victim, or, finally, as in the orthodox Christian view, by "the atoning blood of Christ." This is not the place to criticise this stupendous figment of the human brain; and to most readers of the *Theological Review* it would doubtless be superfluous to point out how radically materialistic are those conceptions of guilt which admit of supposing it transferred, like a pecuniary debt, from one man to another, or to an animal or a Deity; and of weighing in scales as counterpoises things so disparate as moral evil and physical blood. But before quitting the topic of the materialism of High-church theology, we must record the remark, that even here, in the very heart and centre of its theory of Repentance, appears as the leading idea, *not* the ineffable yearning of the soul for spiritual re-union, but something wholly different; the attainment of a magical purification, which, so far as it can be given a definite sense,

seems to imply only exoneration from punishment and the threatened exposure "before men and angels" at the day of Judgment.

Whether such anxiety for escape from punishment be, or be not, a proper feature of genuine penitence, is a question which has been much obscured by the intrusion of the monstrous doctrine of Eternal Perdition into the natural view of the subject. No amount of religion or virtue could enable a man willingly to renounce religion and virtue to all eternity; and therefore, so long as any one believes that his sins may incur everlasting banishment from God, he is compelled to crave eagerly for the remission of their punishment. But the moment this threat is removed, the case is altered. Genuine contrition occupies itself very little about the suffering which we may have entailed on ourselves by sin; nay, in cases of poignant self-reproach and remorse, the prospect of such suffering is undoubtedly far from unwelcome, but rather a relief. That "justice should be done," even though we lie prostrate beneath it, is the noblest sentiment of the repentant soul; the one by which it most surely re-assumes its filial relationship to the Lord of Justice. To encourage an opposite frame of mind, and inspire urgent desire for escape from punishment, with recourse to such a method as priestly absolution for avoiding it, is assuredly very far from an elevating system of religious training. The slave shrinks from the lash. The son cries, "Punish me, for I have deserved punishment. Only receive me again. *That is all I desire.*"

A very marked distinction has existed at all times between the two kinds of sacrifices, those which were intended for a propitiation and vicarious satisfaction for sin, and those which were meant as expressions of love and devotion, and of the inner sense of the rightfulness that all man is and has should be given to God. The Anglican clergy, like the extreme Evangelicals, insist on treating the death of Christ in the former light, and outrun them in making the Eucharist a magical appropriation of that event—a "feeding on a sacrifice." But the Anglicans alone of the two parties in the National Church have attempted to restore, not only the vicarious, but the devotional type of sacrifice, and by their whole scheme of an ornate cultus and perpetual services and ceremonies, to renew in our

century the formalism of an earlier age. Not wholly without tenderness can we view this movement, judging it in a great measure to be the result of a fervent longing to retain a grasp of religion amid the gathering clouds of doubt—a grasp unhappily fastened, not on its realities, but on its mere vesture and dress. But it is none the less a sad, a deplorable spectacle. The original idea of such sacrifice of formal devotion as we are speaking of, may be compared to a child's delight in bringing home to his mother the weeds and pebbles with which he has been himself delighted in his daily walk. The mother accepts them lovingly as tokens of her child's love; and the child brings them again and again, and soon makes a habit, well nigh sacred, of giving them to her continually. At last it dawns on his mind that she cannot possibly really care for them; that they are of no value to her; and that she has only accepted them because she has understood that he meant them as offerings of affection. What now is he to do? Is he to go on giving his mother the weeds and pebbles still? He has nothing else to give, and his heart yearns to give something, and the habit has become so fixed that there seems a want of filial affection in discontinuing it. Very probably, then, he maintains the practice for a time; but it is obvious that the original purpose is lost, the beauty of the action gone. If he persist long in keeping up the dry and now unmeaning custom, a mechanical spirit inevitably creeps over his performance of it, and all his relations with his parent become falsified and distorted. At last, one day she says to him, "Bring no more vain oblations. My son, give me thine heart. Shew thy love to me, not in gifts which I heed not, but in serving my other children, thy brothers." If he hears this warning and still persists in presenting his paltry childish offerings, what hope is there for him? How is he ever to enter into true relations with his mother?

Surely the whole history of sacerdotal religion is wrapped up in this simple parable—save in one point only. The priest-taught child does not bring his own weeds and pebbles to his mother. He gives them to his tutor to offer to her at secondhand.

2. The second grave objection to the use of Confession, except in cases of extraordinary guilt, is that it must inevitably tend to enervate the moral constitution. To acquire the

habit of running to a priest whenever we feel penitent, or desire to strengthen our good resolutions, or, in fact, are passing through any of the deeper phases of the inner life, when God's spirit is striving with ours, can surely have no other result than to make us weaker and less able to walk alone with God every year of our lives. The conscience, which is itself to be brought to another bar, is no longer the supreme Judge within us. The little seed of good which is fructifying in the depth of our hearts, may only too probably be killed by exposure. The more able and powerful may be our Confessor, the more certain is it that he must shortly assume in our minds a place of authority which will leave us small remnant of self-reliance in matters wherein our judgment may differ from his as to the rectitude of an action; and if we reach the point of blindly accepting his *ipse dixit* in cases of duty against our own conscience, where are we, but in the net of the Jesuit's "obedience"? Of course, as in every other history of the struggle between Authority and Freedom, there are endless fine things to be said of the invaluable use of authority in keeping foolish and ignorant people straight, and of the terrible consequences of freedom to anybody short of a sage and a saint. Still, if we have read aright the great purpose for which God has made us, and are not mistaken in supposing that He sees it best to permit all the evil and misery which arise from moral freedom, sooner than leave us without it, we may reasonably demur to the stride which priests would take in curtailing that liberty, were we to allow them to be once more the guardians of the consciences of the nations. Even if the ethics taught by any "Catholic" priesthood were uniformly pure and high, if vile casuistry were a thing unknown in their books, if Catholic nations and individuals trained by the Confessional obviously held the clearest ideas of truth and uprightness, if ecclesiastical behaviour never betrayed signs of shuffling or crooked-mindedness, even if all these things were so, we should still gravely object to permitting the Anglican clergy, or any other order of clergy in the world, to assume the sway over men's consciences obtained by the practice of Auricular Confession. As things actually are, it would seem to us one of the most grievous dangers to public morality to entrust them with such power for a generation, even though

we fully appreciate the lofty morality of their present instructions.

In this, as in every other of the High-church restorations of Romish practices, we find ourselves drawn into discussing as a novelty that which in truth has been an experiment tried on an enormous scale for many centuries, and of which there is no real need to speak save by rehearsing the obvious results. Which are the people of Europe whose characters are most straightforward and manly, who care most for public justice, and whose word is most generally accepted by friends and foes as trustworthy? Is it the nations who have enjoyed all the supposed moral benefits of Auricular Confession from the Dark Ages till to-day,—the Spaniards, the Greeks, the Neapolitans, the Irish? Or does it chance that even in those Catholic countries an English or American heretic, the descendant of a dozen generations of unconfessing heretics, is believed on his word and trusted more readily than a native? How is it that M. Taine (with every wise Frenchman) points with envy and admiration to the public spirit and love of justice which, as he says, “support England on a million columns”? How is it that we are not learning public and private virtue from the priest-led nations of Europe, if the Confessional be the true school of goodness? How is it that the ages when it reigned supreme and unquestioned, were worse ages than any the world has since beheld? How is it that we are growing a little more humane, a little more truthful, a little more sober, as the generations bear us further from the last days even of Protestant Confession; while the comparison of English domestic morality with that of Southern Europe, and of English charities with those of any other land, shew that even as regards the virtues which the Confessional is supposed expressly to guard and to inculcate, we are no whit the worse for its disuse?*

* In connection with this subject it may be remarked, that the Fathers of the Reformation were all brought up on the Catholic system and never got beyond Catholic ethics. If some of their actions lend a shade of colour to Dr. Littledale's insolent application to them of his term of “scoundrel martyrs,” he may look to “the hole of the pit whence they were digged,” or rather whence they partially lifted themselves heavenward, for their exculpation. Strange to say, the only Protestant community which has hitherto adopted on a large scale the practice of Confession, presents some curious

3. Lastly, we have to consider among the objections to the revival of the practice of Confession, the desecrating influence on the spiritual life involved in the exposure of the recesses of the soul. The manual already quoted* says that penitents have two objections to Confession. One is, that they are afraid the clergyman will betray their secrets—an idle fear. The other is, that they are ashamed—a sentiment which ought to be conquered, because “sin not forgiven now will be proclaimed to our endless shame hereafter, before men and devils, holy angels and God Himself.” Our inquiry is whether this latter sentiment be wholly a bad one, which a man will be permanently the better for disregarding and trampling on? This is a very important point in the whole subject we are considering; and to do it justice we must pause an instant to define what is the nature of the shame in question.

There is, first, the kind of shame which consists in the pain of exposure, the sense that we are fallen in the esteem of the person who learns our guilt, and perhaps have become the object of his contempt. To those in whom the sentiment which phrenologists style Love of Approbation is strongly developed, shame of this sort is torture; and to all, save the most hardened, it is probably one of the bitterest drops in the cup of life. Now it is clear that it is this common kind of shame which the advocates of Confession have in their mind as the chief obstacle to the practice, because they constantly insist that the sinner had better make up his mind to compound for the shame of telling his sin to his priest, because “sin not forgiven now will be proclaimed to our endless shame hereafter, before men and devils, holy angels and God Himself.”† (How anything is to be proclaimed before God hereafter, which by implication

features of resemblance to Catholic characteristics—features which must needs be moulded by the practice in question, since in all doctrinal matters the Methodist and the Papist represent the opposite poles of Christian theology. Both Romanist and Methodist, however, accepts it as a part of the discipline of his Church to lay open at stated intervals the state of his conscience, in the one case to his priest, and in the other to his classmates. And both Romanist and Methodist are distinguished among the members of Christian churches by a type of character, in which the theological virtues are apt painfully to overbalance the secular, and sanctity itself seems not altogether divorced from qualities of slyness and astuteness from which old English Church piety is utterly free.

* Pardon through the Precious Blood.

† Ibid., p. 15.

must be concealed from Him now, we cannot stop to consider.) Thus Confession is represented rather in the light of a security for secrecy, than, as some liberal writers have more charitably supposed it, an outburst of honesty. It is recommended as a wise plan for confining to the ear of a single clergyman secrets which, if not so judiciously guarded, will infallibly be published hereafter to the sound of the Last Trumpet. *Some* shame and exposure the sinner is assured he must needs endure. Who would not seize the opportunity of limiting the disgrace to a single auditor, rather than incur the terrible penalty of being pilloried before the assembled universe—which of course will have nothing better to do than to stand aghast and listen to the long catalogue of our misdemeanours?

Now, putting aside this piece of ecclesiastical bribery, let us hold to the point of the moral advantage or disadvantage of braving the shame of exposure so far as to confess our sins to a priest. Is the process likely to be ethically beneficial or the reverse? It would seem that the pain in question is of very varied influence on the characters of those who endure it. To estimate its results aright, we must distinguish carefully between the effects of being exposed involuntarily and publicly, and to all our little world at once; or of being exposed voluntarily only to one person, and under peculiar conditions of penitence pleading on our behalf for a restoration of esteem. And, again, we must distinguish between the exposure of great sins, proving our whole life to have been a hollow pretence, or that of such ordinary weaknesses as do not entirely forfeit our claim to respect. Public involuntary exposure of great sins commonly proves too overwhelming an agony to leave the soul any sufficient balance of self-respect or hope enabling it even to retain such virtues as were previously preserved. The miserable swindler, or immoral woman, under such disgrace, sinks commonly in despair, if not in drunkenness, into complete moral collapse. Only in exceptional cases does public involuntary exposure of either vice or crime, clearing away all fogs of self-deception, leave behind it strength of character and religious or conscientious feeling sufficient to enable the fallen person to start afresh from new ground, and become virtuous in a truer sense than ever. As all who have studied the characters of children,

or of persons convicted of crime, are well aware, this shame of exposure is a punishment to be used with extremest caution; very useful as a threat, but nearly always injurious as an actual infliction. It is doubtless most unwholesome for any one to go on bearing an entirely false character with those around him, and to be placed upon a pedestal when he deserves to be on a gibbet; or to be allowed to weave a romance of self-exculpation and glorification when he actually merits nothing but blame and compassion.* Even the sudden downfall of absolute disgrace may be less dangerous than this. But, as a rule, public exposure of guilt is a terrible and most perilous trial, to which they who understand human nature best are most reluctant to expose any fellow-creature whose reclamation is possible by other means.

Does it follow that private voluntary exposure—a very much milder process, no doubt—is a particularly healthful one? The pang of shame once passed, is passed for ever. No one can ever feel it again in its sharpness. Is it good to have it behind us in our experience, as a thing we have gone through and know the worst of; or to have it always before us as a formless horror of warning? I may be wrong in my conclusion, but it seems to me that the pain we should feel the first time we practised Auricular Confession would leave us harder and more shameless ever after. It might seem to us right to endure it. I can readily imagine a stern sense of self-revenge and thirst for expiation making a man force his lips to utter his own condemnation, as Cranmer held his guilty hand in the fire. But it does not follow that the penance, even if undertaken in the purest spirit of contrition, would leave us any the better for practising it.

This matter, however, is one on which I do not wish to insist. The important point seems to be that of which the advocates of Confession take no notice, namely, that there is another kind of shame beside the shame of exposure. There is a shame which has nothing to do with the "What will he think of me?"—which is all they ever seem to con-

* This is said to be peculiarly the case with inmates of Penitentiaries, who invariably enter them with a rignarole of a history taken out of a penny novelist, and with whom no real reformation ever begins till they admit this pseudo-biography to be a lie, and tell the plain facts of their lives.

temple. It cannot be a dream that there is a spiritual, no less than a physical, modesty implanted in all natures save the very lowest; and if there be such a sentiment, the mode by which it can most grossly be outraged is assuredly by the revelation to a human being of that which passes at the very meeting-place between the repentant soul and God. The shame of such violation of all the sanctities of the spiritual temple as is included in the idea of a "General Confession," or "making a clean breast" to a priest, seems (to one to whom the idea has not been familiarized) something actually portentous; something which must leave the soul which has thus exposed itself no shelter evermore even in the deepest recesses of the spiritual world. To have our whole past laid bare, if only in the crude, imperfect way in which words can describe it; to talk to a man of all that is most awful, most agonizing, and yet (if we have repented and been restored) most inexpressibly tender and sacred in our memories; to uncover every grave of dead sins in our "God's Acre," and exhume the contents for the autopsy of an ecclesiastical coroner,—all this is so purely shocking to the unsophisticated sense, that we feel as if, before it could be done, the soul must be drugged with false excitements. Of course we shall be told that it is to no ordinary human friend that auricular confession is made, but to a priest who stands as the representative of God, and holds the keys of remission from Him. Of the monstrous nature of the last pretension I shall not now speak; but of the fact that it *is* our priest, and not our brother, mother, friend, to whom we are called on to make confession, is an aggravation of the evil complained of, not a mitigation of it. Love, deep and perfect, the union of two souls filled with the same love to God, and wont to approach Him together, may indeed justify, because it sanctifies, confidences and self-revelations which would be hateful if made to one less near or dear. Though even in the tenderest friendship it is certain that many reservations must be made, yet a great deal which no one else may know, may, without any violation of what we have named spiritual modesty, be confided to the one who is "soul of our soul," the nearest to us of created beings, though yet far less near than our God.*

* It is remarkable that the Mosaic law of Confession says nothing about a priest, but makes the penitent confess to his companion.

But the relation of penitent and confessor, as understood by Christian churches, has nothing whatever to do with this union of hearts. There is nothing reciprocal in it, nor does the penitent suppose the priest has any interest in him beyond one of pure benevolence. For obvious reasons, it becomes especially dangerous and shocking for any such natural human affections to subsist where the sexes of the two are opposite. The confessor is not a friend, and has none of a friend's sacred rights. But he claims, on the other hand, to be just that very thing which it is most dangerous to employ, namely, a human "go-between," standing in the place of God to us, and therefore hindering us from accomplishing that one act wherein lies salvation, namely, looking straight up to God, and enduring as best we may the awful Light of Light shining full on our darkness. The intervention of a priest in such a moment must be tantamount, I conceive, to nullifying half the purifying power of repentance ; and, further, it must establish in our minds a tribunal which is not that of the Holy Spirit within us,—a Pardoner who is not our God. To get behind and beyond this priestly interloper, and once more come directly to the Father, must ever after be tenfold more difficult. In fact, I seriously question whether any man long accustomed to auricular confession can really so break the law of association of ideas as to thrust aside in hours of penitence the thought of his confessor and what *he* will say, and think only simply of God against whom he has sinned, and to whom he desires once more to bring his sin-stained heart.

We have now seen reason to doubt that the endurance of the lower form of shame felt by a penitent in confession would be of moral advantage ; and we have seen (I apprehend) excellent reason for believing that the violation of sacred feelings which would form the higher shame, would prove spiritually injurious in an almost indefinite degree.

For those sickly natures to whom self-exposure is not a pain, but a pleasure, and who talk of their spiritual ailments to their priest as readily as they detail their physical weaknesses to their doctor, there is obviously no worse peril than that of the presentation, in guise of a self-denying duty, of a practice which is really to them a vicious self-indulgence, ruinous to all simplicity and purity of heart.

Are we then, it is perhaps asked, never to be altogether

true to any one, never to stand wholly revealed to one single fellow-creature? Goethe says that we all have that concealed in our hearts which if revealed would make us an object of abhorrence to those who love us. Is this nightmare to haunt us for ever, and are we never to cast it off and feel we are free and honest, and may look the world in the face?

I believe that some feelings like these are at the bottom of a good deal of the favour which the suggestion of a revival of Confession has met with in England, and they have a right undoubtedly to be weighed in our estimate of its benefits and ill results. If I am not mistaken, the sentiment in question is essentially one belonging to what may be termed the second period of youth. We are, then, still in the age of fervent enthusiasms and of very partial self-knowledge. We have violated our early vows of heroic virtue, and are sore with the bruises of our falls. At such an age we naturally feel an intense desire to come into closest communion with the souls we love, and to be utterly and truly known to them, never cheating them of affection which we feel we do not deserve. We are tempted to pour out all the accusations against ourselves which even exaggerated self-reproach can dictate. But in later life, and with calmer judgment, we recognize that such "auricular confessions" of love and friendship are in no way needful to place even the tenderest relationships on a footing of absolute candour and veracity. Nay, we learn to know that it is so impossible to see ourselves altogether truthfully (our own breath obscuring the mirror in which we attempt to gaze), and still more impossible to convey to another mind by spoken words what we truly are, that it is in reality little or no gain to genuine mutual understanding to interchange such confidences. If we do not add the history of our virtues to those of our faults; describe where we conquered as well as where we fell; how we struggled, no less than when we yielded to temptation; in a word, paint all the lights as well as all the shadows of our lives, we are in fact giving our friend a picture of ourselves as false in its own way as mere self-laudation would be in another. What sincerity really demands in friendship is, that there should be nothing in our outward conduct or inward desires or intentions *now*, which if our friend should see and understand would alter

his opinion of us for the worse. He has a right to unlock our *hearts*, and see all that is there. God alone has right of entrance into the deep chambers of *memory*.

Thus, then, I apprehend, the thirst for self-revelation, which may lead some young or weak spirits to the Confessional, is one always to be outgrown with advancing wisdom. Still more certainly must it, I apprehend, be outgrown by advancing spiritual life, till a point be reached wherein Divine communion, ever enjoyed in the depths of the soul, would render the suggestion of such an exposure hateful as that of any other sacrilege.

To sum up the argument of the present paper. The advantages to be derived from the practice of Confession, the benefits of self-knowledge, moral instruction and priestly guardianship, cannot be weighed against the evils it involves,—the materializing of penitence, the enervation of the moral nature, the desecration of the spiritual life. A method of combating sin which involves evils of such magnitude, becomes itself an evil. Even supposing that every tale of grossness and misuse be nothing but malignant falsehood, enough and more than enough remains in the inherent mischief of the practice of Confession to urge every friend of morality and religion to oppose it to the utmost of his power.

What is the true Confession? The life which should be open and honest as the day, and yet whose inner springs should rise for ever pure in hidden depths where no defilement may reach them? It is not very hard to picture what such a life might be. Men go about to urge us to confess our *sins* alone, and to confess them to a single priest, while they are content that we keep closest silence to our nearest and dearest concerning much that we are and more that we think. Let them extend their notions of honesty a little further.*

* The self-told story of the lady (*The World and the Church*, p. 225) who went secretly from her father's house to Confession to Mr. Goodwin in a London church, and kept all her doings a mystery till after some interviews, is a very good sample of the way in which Auricular Confession makes a man or woman more honest. To tell our past sins to a stranger who has no natural right to know anything about us, while we hide our whole present course of action and thinking from the parents, brothers and sisters whose love and confidence we continue to accept,—this forsooth is to be specially pious and truthful!

Let them bid us speak out what we think, and live out what we speak; seem what we are, and be what we seem. Let them exhort us to have no secrets, save of sins long since repented and passed into God's keeping; and of generous deeds, in regard to which the left hand may not know what the right has done. Let them bid us strive for that noble state wherein we should feel assured that nothing could ever be discovered concerning us, in word, deed or thought, which would not make those who love us already love us still more. And then let them add one counsel more concerning a part of life which in old times men heeded most of all should be honest, but which in these days is wrapped by thousands of us in a haze of obscurity, if not of deception. Let them bid us confess before friends and foes, everywhere, and at all times when the avowal may be called for, what we in our inmost hearts believe concerning God and duty and immortality, so that neither the fear of forfeiting the worldly advantages of orthodoxy on one side, or that of meeting the sneer of scepticism on the other, shall drive us one step out of the straight path of absolute sincerity.

In a recent sermon, Mr. Martineau spoke of keeping secrets "not *from* God, but *with* Him;" and advised his hearers to make it a rule "not to speak of everything which passes between the soul and God; not to betray every burden He lays upon us, but to reserve somewhat which shall be His and ours alone." Between such a lesson as this and that of the Anglican Manuals of Confession which we have now reviewed, there seems to lie the whole width of the moral and spiritual horizon.

FRANCES POWER COBBE.

III.—SAINT-SIMON AND ENFANTIN.

Saint-Simon and Saint-Simonism ; a Chapter in the History of Socialism in France. By Arthur J. Booth, M.A. Longmans. 1871.

Saint-Simon, sa Vie et ses Travaux. Par M. G. Hubbard. Paris. 1857.

Œuvres Choiesies de C.-H. de Saint-Simon. (Three Vols.) Bruxelles. 1859.

Œuvres de Saint-Simon et d'Enfantin, précédées de deux Notices Historiques. (Vols. I.—XXIII.) Paris. 1865-8.

SAINT-SIMONISM, as a distinct school of Socialistic thought, has been dead for thirty-eight years ; and the story of its short-lived existence is now little more than a curious episode of the eventful *Dix Ans* chronicled by M. Louis Blanc. But the chief leaders of movements in the direction of social reform are generally far in advance of their own age ; and it is only subsequent years that can see all the drift and force of the impulse they have set on foot. This was greatly the case with Saint-Simon and with the brilliant school, even allowing all its vagaries, led by Enfantin. Their influence upon French society has been deep and permanent ; and the story is still so little familiar to English readers as to render a sketch of it not superfluous.

I.

Claude-Henri, Comte de Saint-Simon, born at Paris in 1760, belonged to one of the noblest and most ancient of French families, and was nearly related to the famous Duc de Saint-Simon, who had already added to the other glories of the family name that of a literary reputation. Between the Duke who scorned all *gens de peu*, and his descendant who taught a social philosophy meant to exalt labour to the highest rank, there appears a strange opposition ; yet the family prestige and the sentiment of what nobility must always mean to a character of any manliness, seem best to explain the life of Henri Saint-Simon. The ambition of doing something great in the world possessed him from his earliest years. “Souvenez-vous, M. le Comte, que

vous avez de grandes choses à faire," were the words with which, at the age of seventeen, he ordered his servant to awake him every morning. His education was carefully attended to, though he complained in later years that he had been taught too much, and allowed to reflect too little. Already, when he was only thirteen, he had refused to take his first communion, from a hatred to anything like hypocrisy ; and this, together with a general waywardness and obstinacy in his boyhood, brought upon him the bitter displeasure of his father. In 1779 he sailed for America, as officer in a French regiment, to take part in the war of Independence. Here he fought under Bouillé and Washington with honour through five campaigns, and gained the order of Cincinnatus. An interesting letter from Saint-Simon to his father is printed in the Historical Notice preceding the *Œuvres*, and sets the character of the young soldier in a pleasing light. He dates from the camp before Brinston Hill, where he has been "en correspondance assez suivie de bombes avec MM. les Anglais," modestly tells the story of his campaigns, and pleads eagerly for indulgence at his father's hands for the wildness of his youth. He was beginning to discover already, however, that his was not to be a military career. The war in itself, though he took a zealous part in its perils and honours, did not interest him so much as the end for which the war was being carried on. He saw that the American Revolution must be the beginning of a movement which would touch every civilized country and effect the greatest social changes. It was in the direction of this social revolution that his thoughts were constantly turned ; and the soldier changed into the philosopher. On his return to Europe in 1783, he soon became weary of the idleness of garrison life, and travelled in Holland, and afterwards in Spain, where he employed himself in a design for connecting Madrid with the sea by a canal. The breaking out of the French Revolution brought him back to his own country. It is not the least singular feature of Saint-Simon's life that he lived in France during the whole of the revolutionary period, and gave his cordial approval to the social changes which took place, without allowing himself to be dragged into the conflict of parties. He renounced his titles, made strongly revolutionary speeches as President of the Electoral

Assembly of Falvy, his commune, lost the fortunes which would have come to him from his mother and two uncles, and was for eleven months preceding the fall of Robespierre in prison as a *suspect*; but the events of the period, though he took no very important part in them, had their full effect upon his inquisitive and restless mind. On his release from prison, he went into business and met with success; but after a few years he and his partner quarrelled, and the partner went off with the lion's share of the profits. It was at this moment, at the age of thirty-seven, that Saint-Simon determined to begin his education again; and this he accomplished, not only by attending lectures and attaching to himself some of the leading scientific men of the time, but also by systematically, and to the great damage of his reputation, making acquaintance through actual experience with as many conditions as possible of human life. This course he expressly defended as being worthy of a philosopher, asserting in one of his writings that his esteem for himself had increased in proportion as his reputation with other men had suffered; though, if a man were to give himself up to bad manners and hurtful society only for the sake of excitement or pleasure, nothing, he declared, could be more fatal. Only the end would justify such hazardous means. This abandonment of himself to a scientific object seems to have governed all the rest of Saint-Simon's life. In 1801, he married an accomplished woman, in order to be able to gather about him a brilliant circle of literary and scientific persons who might afford him instruction; and in the year following, he divorced his wife, not because of any insuperable dislike or incompatibility of temper or taste, but, if we are to believe M. Hubbard, his admiring biographer, in the hope of obtaining the hand of Madame de Stael. Saint-Simon shed tears before the municipal officer who made out the deed of divorce, and M. Hubbard thinks we have in these tears the clue to all the philosopher's life,—the perpetual sacrifice of his affections to his intelligence. Madame de Stael was, however, not to be won, and we hear nothing more about any matrimonial schemes. At Geneva, whither he had gone to be near to Coppet, Saint-Simon published his first work. Few copies were printed, and the pamphlet was so little noticed that even his literary executor did not

become aware of its existence until some time after the author's death. From Geneva he went to Germany, where he became confirmed in his belief in science, but more than ever dissatisfied with existing French methods. In England, too, he had already travelled, after the Peace of Amiens, but found nothing afloat there, "no capital new idea." Meanwhile his resources were exhausted, and he was reduced to holding a wretched clerkship at the Mont de Piété, at £40 a year. From this position he was rescued by the generosity of a former servant, Diard, who took him to his home, and provided him with the means of continuing his studies and of bringing out his first important work. This book, *Introduction aux Travaux Scientifiques du 19^e Siècle*, which, like everything else that Saint-Simon undertook, is incomplete, he did not publish, but sent copies of it to a select list of savants. It obtained little notice. The copy sent to M. de Lacépède, a naturalist, and at that time President of the Senate, was bought at an auction some years later with its leaves still uncut. A third work also appeared during this period; but in 1810 Diard died, and Saint-Simon was again reduced to distress. Of the savants of Paris to whom he made an appeal, Cuvier was the only one who came forward with help and encouragement; but soon afterwards an arrangement was made with his family which secured him a moderate income. From this time, his character and writings began to gain him both friends and disciples. Among the former were MM. Laffitte and Ternaux, leading men in the liberal party after the Bourbon restoration, Louis Courier, Béranger, and Rouget de l'Isle, author of the *Marseillaise*, and with less fame of a Song of Labour inspired by Saint-Simon. Among the disciples were Augustin Thierry, the accomplished historian of the Norman Conquest, and at a later period Auguste Comte, who for seven years worked under and with Saint-Simon.

The labours of Saint-Simon were now turned more in the direction of the practical improvement of the industrial classes of the community, than towards general science. Besides a work in four volumes, entitled *l'Industrie*, to which he prefixed a motto that became oracular for his disciples, *Tout par l'Industrie, tout pour elle*, he started a newspaper called the *Organisateur*, which made a sensation and had at first a success. An article in this paper brought

upon him in 1820 a public prosecution, for moral complicity in the recent assassination of the Duc de Berri. Saint-Simon's argument had been a bold one. If fifty of the best workers of France in every grade, fifty leading men of science in each sort, fifty best artists, fifty best artizans in each kind of manual labour,—in all, the three thousand best labourers in the country,—were suddenly to be cut off, France would not only be sorry, but would not recover from such a loss for a generation at least. But suppose France to keep these three thousand, while she has the misfortune to lose in one day Monsieur the King's brother, M. le Duc d'Angoulême, and Madame la Duchesse de Bourbon, and all the great officers of the Crown, and all the Ministers of State, Cardinals, Bishops, Prefects, and so on, and, finally, the ten thousand richest owners of land, the "upper ten thousand," this accident would certainly grieve the French people, because they are kind-hearted and could not look with indifference upon the disappearance of so many compatriots; but the loss would cause only a sentimental grievance; no political hurt to the commonwealth would result from it, for it would be quite easy to fill up the empty places. In four letters to the jury, Saint-Simon explained away all that appeared disloyal or seditious in this language, chiefly by insisting on the obvious good sense which the article displayed; and the jury acquitted him. This trial brought round Saint-Simon many of the younger and more ardent politicians of the day, among whom we must notice one who became afterwards a chief apostle, M. Bazard.

In the prosecution of his literary labours, Saint-Simon had far exceeded his small income, and the year 1823 found him hopelessly in debt, and with suicide as the only resource open to him. But the attempt failed, and some friends found him still living, and philosophizing over the possibility of a man thinking with seven slugs in his brain. The same year added to the list of his friends M. Olinde Rodrigues, who afterwards became his executor and the chief link connecting his memory with the school which took his name. Against the acquisition of this friend must be set off the separation of Comte from Saint-Simon. The third volume of the *Catéchisme des Industriels*, published in 1824, was entirely from the pen of Comte, who acknowledged that

he could go with his master only in the scientific part of his philosophy. To this volume Saint-Simon appended a note, praising the manner in which his disciple had accomplished his portion of the task, but explaining that Comte had raised to the first rank of importance some parts of his system which he himself could consider only as secondary. At this point, Comtism diverges from Saint-Simonism. Ardent admirers of Saint-Simon, like M. Hubbard, declare that the leading ideas of the Positivism which Comte taught a little later are to be found in Saint-Simon's works, and amongst them even the famous law of the three stages of development, the theological, the metaphysical, the positive. On the other hand, the followers of Comte generally deny any such origin for his system, and declare Saint-Simon to have been incapable even of understanding Comtism. The influence, however, of Saint-Simon's positive phraseology in the writings of his seven-years' disciple is indisputable; and it cannot injure the fame of so original a writer as Comte, that he had a forerunner leading the way to his fuller exposition.

Three works of great importance appeared from the pen of Saint-Simon during the last two years of his life; to two of them we will in a moment return. On the 19th of May, 1825, Saint-Simon died, surrounded by attached friends, to whom he spoke with enthusiasm about the great social reforms which they were on the way to accomplish. "I tell you," he said, "the fruit is ripe; you have only to pluck it." "Remember that in order to accomplish anything great, it is necessary to be enthusiasts. The only end of every effort throughout my life has been to secure to all the members of society the greatest possible room for the development of their faculties." Three days later, when the funeral train drew up at the entrance of Père la Chaise, and the official in charge of the cemetery asked where were the relatives of the deceased, there was no reply; but when he asked where were the friends, every voice answered. For M. Henri, *cit-devant* Comte de Saint-Simon, had run a career strange as the features of the times through which he had lived, and in his death was surrounded, not by his family, but by disciples. Such a man would be, perhaps, in every aspect of his life too much the student and philosopher to be very sociably disposed. He used to say that he liked to talk with

one person, not with many ; "the human race was not sufficiently advanced for three to talk together with any profit." Still it is essential to notice that, whatever disabilities his character suffered under, he had the power, given to so few, of attaching men of remarkable character and weight personally to himself. The real strength of Saint-Simon possibly is shewn far more in the existence of the circle of enthusiastic followers whom he left behind him, than in anything that he either wrote or said.

During his lifetime, Saint-Simon never gained the popular ear for his systematic teaching. It was left to his disciples to shew the true place which he had earned as a social reformer. From such men as Fourier and Owen he was distinguished by his work lying, not in carrying out experimental schemes, but in laying the foundations of a social philosophy upon which others might build. It was in harmony with this conception, which he himself held of his special task, that his writings cover so wide a field of speculation. For social reform, using the words in a broad sense, can never be simply a matter either of economy or of temporary expediency. It is entangled both with religion and with science ; with religion, because it demands a principle upon which the new and better order of society shall be established, and looks for a sanction for that principle ; with science, because we cannot believe human organizations to be a work of chance, and therefore seek to know the laws by which the progress of society is achieved. We need not wonder, therefore, that any one devoting his life to socialist questions should be led in his speculations over a wide range of subjects. The fundamental thought in all Saint-Simon's writings is his profound belief in the possible perfection of the human race. The Golden Age, which men had delighted to think of as in a remote past, he looked for in the not distant future. In his scientific works, which are works seldom of scientific detail, but mostly of what he called general science, or the philosophy of science, he attempted to shew the laws according to which the next steps in the evolution of society must follow. In his economical or industrial works, he attacked the other end of the logical scale, and instructed the working classes of the community how they were to claim their rightful place, and how, with orderly behaviour and loyalty to the powers that

be, to combine an irresistible pressure upon society, which must eventually subvert the existing and intolerable order of things. In his religious works, he attempted to deduce a new religion from the primitive Christianity, avowedly utilizing for his one object, the re-organization of society, the power of the religious sentiment in man.

Passing over the scientific works, which abound in amusing and original speculations, we shall perhaps give the best notion of Saint-Simon's method and manner by sketching the argument of the first portion of the *Catéchisme des Industriels*. An *industriel* he defines as one who works in order to put into possession of the various members of the community the means of satisfying their wants or their tastes. The industrial class, as thus defined, ought to hold the foremost place in society, because it can do without the rest, while they cannot do without it: "tout se faisant par l'industrie, tout doit se faire pour elle." But the existing fact is that labour holds a quite subordinate rank in every civilized country; and the chief social question consequently is, how to alter this state of things, how to put the industrial class into full possession of its rightful place. The only means which offer for accomplishing this is to open the eyes of working men both to their power and to their claim. So far from this step being likely to promote insurrection and disorder, the only way by which peace can be maintained in the future is to throw the governing power into the hands of the workers; and this for the simple reason that the wish of the great majority of labourers in a civilized nation always is to be governed as *cheaply* as possible, as *little* as possible, and as *well* as possible, the last requisite meaning only, so as most certainly to ensure tranquillity. It is exactly the industrial class which is most interested in public economy, in limiting arbitrary power, and in the conservation of order. Peace can be in danger only while it depends upon the will of a privileged class. The power to effect this social revolution lies already virtually in the hands of the *industriels*, for they form twenty-four twenty-fifths of the population, and all that they need is union among themselves. While this union is still wanting, the epoch, such as that in which we now find ourselves, is one of transition. It is necessary to have the eye fixed upon a definite form of the future. In the future we ought

to aim at, the industrial class is to be at the top of the social scale. By its leading members, it will administer the public purse, make the laws, and fix the rank which the other classes are to hold, giving to each a place of importance proportionate to the service it pays to labour. It is true, an army and police and lawyers will be needed, and proprietors of land and capitalists are not to be forced to engage in business pursuits ; but these and all other non-productive classes are to exert an influence in the community quite subordinate to the will of the working and dominant class. That this is inevitably the future before us, Saint-Simon continues, may be gathered in the following four ways. First, from a review of the gradual growth of the power of the industrial class in past times. Secondly, simple good sense points out that since men have always toiled for the amelioration of their lot, the natural drift of society must be to the recognition of its most useful members as at the same time properly its most powerful. Thirdly, work is the source of all the virtues ; consequently, the moral law, human and divine, summons the workers to the leading place. Fourthly, the progress of society is analogous to that of the individual ; in infancy, the child has to be governed, in youth he can be taught ; so in past ages, military or feudal repression has been necessary for the education of the race ; but as society develops, arbitrary power is less required, and the community will become self-administrative. The only or chief difficulty which lies in the way of this social revolution is that of finding a means of putting into harmonious co-operation for this single end science, public education, religion, the fine arts and legislation ; that is, in finding a means of making savants, theologians, artists and the present ruling class, concur in a social change favourable to the industrial population. After forty-five years of labour, Saint-Simon has arrived at these means, and with the help of his disciple Comte in the third volume, will propound them in this catechism. Briefly, the means are Instruction and Organization. How greatly the first is needed may be seen at once on looking at the present practice of working-men. Obviously they are not educated to know their true superiority and dignity ; for, one and all, they are glad to escape from their position as workers into the non-working

class. This nearly universal mistake is evidence of the degree to which society is still encumbered with the débris of feudalism. As to the Organization, it is to grow up gradually on a plan given in detail elsewhere, and beginning with a few intelligent men in Paris will spread over France, and from France to the rest of the world. Two questions further Saint-Simon delights to ask and answer. Will the new order of things be consistent with the retention of monarchy? Yes, very possibly; only the king must himself become an *industriel*. And what course ought the industrial classes to take in the political contests of the day? They are to throw their whole weight to the support of the left and right centre, the liberal-conservatives and the conservative-liberals; they are not to take up with any extreme party, because all that they want is time and national tranquillity in order to develop their inevitably advancing power.

Early in 1825, the year of his death, Saint-Simon published his *Nouveau Christianisme*, a work which it is the more proper to notice because it was taken by his disciples a little later as the chief oracle the master had left them. A preface, written by Rodrigues and accepted by Saint-Simon, was meant to smooth the transition from the tone of thought hitherto maintained in his writings to the purely religious tone of this work. But it is scarcely needed. The drift is everywhere the same; the chief peculiarity of the *Nouveau Christianisme* being the respect it shews for the religious sentiment as not only ineradicable, but the most potent agency in human nature. A weaker feature of the book is the almost studied ambiguity in which some leading terms are allowed to remain. The word God is used without any definition of the sense in which it is taken; although it is certain from passages in Saint-Simon's earlier writings that he must have held a conception of God widely different from that which the word would raise in the mind of an ordinary Christian reader. This is well pointed out in the interesting essay prefixed to the *Œuvres Choiesies*, the writer remarking justly that the word God is one that allows of no equivocal use; we must either banish it from the vocabulary, or state clearly the sense in which it is employed. Saint-Simon did not live to remedy the defect, and the school which took his name broke up in

one case upon this very point. Confusion about the meaning of the cardinal word in religion opened the door to all kinds of speculations, while it left Saint-Simonism without decisive rule in the critical question of the personality of the Deity. Consequently, *Déistes au verso, Panthéistes au recto !*

The *Nouveau Christianisme* is in the form of a catechism ; and *Novateur* chiefly aims to convince *Conservateur* that the time is come for the religion of Jesus Christ, which has never yet had a full and fair chance in the world, to become the universal religion of mankind. This great religion, he declares, is not the system known as Christianity in the Catholic Church, nor is it any form of Protestantism, nor is it any philosophical abstraction. Its central principle is contained in the words, Men ought to act towards one another as brethren. It was this, and this solely, that Jesus Christ came to teach ; and it is to a modification of this, suited to the necessities of our own times, that we ought now to return. In its new form, the principle stands thus ; Religion is to guide society towards one great end, namely, the improvement, moral and physical, of the condition of the poorest and most numerous classes. This new Christianity will have its moral law, its forms of worship and its creed ; but of these three, the first will have a vast ascendancy over the other two, and will follow directly from the principle just stated. In subordination to this, all the resources of art are to be employed to make the worship of God impressive ; the eloquence of the preacher is to be used to set forth the miserable fate of the man whose conduct deserves public disapproval, and to inflame the soul with philanthropic ardour ; with the same end in view, poetry is to provide the noblest hymns, and music is to lend her best help, so as to carry generous sentiments to the inmost hearts of the faithful. Painters and sculptors are to attract by their art the eyes of the worshipers to acts peculiarly Christian in this philanthropic sense ; and architects are to design buildings suitable in every way for such a worship. This church of the future will be governed by its ablest men ; and these, as in all cases where the really ablest bear rule, will be practically for their age infallible. Saint-Simon directly accuses, first, the Roman Catholic Church, then Protestantism, of heresy,

that is, of departure from the fundamental gospel of Jesus Christ. Roman Catholicism is heretical, because the teaching of the clergy is vicious, as judged by the single principle of the new Christianity ; because the papal government grievously offends, similarly judged ; and because of the two institutions which it sanctions, the Jesuits and the Inquisition. Protestantism is heretical on three accounts. First, it has sanctioned, though as a matter of necessity, the partial retention of the feudal state of society, which is opposed to the leading principle of Christianity as already laid down. Secondly, it has adopted a wretched *Culte*, stripping from the worship of God all beauty and splendour, cutting off from it the aid of the Fine Arts, and reducing it in every department except the preaching, which suffered in another way, to the most prosaic thing under the sun. Thirdly, Protestantism fell into heresy by establishing its creed upon the Bible, a proceeding as absurd as if mathematicians, physicists, chemists, should confine their studies and expositions to the earliest works written on their respective subjects. Nevertheless, we must acknowledge the immense services Protestantism has rendered to civilization. If from the Christian point of view it offends, it has still been a marvellous step in that growth of thought which has led at last to the Saint-Simonian recovery of a true Christian religion.

The reader will see from this very imperfect sketch that the new religion is only in part definite ; its moral requirements are summed up in a systematized philanthropy ; its theology is left in the clouds. In fact, with Saint-Simon religion has reached the positive stage, but still with, we think, an unnecessary limitation in its moral functions.

II.

The second of the Historical Notices printed with the *Œuvres de Saint-Simon et d'Enfantin* runs through more than twelve volumes, and gives a detailed account of the fortunes of the Saint-Simonian school after the death of its founder. Mr. Booth, who in his interesting volume has treated the whole subject with candour, and with far greater appreciation of the strong points of Saint-Simonism than is usual with English writers on French Socialism, has

very pleasantly condensed this portion of the narrative. The movement derives its chief interest from the character of the men and women who were its leaders. The best training of the schools, talent, beauty, and the energy and enthusiasm of youth, were to be found in a rare degree united in the band of Saint-Simonian disciples who led, during eight years, a movement said by Lacordaire to be "the greatest the human intellect has known since Luther." The central figure of this group is Enfantin. His adherence to the new faith gave it impulse; the expansion of his thought marks a corresponding development of Saint-Simonian doctrine; and when his influence was wrecked, partly through external repression, partly through his own errors, Saint-Simonism disappeared, leaving behind it immense results, but ceasing to have other than indirect action upon the world.

Prosper Enfantin was the son of a Paris banker, and after going through the training of the Lycée and the Ecole Polytechnique, fought in the defence of Paris in 1814, went into business as a wine-merchant at Romans, passed to a banking-house at St. Petersburg, and in 1823, at the age of twenty-seven, returned to Paris. His favourite studies were philosophy and political economy; and as a subscriber to the *Catéchisme des Industriels*, he became familiar with Saint-Simon's views. Shortly before Saint-Simon's death, he was brought into personal contact with him by M. Rodrigues. This was the turning-point of Enfantin's life; from this moment we may say, judging from the *bourgeois* point of view, a nature of specially bright endowment went astray, and began a career which led to fanaticism and disappointment. A passage in a letter written by him to a friend some years later throws light upon his character. "You know that I tried once to sell wine; at least, that was my profession; but I wish you to know also that I always found more friends than customers,—for the simple reason that I looked for the one more than the other. I made also during seven years nearly the round of Europe, and found everywhere loving hearts that came to meet mine. I have seen men, women, children and old people; and I thought that I could consecrate to something better than selling bottles that happy gift which made every one attach himself, bind himself, to me. I learned what it

meant to be *religieux*. Up to the moment when I knew Saint-Simon, what could I do or teach to men? Nothing, or but little. The Polytechnique, reading, intercourse with polished men, allowed me to hold a place anywhere; but what did I know of human destinies? In this world, where the greater number of men die in misery; in a world parcelled out into sects, hostile factions, families whose members hate one another, individuals given up to a frightful egotism; in a world without common beliefs, without common interests, consequently without devotion, what could I do with this precious gift which you also found in me, and which caused me everywhere to be loved? How utilize it? How make it contribute most widely to the happiness of all? The day when I put to myself these questions was that of a new life; . . . it is the day from which I date my madness, as some say; but from it I date my Faith, my Life." Unusual beauty of person, we are told, was added in Enfantin to a natural grace of manner, a bright intelligence and a commanding self-reliance; and certainly his peculiar personality, with its power of fascinating the hearts of men and women, is the only key to much in his curious career.

Olinde Rodrigues was the oldest disciple and the literary trustee of Saint-Simon. He was joined by Cerelet, Bazard, Buchez, Rouen, Enfantin, and a few other adherents of the new views, in establishing the *Producteur*. This newspaper, which bore the motto, "The Golden Age, which a blind tradition has placed in the Past, is before us," was not entirely Saint-Simonian. Among its contributors were Auguste Comte, Blanqui, Armand Carrel, and others whose names are less well known; writers who approved of the general purpose of the journal, but were not disciples of Saint-Simon. The *Producteur* was widely read, especially in the large towns of the South; and its expositions of Saint-Simonism, as well as the general articles on industrial, political or literary subjects, marked at once the calibre of the men who were thus challenging public attention. They wrote for those "who read to learn, not for amusement," and with perfect confidence that they had something to say which it would be worth while for earnest men to know. We mark this characteristic at once, because it belongs to the whole voluminous series of Saint-Simonian writings.

The six men whose names we have mentioned above, won a hearing for the new doctrine beyond the pages of their newspaper. Wednesday and Friday assemblies were held at the homes of the editors; while on Thursdays, this band of reformers met politicians and literary men of all shades of opinion at Lafayette's assemblies. On all these occasions, endless discussions served to bring into clearer light what each disciple considered as the essential points of Saint-Simonism, and at the same time created a general interest in the subject among thinking men. At Lafayette's, Benjamin Constant would give fierce battle to the Saint-Simonians, and, as Enfantin's biographer delights to tell, only to enjoy a signal discomfiture. But for the present, the effort to establish a school was a failure. The *Producteur* did not pay its way; it became a monthly; then ceased. The attempt had served two purposes; the seed of Saint-Simonian thought was scattered far and wide; and the relation in which the three chief leaders, Rodrigues, Bazard and Enfantin, were to stand to one another had silently declared itself. The political exigencies of the times, —on one side the conservative policy which was leading up to the Polignac ministry, on the other, the revolutionary element which was ready at any moment to risk order for the sake of change,—left no room for a doctrine so radical in its conceptions as Saint-Simonism, yet by its own professions so pledged to order and peace.

In 1828, however, before the political situation had reached a crisis, Bazard, carbonarist and Saint-Simonian, opened a room in the Rue Taranne, and in a course of lectures gave an exposition of the system. This oral exposition was the occasion of a great internal development in the doctrine. The discourses were prepared jointly by Bazard and Enfantin, the latter always leading and forcing the former; though the treatment of their subject was mostly critical. The world as it actually is was judged by the Saint-Simonian standard of what it might be, and the necessity shewn for a bond of love, of opinion and of activity, which should unite men for the attainment of some common end. But Saint-Simonism did not yet clearly define itself on many important points. While the raising in the social scale of the poorest and most numerous class was always a chief object, questions relating to the position of

women in the new order of society, to the belief in a future life, and to the conception of God with respect to his material manifestation, were not yet resolved. Enfantin himself was a Saint-Simonian and already more; for he had arrived at a full religious creed of his own. In his letters, and in debate with his friends, he discussed without reserve the problems which he was waiting to put in definitive form before the school. Some of the younger Saint-Simonians, peculiarly attached to Enfantin and under his influence, favoured his plans at this time by laying the foundation of a hierarchy. They formed themselves into a rank of the Second Degree, claiming to have received initiation at the hands of the primitive disciples of Saint-Simon. Among these we may especially notice Eugène, a younger brother of Olinde Rodrigues, and destined to be the first to die with the new faith upon his lips, Carnot, son of the Director, Isaac Péreire, Margerin, Henri Fournel, Michel Chevalier and Charles Duveyrier. In the South of France, Saint-Simonism had found an apostle in Resseguier, and was spreading far and wide; and we find Enfantin in 1829 visiting the various societies in the South, everywhere comforting and encouraging them, and establishing himself in the consideration of all as the virtual head of a new priesthood.

It was to this that things had come. To destroy the old dualism of good and evil in the world, and teach men that everything, rightly known and used, is good; to reinstate labour in all its rights, so as to secure to every man compensation proportioned to his labour, and abolish idleness as the privilege of birth; and to effect these changes under the religious rule of loving one another as brethren, so as to discountenance all war and armed revolt, were tasks sufficiently formidable to require all the aid which organization and discipline could give to the reformers. It was consistent with Saint-Simonian doctrines that in critical periods of change in society, when national law is by force and proof of circumstances unavailable, authority should declare itself in a Living Law, that is, a Dictator. Such a time was the present; and the *Loi Vivante* being found to reside in the duumvirate, Bazard and Enfantin, they assumed, under the dictum, "Every man according to his capacity," the place of chiefs in the new order. The first

considerable difference of opinion among the Saint-Simonians was the occasion of the declaration of this new paternal government. Buchez retired, differing from the other leaders chiefly on theological points; and the other disciples gathered closely round the two Fathers, Bazard and Enfantin, even Rodrigues generously taking a subordinate place.

Between these two men, Bazard and Enfantin, the difference is perhaps best marked by the saying of one of them, that the former taught, the latter dictated. While Enfantin, besides persuading men and women by his eloquence and personal influence that in order to be happy they must "grow out of egotism as out of infancy, joy coming only with love for others," gave constantly a new development to Saint-Simon's ideas and supplied his colleague with material, Bazard, with his facile tongue and pen, ready logic and fertile imagination, set the doctrine in every variety of aspect before the world. From the moment of their acknowledged leadership, Saint-Simonism achieved a great expansion. Money was needed to support the *Organisateur*, a weekly paper entirely devoted to Saint-Simonian objects, and the liberal contributions of the disciples, though in some cases ruinous to the donors, marked their faith and enthusiasm. Rooms were secured in the Rue Monsigny, where larger réunions could be secured, and the leaders of the movement could live with some practical attempt to carry out their notions of family life. In the July days of 1830, when all Paris was in uproar, and the proletariat fought the battle for the bourgeoisie and left the fruits of the victory in bourgeois hands, Saint-Simonism held aloof on principle, even revolutionary Bazard approving; though the chiefs watched anxiously for any sign that the class to whose interests they were pledged might be likely to reap some permanent benefit. The improved political situation, however, gave an advantage to the school, and its numbers and influence still more rapidly increased. A hall in the Rue Taitbout was opened for lectures and assemblies. Ladies, among whom we must specially name Mesdames Bazard and Fournel, as well as engineers of the Polytechnique, artists, physicians, lawyers, poets and musicians, contributed to the ranks of the society. The hierarchy gradually assumed new proportions. Next to the Pères Suprêmes came the Collège, consisting of the earliest and ablest of the dis-

ciples ; under the members of the Collège were the disciples of the second degree, and third and fourth degrees were subsequently added. In each degree the members gave to those of the higher orders the title of father ; and son, daughter, brother, sister, became the proper and customary designations within the hierarchy. A privy council, consisting of Rodrigues, Margerin, who had soon to be discountenanced by his superiors, and somewhat later Madame Bazard, specially assisted the Pères Suprêmes. But the influence of Enfantin became extraordinary. The "lyrical devotion," as his biographer calls it, expended upon him by ardent disciples, took every form of extravagance short of actual worship. "Le Pape se fait," one of them cried with some truth on occasion of an arbitrary display of Enfantin's authority. He took upon himself sacerdotal functions ; heard confessions, comforted, reproved, punished ; but he was careful, nevertheless, to remind his followers that the hierarchy was only a propagandist organization, not the actual establishment of a new form of society ; for this they must work and wait.

Meanwhile, the *Globe*, a daily paper which for some time had been favourable to the new views, had been acquired, and was being conducted with rare ability by Michel Chevalier. Four new centres for exposition were opened in Paris ; special apostolic functions were allotted to the members of the Collège and of the second degree, according to their fitness in the eyes of the chiefs ; and the doctrine flourished beyond Paris, in Toulouse, Montpellier, Lyons, Macon, Dijon, Metz, Rouen ; and in Belgium, though failing in Brussels, obtained a footing in Liège. Saint-Simonism was in this its best period brought also to bear directly upon the working classes. Homes were established for artizans, labour found for those who had none, and support provided for the destitute ; but that the objects of the society were not charity, in any ordinary sense of the word, was always prominently taught. The ladies of the Collège presided over assemblies of women of all classes, where it was attempted to inculcate Saint-Simonian principles, and induce the hearers to assert the equality of woman with man, proclaimed theoretically, by practical apostleship. From whatever cause, this attempt was never a great success. "I have realized none of your hopes, my father," wrote Claire Bazard

to Enfantin ; "the hierarchy is for us an empty word ; our times of meeting are spent in tumult and disorder ; the mother knows not how to win respect from her children, the children know not how to respect the mother. These daughters you have confided to me are the tenderest, the best of women ; but though drawn towards the doctrine, they do not love it, for they cannot understand or realize it." This was the report of a woman of exceptional character and endowment, with a soul absorbed in the new faith, but expecting perhaps too much from those who had been prepared by no previous training.

The most important Saint-Simonian assemblies were held in the Salle Taitbout, where every Sunday at noon a crowd of the faithful and of strangers was collected to hear discourses from the fathers, or those whom they called upon to speak. "Nothing," says M. Louis Blanc, "could be more curious than the spectacle of these assemblies. In front of three rows of boxes and an amphitheatre filled with an expectant crowd, sat in three ranks some young and earnest-looking men, dressed in blue, and among them a few ladies in white dresses and violet scarves. Presently the preacher of the day appeared, and the two supreme fathers, Bazard and Enfantin. At the sight of the fathers, the disciples rose and saluted them with affection, while the spectators kept a profound silence either of respect or of irony. When the preacher began, many listened at first with a smile on the lips or raillery in the eyes ; but after he had spoken, there was in the minds of all astonishment mingled with admiration ; the most sceptical could not guard themselves from being impressed and feeling some secret emotion."

The Bazard-Enfantin religion thus brought before the world, though wanting a settled creed, found for the time sufficient union in the personal attraction of Enfantin, who carried his sacerdotal function further every day, and in certain general conclusions accepted, nominally at least, by all. These are expressed over and over again in Saint-Simonian writings in such phrases as the following. The era for the foundation of the universal family is come. All privileges of birth and sex shall be abolished. Every one shall have work to do according to his capacity, and every one shall be rewarded according to his work. The inferior

is no longer to be the slave of the superior; they are to be in association: the man is no longer to be master of the woman; they shall be one in marriage: a people shall no longer be tributary to another people; they shall form one single family. And the pantheistic formula,—God is everything that is; everything is in Him and by Him; none of us is outside of Him; but none of us is He; each of us lives in His life; and we all partake together in Him; for He is All that is. The morale of this religion was the primitive Christian law, as we have seen it developed by Saint-Simon in his *Nouveau Christianisme*, brought into full contact with the misfortunes and special needs of the nineteenth century. But in the process of this application, it became estranged from any known system of Christian morals, as much as the pantheism of Saint-Simonism removed it from Christianity in respect to dogma. Christianity had set itself to overcome the flesh by exalting the spirit; Saint-Simonism had to restore to the flesh its rights, recognizing both the body and the soul, the carnal and spiritual natures, as equally holy, equally to be cultivated as the gracious gift of God. The words *Réhabilitation de la chair*, or, with a wider scope, *de la matière*, form another phrase accepted by the school as of oracular force.

The extreme development by Enfantin of this doctrine, as applied especially to marriage rights and divorce in the new society, led at last to a rupture in the duumvirate and a fatal disunion among the brethren. Enfantin carried to logical extremes the doctrine he had embraced, and though emphatically maintaining that Christian morality must be for long to come the actual practice of the new religionists, declared that the public teaching on the subject ought to be bold and without compromise, however it might offend against the prevailing code of manners. Bazard acknowledged the logical tendency of the new faith, and the need of social reform in the world in this direction, but protested, partly, as he explained in a letter of a later date, with a view to save the new society from public odium, partly from a fear of compromising the future of one section at least of the younger disciples, against moving for the present on this path. Opposition only confirmed the resolution of Enfantin. He raved about the emancipation of woman,

until this absorbed in his mind all other points of doctrine and practice. If we wished to seek excuse for the fanatical intensity of his prepossession, we might find it to some extent in the state of French society at that period. A keen perception of the miseries about him, acting upon a generous nature and an ardent imagination, might well produce the exaggeration which soberer people called madness. After stormy and prolonged debates, during which the interests of the society were in much peril, Bazard at first consented to serve under Enfantin with a special field of work of his own; but shortly afterwards, in November, 1831, entirely withdrew. A large and influential following retired with him, but Enfantin remained master of the situation; and from this rupture begins the last period of the collective existence of Saint-Simonism. Bazard, a noble and brave man, did not long survive this failure of his great hopes; he died a few months later, some say broken-hearted, but still an ardent believer.

The new faith, even after this division, had the elements of success within it,—a gifted leader, enthusiastic disciples, and, most of all perhaps, the clear head and skilful pen of M. Chevalier, directly defending it in the *Globe*, indirectly aiding it by sketching large industrial projects, many of which by their subsequent execution have verified the soundness of judgment that originated them. Enfantin, as sole chief, now called himself the Father of Humanity, meaning, as he said, that he was chief director and comforter of re-organized society. Though following out in his teaching the path which had offended the good sense of Bazard, he explained that the new Law, so far as it related to woman, could not be revealed in detail except by a woman; and that henceforward, until the other half of the perfect Chief of Humanity should appear, the attitude of Saint-Simonism must be one of waiting. For himself, it was to be the paramount duty to seek for her, the pontifical woman, who should complete in concert with him the new revelation. As a symbol of this expectant condition, an empty arm-chair stood by Enfantin's side at the public assemblies.

Not the least interesting portion of the works of Enfantin is his correspondence with a cousin, Thérèse Nugues, a woman of fine, sensitive nature and keen intelligence,

brought up as a devout Catholic, yet releasing herself from Catholic dogma sufficiently to follow her cousin's career with a free judgment. Up to the extreme point where Enfantin's teaching began to offend her sense of what was due to a woman's own perception of the right and becoming, she boldly sympathized, against the rest of his family, with his course, although it seemed to be destroying all the bright promise his youth had given of success in the world; but beyond this point, she never hesitated, with an ability and affectionate ardour equal to those of Enfantin himself, to combat him, and plead at least for less precipitancy. That which Bazard had justly dreaded was the Law which might be imposed by any first pontifical woman whom Enfantin might choose to set up as such. One cannot help speculating what might have been the fate of Saint-Simonism, if a large-hearted, wise woman like Thérèse had been called to the hazardous place of law-giver.

If some of Enfantin's vagaries of doctrine are perplexing to an ordinary mind, still more so are the Saint-Simonian financial arrangements of this period. The character of the men implicated is sufficient defence against the charges of dishonesty brought against them; but the facts of the case can at best be taken only as proof of the confidence felt in the speedy realization of Saint-Simonian dreams. The expenses of the society were very considerable, chiefly arising from the support of the establishments for working-men, the halls for teaching, and the gratuitous distribution of the *Globe*; and the generous sacrifice of their private fortunes made by the disciples did not avail to keep off the risk of bankruptcy. A public charge was brought against the leaders of obtaining money by undue influence over the more youthful and ardent of their adherents; and on this occasion, the Paris journals, excepting those devoted to the ministry of the day, spoke out honourably on behalf of the Saint-Simonians. Other charges, arising out of articles in the *Globe* which were considered dangerous to public morality, were brought by the government against Enfantin, Duveyrier and Chevalier; and accordingly, early in 1832, the Saint-Simonian chiefs were arrested in the Rue Monsigny, and the Salle Taitbout was closed against their assemblies. The charges were allowed to hang over the heads of the accused for many months; and in the meantime the

school extended itself more widely than ever through France, sent a branch into Algeria, and by the hands of two disciples tried to establish itself in England. One of these was the accomplished critic, M. Gustave d'Eichthal, who is perhaps best known to the readers of the *Theological* by his work, *Les Evangiles*.

On Bazard's retirement, Rodrigues, under the title of Chef du Culte, had taken the direction, next to Enfantin, of the affairs of the society. Enfantin went, however, too fast and far for the despositary of the original Saint-Simonism to keep up with him. Rodrigues deserted Enfantin, and declared himself to be henceforward the only and proper Chief. With his departure, the finances of the society fell into further confusion. In April, 1832, the *Globe* ceased, the house in the Rue Monsigny was given up, and the hierarchical period of Saint-Simonism was formally brought to an end by Enfantin.

The Père now called upon forty of his children to join him in symbolizing Saint-Simonian doctrine, and the expectant attitude of the faith, by a life of meditation, celibacy and labour, until the woman-revealer should shew herself. It was to be a symbolic, not a model period; dress, employment, behaviour, were to have a meaning pointing to the "infinitely preferable" future. Enfantin, accordingly, retired with his followers to a house of his own at Ménilmontant. Here he maintained his remarkable ascendancy; and an incident, which belongs, however, properly to a date a little earlier, is worth quoting as serving to shew the relation in which Enfantin, in the land of Voltaire and the philosophes, and a child of the Revolution, stood to his disciples. One of them, whose name has been justly mentioned above with honour, enjoyed dreams and ecstasies; and in the course of these came to know in truth that Enfantin, more than apostle, more than Pope, was the very "continuator of the Christ across the ages." Burning with this knowledge, he burst into Enfantin's room one morning before the father was up, and implored him to declare himself to the world, or at least allow the disciples to make the truth known. Enfantin's story is that he only gave the dignified answer, "In the absence of the woman, I cannot name myself; still less can you name me." The

disciple's report is that Enfantin, rising from his bed and pulling on his stockings, said, "Homo sum." The exquisite simplicity of the disciple's narrative is some clue, we think, to the success of Enfantin in leading the judgment of these talented young men.

We have no space to give in detail the life at M nilmontant. The brethren performed all the menial services of the house for themselves, laboured in the garden, studied, conversed, and sang original hymns and songs, to which one of them, F licien David, composed the music. On certain occasions, the outer doors were thrown open, and the public allowed to witness the ways of the community. On the 6th of June, 1832, while fighting was going on in the streets of Paris, the adoption of a symbolic dress was made the occasion of one of these public displays. A red cap, blue jacket, a waistcoat so made that it could not be taken off without the help of one of the brethren, leathern girdle and white trousers, and the beard allowed to grow, formed the costume ; and the ridicule it brought upon the wearers was sufficient test of their earnestness of purpose. Late in August of the same year, legal proceedings were begun on the several charges against five of the Saint-Simonian leaders, Enfantin, Chevalier, Duveyrier, Barrault and Rodrigues. For the scene at the trial,—Enfantin, in full costume, with *Le P re* in large characters on his breast, directing his witnesses what to do and what not to do, trying in his defence the power of his silent gaze upon judge, jury and counsel, until the irritation of the court rose to a climax, and then scandalizing the court by his incisive delineation of the moral pestilences of the world, which it was his mission to heal,—we refer the reader to Mr. Booth's book, or, still better, to Volume VII. of the *Œuvres*. Enfantin, Duveyrier and Chevalier, were condemned to a year's imprisonment and a fine, on the charge of corrupting the public morals ; the other two prisoners were fined in a small sum.

The establishment at M nilmontant gradually broke up. Enfantin dispersed his family, in some cases, as in that of Chevalier, even roughly breaking the connection between them. The more ardent of the brethren still engaged themselves in propagandist labours. Terson in Roussillon and the Pyrenees, Similion in Savoy, encountered romantic, but

harsh, persecutions, chiefly at the hands of the faction "which has the hilt of its sword at Rome, its point everywhere." Barrault led an enthusiastic band to the East. The mate of the ship in which he sailed to Constantinople was Garibaldi; and from a passage in the *Mémoires de Garibaldi* it appears that in his case there was no exception to the general fact, that these Saint-Simonians never came across any one's path without influencing them somehow for good. Even this Enfantinism was sound at heart.

From his exaltation as Father of Humanity, Enfantin could never descend quite to the level of other men; yet the latter half of his life, though darkened by disappointment and not altogether worthy of him, was not wasted in useless regrets. He accompanied Lambert and Fournel to Egypt, where they urged upon Mehemet Ali a scheme for cutting a canal from Suez to the Mediterranean. The Pacha chose to undertake the rival plan of throwing a bar across the Nile near the sea, with the object of commanding the rise and fall of the river; and Enfantin engaged himself, still as Saint-Simonian chief, as a volunteer upon the work. After the abandonment of this undertaking, he returned to France and to more ordinary ways of life, deeming, as he said, "the exceptional and symbolical Apostolate no longer necessary, since it had struck the world sufficiently, had made enough victims, and ought now to become practical and gradual in its operation." In 1839, he was upon a scientific Commission in Algeria, and afterwards held an important place in the administrative Council of the Paris and Lyons Railway. His pet scheme was, however, the Suez Canal; and though the carrying out of the plan fell to other hands, the establishment of the *Société des Etudes* was greatly due to his efforts, and he effected much by arousing public interest throughout France in the project. In 1848, he established, with some friends in Paris, a journal, availing himself of what appeared to be once more a happy turning-point in French affairs; and to the end of his life, August, 1864, he retained the one religious passion of his soul, the hope to develop more swiftly and surely the resources of the present in view of a better future. There is much in Enfantin's career difficult to defend, but Béranger's lines may well check too hasty a judgment:

Messieurs, lorsqu'en vain notre sphère
Du bonheur cherche le chemin,
Honneur au fou qui ferait faire
Un rêve heureux au genre humain.

Of the other leaders of Saint-Simonism, some died early, and the rest, with but few exceptions, have won their way to fortune or fame. One of these, whose name is now as well known in England as in his own country, was for several years Professor of Political Economy in the Collège de France. The *Journal des Débats*, in reporting one of his lectures, used words which may be taken, we suppose, as indicating a general feeling in the later school. "M. Michel Chevalier gave an impartial and philosophical exposition of all which has deserved to survive in the doctrines of Saint-Simonism, disengaged from the errors which the inexperience and youth of its first apostles had grouped around its cradle." Félicien David, Lambert (Bey), Raymond, father of Rosa, Bonheur, are names well known in England; and Barrault, persisting in propagandist schemes long after the confidence of his old friend, Enfantin, had been withdrawn from them, was the last to try to found on Saint-Simonian principles a perfect society within society as it is.

EDWARD S. HOWSE.

IV.—THE ALT-KATHOLIK MOVEMENT IN GERMANY.

1. *The Pope and the Council.* By Janus. Authorized Translation from the German. Third Edition. Rivingtons.
2. *Letters from Rome on the Council.* By Quirinus. Authorized Translation. Rivingtons.
3. *The Church of God and the Bishops. An Essay suggested by the Convocation of the Vatican Council.* By Henry St. A. Von Liaño. Authorized Translation. Rivingtons.
4. *Documenta ad Illustrandum Concilium Vaticanum anni 1870.* Gesammelt und herausgegeben von Dr. J. Friedrich, Professor der Theologie in München. Nördlingen. 1871.
5. *La Dernière Heure du Concile.* München. 1870.
6. *J. J. von Döllinger's Erklärung an den Erzbischof von München-Freising.* München. 1871.
7. *Das Vaticanische Dogma, von dem Universal-Episcopat und der Unfehlbarkeit des Papstes in seinem Verhältniss zum Neuen Testament und der Patristischen Exegese.* Von Dr. J. Langen, Prof. der N. T. Exegese der Kath. theol. Fakultät zu Bonn. Bonn. 1871.
8. *Die Päpstlichen Dekrete vom 18 Juli, 1870.* In sechs Broschüren beleuchtet von Dr. J. Hub. Reinkens, Professor der Kirchengeschichte. Münster. 1871.
9. *Die Stellung von Concilien Päpste und Bischöfe und die päpstliche Constitution vom 18 Juli, 1870.* Von J. F. von Schulte. Prag. 1871.
10. *Stenographischer Bericht über die Verhandlungen des Katholischen-Congresses abgehalten vom 22 bis 24 September, 1871, in München.* München. 1871.
11. *Letters to Mgr. Deschamps.* By A. Gratry, Priest of the Oratory. Translated from the French by T. J. Bailey, B.A. Hayes.
12. *Papal Infallibility and Persecution. Papal Infallibility and Usury.* By an English Catholic. Macmillan. 1870.
13. *The Pontifical Decrees on the Motion of the Earth, considered in their Relation to Advanced Ultramontanism.* Second Edition, Revised. Longmans. 1870.

14. *Sendſchreiben an einen deutschen Bischof des Vaticanischen Concils.* Von Lord Acton. Sept. 1870.
15. *Die Geſchäftz-Ordnung des Concils von Trient.* Wien. 1871.

THE works named at the head of this article are but a few specimens of the copious literature which has issued during the last two or three years, since the summoning of the Vatican Council, from leading members of what has now come to be called the *Alt-katholik* party in Germany, and those Catholics who sympathize with them in other parts of Europe. The catalogue might easily be lengthened. But we venture to think that even a cursory examination of the writings already mentioned would serve to dispel two serious, though not unnatural, mistakes very prevalent in this country on the subject. On the one hand, it is frequently said or implied that the movement is a mere flash in the pan, so to speak, without any principle of vitality or prospect of ultimate success; that it lacks enthusiasm and reality; that it has, in fact, no substantive existence, and will be easily and completely crushed out by the undoubtedly enormous resources at the command of the Roman *Curia*. On the other hand, many, both of its well-wishers and its assailants, regard it as simply a new, and perhaps half-unconscious, development of Protestantism, and would assign to Döllinger as the one justification of his attitude the rôle of a second Luther. A weekly journal which has from the first consistently misrepresented the principle and aims of the movement and its true relations to Catholicism, spoke not long ago of "Old Catholics" as "Roman Catholics on the turn." And this notion was fostered by a paragraph which went the round of the English newspapers some months ago, purporting to be the programme of the Old Catholics of Austria, in which the abolition of the Primacy of Rome, of confession and other distinctive doctrines or practices of the Church, was demanded. How far either of these criticisms is well founded will appear more fully as we proceed, and especially when we come to notice the recent Congress at Munich. Meanwhile, as regards the second, it may be observed at once, that the obnoxious programme emanated not from the Old Catholics at all, but from a little clique of Rationalist malcontents, who inherit

the opinions of the followers of Ronge and Czerski some twenty-five years ago. Anton, the Viennese priest who was the chief spokesman for Austria at the Congress, and a representative of the extreme left of his party, took care to preface his remarks by disclaiming all knowledge of the programme, and distinctly affirming his recognition of the Roman primacy. Nor, indeed, can any one read the debates of the Congress, or the works in which several of its leading members have explained their views in detail, without feeling convinced that their standpoint is distinctly Catholic, resting on the basis of the ancient Church before the introduction of the Isidorian decretals and the separation of East and West, though they are none the less resolutely opposed to the Ultramontane or Romanizing element in the Church. To those who, with the mass of ordinary Protestants, have never had occasion to study the question, and regard Romanism and Catholicism as synonymous terms, the distinction may appear unintelligible. We shall trust, however, before concluding, to have convinced them of the existence, if not of the reasonableness, of the fact—which is, in truth, the crucial fact on which the whole life and meaning of the movement turns, and which constitutes its *raison d'être*.* Like the cry for a reform of the Church in her head and in her members which rang through the fifteenth century, and found an organized expression in the Councils of Pisa, Constance and Basle, this too is essentially a war-cry sounded from within the camp. And therein, as we believe, lies the best guarantee of the stability of the movement and the hope of its eventual triumph. A mere Protestant revolt would be sure to end, as others have ended before, in a fiasco. It might detach a few hundreds, or thousands from Catholic communion, soon to be swallowed up in the omnivorous vortex of German Rationalism, but it would leave no trace of its influence on the great body from which they went forth, except in supplying a fresh excuse for the rejection of

* It may not be superfluous to caution our readers against the inaccurate reports which constantly find their way into English and American newspapers, especially as regards the great leader of the movement, Dr. Döllinger. It has become the fashion of late to "interview" him for the purpose of providing matter for sensational articles and reports, often entirely misrepresenting his real sentiments. A gross instance of the kind, which elicited an authoritative contradiction, occurred in an American paper last September; but the same thing may of course easily be repeated without any contradiction following.

all projects of reform, and serving to rivet the yoke of Rome more tightly than ever on the necks of all who continued to acknowledge her jurisdiction. It is precisely because it starts with a profession of unshaken allegiance to the ancient Catholic worship and Catholic faith, that the movement is felt, by friend and foe alike, to be a real power within the Church. We are aware of course that there are those to whom any scheme of reform will appear inadequate, if not abortive, which does not include a rejection of the distinctive tenets—or, as they would call them, distinctive errors—of Catholicism, such as, e.g., the Real Presence, the Sacrifice of the Mass, Purgatory, Invocation and Intercession of Saints, and the like. Such persons cannot be expected to sympathize with the *Alt-katholik* movement, but it is well that they should not misunderstand it. Wide as is the gulf which separates the Old Catholics from the Ultramontanes, they have a common ground in their acceptance of the traditional faith which was laid down and expounded afresh at the Council of Trent. It is in the additions to that faith, or the practical perversions of it, that the source of their antagonism is to be found.

To those, whether Catholics or Protestants, who pool-pool the movement as a mere passing outbreak of scepticism, or spleen, or discontent, the doctrinaire theorizing of a clique of baffled professors who had endeavoured to pit their own infallibility against the infallibility of the Pope, and had been ignominiously foiled in the attempt,* the only adequate answer lies in an appeal to facts. If it shall appear that the convictions which gave it birth have struck too deep roots in the soil of the Catholic conscience to be viewed as a mere creation of yesterday; that the movement itself is too wide-spread in extent, too varied in the character and antecedents and intellectual temper of its upholders, too fixed in its principles, and too energetic in its policy and aims, to be dependent for continuance on any mere accidents of time or place—and so much as this will at least come out clearly in the sequel—then it must be admitted to have a life and vigour of its own, not liable to be snuffed out, like a flickering rushlight, by the first breath of papal or episcopal displeasure. That this is felt to be the case by the

* See an article on "Papal Infallibility," by Father Dalgairns, in the *Academy* for February, 1, 1871.

Roman authorities themselves is abundantly evidenced, as well by the extreme bitterness of the Pope's utterances on the subject,* as by the fierceness of the German bishops—we really hardly know what other word to use—especially such of them as are recent converts to the Vatican dogma, in their ineffectual attempts to stamp out the plague-spot from their dioceses. Not that the movement is to be looked upon as exclusively German, still less Bavarian, though there are obvious reasons, which shall be referred to presently, why its head-quarters should be in Germany. There were delegates from France, Switzerland, Spain, North America, Brazil and Ireland, present at the Congress, not to mention the priests of the Russo-Greek Church and the Church of Utrecht, who came to tender their sympathy, and took an active part in the proceedings. Italy, somehow, was not represented there; but it is nevertheless certain that there is a large and growing body of Italian Catholics, both clergy and laity, who are in thorough accord with the *Alt-katholiken*, and who have their organ in the *Rinnovamento Cattolico* of Florence, as the Germans have in the *Rheinische Merkur* published at Cologne. But it is quite true that Germany is the centre and focus of the movement, and a few words will suffice to explain why this should be so.

When the Catholic reaction, which set in about the beginning of the present century, and of which De Maistre and Lamennais were in France the leading representatives, found an echo across the Rhine, it necessarily assumed a different and a more scientific form. In Germany, Catholics and Protestants had for two centuries lived peacefully side by side; they studied together in the same universities, and mingled freely in the intercourse of daily life. During the general religious stagnation of the eighteenth century, both Catholic and Protestant theology had sunk into a deep sleep; though it must be confessed that Catholic theology, under the narcotic influence of Jesuit discipline, which invariably tends to the extinction of all originality of thought, was the more sterile and lifeless of the two. But with a

* Thus, e.g., in one public address the Pope described the Liberal Catholics as worse than the Paris Commune; while in a formal Allocution, on the occasion of preconizing some new bishops, in October last, he denounced "the impious temerity and perversity" of those "sons of perdition," the Old Catholics of Germany.

revival of religious energy, the champions of the rival creeds were brought into closer contact, as well as into sharper conflict, with each other. It was impossible, as in countries either wholly Protestant or wholly Catholic, for each to go his own way, ignoring the existence of any other form of faith. The Catholic professor had to address an audience familiar with the beliefs and arguments of their non-Catholic fellow-students, and who might the next hour be listening to the lectures of a Schleiermacher or a Strauss. Moreover, history, and not least ecclesiastical history, had long been a speciality of German students, and much had been done through the impartial labours of non-Catholic, often Rationalist, historians to vindicate the mediæval Church from the stupid or malicious calumnies of mere Protestant controversialists. Catholic writers could not afford, even had they desired it, to repudiate the impartiality to which they owed so much, and to treat Church history as a barrister treats his brief. And thus it necessarily came to pass that the spirit of honest and scientific inquiry, which pursues truth for its own sake, gradually infected every department of the Catholic literature of Germany, as well in theology and philosophy as in history. We say infected, for in the judgment of Rome that spirit was feared and distrusted as a subtle poison. For the last three centuries her fixed policy has been to suppress all revelations, whether of fact or opinion, which might be used against the cause of orthodoxy, or even of her own most extravagant claims, quite independently of their truth or falsehood, and the principal instrument used for this purpose was the *Index Ex-purgatorias*. The process was unflinchingly applied not only to all philosophical speculations out of harmony with received beliefs, but to all historical discoveries which might serve to discredit the infallibility of the ecclesiastical government, or the virtual impeccability of its administrators—to any statements, in short, which tended to exhibit the human element in the Church. Such a system could not fail to press with peculiar severity on the Catholic writers of Germany, who are averse, both from circumstances and national temperament, to the Roman expedients of manipulating history and science. Accordingly, few of the more illustrious names among them have escaped censure; and even where it may have been merited, the method of inflic-

tion has deprived it of all moral weight. It was a trial in the absence of the accused, without examination, explanation or appeal, ending in a sentence pronounced usually without even any indication of the particular errors meant to be condemned. And thus all the works of a voluminous writer, like Hermes or Günther, would be placed on the Index on account of some few passages suspected, perhaps through the merest misapprehension, of a tendency to Rationalism. The combined injustice and absurdity of the process was signally manifested in the condemnation of Günther, of which we happen to possess an unimpeachably authentic record in the posthumous collection of letters from Rome by Dr. Flir, who was residing there at the time as Rector of the German College and Consultor of the Congregation of the Index.* The constant vacillation of the Pope, who of course could not read a word of the inculpatated works himself, and the hopeless blundering of the Congregation, only one of whom had any knowledge of the German language, to say nothing of German theology, are exposed all the more forcibly because the author was a devout Ultramontane, only gradually and partially disillusionized by his experience of Roman administration.

Günther yielded to the sentence, though its grounds baffled his comprehension ; but some years later, Rome had a more intractable subject to deal with. Dr. Froeschhammer, of Munich, has unhappily now abandoned his faith, not only in Catholicism, but in supernatural revelation altogether ; but it may well be doubted whether the policy of the *Curia* was not rather the cause than the consequence of his unbelief. About seventeen years ago, he published a work in which the Traducianist theory of the origin of the soul is defended by copious extracts from the Fathers and modern Catholic divines of unchallenged orthodoxy. Notice was sent from Rome that his book was to be put on the *Index*, and that he must make an *ex animo* submission. To such a requirement, without any reason assigned, and coming from an authority which the extremest infallibilists, having the case of Galileo before their eyes, admit to be liable to error, he could not conscientiously submit, but he begged for further information as to the grounds of the sentence, which

* *Briefe aus Rom*, von Dr. Flir. Innsbruck. 1864.

was peremptorily refused as against the accustomed usage. To a renewed demand for unconditional submission, he was therefore obliged to refuse assent, whereupon he found himself excommunicated.* This was in 1863. In the autumn of the same year, an event occurred which helped to bring matters to a crisis in the long-pending quarrel between Germany and Rome.

The need for some bond and common centre had been long and growingly felt by the Catholic theologians of Germany. In other times and countries such a bond had been supplied by a uniform system of training, or the recognized influence and traditions of some great educational depository of the nation's intellectual life, such as the old Parisian Sorbonne. But no central institution or common discipline of this kind was compatible with the political and religious conditions of modern Germany. Reared under different governments, some of them in mixed universities, and in habitual contact with Protestant scholars and divines, some in the seclusion of episcopal seminaries representing various and often conflicting schools of thought, German Catholic theologians lacked any common centre or common traditions, and were only accidentally brought into intercourse with one another. And this want became the more urgent, as the jealousy of Rome, on the one hand, and the pressure of the Protestant and Rationalistic controversy, on the other, enforced on them the duty of bringing their forces to bear on a common point, and ascertaining and exhibiting to the world their true position as champions at once of freedom of science, and of Catholic orthodoxy. It was sorrowfully acknowledged that the Church had been deeply compromised in the eyes of outsiders by the policy of repression so long pursued by the Roman hierarchy, suggesting the inevitable suspicion of some real incompatibility between the honest investigation of philosophical or historical truth and loyalty to Christian belief. It was felt

* Some articles have lately appeared in the *Contemporary Review* on the "Catholic Church Crisis in Bavaria," under the signature of "A Bavarian Catholic," which require to be read with great caution. They are understood in Germany to be written by Professor Froeschhammer, who is animated with all the proverbial bitterness of a renegade towards his former associates, and whose estimate of the principles and policy of the *Alt-katholiken*, which is measured exclusively by their divergence from his own present standpoint, can only be received as the *ex parte* statement of a hostile and censorious critic.

that if Catholic theology is to hold her own in an age like the present, it can only be by frankly accepting the genuine results of other branches of knowledge, and shewing that, while each is in its own sphere supreme, there is indeed a distinction, but no real antagonism, between the teachings of reason and of divine revelation. And it was in the hope of doing something to meet this grave emergency that a Conference of about a hundred Catholic scholars and divines assembled at Munich in September, 1863, under the presidency of Dr. Döllinger. His opening address on *The Past and Present of Catholic Theology*,* gives a luminous and masterly sketch of the gradual development of Christian theology from its cradle at Alexandria, through the patristic and mediæval periods, down to our own day; and dwells towards the close, with earnest and incisive force, on the special opportunities and mission of German theologians under existing circumstances, and the conditions indispensable for fulfilling it. Both here and in his pointed criticisms on the decadence of theological study in Italy and Spain, where, under the beneficent rule of the Index and Inquisition, it has long been struck with a deadly paralysis, he cut across the darling sympathies and views of the Romanizing school; and the whole tone of the address, which treats theology as a progressive science, where truth is gradually attained through experience of errors, was hostile to scholasticism. The Congress had met in the Abbey of St. Boniface under high ecclesiastical sanction, and the Archbishop of Munich sang high mass at the opening. But the suspicion of Rome, prompted by the reports of the Nuncio, was quickly roused; and within a few months a Brief was addressed to the Archbishop, denouncing the spirit and methods of German theology, and insisting on the scholastic system as alone legitimate, and on the duty of theologians to yield an unreserved and *ex animo* submission to the decrees of Roman Congregations. Later in the same year followed the famous *Syllabus*; and thus war to the knife was proclaimed between Catholic Germany and Rome. It was impossible for German theologians, without an act of moral suicide, to accept decrees of which the one object was to extinguish them.

* *Die Vergangenheit und Gegenwart der katholischen Theologie.* Von J. J. von Döllinger. Regensburg, 1863.

One thing was still wanting, and that was to stamp these obnoxious utterances with the seal of infallibility. The infallibility of the Pope had never been recognized in Germany; and it was open, therefore, to German Catholics to ignore or even dispute decisions resting on his sole authority. German Jesuits had been among the most copious, and, we will add, the most candid, commentators on the articles of the Syllabus; for they did not shrink, like so many of the bishops, who professed to accept it while explaining away its obvious meaning, from bringing out the naked sense of the words in all its startling simplicity.* It has always been the ambition of the Jesuits to reduce the government of the Catholic Church to that model of a rigid military despotism on which Ignatius formed his Order, and which they honestly believe to be the highest, and indeed the only true, system of ecclesiastical organization. In the Syllabus, compiled under their own inspiration, they had framed an admirable instrument for the purpose; but it was essential for success that its principles should be enforced by an authority from which there was no appeal. Such an authority could only be found in a General Council, which might at the same time crown the edifice of hierarchical absolutism, and make resistance impossible for the future by proclaiming the infallibility of Rome. To this end, therefore, were directed all the energies of a Society, which has been not inaptly described as "the Catholic Church gone into commission," which for two centuries after the Reformation had pretty well the whole higher education of Catholic Europe in its hands, which has shaped the whisper both of pontifical and royal thrones, and contrived for years to govern even the old Gallican Church through the mistresses of Louis XIV., but which has never, even in its palmiest days, been so dominant at Rome as since its restoration by Pius VII., after a break of forty years, and especially during the last twenty years of the present pontificate. We need not stay here to discuss the prudence of their desperate policy; but they must have felt that in achieving the Vatican definitions they had burnt their ships, and that henceforth their long struggle against the rival forces in the Church could only be determined by

* See, e.g., *Stimmen aus Maria Laach*, Freiburg im Breisgom, 1868-70, and cf. *Janus*, pp. 9, sqq., with the authorities quoted there.

their supremacy or their fall. In the facts of the past history and present policy of the Jesuit Order, must be sought the ground and justification of the demand of the *Alt-katholiken* for their suppression. With them, as one of the speakers observed, no compromise is any longer possible.

When, then, it was officially announced in 1868 that a General Council was to assemble at Rome in the ensuing year, it was only natural to surmise, though of course no such design was openly proclaimed, that one motive at least for convoking it was the suppression of Liberal Catholicism in its native home in Germany. The Bull of Indiction was studiously vague in its language. It promised much—little less, indeed, than a complete regeneration of modern society—but specified nothing. All the early Councils had been summoned, as was also the Council of Trent, for the purpose of meeting the inroads of some particular heresy; but it was clear that if the Vatican Synod was to deal with doctrine at all, it must be by formulating new articles of faith. The mediæval Councils were ostensibly occupied with the reform of abuses or the reconciliation of Christian bodies estranged from the Church; but the Bull of 1868 gave no hint of any need of internal reform, and breathed no word of conciliation to those without; while the Letters afterwards addressed to the Oriental bishops, who were pointedly insulted by the refusal of their ordinary titles, and to the Protestants, were a demand for unconditional submission. Meanwhile it was notorious, as we observed just now, that for the last twenty years the Jesuits, who have been all-powerful at Rome since the Pope's return from Gaeta, had systematically concentrated all their energies on the establishment of Papal infallibility. With this object they had procured the definition of a new dogma in 1854, for the first time in Christian history, by the sole authority of the reigning Pontiff. But as the belief in the Immaculate Conception, as an opinion, was very general in the Church, this startling innovation passed almost unnoticed at the time, and it was only in the light of later events that its true motive and significance came fully into view. With the same object, Provincial Councils, which had long been in abeyance, were held in several countries, England included, by direction of the Roman authorities; and on their decrees being returned from Rome after revision, they

were found to contain in every case a more or less explicit assertion of Papal infallibility. Nor was this all. An association was actually formed under Jesuit auspices, which all the faithful were invited to join, the members of which were pledged by oath to do all in their power, "even to the shedding of their blood," to promote the infallibilist dogma. And if these circumstances were sufficiently suspicious, suspicion was raised into something very like certainty by the appearance early in 1869 of a series of papers in the *Civiltà Cattolica*, the organ of the Roman Jesuits, which had been expressly sanctioned some years before by a Papal Brief as the exponent of the true mind of the Holy See. In these letters it was broadly intimated that the real work expected of the forthcoming Council was to formulate Papal Infallibility, the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin, and the eighty articles of the Syllabus, into dogmas of faith, and a significant hint was added that the work might be despatched in three weeks; in other words, that the Council was intended to register foregone conclusions, not to discuss them.

The challenge thus given was promptly taken up by a Catholic writer in the *Allgemeine Zeitung*, whose letters were afterwards reprinted in the earlier portion of *Janus*. In the summer of the same year, an address, largely and influentially signed by Catholic laymen at Coblenz, was presented to the Bishop of Trèves, disclaiming all sympathy with the views and wishes of the Jesuit party, and setting forth their own idea of the duties which might profitably be undertaken by an Ecumenical Council in the present day. They point especially to the need of internal reforms, of re-adjusting the relations of Church and State, and of the clergy to the laity—partly by raising the standard and remoulding the system of clerical education in a liberal sense—and of seeking to promote the re-union of Protestant bodies with the Church. They insist, in conclusion, on the weighty reasons for abolishing the useless and oppressive action of the *Index Expurgatorius*. These views were known to be shared by the great mass of the educated laity in Germany, but they met with no response from authority, except in a Pastoral issued from Fulda, in the following September, by the North-German bishops, nearly all of whom have since eaten their own words, assuring the faithful that no new dogmas would or could be introduced into the Church.

Every shadow of doubt, however, as to the real aims of the *Curia* had disappeared, long before the actual meeting of the Council, from the minds of all who did not wish to be deceived. The proceedings of the preparatory Commissions had indeed been carefully shrouded in what was called "the Pontifical secret," and the bishops were not suffered, before their arrival at Rome, to have any inkling of the matters to be brought before them. But in fact the whole plan of campaign had been mapped out to its minutest details. The fifty-five *Schemata*, which the Fathers were expected, not to debate, but to vote unanimously, had been drawn up mainly under Jesuit supervision; and a council-hall, as admirably adapted for scenic display as it was, from its known acoustic defects, unsuitable for debates, was fitted up and resolutely adhered to throughout, notwithstanding the indignant protests of the bishops, who could neither hear nor be heard. On similar grounds, an order of business was prepared and enforced which made freedom of debate impossible.* Papal infallibility was not included in the *Schemata*, because it was intended to be carried by acclamation at the first meeting of the Council,—a scheme which was only foiled by the tact and firmness of the great Archbishop who has since fallen a martyr, to use his own dying words, "for the cause of liberty and faith."

It would take us far beyond our present limits to narrate the history of the Council, of which a luminous and authentic record may be found in the *Letters of Quirinus*. Suffice it to say that from the first a strong opposition manifested itself, and thus the work meant to be accomplished in three weeks was extended over seven months. It was near the end of April before the *Schema de Fide*, directed against Rationalism, alone of the five which had been introduced, was put to the vote and carried, after much discussion and revision. It was chiefly important on account of a supplementary paragraph on the binding authority of Roman Congregations, which the minority had strenuously opposed, but were finally induced to acquiesce in by explanations which, had they been sincere, would have proved it to be

* The order of business of the Council of Trent has since been published by Father Theiner, and contrasts most conspicuously in this respect with that of the Vatican Council. He has been dismissed from the librarianship of the Vatican in consequence.

wholly superfluous. Three months more had passed away before the grand object of the Court of Rome was attained, and the dogma of Papal infallibility passed by a majority of the Fathers still remaining in the middle of July.* Many bishops, especially from Northern countries, where lay the strength of the Opposition, had already been driven from Rome by the excessive heat, and many more were ailing; but to all remonstrances the Pope had but one reply. The Council could not be prorogued till the decree was passed, and if the bishops were dying, so be it—"let them die like dogs."†

A word must be said here on the composition of the Council. There are about 900 bishops in communion with Rome, and of these a full third are Italian, while the other bishops of the Latin race, including those of Brazil and South America, number about 250 more. Over most of these the influence of Rome is paramount, as also over the vicars-apostolic, who are absolutely at the mercy of the Propaganda, and over the mere titular prelates, a large number of whom were created after the convocation of the Council, to swell the papal majority. Moreover, about 300 of the bishops were being entertained at the Pope's expense, and were thus doubly bound to him—a circumstance of which they were not suffered to be oblivious. So enormously disproportionate, however, is the numerical force of the Episcopate in different countries, that the 88 bishops who voted against the decree of infallibility on July 13, actually represent about half the Catholic world. The inhabitants of the dioceses of Paris and Breslau alone more than outnumber the old Papal States, with its 143 bishops. Considering the enormous forces at the command of the *Curia*, and the unscrupulous use made of all the arts of intimidation, cajolery, and what is euphemistically termed undue influence, the real wonder is, not that the opposition was not larger, but that there was any effective opposition at all. It was no doubt a fatal mistake of the minority, instead of renewing their *non placet* of the previous week in the Solemn Session

* In the General Congregation of July 13, there were 451 *placets*, 88 *non placets*, 62 conditional votes, and 70 bishops, still in Rome, purposely absented themselves. Three Cardinals voted *non placet*, three *juxta modum*, and seven stayed away.

† "Che crepano."

of July 18—which would never indeed have been held had such an intention been avowed—to content themselves with re-affirming it in a written memorial, and taking their departure. Still, *littera scripta manet*; they cannot now disavow their own solemn act, however much their subsequent faithlessness to their pledges may make them desire to forget it. But we are concerned here with the results of the Council, rather than with the details of its course.

The voice of the Pontiff, as he proclaimed the dogma destined, according to its authors, to inaugurate the reign of peace on earth, was drowned in the crash of thunder, and its echoes were lost in the roar of artillery of the Franco-German war. But it was not therefore to be forgotten, still less tacitly acquiesced in. Cardinal Antonelli lost no time in correcting, in a letter to the Nuncio at Brussels, the "imagination of some Catholics, and perhaps even one or two bishops," that the "Apostolic Constitution" promulgated by the Holy Father in presence of above 500 bishops,* was not already and absolutely binding on the Catholic world. The announcement provoked no faint or doubtful response. Count Beust at once officially intimated the abrogation of the Austrian Concordat; and Father Hyacinthe, in renewing his earlier appeal to "a Council really free and truly Œcumenical," declared that, as a Christian, he rejected "those almost divine honours decreed to a man, now presented to our faith—I had almost said to our worship;" and, as a Catholic, he rejected a dogma unknown to the ancient Church, and implying not a regular development, but a radical change in her constitution and her immutable rule of faith. But the Opposition bishops, who before leaving Rome had agreed to correspond and act in concert, did but illustrate the old adage about the bundle of arrows, and one by one succumbed in their isolation to the various influences of fear or favour brought to bear upon

* This was not strictly true. More than 500 members of the Council were present on the 18th of July, but above 50 of them were Cardinals and heads of religious orders, not belonging to the Episcopate. Meanwhile, it is noteworthy that the decree is spoken of as an "Apostolic (i.e. Papal) Constitution," not as a canon of the Council. And rightly so, on this account, if on no other, that no decrees of any Council are binding till it is dissolved and the decrees signed by the bishops, any more than an Act of Parliament till it has received the Royal assent. The Vatican Synod is not dissolved, but prorogued only.

them.* With a few bright exceptions, they faltered, prevaricated and fell.† About a month after the Council was adjourned, seventeen German bishops assembled at Fulda, in order, to cite the words of Professor Reinkens, "to affirm the precise opposite of their Pastoral of less than a year before, and of their public declarations at Rome, in an official address to the clergy and faithful of their dioceses." Then the storm broke. Lord Acton, who has property in the diocese of Bishop Ketteler, of Mayence, one of the stoutest anti-infallibilists at Rome, and now one of the bitterest of their persecutors, published a Letter to a German bishop, named at the head of this article, in which he convicts the Opposition, out of their own mouths, of their strange and startling inconsistencies, chiefly by reference to the *Synopsis Analytica Observationum*, compiled from the opinions of different bishops during the Council, and since republished in full by Friedrich in the second volume of the *Documenta*. One bishop says he had rather die than accept the decree; another, that it would be an act of suicide on the part of the Church; a third, that it will undermine the authority of Popes and Councils and of Catholic doctrine; a fourth, that it is neither in Scripture nor Tradition; and a number, from various countries of the Old and New world, that it is unknown to their people, never taught in their catechisms, and will make the return of Protestants to the Church hopeless. Cardinal Schwarzenberg maintains that it will shake the faith of the most pious; Archbishop Kenrick, that it will put Catholicism in contradiction with history, is no dogma of faith, and

* How potent these influences are may be judged from the case of Bishop Hefele, the learned author of the *Conciliengeschichte*, who held out for several months, but was ultimately reduced to submission by a refusal of his "quinquennial faculties," without which, among other things, he could not dispense any of the various remote degrees of relationship which Rome makes impediments to marriage, apparently for no better reason than to secure a constant source of influence or extortion in their dispensation. Strong protests were made on the subject by Hungarian bishops at the Council. Hefele had several couples in his diocese waiting to be married. He yielded, and issued a pastoral in which he formally accepted the Vatican decrees, while trying to explain them away; but he has taken no steps to enforce them on his clergy or people.

† Among these exceptions, there is every reason for including Archbishop Darboy. No proof has ever been given of his recantation, and no one who reads his speeches in the Council, or his pamphlet issued at its close, *La Dernière Heure du Concile*, could believe it without the most direct evidence.

cannot become so by any definition even of a Council; Bishop Dupanloup, that it is unprecedented and absurd. Nor are these same prelates less outspoken in their denunciation of the violent and illegitimate methods by which the decree had been forced through the Council, which they describe as a conspiracy against truth and right. Bishop Ketteler issued a manifesto of his own at Rome, under the title of *Quæstio*, since republished in the first volume of the *Documenta*, which endorses all the strongest statements of *Janus*, often in the same words.* The Archbishop of Munich had publicly declared his entire agreement with Döllinger's views, whom he has since excommunicated for adhering to them, and denied that any reasonable man could accept the dogma of Papal infallibility. But we need not multiply these details. Lord Acton sums up his Letter in words which it cannot have been pleasant for the signatories of the Second Fulda Pastoral to read.

“Men in high position at Rome used to say that the Opposition was abusing its freedom, to disseminate heresies. If the bishops themselves have at the last moment come round to this view, and recognize as the doctrine and law of the Church the contrary of what they have hitherto maintained, they will inevitably have to atone for the scandal they have given. These are things requiring not simply to be recanted but refuted, for they were listened to and have roused conviction in many hearts. The announcement that the Vatican Council was a long intrigue, carried through by treachery and force, has penetrated the whole world. Not only are bishops of opinion that it was not the real object to give true expression to the faith of the whole Church, and that their proofs from Scripture and Tradition, reason and morals, remained unanswered. If priests and laymen reject the decree now, that is simply the effect of the bishops' example and the echo of their words. The movement obeys the impulse they gave, and follows the course they pointed out; they are its originators and its natural leaders. On them it depends whether the defence of the ancient organization of the Church is to be restrained within the limits of law and to conservative ends, or whether Catholic science will be forced into a contest with the authorities of the Church themselves. I believe that you will not forget your words or deny your work, for I place my trust in those bishops—there were Germans among them—who at the

* Not written by his own hand, but at his suggestion, and disseminated by him in Rome.

very close of the Council reminded their colleagues '*that they must persevere to the end, and give the world an example of courage and endurance, which it so greatly needs.*'"

Nor was this an isolated protest. Scarcely had the Pastoral appeared when it was followed up by what may be called the first manifesto of the Old Catholic party as such, put forth by a body of Catholic professors assembled at Nuremberg in September, 1870; and this address was speedily supplemented by similar documents published at Coblenz and Munich. We give the text of the Nuremberg manifesto as it stands, as well on account of its importance as the first open declaration of resistance, as because it states with great clearness the main grounds of resistance to the authority of the Vatican Synod :

"We are convinced that a longer silence neither becomes us nor is for the good of the Church, in view of the Papal decrees published by the Bull *Pastor Aeternus*, following on the vote of the majority of the Vatican Assembly on July 18, 1870. The third chapter of the *Constitutio de Ecclesiâ Christi* states that 'the Bishop of Rome not only has the supreme care and guidance of the Church, but possesses plenary power and ordinary and immediate jurisdiction over all churches, and each church separately, over all church officers and individual Christians.' The fourth chapter teaches that it is a truth revealed by God that the Roman Pontiff, when speaking *ex cathedrâ* to the Universal Church on points of faith and morals, possesses the infallibility promised by Christ to the Church, and, therefore, such decisions are irreformable of themselves, and not from the consent of the Church.

"These principles we cannot accept as the utterance of a really Œcumenical Council; we reject them as *new* doctrines, never acknowledged by the Church. And we recount the following grounds of our rejection, reserving a strictly scientific exposition of them. 1. The secrecy observed before the opening of the Council, and the hindrances thrown in the way of a complete bearing of testimony and free expression of opinion by the premature closing of the debate, prevented the doctrine of the Church on these points being proved and established at the Synod. And thus the indispensable office of an Œcumenical Council was set aside. 2. That freedom from all moral compulsion and exercise of influence by authority, which is essential to an Œcumenical Council, was wanting, because, (*a*) in contradiction to the usage of former Councils, the Pope imposed an

order of business on the assembly which hampered its freedom, in spite of the protest of a great number of bishops, and afterwards changed and upheld it against their renewed protest, without the assent of the Council ; (b) in a doctrine first to be decided, and which concerned the Pope personally, a moral pressure was exercised on the members through the most various means at the command of the Pope. 3. The rule hitherto observed in the Church—that only that can be an article of faith which has been acknowledged as such always, everywhere and by all—has been departed from at the Vatican Council. A mere portion of an episcopal assembly, against the persevering opposition, finally renewed in writing, of a minority, influential as well from its members as from the dignity and extent of the churches it represents, has made into an article of faith a doctrine notoriously and evidently wanting in all the three requisite conditions of universality, antiquity and consent. This procedure exemplifies in act the wholly new principle that an opinion, the contrary of which has been freely taught and believed in many dioceses, can be declared to be a divinely revealed doctrine. 4. The third chapter expressly assigns to the Pope the ordinary jurisdiction in each diocese, which belongs according to Catholic doctrine to the bishop, and thus alters, and in one sense completely overthrows, the nature and essence of the Episcopate, as a divine institution founded in the apostolate, and an integral constituent of the Church. 5. By the assertion that all doctrinal judgments of the Popes addressed to the whole Church are infallible, these ecclesiastico-political maxims and statements of ancient and modern Papal decrees are declared to be infallible rules of faith, which teach the subjection of states, peoples and princes, to the authority of the Popes even in secular matters, and establish principles, about the toleration of heretics and the civil rights of the clergy, opposed to the present order of society. Thereby will the peaceful understanding between Church and State, clergy and laity, Catholics and non-Catholics, be excluded for the future.

“In view of the disturbance these new doctrines have already introduced into the Church, and which will obviously increase, we place our confidence in those bishops who have opposed these doctrines, and by their attitude at the Council have deserved the thanks of the Catholic world, and we entreat them to use all means in their power to bring about the assembling of a true and free Œcumenical Council, and therefore one not to be held in Italy, but on this side of the Alps.”

For some months the controversy smouldered on. The theological professors of Munich, with two exceptions, had

given in their submission to the new dogma on the demand of the Archbishop, though nobody supposed that they really believed it, least of all Haneberg, Abbot of St. Boniface and Professor of Oriental Languages in the University, who was well known for his liberal sentiments, and whose recantation was a public scandal. At length, by the end of March, the utmost time allowed for consideration had elapsed, and Friedrich had formally refused to acknowledge the Council and its decrees. On March 29, Döllinger sent in his *Erklärung*, which at once struck a chord that has vibrated throughout Catholic Germany. He states his readiness and desire to prove before the assembly of German bishops then about to be held, five points: (1) that none of the passages of Scripture quoted for Papal infallibility are so understood by any of the Fathers, and therefore the Tridentine oath to interpret Scripture *secundum unanimum consensum Patrum*, binds him to reject that dogma; (2) that the assertion made in several recent Pastorals and other official documents, that Papal infallibility and autoeracy existed from the beginning in the Church, is in flagrant contradiction to the facts and tradition of the first thousand years of her history; (3) that the bishops of Romance countries, who formed the overwhelming majority at the Council, have been misled by text-books full of spurious or adulterated citations, such as Perrone's *Praelections*, Liguori's *Moral Theology*, and the writings of Cardoni and others, which were distributed at Rome during the Council; (4) that two Ecumenical Councils of the fifteenth century, confirmed by several Popes, have decided against the infallibility and autoeracy of the Papacy; (5) that the new dogmas are incompatible with the existing constitutions of European States, and, in particular, with that of Bavaria, which he has himself sworn to observe.* Döllinger adds that thousands of the clergy and hundreds of thousands of the laity believe as he does, and that every one he meets assures him that nobody believes the Vatican dogmas, even of those who have announced their formal submission. He shews that the attribution to the Pope of the "whole plenitude of power," is a virtual annihilation

* It is understood that these points will be worked out by him in a volume now in course of preparation.

of the Episcopate, and was so understood at the time by the minority bishops, whose abortive attempts to stave off the decision, and the means by which they were overcome, which remind one of the *Latrocinium* of Ephesus, are then dwelt upon. After again insisting on the tremendous gravity of the question at issue, as affecting the very foundations of the faith, he winds up with the solemn declaration, that as a Christian, a theologian, an historical student and a citizen, he cannot receive the new doctrine.

“Not as a theologian, for the entire genuine tradition of the Church is directly at issue with it. Not as a student of history, for as such I know that the persistent endeavour to carry out this theory has cost Europe rivers of blood, disturbed and ruined whole countries, overthrown the fair organization of the ancient Church, and produced and fostered the deadliest abuses in her bosom. Lastly, I must reject it as a citizen, because, with its claim for the subjection of countries and monarchs and the whole political order under Papal authority, and by the exemptions demanded for the clergy, it gives occasion to endless and fatal division between Church and State, clergy and laity. For I cannot conceal from myself that this doctrine, whose consequences brought the old German empire to destruction, were it to become dominant in Catholic Germany now, would at once implant the seeds of a deadly malady in the new empire just established.”

This statement was presented to the Archbishop on March 29. On Palm Sunday, April 2, a Pastoral was read in all the churches of Munich, threatening to “cut off” the author “from the Catholic Church” if he persisted in his resistance; while his request for a hearing was refused on the ground that the question was already infallibly determined, and historical inquiry must succumb to the authority of the Church. On Holy Thursday, and again on Easter Day, April 9, Dr. Döllinger solemnly pontificated in the Royal Chapel, of which he is mitred Provost. On the 10th of April, a large meeting was held in the Hall of the Museum at Munich, at which many high officials of the Court and the Government were present, when an address to the King was drawn up, which received above 12,000 signatures, requesting him to use all legitimate means for averting the perilous consequences which must follow the dissemination of the new dogma, and to forbid its being taught in public

schools and colleges. Meanwhile, on the 2nd of April, nearly the whole Catholic professoriate of Munich had joined in presenting an address of sympathy to Döllinger, which was quickly followed up by similar addresses from several towns and universities of Germany. A Committee also was formed at Munich to organize the movement in opposition to the Vatican decrees. On the Sunday after the meeting in the Museum, a second Pastoral of the Archbishop's was read out, announcing that all who took part in it were *ipso facto* excommunicated; and on Monday, April 18, the Archbishop pronounced the greater excommunication against Dr. Döllinger for "the crime of formal and external heresy." His friend and colleague, Dr. Friedrich, one of the authors of the *Letters of Quirinus*, had already been excommunicated.

The sentence took nobody by surprise, but it was felt to be a distinct intimation that Rome had thrown away the scabbard, and was resolved to fight out the contest for her newly-constructed creed to the bitter end. Dr. Döllinger is reported to have answered those who urged him to secure himself from further molestation by a timely retreat: "I have little left to hope or fear on earth. The grave is opening before me, and I will not descend into it with a lie in my mouth." The situation was indeed a striking one. Here was a venerable man, full of days and of honours, who has justly been styled "the Nestor of Catholic theology," the one living Catholic divine, with the exception of Dr. Newman, who enjoys a European celebrity, cast out in his old age by the authorities of that Church to whose service he had dedicated from early youth the undivided labours of a long and singularly laborious life. He is over seventy, and in old age men crave for rest; his prestige is immense in his own communion, and he knew that by whispering one little word he would have had Pope and hierarchy at his feet, and by refusing it would incur their bitterest obloquy, and draw down on himself the vilest aspersions of a party just now dominant in the Church, who enjoy the unenviable distinction of having reduced vituperation to a science; he is by instinct and habit a conservative, and by nature a man of peace, and to refuse assent to the Vatican dogmas was to occupy outwardly the position of a rebel against authority, and to engage in a warfare which could

only end with his life; he is a high dignitary of the Church, and to refuse was to assume, to vulgar apprehension, the rôle of an heresiarch. But he faltered not for a moment. Neither ease nor honour, nor a quiet old age, nor immunity from slander, nor the sanction of authority, of which he has always been the resolute upholder, would he purchase by throwing, or seeming to throw, one grain of incense on the altar of the new idolatry. But it is sneeringly said, and not only by Ultramontanes, that however conscientious may be his motives, his position is a grotesque anomaly, unless he is willing to break with the Church altogether, and place himself, like a second Luther, at the head of a new Reformation. He is "walking on a razor's edge;" there are no bishops on his side, and he can only justify his opposition to the Council by rejecting the infallibility of the Church. Such criticisms betray a profound ignorance both of the character of the *Alt-katholik* movement and of ecclesiastical history. There is nothing new in the appeal from an innovating Council to the ancient creeds; from the tyranny of a time-serving or heterodox Episcopate to the *sensus fidelium*, the traditional belief of the great body of the faithful. Not to cite later examples, the *Latrocinium* of Ephesus and the Arianizing Synod of Rimini had all the external semblance of conciliar authority, and it was more than twenty-two years before the latter was superseded by any corporate act of the Church. When, again, in St. Jerome's words, the whole world groaned to find itself Arian, it was neither from Pope nor Episcopate that salvation came. What Father Hyacinthe has said of the present crisis was even more emphatically true then: "Toutefois ce n'est pas dans un évêque, mais dans un simple prêtre qu'il se personnifie." To adopt Dr. Newman's words in his History of the Arians, certainly not written with any reference to the present controversy: "The Episcopate whose action was so prompt and concordant at Nicæa on the rise of Arianism, did not, as a class or order of men, play a good part in the troubles consequent upon the Council, *and the laity did*. The Catholic people, in the length and breadth of Christendom, were the obstinate champions of Catholic truth, *and the bishops were not*. Of course there were great and illustrious exceptions, . . . but on the whole, taking a wide view of the history, we are obliged to say that *the*

*governing body of the Church came short, and the governed were pre-eminent in faith, zeal, courage and constancy.** And who, we may add, gave the first impulse, and was throughout the sustaining power, of that Catholic opposition to tyrannous and triumphant error? Popes were vacillating or silent; bishops, like Cranmer and his motley crew at a later day, were cowering or fawning before the steps of a despotic throne; it was not even the priesthood that supplied, as now, the destined champion of orthodoxy. It was a youthful deacon, as yet without name or fame or position in the Church, who stood forth in the day of trial, "among the faithless, faithful only found," *Athanasius contra mundum*. It is no cause for surprise, still less for cavil, if the experience of the fourth century should renew itself in the nineteenth. And those who believe in God's promises to His Church will doubt as little of the ultimate result. Meanwhile, to the objection that Catholics in revolt against their ecclesiastical superiors are self-condemned, we may be content to reply with the comment of St. Hilary on a similar phenomenon in his own day: "Sanctiores sunt aures plebis quam corda sacerdotum."

And now to resume the thread of our narrative. Towards the end of May, another joint Pastoral was issued by twenty-three German bishops, equally conspicuous with that of the previous August for its sweeping condemnation of all who adhered to what had been their own professed principles at the Council, and for its shuffling evasion of the unmistakable sense of the Vatican decrees and of the facts of history, especially as to the extent of the powers claimed by the Papacy, and now placed under the shelter of an infallible sanction, over every department of political and social life. Professor Schulte, of Prague, the first living canonist of Germany, and formerly a strong Ultramontane, had pointed out in a masterly pamphlet at the beginning of the year, the absurdity of, in the same breath, accepting the Vatican dogmas and shrinking from the simplest consequences of any genuine belief in their truth.† His summing-up on this head is a bare statement of facts notorious to every student of Church history:

* *Arians of the Fourth Century*, 3rd Edition, p. 454.

† *Die Macht der römischen Päpste über Fürsten, Länder, Völker, Individuen, &c.* Von Dr. J. F. von Schulte. Prag. 1871.

"Since it has been declared by Popes *ex cathedrâ* that the Popes have never exceeded the limits of their power, or erred in their canons and constitutions, and that their constitutions rest on divine inspiration; since no declaration can be quoted which distinctly exempts any one side of individual or social life from their jurisdiction; since in Papal acts and decrees all kinds of civil and private rights are embodied, the disposition of crowns, peoples, territories, laws, treaties of princes, property, freedom and life of subjects, whether Catholic or not, marriage, wills, inheritances, public and private security, authorizations to seize the property of others, invade their rights, &c. &c.; it necessarily follows that it rests simply with the Pope whether he will or will not act in any given case. Thus have they justified in word and act their own statements that they are the representatives of the Almighty. The limits of Papal omnipotence on earth depend solely on their own will."

The new Pastoral only added fuel to the flame, and it was determined to hold a Conference at Munich, to which delegates from other parts of Germany should be invited, in Whitsun week, under the presidency of Dr. Döllinger. Professors Schulte of Prague, Reinkens of Breslau, Knoodt of Bonn, Stumpf of Coblenz, and Michelis of Braunsberg, were present, and a programme was agreed upon, which formed the basis of that subsequently adopted at the Congress of last September. It enters more fully, however, than the latter into the theoretical aspect of the question at issue, and a brief résumé of its contents will not be out of place here. It was published at the time in the German newspapers as a manifesto to the world in general of the principles and aims of the *Alt-katholik* party in the Church.

The document is divided into five points. 1. It opens with the declaration that the signatories are bound, by their acknowledged duty as Catholics, to adhere to the ancient faith of the Church and repudiate every novelty, even though preached by an angel from heaven, and must therefore persist in their rejection of the new dogmas of the infallibility and absolute supremacy of the Pope, which are mere scholastic opinions originating in fraud and disseminated by violence, incompatible with the just rights of the faithful and the Vincentian canon, *quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus*. The assertion of the last Pastoral, that Peter has proclaimed these doctrines by the mouth of Pius IX., they

denounce as a blasphemy; and the attempt to explain away both the letter and spirit of the decrees, as unauthorized and self-contradictory. 2. The Vatican decrees are a standing menace to the laws and institutions of all modern states. It is the merest sophistry to suppress or ignore the numerous Bulls and decisions of Popes which subject all rights, spiritual or temporal, to the absolute sovereignty of the Holy See, or to deny that to be a *personal* infallibility which belongs *ex officio* to a single person independently of all others; and the German bishops are perfectly aware that their collective interpretation has no real authority and much less weight than the opposite interpretation of a single Jesuit. Other prelates, like Archbishop Manning, have more correctly appreciated the meaning of the decrees, according to which it is clear that the Pope, as sole legislator in matters of faith, discipline and morals, supreme judge and irresponsible ruler and executor of his own decrees, possesses a plenitude of power which the wildest fancy cannot exaggerate. 3. The bishops have refuted themselves by their strange and contradictory utterances, forgetting that, if they allowed themselves the same latitude of interpretation in dealing with other dogmatic statements as with, e.g., the Bull of Boniface VIII., *Unam Sanctam*,* all definite faith would be at an end. They dare not, like Manning and the Jesuits, take the Vatican dogmas in their plain and natural sense, while yet "they meet the cry of conscience that comes from their flocks with nothing but invectives against reason and science." 4. The signatories therefore reject, as of no force or authority, the menaces and unjust sentences pronounced against them. That doctrine has ever been held false in the Church which can be shewn, like Papal infallibility, to have been introduced at a given time, by particular persons, and to serve particular interests. And it is for refusing to accept such a novel invention that now, for the first time in eighteen centuries, men are being excommunicated. "We know," adds the Declaration, "that such sentences are as invalid as they are unjust, and neither deprive the faithful of their right to the sacraments of Christ, nor

* The Bull *Unam Sanctam*, issued 1302, asserts dogmatically the absolute supremacy of the spiritual over the temporal power in all matters whatsoever, and declares it, in this comprehensive sense, "necessary to salvation for every human creature to be subject to the Roman Pontiff."

priests of their power to dispense them ; and we are determined not to allow our rights to be prejudiced by censures pronounced for the promotion of false doctrine." 5. The fifth and concluding paragraph, which is a very important one, shall be given in their own words :

"We live in the hope that the present struggle may serve, under Divine Providence, to bring about the long-desired and now inevitable reforms in the constitution and life of the Church. In the midst of our present troubles we are consoled by looking to the future. If at present we are confronted everywhere by those rank abuses in the Church which have not only been rendered unassailable, but exaggerated to the annihilation of all Christian life through the triumph of the Vatican dogmas ; if we have to deplore the sedulous endeavours after a paralyzing centralization and mechanical uniformity ; if we are compelled to watch the growing incapacity of the hierarchy, which can only accompany or interrupt the great intellectual labour of modern days with the empty jingling of obsolete phrases and impotent curses—we are consoled by the memory of better times, and our confidence in the Divine Guide of the Church. While we thus look backwards and forwards, there rises before us a vision of the true regeneration of the Church, when the cultivated nations of Catholicism, without prejudice to their membership in the general body, but free from the yoke of unrighteous ambition, shall mould and consolidate, each for itself, a church system corresponding to its national character and in harmony with its cultivation, through the joint action of clergy and laity ; while the universal Catholic world enjoys the guidance of a Primacy and Episcopate which has won for itself by science, and by its share in the common life, the capacity to restore and preserve permanently to the Church the place alone worthy of her, at the head of the civilization of the world. By this means, and not through the Vatican decrees, shall we also reach that highest end of Christian development, the union of the now divided Christian communities, which is willed and promised by the Founder of the Church, invoked and yearned after with an ever-increasing desire by numberless pious souls, and not least in Germany. May God grant it !"

The question here referred to, of the invalidity of unjust excommunications, soon became a practical one. At the end of June, Dr. Zenger, Professor of Roman Law at Munich, who had been one of the first to sign the address of sympathy to Dr. Döllinger, died at the age of 73. He was told by the priest who attended him that he could not

receive the last sacraments until he had retracted his signature. This he of course declined to do; and eventually Dr. Friedrich administered the sacraments, and also performed the funeral rites after his death—which were refused by the parish priest—and delivered an address at the cemetery, in presence of some 20,000 persons, including nearly the whole professorial staff of the University, who came to testify their respect to his memory and their sense of the injustice of his treatment. A similar difficulty occurred in the case of marriages of persons who had incurred excommunication by taking any public part in the movement. By Bavarian law, the marriage of Catholics can only be solemnized according to the Tridentine canons, which require the presence of the parish priest; and the parish priests, instructed by the Archbishop, refused to act. Here, again, Dr. Friedrich interposed and performed the ceremony; but the question was raised, how far such acts were legally valid. In this and other ways the matter was forced on the attention of the Government, who were known to be favourably disposed towards the *Alt-katholiken*, but shy of committing themselves to any definite line. Meanwhile, in July, Dr. Döllinger was elected *Rector Magnificus* of the University for the ensuing year, being the four-hundredth anniversary of its foundation, by the wholly unprecedented majority of 54 votes over 6. The circumstance of his having held the Rectorship only four years before, when he delivered a very remarkable Inaugural Address,* which has since been translated into English and frequently quoted in Parliament and elsewhere, made this second election the more marked a homage to his high character and claims on public respect. The Government were petitioned by the Church authorities not to confirm the election; and thus again the necessity of their defining their attitude towards the rival parties became manifest. What the reply would be when given could hardly be doubtful; but it was an unfortunate error of policy that it was deferred so long. Many of the clergy who submitted “with a smile or a sigh” to what had come to be called in Germany the “famine dogma” (*Hungerdogma*), would unquestionably have joined the ranks of the *Alt-katholiken*, had they been assured that degradation and

* *Die Universitäten sonst und jetzt.* München. 1867.

beggary would not be the inevitable result of adhering to their convictions. This fact, which is notorious to all who have had any opportunities of personal observation, should be borne in mind by those who are never tired of dwelling on the paucity of clerical supporters of the movement. It requires more than ordinary courage to be true to conscientious convictions with starvation staring one in the face; and the more so when the question is one which may be made to seem more or less obscure to those who have little historical or theological learning to fall back upon, and are open to the plausible subterfuges of episcopal and other special-pleaders, with more knowledge than themselves and less scruple in the use of it.

At length, towards the end of August, an official note appeared from Herr von Lutz, the Bavarian Minister of Education and Ecclesiastical Affairs, in reply to the Archbishop's Pastoral of the previous month. In this document, the grave dissatisfaction with which the Government necessarily views the Vatican decrees in their political aspect is insisted upon, and the reasons are pointed out why they cannot be considered, especially in view of the notorious tergiversation of so many bishops who had at first strenuously opposed them, as embodying the faith of the Church. The infallibility of the Pope is shewn to be widely different from the infallibility of the Church, which can only be exercised under conditions and guarantees wholly wanting to the former, as is sufficiently plain, to go no further back, from the portentous *ex cathedra* decisions contained in the Syllabus. The Minister concludes with stating that the Government will refuse all legal force to acts done by the ecclesiastical authorities in furtherance of the Vatican decrees. Two months later, in reply to an interpellation in the Chambers, Herr von Lutz repeated at greater length and in more explicit terms what he had previously written. After entering at some length on the theological argument against the validity of the decrees, he exhibited in detail the glaring contradictions of episcopal utterances on the subject before and after the Council. And if the new dogma has no claim to respect on ecclesiastical grounds, it constitutes in its direct and necessary consequences—which have been elaborately drawn out by the *Civiltà Cattolica* and other Jesuit commentators—a standing menace to the State.

The Government will therefore extend full legal protection to those Catholics, whether priests or laymen, who resist it, and to Catholic parents who desire to have their children educated in the ancient and unaltered faith of the Church. Congregations of Old Catholics, and the priests ministering to them, will be recognized by the law as enjoying all rights and privileges appertaining to the Catholic Church. This second declaration of Ministerial policy followed quickly on an important event which formed the starting-point for the future progress and development of the *Alt-katholik* movement, the Catholic Congress held in Munich on the 22nd, 23rd and 24th of last September, to which we referred in an earlier portion of this article. To this we must now revert.

The Congress met on Friday, Sept. 22, under the honorary presidency of Professor Schulte, of Prague, a Prussian by birth, and held two sessions on that day and one on Saturday, for discussion and despatch of business, and two public meetings afterwards in the Glass Palace on Saturday and Sunday afternoons, when addresses were delivered by some of its principal members to audiences of several thousands of persons. Schulte presided, and not Döllinger, because the Congress and the movement it was designed to organize are the response of educated Germany to his public declaration of the previous March. And therefore on his first appearance the whole assembly rose as one man, at the invitation of the President, to offer "the homage of its profoundest gratitude to the most venerated of German theologians, who has come forward under a stern sense of duty and at great personal cost, amid the almost universal apostasy of the Episcopate, to devote the weight of his vast influence and enormous stores of learning to the furtherance of the movement directed in conscientious opposition to the Vatican decrees." One of the Vice-presidents was Windsheid, formerly Professor at Munich, now at Heidelberg, and the most eminent lecturer on Roman Law in Germany, who is deeply interested in the question; the other was Keller, of Aarau, one of the chief men in the canton, who has written a book against Gury's Moral Theology.* The

* Gury's book is a compendium from Liguori, declared the other day by Pius IX. to be a "Doctor of the Church."

selection of these three men for the most prominent positions in the Congress was a sufficient indication of the movement not being a local one. The Committee appointed to draw up the resolutions consisted of Döllinger, Schulte, Maassen, Professor of Canon Law at Vienna, and the most rising man in that branch of knowledge in Germany; Professor Langen, of Bonn, author of a masterly pamphlet on the "Vatican Dogma;" Reinkens, of Breslau, who has also written on the "Papal Decrees of July 18," and Huber, one of the contributors to *Janus*.

The first and part of the second session was occupied with the discussion of the programme, drawn up by the Committee, and introduced and commented on by Huber. We append a full translation of this important manifesto, which was unanimously accepted, after a full debate, with a few alterations, marking the added or substituted words in italics, and bracketing those eventually omitted:

Programme of the Catholic Congress at Munich.

"I. In the consciousness of our religious duties, we hold fast to the ancient Catholic faith and worship, as witnessed in Scripture and Tradition. We therefore hold ourselves to be in the fullest sense members of the Catholic Church, and refuse to be excluded from Church communion or from the ecclesiastical and civil rights thence accruing.

"We declare the ecclesiastical censures inflicted on us on account of our loyalty to the faith to be groundless and arbitrary, and shall not be disturbed or hindered by them in the exercise of Church communion.

"From the standpoint of the confession of faith contained in the so-called Tridentine Creed, we reject the dogmas formulated under the Pontificate of Pius IX., in contradiction to the teaching of the Church and the principles followed since the Apostolic Council, especially the dogmas of 'the infallible teaching office,' and the 'supreme ordinary and immediate jurisdiction' of the Pope.*

"II. We hold fast to the ancient constitution of the Church. We repudiate every attempt to thrust the bishops out of the immediate and independent government of the separate churches. We reject the doctrine contained in the Vatican decrees, that the Pope is the sole divinely constituted possessor of all ecclesiastical

* This was explained by the mover of the programme, Professor Huber, to include the Immaculate Conception, both as being illegitimately defined by Pius IX., and as originating, like Infallibility, from forgeries and falsifications.

authority and official power, as opposed to the Tridentine canon, according to which the divinely appointed hierarchy consists of bishops, priests and deacons. We acknowledge the primacy of the Bishop of Rome, as it was acknowledged by the Fathers and Councils in the ancient undivided Christian Church* on the basis of Scripture.

“(a). We declare that articles of faith cannot be defined simply by the sentence of the reigning Pope with the express or tacit assent of the bishops, who are bound by oath to unconditional obedience to him, but only in accordance with Holy Scripture and the ancient tradition of the Church as laid down in the acknowledged Fathers and Councils. Even a Council not wanting, like the Vatican, in the essential external conditions of ecumenicity, but effecting a breach with the first principles and the past of the Church with unanimous consent of its members, could issue no decrees binding on the members of the Church.

“(b). We insist that the agreement of the dogmatic decrees of a Council with the original and traditional faith of the Church must be attested in the immediate consciousness of belief of the Catholic people and in theological science. We reserve to the Catholic laity and clergy and to theological science the right of witnessing and of objecting in the definition of articles of faith.

“III. We aim, by the aid of the sciences of theology and canon law, at a reform in the Church which shall remove existing faults and abuses in the spirit of the ancient Church, and especially shall fulfil the legitimate desires of the Catholic people for a *constitutionally organized* participation in the affairs of the Church, *whereby, without prejudice to unity of doctrine, national views and requirements may be recognized.*

“We declare that the charge of Jansenism brought against the Church of Utrecht is unfounded, and consequently that there is no dogmatic difference between it and ourselves.

“We hope for a re-union with the Greek-Eastern and Russian Churches, whose separation was produced by no constraining causes, and rests on no *irreconcilable*† dogmatic differences.

“In view of the reforms aimed at, and by means of science and advancing Christian culture, we look for a gradual understanding with [the other Christian confessions, especially] the Protestant and the Episcopal Churches [of England and America].‡

* Explained to mean, up to the ninth century (when the spurious decretals were introduced).

† Substituted for “essential.” The *Filioque* is the point referred to.

‡ It was proposed to insert “German” before “Protestant,” but was eventually thought better to omit any national specifications; hence the omission of England and America.

"IV. We hold scientific study indispensable in the education of the Catholic clergy.

"We consider the artificial exclusion of the clergy from the intellectual culture of the age (in boys' seminaries and higher schools under the one-sided direction of the bishops) dangerous, on account of their great influence on the culture of the people, *and especially ill adapted for the education and training of a morally pious, scientifically enlightened and patriotically minded clergy.**

"We demand for the so-called inferior clergy a worthy position, protected against all caprice of the hierarchy. We reject the arbitrary right of moving from place to place (*amovibilitas ad nutum*) the clergy with cure of souls, introduced by French law and lately attempted to be made general.†

"V. We adhere to the constitutions of our countries, which secure civil freedom and liberal culture, and therefore reject the dogma of plenary Papal power, so perilous to the State on civil and educational as well as on other grounds; and we declare our firm and loyal adherence to our Governments in the contest against the Ultramontanism formulated into dogma in the Syllabus.

"VI. Since it is notorious that the present mischievous distraction in the Church is the fault of the so-called Society of Jesus; since this Order abuses its powerful position to spread and foment in the hierarchy, clergy and people, tendencies hostile to civilization, dangerous to the State and anti-national; and since it teaches and *enforces‡* a false and corrupting morality,—we proclaim our conviction that peace and growth, unity in the Church, and right relations between the Church and civil society, are impossible until an end is put to the universally pernicious activity of this Order.

"VII. As members of the Catholic Church before it was altered by the Vatican decrees, to which the States have guaranteed political recognition and public protection, we also maintain our claim to all real property and possessions of the Church."

This programme was discussed, point by point, during several hours, down to its minutest details, all the leading

* Substituted for, "We desire the co-operation of the secular magistrates for the education," &c. The influence of the Jesuits on clerical education is the point chiefly aimed at.

† The French system was described by the mover as reducing the lower clergy to "pariahs." He said that in Paris hundreds of suspended clergymen were acting as waiters, cabmen and compositors.

‡ Substituted for "practises."

members of the Congress taking part in the debate ; and it is remarkable to observe, amid some minor and mostly verbal differences, which resulted in the few alterations above specified, how complete was the unanimity on all matters of principle. It will be seen at a glance that the basis of operations indicated is very far from being, as has sometimes been objected, of a purely negative character. On the contrary, those who accept it are directly pledged to grapple with practical abuses and aim at practical reforms, the main points insisted upon being the active promotion of the re-union of separated bodies to the Catholic Church, and primarily of those communities, like the Greek Church and the Church of Utrecht, which are not held aloof by any real dogmatic differences ; the improvement of clerical education and of the *status* of the inferior clergy, and the restoration to the laity of a due share in ecclesiastical affairs ; and the expulsion of Jesuit influences from the Church. It is obvious that each of these objects implies much more than is contained in the mere statement, and that anything like an effective carrying out of the line of policy projected would transform, in the sense of a return to earlier models in conformity with present needs, the whole life and spirit of the modern Church. And the tone of deep, impassioned earnestness and calm resolve which pervaded all the speeches, proves how intently the leaders of the movement are bent on effecting their purpose. Still more clearly was this resolution manifested in the debates which followed on the establishment of unions (*Vereine*) throughout Germany for "the general organization of the *Alt-katholik* movement," and on the formation, wherever necessary, of *Alt-katholik* congregations (*Gemeinde*) for worship, instruction and ministration of the sacraments. On the latter point there was some divergence of opinion between Döllinger and other leading members of the party, which looked at first, from the perfect freedom of speech on all sides, more serious than it really was. No doubt several currents of thought met in Schulte's decisive motion for the organization of congregations in which priests suspended or excommunicated for resistance to the new dogma should be called to minister. There is a strong and growing national feeling in Germany in favour of restricting Roman influences to the *minimum* involved in the original idea of the Primacy,

and that partly with a view to paving the way for the reconciliation of the Protestant confessions ; then, again, there is a deep moral indignation against much which is tolerated or fostered by the policy of the *Curia*, and a disposition in some quarters to think that, through the excesses and usurpations based on the false decretals and other kindred forgeries, Rome has gravely prejudiced, if not actually forfeited, even her legitimate authority, whatever that may be. But above all—and this was urged by devout and conservative speakers like Liaño and cautious politicians like Reinkens, just as much as by the more impetuous spirits of the party—there was a pressing practical need (*Nothstand*). Old Catholics were being refused the offices of the Church for themselves and their children. They could not get married, or receive the last sacraments on their death-beds, or even get their children baptized, still less instructed, except in the infallibilist doctrine. It was essential that this emergency should be met, and met promptly, if the movement were to hold its own ; and it was only natural that this necessity should be more keenly realized by men in the thick of the battle, than by those whose position and pursuits, as in Döllinger's case, did not bring them into immediate personal contact with the pastoral work of the Church and the cure of souls. His fear was lest any unadvised step should be taken that might wear an appearance of wilful schism, and thus discredit the claims of the *Alt-katholiken* to be bonâ-fide members and ministers of the Catholic Church. But he quite admitted that provision must be made for cases of necessity, and this, as Michelis and Schulte pointed out, is all that was desired. Their proposal meant that wherever there was a sufficient number of *Alt-katholiken*, a congregation should be organized ; and this has in fact been done at several places, including Munich, where the church of St. Nicholas has since the Congress been used every Sunday for *Alt-katholik* worship. Eye-witnesses, by no means favourable to the cause, have described the unabated zeal with which it is regularly frequented in all weathers, and by persons of all ages, ranks and classes and either sex, and the manifest devotion of the crowds who are compelled from stress of room to kneel around as well as within the church during the celebration of mass.

That does not look like a movement destitute of enthusiasm. Schulte expressed his full conviction at the close of the debate, and he was not contradicted, that his seeming difference with Döllinger was one of words only ; nor did Döllinger then or afterwards for a moment cease his active co-operation with the leaders of the movement. We have dwelt on this point at what may seem unnecessary length, because no pains have been spared by unfriendly critics to exaggerate what at most was a divergence of judgment on practical details, into a split between the great standard-bearer of the Catholic Opposition and the army that is fighting under his banner.

At the two public meetings in the Glass Palace, a series of popular addresses of much eloquence and force were delivered by Schulte, Huber, Van Thiel (from Utrecht), Father Hyacinthe, Reinkens, Michelis and others, which will well repay perusal. They are important as conveying a practical refutation of the charge, so persistently repeated, against the movement, that it represents a merely abstract and doctrinaire phase of thought, without points of contact with the people or any motive power for kindling their interest or enthusiasm. No criticism could be less felicitous. At the same time, when we are told that Döllinger has no such appliances as Luther for working on the minds of his countrymen, and thus lacks the first element of success, the fact may be at once admitted, or rather insisted upon, while the inference is denied. The founder of a new religion requires, in the absence of miraculous assistance, rare gifts of genius or enthusiasm, if any considerable section of mankind is to listen to his message. And Lutheranism, as taught by its founder, with its novel and profoundly immoral theory of justification, was as startling a contrast to any form of Christianity the world had previously heard of as can easily be imagined. It was simply "another gospel," admirably adapted to serve its immediate purpose, but requiring all the genius and commanding moral energy of its author, backed by the peculiar conditions of his age and country, to get it accepted as the basis of a new communion designed to supersede the Church which had been for fifteen centuries in uninterrupted possession. Such an instrument of religious revolution the present movement neither needs nor admits. It is one thing to re-construct *de novo* the faith

and worship of Christendom, on the assumption of an universal apostasy dating from the apostolic age; it is quite another to appeal, against the modern errors and abuses by which it is overlaid, to the unchangeable creed and original constitution of the One Catholic Church. The *Alt-katholiken* have undertaken the humbler, and therefore, as we venture to think, more practicable and more profitable task. They desiderate reform, not revolution. They do not, like the followers of Rongé, call themselves "New Catholics," but expressly base their plan of action on the loyal maintenance of the ancient faith. It is precisely because the Vatican dogmas demonstrably contradict that faith, that they are rejected; it is because, alike in its antecedents, in its course of proceedings and in its close, the Vatican Synod lacked every criterion of a genuine (Ecumenical Council,—because its members were collected blindfold to register a foregone conclusion,—because it was neither free in its deliberations nor even outwardly unanimous in its decisions,—and because from the first they have been instinctively rejected by the judgment of theologians and the common intelligence of the faithful,—that it cannot be considered to speak with any authoritative voice, or to represent the real mind of the Church. It is true that for rejecting it Döllinger has been excommunicated by Papal authority; but so, too, was Athanasius.

If it is asked what measure of success may be expected to attend the efforts of the reforming party, the answer must be less explicit, though the end cannot be doubtful. The Papal system, which gradually superseded the original constitution of the Church, has now been for centuries in possession, and clings, as is natural, with desperate tenacity to its usurped prerogatives. But there are not wanting signs that, as Döllinger himself is reported to have expressed it, "Philoctetes has received his death-wound, and it is only a question of time. A movement is set on foot which must sooner or later triumph, and the Curialistic system must succumb before it." He believes that the fall of the Temporal Power will conduce towards this result; but he relies more confidently on the invincible force of truth, and immediately on the progress of liberal and enlightened views throughout Europe, and especially in Germany, where the great body of the educated classes are strongly opposed

to Ultramontanism. This is, indeed, no ephemeral outburst of zeal, depending on individual influence or local accident, like the attempted reform of Savonarola; it is no inchoate revolt against Catholic doctrine which has not yet found its natural vent in a Protestant secession, leaving the waters to close over it as though it had never been. Not only do the ramifications of the movement spread far and wide, not only is it animated by a keen enthusiasm, but it has fixed principles easily apprehended, and definite aims of surpassing moment, while the seemingly compact ranks of the dominant majority are demoralized by internal division and the faltering or insincere allegiance of a host of its nominal supporters to their newly-adopted creed. Some desponding souls, to quote the language of the martyred Archbishop of Paris, thought all was lost when the cause of truth was outvoted in the Vatican Synod. But it was not so. "Si la multitude passe quandmême, nous lui prédirons qu'elle n'ira pas loin. Les Spartiates, qui étaient tombés aux Thermopyles, pour défendre les terres de la liberté, avaient préparé au flot impitoyable du despotisme la défaite de Salamine."* The Papacy is hostile, the Episcopate ignorant or timid or enslaved; but now, as at former periods, and more even than then, there are forces at work in the Church to which both Pope and bishops must eventually bow. Arianism, in the heyday of its power, with the whole weight of civil and ecclesiastical authority at its back, could not make good its footing within the sacred precincts, for error can take no root in an uncongenial soil. And the same Catholic instinct which expelled the elder heresy is rising up against this new *école de mensonge*, as Gratry has aptly termed it, which, instead of degrading the Creator to the level of the creature, would impiously exalt the first of His commissioned servants to a higher than human throne.

• A LIBERAL CATHOLIC.

* *La Dernière Heure du Concile*, p. 7.

V.—CHURCH DESIGNS FOR CONGREGATIONS.

Church Designs for Congregations: its Developments and Possibilities. By James Cubitt, Architect. London: Smith, Elder and Co. 1870.

THIS volume begins by asserting "that the art of building satisfactory churches for modern congregations is one that yet remains to be perfected;" and the problem which the author proposes is, "How to build a church, dignified, artistic and permanent, in which the congregation can hear and see the service." He states that the plan adopted in nearly all our religious architecture, whether Protestant or Catholic, Anglican or Nonconformist, has been the development, or the repetition, of a single idea,—a nave with aisles, or, in other words, a space for the congregation divided into parallel avenues by rows of columns; and that this "conventional type" of Church plan is not that best suited for Protestant worship, however well it may have been adapted to a mediæval ritual, out of which it was a natural growth, the services and the architecture having been made for each other. And he believes that it is necessary "to step out of the enchanted circle of habit and precedent, to break through the tyranny of custom," and "to find a type in which architecture and practicability are not incompatible."

All this doubtless is very hard to dispute; there is such an appearance of business-like common sense about it, that in these practical days Mr. Cubitt will meet with many sympathizers. But the revolution he proposes to bring about in our church architecture will hardly be effected by the arguments he sets forth, though it must be admitted that he discusses his subject without any apparent bias and in a fair and unprejudiced manner.

But "by their fruits shall ye know them;" and any fairly qualified judge of the merits of attempts which have recently been made to strike out an original treatment of ecclesiastical building, can hardly fail to perceive how sadly even the best of them fall short of the old standard; while the average Nonconformist churches which are springing up on all sides, with their wide-spreading roofs, their

low disproportioned walls, their attenuated iron columns, and their conveniently arranged seats and galleries, make one fear that the days of all true and genuine art have gone by.

Were Augustus Welby Pugin, the enthusiast who advocated with such earnestness, some five-and-twenty years ago, the revival of our old Gothic architecture in its "True Principles," to rise up and see this wretched and degenerate offspring of his own zeal and self-devotion, what, indeed, would be his horror and dismay!

But in these days, when the first object usually is to crowd the largest possible number of persons into the smallest possible space at the lowest possible cost, the architect recoils in face of the demands of utility and economy and competition, and his place is taken by others more ready to comply with the practical demands of the age. Thus it is that we see on all sides district churches in the churchwarden manner of Gothic, and Dissenting chapels with their sham façades, their miniature spires rich in crockets and pinnacles, but without one spark of the "True Principles" on which our old parish churches have been built, and for which Pugin so eloquently pleaded. A thousand times rather than such as these, give us the rudest old tythe barn, with its unpretending bare walls, its simple buttresses, its well-proportioned and well-timbered roof! Fortunately, we do occasionally find modern churches of a wholly different type of design, really noble examples of church architecture; but on examination we usually discover in them the least disposition to depart widely from the old mediæval type.

It would be childish to assert that under no circumstances are the ancient standards to be abandoned; but with our fine old church architecture as a model and guide, it behoves us not hastily to cast aside so rich an inheritance, but to endeavour, where peculiar circumstances or requirements involve new adaptations, to introduce them with the most jealous caution. The architecture of a nation, like its language, must be a gradual and natural growth; it cannot be suddenly forced or changed by the importation of foreign forms and novel ideas. Look at our own cathedrals, those grand old religious lessons in stone and marble, built up by our mediæval forefathers in what are called the dark ages

for the instruction of these later and, as we consider, more enlightened times! Who has not felt that solemn awe which steals over the soul as he enters one of those glorious piles, so silent yet so eloquent? The long withdrawing aisles, the vaulted roof, the storied window, seem unconsciously, in their hushed seclusion, to banish from the mind the cares and sorrows of the outer world, and to awaken a calmer and more prayerful mood. Look, too, at those quiet churches of the Middle Ages, with their heavenward pointing spires, their grey buttressed walls, their massive arches of fair proportions, and the same reverent feeling seems insensibly to steal over us. It has been said, "the by-gone periods come not again:" it is true; yet let us beware lest the passion for novelties and originalities blind us to the real value of that which we actually possess.

But to return to our author. Mr. Cubitt divides his volume into four chapters, and illustrates his arguments by a series of well-selected plans. In his first chapter he discusses the "conventional church type,"—the old form of it with its thick stone piers, and the modern form with its thin iron shafts. Against the former he urges that it shuts out a large portion of the congregation, and to the latter he objects that the slightness of appearance and the weak inartistic effect render it inadmissible. As the writer quaintly expresses it in speaking of the constant attempts to reduce the dimension of the columns supporting the usual clerestory,—“as the nave piers waste away, the whole structure falls into a sort of architectural consumption.” After condemning both forms of this type, which, “with its long many-columned avenues of nave and aisles, it was for Catholic times to perfect,” he proceeds to state that it remains for us to develop the magnificent capabilities of the central dome and the lantern tower.

In his second chapter, after admitting that, in wide buildings, columns not only facilitate the construction, but improve the proportion, he points out the possibility of using them without causing obstruction, and draws attention to Eastern churches and mosques with large piers carrying a central dome, and other examples in continental architecture, where churches are found with partial aisles and few columns. In the latter part of this chapter, he suggests a wide unbroken nave with side aisles reduced to mere

passages ; and this really appears to be an admirable and practical idea, though perhaps not altogether an economical one. By such an arrangement, the columns may be so placed as not to obscure the view from the seats, while both construction and proportion are benefited ; the side aisles becoming narrower and the nave wider than in the usual plan. This arrangement has been tried with success in some recently erected churches.

The third chapter contains " suggestions for Church arrangement without columns," " aisleless straight side plans," " cruciform plans with central spaces," and plans based on the circle. The illustrations are numerous, and it is interesting to examine and compare the many varieties of plan of which continental and oriental architecture afford examples ; such, for instance, as St. Cecile at Alby, Gerona Cathedral, the chapel of the Archbishop of Rheims, and many others which Mr. Cubitt enumerates. These buildings, however, depend chiefly on great magnitude for their effect ; and the lanterned domes and wide-spanning vaults of the churches and mosques of the East seem hardly adapted to the necessities of congregations requiring churches and chapels of moderate size at moderate cost. Moreover, the difficulty of dealing with seats on a circular plan is so great as almost to exclude its use, except where cost is not a consideration ; though, where economy is not necessarily studied, it doubtless offers opportunities for combinations of forms extremely attractive and beautiful.

The fourth and concluding chapter treats of " galleried churches and iron columned churches." While condemning the miserable modern galleried buildings, our author explains that in early times, both in Europe and Asia Minor, galleries were in frequent use, and were not even altogether abandoned in the Gothic period ; yet that such galleries were not like those wooden stages sometimes seen in modern Gothic churches, fixed about half-way up the nave columns, but formed part of the original architecture, and were executed in the same permanent materials as the rest of the structure, there being no attempt to make it appear, whether from within or from without, that the building is other than a two-storied one.

The arrangement of placing a gallery over a large western porch or narthex, is by no means uncommon in con-

tinental churches, and is worth notice for our present-day purposes; but galleries in the aisles, as described by Mr. Cubitt, even though constructively admissible, will hardly, we hope, be generally adopted in modern church architecture.

In the frontispiece to his volume, the author gives the interior view of a handsome Nonconformist church with galleried transepts, and lofty lantern at the intersection of the nave and transepts, in which he so effectively introduces and sets forth some of the more prominent features suggested in the course of his work, as almost to reconcile us to his departures from that "conventional type" to which he takes such unqualified exception.

That the first or the sole object to be attained in building a church is to produce the best auditorium, a room in which the largest number of people shall see and hear without interruption from the obstruction of columns or projections, is a proposition to which we can by no means assent. Were this the only desideratum, it would not be difficult to point to many examples, both in the metropolis and in our provincial towns, which combine excellence of secular architecture with utility, good acoustic qualities and fitness of purpose. Nor is a servile copying of the old forms likely to meet the needs of the present times. The golden age of mediæval art, that age when William of Wykeham and his brethren were priests and architects, can never be brought back. The material and intellectual progress of our times has developed other requirements and other ideas which must not be set aside; and certainly the writer of this article would be the last to advocate a blind adherence to precedent. But in this busy nineteenth century, in the race after wealth and novelty and luxury, there is serious risk lest we should be tempted to depart from that true spirit of art which promised a few years ago to lead to a complete and successful revival.

Mr. Cubitt desires to develop the capabilities of the central dome and the lantern tower, but it may be doubted whether the Byzantine type with its vaults and domes is capable of adaptation to our present-day wants. There is, it is true, a certain grandeur in the oneness of idea typified by the dome, while the vaulted ceilings and the circular or polygonal recesses, of which he gives interesting examples from oriental churches, are very suggestive, and pos-


sibly may prove occasionally valuable as precedents ; but the loftiness and vastness of proportion which are the first essentials of such designs, involve difficulties in construction and a costliness which it is clear would confine their adoption to quite rare and exceptional cases. In order to maintain a tolerable breadth and grandeur of proportion in any ecclesiastical structure, the height must be increased in an equal ratio with the width. Mr. Cubitt states that for every foot of increase in width, at least one foot in height must be added to the external walls ; so that, if churches are not to be divided by columns and arches, the proportions cannot be maintained without a very great addition to height, and of course to cost, apart altogether from the difficulties which would arise in the treatment of the external design. Moreover, for congregational purposes the question of acoustics is not the least important ; and whether the Byzantine domes and lanterns would not be likely rather to increase than to diminish the difficulty of hearing, is a matter which would require most careful and deliberate examination.

There are many other considerations on which it is impossible to enter without the aid of explanatory plans and sections ; but whatever may be the objections urged against the old type, they do not appear to be sufficiently strong to justify the sweeping changes advocated by our author.

A careful and unprejudiced perusal of Mr. Cubitt's book leaves an impression which is, on the whole, unsatisfactory.

His anxiety that every person in the church shall see and hear, seems to blind him to the deep poetic significance of our old architecture, the unsurpassed beauty of which influences alike the cultured and the uncultured, and which may yet be used as a powerful means of attracting that great mass of the people who shrink from entering the cushioned and carpeted pews in the churches frequented by the well-dressed and opulent classes.

That certain seats behind the nave piers must be partially hidden cannot be avoided ; but we think that too much importance is attached to this objection. By somewhat reducing the number of columns, and by a judicious arrangement of the seats, it is quite possible to plan a church, preserving the main features of the old type, to which very little objection can be taken on this ground. The nave



piers may, by the use of some of the finer kinds of granite, be reduced to a single shaft rarely exceeding eighteen inches in diameter. The Aberdeen, Dalbeattie or Shap granites, when polished, have a peculiarly rich and agreeable effect, and are valuable from their reflective qualities, both as to sound and light. The obstruction caused by such columns is very insignificant; and it will usually be found in most congregations that there are persons to whom the privacy of a seat behind a column such as described would not be regarded as an objection.

In the accompanying plan (marked B) of a church on this arrangement, suitable for a town, and intended to seat from 850 to 1000 persons, it will be seen that very few of the seats would be actually obscured, and most of these only partially so.

Moreover, should the custom become general in this country, as on the continent, for the doors of our churches and chapels to be open daily, so that all may enter who desire to do so, the internal architecture will become more than ever important, and the large open area desired for preaching purposes alone less the primary object in view. In fact, that which is brought forward as a chief objection to the old "conventional type," as it is persistently called by our author, seems on this ground to offer advantages over the wide-area plan which he so ardently desires to see adopted; as in every place of worship it would seem desirable that portions of the building should be more secluded than the rest, to which persons desiring to retire apart from the body of the congregation may have the opportunity of withdrawing.

Then, again, as to lighting, the old type offers very important advantages, more especially in town districts, or where the church is surrounded by other buildings. The means afforded by the clerestory of procuring a plentiful and well distributed light in the central and upper part of the nave, is of more value than may generally be supposed, until the difficulties which sometimes arise in obtaining light have been encountered. Besides which, the clerestory gives valuable facilities for a free and natural ventilation in the highest part of the church.

Perhaps no form of building admits of more varied or more picturesque treatment in external design than the


old conventional type of church plan. Whether treated with western gable, with or without entrance portal ; whether with tower at the west or the south, or at the intersection of the transepts ; whether with simple tower or with tower and spire, engaged or entirely disengaged from the main structure ; whether in the busy streets of our great cities, or in the retirement of the country village,—this type of plan is ever capable of forming the foundation of a beautiful and shapely superstructure. The distribution of well-proportioned nave and aisles with clerestory above, offers such rare opportunities, that it is hardly possible, except in incompetent hands, to fail in producing a beautiful whole.

Mr. Cubitt speaks with some rancour of those “whose work lies rather in perpetuating old types than in trying to create new ones ;” but we have still to learn that more is not to be accomplished by an intelligent and thoughtful adaptation and development of our old and cherished church architecture, than by a wholesale importation of foreign features or new creations which would not assimilate with the old forms.

The practical realization of this writer's grand conception of the church architecture of the future should be entrusted to a race of Titans, with gigantic pecuniary resources.

To those possessed of ordinary powers, but who are crippled, as is unfortunately so often the case, by the usual economical ideas of churchwardens and building committees, the result would only be failure ; the ambitious vault and the fretted dome would dwindle to insignificant proportions ; and the inevitable thinness and poverty of design and material would seem as though the magnificence and vastness of oriental architecture, after having been transported to a frigid and inhospitable clime, had been starved into submission to a northern will, till all its native interest and beauty had been expelled from its constitution.

It is more than probable that were the wide-area, aisleless church to become the form generally adopted, instead of the vaults and the domes, we should soon have tie-beam roofs with low-pitched or flat ceilings ; that our old national architecture would disappear, expelled by new forms and more convenient arrangements ; and we should be left with a generation of churches and chapels little better than lecture-halls, and in art only worthy of the times of the Georges.



Although we differ from many of the opinions expressed by Mr. Cubitt in this volume, there are one or two suggestions which seem to be really practical and valuable. His proposals to make the side aisles into mere passages of access to the seats, and to introduce the large western porch or narthex with gallery above, as is not unfrequently found in continental churches, may in some cases be adopted with much advantage and with good internal effect; and on the accompanying plan A, such an arrangement is indicated, which by a few words of description may perhaps be made intelligible to the reader.

Imagine, then, a wide open nave, proportionately lofty, containing the whole of the seats occupied by the congregation, there being a broad central passage up the middle of the church. The side walls would be divided from the narrow aisles, which would be simply passages, by columns and arches, over which the clerestory windows would admit a full body of light into the centre of the church. These windows might be larger and loftier than in the more usual arrangement, and should, if possible, be filled with stained glass. The ceiling might, with a view to good acoustic result, be formed in panels, following the general constructive form of the roof timbers, but leaving a sufficient chamber between the ceiling and the roof to admit of a ventilating trunk being formed, and also to prevent the rush of cold air which is sometimes felt in churches where there is no sufficient space left between the slates or tiles and the ceiling or boarding. The ceiling may be so constructed as to form, as it were, a continuous sounding-board, and with good internal effect. At the western end, the large porch or narthex would be divided from the church by a screen, probably arcaded in stone, and built in with the rest of the structure, above which the gallery would be separated from the body of the church by a wide arch spanning the full width of the nave. The ceiling of the narthex should be vaulted or groined in stone, as in continental examples of this arrangement. The pulpit and reading-desk would occupy the usual positions adjoining the chancel arch. On each side of the chancel is the best position for the choir, seated in double rows parallel with the side walls, and it is desirable that there should be some kind of screen to prevent the singers being exposed to the full gaze of the

congregation. The organ would be placed in a chamber built out from the side wall of the chancel, and the vestry would naturally be situated at this end of the church. Beyond the singers' seats would be the place set apart for the communion-table, with suitable seats for the ministers ; and against the end wall, under the east window, a handsome reredos has, under all circumstances, a rich effect. An apsidal end to the chancel, either semi-circular or semi-octagonal, is always capable of enriching an interior where site and other considerations admit of it, especially if stained glass and decoration are attainable.

For decoration, the paintings of the old masters and Scripture texts will afford an inexhaustible supply.

Where transepts can be added, they doubtless are a feature of great beauty, and in all Christian art an appropriate arrangement. Of course, church plan admits of infinite variety according to funds, peculiarity of site, and the special requirements of each case ; but in carrying out any plan, the fundamental principles of all true art which inspired our mediæval architects should ever be kept in view. Those principles we conceive to be, that no part of the structure shall be without its meaning and purpose ; that every piece of material, wood, brick or stone, shall be in its proper and fitting place, each serving some useful part in the construction of the building ; that no "shams" shall be admissible, and no meaningless decoration permitted ; but that there shall be a significance in all, expressive of the special object for which the church has been built.

Guided by these the true principles of all genuine art, we fully believe that, without any wide departure from the old forms of our cherished national architecture, our churches may assume a form well adapted to Protestant worship.

Mr. Cubitt, however, has done good service in discussing a subject which has occupied the attention of many thoughtful minds ; and we are willing to adopt with him the quotation from Carlyle which appears on the title-page of his volume :

"We may say the old never dies till this happen, till all the soul of good that was in it have got itself transferred into the practical new."

THOMAS WORTHINGTON.

VI.—THE DENOMINATIONAL DIFFICULTY.

An Act to provide for Public Elementary Education in England and Wales. [33 and 34 Victoria, Cap. 75.]

Speech of the Right Honourable Robert Lowe, M.P., at Halifax, December 4th, 1871. [Times, Dec. 6th, 1871.]

The Politics of Nonconformity. A Lecture by R. W. Dale, M.A. [Nonconformist, Nov. 29th, 1871.]

‘BEHOLD how great a matter a little fire kindleth.’ Some such reflection as this, half scornful and half repentant, may be passing over the minds of certain Liberal Members of Parliament representing constituencies largely Nonconformist, as each recollects the part he took, by speech or silence, in the discussions which prefaced the passing of the Elementary Education Act. If so, it is not impossible that the sentiment may precede a dawning consciousness that it might have been well after all to take the apostolic warning to heart, and refrain from attempting to make the same fountain send forth ‘sweet waters and bitter.’

Not that the Act was a compromise in the common sense of the word. It would be a misnomer to apply this phrase to an adjustment which had the assent of no party and was forced upon all. The Church kept as much as it could hold. The Nonconformists took as much as they could get. The Roman Catholics stood by, grimly expectant of the results to themselves which might drop from Protestant fallings-out. No one party, religious or political, accepted the Act as a compromise by which it was to be honourably bound.

Yet never was the opportunity for a compromise just and fair to all more thrown away. A resolute Minister, sure of his ground out of doors, could have compelled every party in the House to yield something of its extreme demands. But unhappily the real strength of the unanimous feeling with which the country was prepared to accept a large and full measure of compulsory National Education was unsuspected at the time. This feeling had been of late and sudden growth; for to believe otherwise would be to cast the heaviest blame on statesmen of both parties, who in that case are shut up to the alternative of previous ignorance of public opinion or indifference to popular education. As it is, he who

should judge of the Act from its internal evidence, can scarcely miss seeing in it an attempt to secure a colourable unanimity by flinging some concession to be snatched at by every party in turn.

The Act has no preamble, but the 5th section lays down its object in the following words: "There shall be provided for every school district a sufficient amount of accommodation in public elementary schools (as hereinafter defined) available for all the children resident in such district for whose elementary education efficient and suitable provision is not otherwise made; and where there is an insufficient amount of such accommodation, in the Act referred to as 'public school accommodation,' the deficiency shall be supplied in manner provided by this Act." Hence the Act does not pretend to be a measure for universal national education, but assumes the more modest function of supplementing existing provisions for primary education. It is to its mode of dealing with these existing schools, not to its plan for supplementing them, that the country owes the present agitation.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer told his audience at Halifax that he had never been weary of denouncing the plan of elementary education by which the Government delegated the duty of educating the children of the State, not to persons chosen by itself, but to any set of persons who would "find a school,—thus regulating the education not according to the wants of the people, but according to the willingness of persons to establish a school. That Lord Granville and he, unable to extinguish a faulty system, had amended it by the plan of payment for results. That they had endeavoured without success to enforce a conscience clause and undenominational inspection—but that both these objects had been attained in the present Act—two immense benefits in the way of progress, taking the virus out of denominational schools.

Now we object to the Act under this head, not that it did not abolish denominational schools, which would have been tyrannical and extravagant even if practicable, but that it encourages and perpetuates them. We dislike the denominational system, even when purely voluntary, because it encourages and perpetuates sectarian distinctions and social separations. Still, if people prefer a denomina-

tional system, and are willing to pay for it, and if parents will send their children to be educated under it, it is clear there ought to be no law to prevent them. Nor—considering how for years past this system has been fostered by the State; and considering, above all, that it is to this very system, faulty as we deem it, that the country is indebted for nearly all it has yet got in the shape of primary education—are we in anywise prepared to contend that any sudden check should have been applied to it. This, however, is a very different thing from doing aught to strengthen a system admitted to be wrong. We say “admitted to be wrong,” for if that be not so, why are new schools when established by school boards under the Act to be of a different character? When so much else has been turned over to local boards, why refuse them an option as to this? If sectarian teaching in state-aided denominational schools is not a bad thing, why forbid it in a school-board school even though the school board may favour it? The argument of the Nonconformists on this point seems to us irresistible.

But the Nonconformists ask nothing so unreasonable as the abolition of the denominational system. They protest feebly, when at all, against the continuance of payments to denominational schools by the Committee of Council on Education. “But,” say they, “do nothing to *extend* a system whose principles you have condemned. You have admitted in your Act that if religious instruction be given at the expense of the ratepayers, that instruction should be unsectarian. Be consistent, and wherever *new* pecuniary aid is to be given to a school under the Act, let it be given in accordance with the principle you have laid down.”

Most unfortunately, the old controversy between Voluntaryism and State-churchism here crops up, and a false issue is raised in both educational and ecclesiastical politics. The battle is being fought on the 25th section of the Act, which (the Nonconformists say) is a retrograde movement on the part of the Legislature towards providing sectarian religious instruction at the public expense. The clause runs as follows: “The school board may, if they think fit, from time to time, for a renewable period not exceeding six months, pay the whole or any part of the school fees payable at any public elementary school by any child resident in their district whose parent is in their opi-

nion unable from poverty to pay the same ; but no such payment shall be made or refused on condition of the child attending any public elementary school other than such as may be selected by the parent ; and such payment shall not be deemed to be parochial relief given to such parent."

Let us try to make out clearly what this means and implies. An "elementary school" is defined (3rd section) as "a school or department of a school at which elementary education is the principal part of the education there given, and does not include any school or department of a school at which the ordinary payments in respect of the instruction, from each scholar, exceed ninepence a week." Again, the conditions under which an "elementary school" may become a "public elementary school" are prescribed (7th section) as follows : "Every elementary school which is conducted in accordance with the following regulations shall be a public elementary school within the meaning of this Act ; and every public elementary school shall be conducted in accordance with the following regulations (a copy of which regulations shall be conspicuously put up in every such school) ; namely,

"(1.) It shall not be required, as a condition of any child being admitted into or continuing in the school, that he shall attend or abstain from attending any Sunday-school, or any place of religious worship, or that he shall attend any religious observance or any instruction in religious subjects in the school or elsewhere, from which observance or instruction he may be withdrawn by his parent, or that he shall, if withdrawn by his parent, attend the school on any day exclusively set apart for religious observance by the religious body to which his parent belongs.

"(2.) The time or times during which any religious observance is practised or instruction in religious subjects is given at any meeting of the school, shall be either at the beginning or at the end, or at the beginning and the end, of such meeting, and shall be inserted in a time-table to be approved by the Education Department, and to be kept permanently and conspicuously affixed in every school-room ; and any scholar may be withdrawn by his parent from such observance or instruction without forfeiting any of the other benefits of the school.

"(3.) The school shall be open at all times to the inspection of any of Her Majesty's inspectors, so, however, that it shall be no part of the duties of such inspector to inquire into any instruction in religious subjects given at such school, or to examine any

scholar therein in religious knowledge or in any religious subject or book.

“(4.) The school shall be conducted in accordance with the conditions required to be fulfilled by an elementary school in order to obtain an annual Parliamentary grant.”

The 97th section enacts that

“— the conditions required to be fulfilled by an elementary school in order to obtain an annual Parliamentary grant, shall be those contained in the Minutes of the Education Department in force for the time being, and shall, amongst other matters, provide that after the 31st March, 1871,

“(1.) Such grant shall not be made in respect of any instruction in religious subjects ;

“(2.) Such grant shall not for any year exceed the income of the school for that year which was derived from voluntary contributions and from school fees, and from any sources other than the Parliamentary grant ;

but such conditions shall not require that the school shall be in connection with a religious denomination, or that religious instruction shall be given in the school, and shall not give any preference or advantage to any school on the ground that it is or is not provided by a school board.”

It is manifest therefore that a school board can pay the school fees (or school pence) of indigent children to the managers of no other schools than those in which the child is protected by the conscience clause and time-table, and which are under Government inspection—that, subject to these restrictions, the particular school is to be chosen by the parent, not by the school board—and further, that the school so chosen by the parent needs not necessarily be connected with any religious denomination, nor be one in which religious instruction is ordinarily given.

Having thus gone so far in what we humbly conceive to be the right direction, we cannot but regret that the Legislature did not take one step farther, which we venture to think would have removed the payment of school fees to denominational schools beyond the reach of reasonable objection. Even now, it may not be too late for the change to be accepted, though passions have been roused (as no one who reads Mr. Dale's Lecture on the Politics of Non-conformity will fail to see) which it may seem utopian to expect can be allayed by any single or simple expedient.

The plan we suggest is to separate the religious instruction from the secular instruction in money as they are now separated in time. That is to say, *distribute the income between the two in proportion to the time given to each.* If, as an illustration, the whole number of hours in a week during which instruction is given be thirty-six, and if, as shewn by the time-table, thirty of those hours are given to secular instruction, and six to religious instruction, let the Department require as a condition of a Parliamentary grant that every child who takes the benefit of the conscience clause shall be excused from paying one-sixth of the school fee. If the whole fee be now sixpence, the child who does not accept religious teaching will be let off for fivepence; being thus no longer compelled to pay for that which he does not receive.

A real separation being in this manner effected (as a rule applying to the whole school) between the fund which provides for secular instruction and the fund which provides for religious instruction, *the school board must be limited, in the payment of school fees to a denominational school, to that portion only of the whole school fee which is exacted from a child who avails himself of the conscience clause and so receives no religious instruction.*

We have not the slightest authority to speak for other Nonconformists. With this qualification, we express the strongest conviction that the Nonconformists will not be content with that part of the plan only which has reference to the school board. We mean that they will not be content with merely limiting the payment by the school board to a portion of the whole school fee, but will insist as a preliminary on the like limitation in the case of all children in the same school who do not require religious instruction. For otherwise there would be no reality about it. The school-board payment would just go into the common fund of the school, the only real result being that the school-board children would be received at a lower rate than others.

Of course there will be objections on behalf of the denominational party. We can fancy these as taking some such form as follows :

1. *The plan will give a pecuniary inducement to parents to refrain from requiring religious instruction for their children.*

Undoubtedly that will be the effect; but a parent's motives must not be assumed, and the denominations must take their chance. On the other hand, the great injustice of compelling payment for instruction which is not received will be removed.

2. *The school board will neglect a duty if its children are allowed to grow up without religious instruction.*

The law does not even now lay it as a duty on a school board to give or to encourage religious instruction at all; nor is there anything whatever in the provisions of the law to shew that the Legislature have taken upon themselves the duty of giving religious instruction at the public expense. If an indigent parent really desires that his child shall have sectarian teaching for which he cannot pay, it is against all probability that private benevolence will not be found to supply the means for it.

We are of opinion that the Education Department will be unable to rest here. Since the 31st of March last, the Department has been forbidden by the Act (97th section) to make an annual Parliamentary grant to any school 'in respect of any instruction in religious subjects.' At present this condition has no reality, and no more force than may be possessed by a verbal statement. The Department complies with the Act by *declaring* (Revised Code, 1871, Art. 7) that no grant is made in respect of such instruction; and by refraining from examinations in religious subjects. But the Parliamentary grant to a school, whatever be its amount, goes into the common fund of the school. If religious instruction be provided for out of that common fund, the Act and the Revised Code may *declare* what they may, but can never convince us that the portion of the common fund which comes from the State does not virtually help to provide for the religious instruction of the children, just as much as the portion of the common fund which comes from other sources.

Again, the amount of the Parliamentary grant for any year is limited by the Act to the amount of that portion of 'the income of the school for that year which is derived from voluntary contributions and from school fees, and from any sources other than the Parliamentary grant.' The Revised Code (1871) includes under the word 'other,' payments for such purposes made by a school board.

Further (as already stated) school fees can be paid by a school board only to schools which have the conscience clause and time-table, and are otherwise conducted in accordance with the minutes of the Education Department in force for the time being.

Well then, we say, let the Education Department obey the Act of Parliament in substance, and not as now in form merely; when not only will its own proceedings become consistent, but just and reasonable causes for blame now laid at its door by the Nonconformists will be removed. At present the Department allows itself to go up to the full extent of the limit to the amount of its grant imposed by the Act; the article of the Revised Code (1871) which refers to this limit standing as follows:—

“32. The grant is reduced,—

“(a.) By its excess above,—

“1. The amount of school fees and subscriptions for educational purposes, *including payments for such purposes made by a school board.*”

We suggest as an amendment, that the grant should be reduced by its excess above the amount of *that proportion of other income which the time-table test already referred to shall indicate as being the amount contributed to the school in respect of secular instruction.*

We suspect that Mr. Forster and his Department have power to make both these amendments forthwith; in the first case, by imposing the necessary restriction on the powers of the bye-law under which each school board pays fees to denominational schools; in the second case, by revising their own code of minutes for the coming year. If so, we cannot but think that there is a fair chance of their proving able to remove the very head and front of offence; insomuch that fresh legislation may perhaps be postponed until experience shall have disclosed the full extent to which in other respects the Act needs amendment.

That amendment will be called for in other respects we entertain no doubt. We see a rock ahead in the boasted and popular 14th section of the Act. A singular delusion seems to possess the minds of many intelligent persons as to the powers of school boards with reference to religious instruction in the schools which may be formed by themselves. Because the 14th section enacts that in a school

provided by a school board 'no religious catechism or religious formulary which is distinctive of any particular denomination shall be taught,' it has been supposed that theological dogma is necessarily excluded. An ecclesiastical historian has recorded that in an early age of the Church, 'the Christian world marvelled to find itself unexpectedly become Arian.' And there are good people who are now being sadly exercised in their minds lest unsectarian religious teaching should turn out to mean rank Unitarianism. Let us comfort them by an assurance that any school board may prescribe the doctrine to be taught in its schools, so only it avoid the use of a catechism or formulary. In one parish the board may order the doctrines of predestination, election and reprobation to be taught, so only it open not the Westminster Confession. In the next, another board may prescribe the teaching of free-will and universal redemption, so only the use of Wesley's Sermons be eschewed. In a third, any doctrines of the Established Church may be taught, so only the Book of Common Prayer be ignored. In short, there is no doctrine or dogma, we say not of Christianity alone, but of Judaism, Mahometanism, Brahmanism or Buddhism, which a school board may not require to be taught in its schools, subject in the case of each individual child to the protection of the conscience clause. It would almost appear as though a majority of the members of both Houses of Parliament are unable to conceive of either teaching or praying without a book in the hand. In forbidding the use of catechisms or formularies, we doubt not that it was honestly intended to exclude all disputed doctrines or dogmas. Yet the result is what we have described; and we look upon much of the discussion which has arisen about what undenominational teaching means as altogether thrown away. That the National Education League are tremblingly gazing at the horns of a dilemma is painfully manifest from the late lamentable correspondence between Lord Russell and Mr. Dixon. And it is significant that Mr. Dale, perhaps the most prominent member of the League, sees no other solution than the simple reading of the Scriptures, the teacher being absolutely forbidden to offer exposition, explanation or comment. The end is not far. We have believed that the great first truths which underlie all religious faith may be

presented to the minds of children utterly separate from sectarian distinctions and divisions. But we see clearly now that the English people are so tied and bound in the chain of sectarianism, that if such truths can be so taught, the men are not to be found who can so teach them. Our last hope for common religious teaching has faded away. We repeat, the end is not far; and that end is simple secularism.

To conclude. We have not attempted to conceal our strong sympathies with the Nonconformist side of the questions we have been considering. But we must disavow all sympathy with either the substance or the spirit of such a manifesto as Mr. Dale's Lecture on the Politics of Nonconformity. Nothing could be more destructive to the vast and growing influence of Nonconformity on public opinion, than a belief in the approaching formation of a Nonconformist party in the State, broken away from the great historical Liberal party, standing by itself, working by itself, seeking its own ends. We utterly disbelieve the possibility of any such catastrophe.

W. J. LAMPORT.

VII.—NOTICES OF BOOKS.

1. *Wilkins' "Phœnicia and Israel."*

Phœnicia and Israel. A Historical Essay. By Augustus S. Wilkins, M.A., Fellow of University College, London; late Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge; Professor of Latin in Owens' College, Manchester; being the Burney Prize Essay for 1870.

WE learn from the Cambridge University Calendar that the Burney Prize, which derives its name from the late Archdeacon Burney, has been regularly awarded and the Essay published since 1847. The subjects prescribed by the founder are "some moral or metaphysical subject, the existence, nature and attributes of God, or the truth and evidence of the Christian religion." Perhaps some of our readers may have seen the Essays which it has previously

called forth, and can judge of the value of their contribution to our stock of knowledge on the subjects which the founder's will prescribes. We must confess our ignorance of them, and also our distrust of essays or lectures written to a strictly prescribed pattern. Even the Bridgewater Treatises are valuable as a body of scientific knowledge proceeding from the most eminent men of their day, not as adding anything to the argument which they were designed to enforce. We are glad that the Vice-chancellor for 1870 stepped out of the narrow circle drawn for him, and proposed for a subject, "The Influence of the Phœnicians on the Political, Social and Religious Relations of the Children of Israel." The bearing of this subject on "the truth and evidence of the Christian religion" is not very clear; but it has led to the production of Mr. Wilkins's comprehensive and instructive Essay, in which the student of history will find a full collection and a sound estimate of all that ancient or modern authorities could supply. Following the example of Dean Milman, he treats Jewish history according to the established principles of historical criticism, regarding it not as exceptional, but rather typical of the training by which Divine Providence educated those also whom we call heathen nations, for the part which they were to bear in the Church of Christ.

When the children of Israel took possession of the land of Promise, the Canaanites were its occupants, as they had been already in the days of Abraham. What was the ethnological relation between these joint inhabitants of the interior of Palestine and those of the sea coast, the Philistines and Phœnicians? Had it not been for the genealogy in Genesis, which deduces Canaan from Ham, there could have been no doubt that both were branches of the great Semitic stock. The evidence of language has long made this clear as regards all the people who dwelt westward of Jordan and Lebanon; and the Moabite stone has shewn the same argument to be applicable to eastern Palestine. But beyond this similarity in blood and language they had little in common. Our earliest accounts of the Phœnicians represent them to us as a commercial, artistic, maritime people. The Canaanites had strong cities and large military forces; they were pastoral and agricultural; war seems to have been nearly their only art. And the Jews, when they

succeeded to the Canaanites in the partial possession of their land, were no further advanced in civilization. But in religion there was from the first a strong antagonism between them. The worship of the Canaanites was idolatrous, and their ritual gross and sensual. The religion of the Israelites, at least at the period of the Mosaic legislation, was purely and rigidly monotheistic, and their ritual specially framed to afford the mind of a people not accustomed to abstraction a hold upon the conception of one spiritual God.

It is, however, with the Phœnicians, rather than the Canaanites, that the essayist has to deal. A novel and valuable part of his book is the application of the discoveries made by the interpreters of hieroglyphics, to the relations between Phœnicia and Egypt in the times of the Ramessides. Their monuments record victorious wars with the natives of Syria, not only in the north, but along the sea-coast. The wealth and naval power of the maritime regions made their possession of great importance to Egypt; the Israelites, kept in check by the Canaanites and their kindred tribes on the one side, and the strength of the cities on the sea-coast on the other, were incapable of offering any obstacle to the Egyptian arms. And hence the absence alike of all mention of Egyptian armies in Joshua and Judges, and of Israel in the monuments of the Ramessides. Mr. Wilkins thinks that the settlement of the Israelites in Canaan produced considerable effect on the Phœnician cities by driving the Canaanites into them. He even supposes that this augmentation of their numbers led to their colonizations in Europe* and Africa. It is hardly necessary to seek for

* We are surprised to find Mr. Wilkins apparently countenancing the derivation of Cadmus from 𐤇𐤓𐤕 "the East." Could the colonists from Tyre or Sidon give the Greeks no more definite account of themselves than that they were "orientals," and this too in an unintelligible language? Otfried Müller (*Étrusker*, i. 77) has justly observed that *Kádmos* must be a Greek word, as it occurs in the compound *Eṛkádmos*. The origin of the Cadmean myth appears to us very simple. A Phœnician colony settling at Thebes introduced the use of brazen armour. *Kádmos*, according to Hesychius, signified a suit of armour. *Kádmos*, *ἄρν. λόφος. ἄσπες. Κρήτες*. Cadmus was the reputed inventor of brazen armour (*Hygin*, 274), and it was entirely in harmony with the practice of the Greeks to make the name of the thing invented that of the inventor. The *Kádmeia* was the arsenal of Thebes; and the fable of the dragon's teeth points to the deadly effect of the invention of metallic weapons. The same truth is shadowed forth by the legend of the fratricide committed by the primeval smith, Cain, whose name קין signifies in Hebrew a lance, and in Arabic (*Gesenius*, s. v.) a smith.

a special cause of an event so common in ancient history, as redundant population seeking a new settlement. The appreciable influence of Phœnicia on Israel can hardly be referred to an earlier time than that of David and Solomon. The Israelites had brought with them from Egypt a considerable amount of artistic skill and taste, as manifested in the decoration of the Tabernacle; but this appears to have been lost in the troubled times which succeeded, and there is no trace of architectural skill in the following centuries. There is no necessity for attributing the fact that the Bible makes no mention of Tyrian art till the time of the monarchy, to the late settlement of the Phœnicians on the coast. Till then there had been no work to be done requiring the aid of Phœnician skill, and no wealth to pay for it if it had been called for. No doubt from this time there was an active intercourse between the Israelites and the cities on the coast, the former furnishing the food which the latter needed, and receiving in return the productions of native art and foreign commerce. The effects of this increased intercourse upon the social condition of Israel are well pointed out by Mr. Wilkins. Our chief interest, however, is in the influence which Phœnicia had upon the religious history of Israel. The example of a wealthy and refined neighbour, devoted to polytheism and idolatry, must have strengthened the tendency to fall into these errors, which is so manifest in every page of Israel's history. The matrimonial connections which their sovereigns formed led to the establishment of the worship of Baal and Ashtarothe, in itself an "abomination" in the eyes of Hebrew prophets and historians, and no doubt often accompanied by licentious practices.* Mr. Wilkins, however, when he charges the corruption of Israelite religion and morality upon the Phœnicians, overlooks, we think, the fact, that such corruption prevailed among them long before the influence of Phœnician traders could have operated upon them. And we know of no warrant for the suggestion that the ἀθέρματα (Od. δ. 415) with which the Phœnician mariner tempted a Greek maiden or purchased a slave, were obscene symbols. Were it so, could Christian Paris or

* Abaz imitated "the abominations of the heathen whom Jehovah had cast out before the children of Israel" (2 Chron. xxviii. 2, 4). But these were not the Phœnicians, who were never cast out.

London acknowledge this as a certain index of national morals? We doubt whether the population of Jerusalem had much to learn in regard to corruption of morals from the Tyrians who settled among them. The "strange woman" of the book of Proverbs (vi. 24—29) appears to have been so designated, not as a foreigner in blood, but as a contrast to the faithful wife.* Tyre is reproached by the Hebrew prophets for her pride, her ambition, her luxury, and specially for selling the Jewish youths for slaves; but we do not remember that the corruption of Jewish morals is anywhere mentioned among their offences.

Phœnicia and Israel had each its distinct mission in the history of the world. To the former the office was assigned of carrying letters and art to the western boundaries of the world, of first making the sea the highway of nations, of awakening the vast mental and creative power which slumbered in the Greek brain and hand. Israel was chosen as the instrument of preserving, and through Christianity of diffusing over the world, the belief in one pure and spiritual God. The question naturally occurs to Mr. Wilkins, "If this was the destination of the chosen people, why were they planted within the reach of so many misleading influences?" And he justly observes, that the gross form of polytheism exhibited by their Semitic neighbours was really less permanently injurious than the attractive and refined form in which it was exhibited among the Greeks. The charm of their mythology might have seduced even the highest spirits of the nation, and led them astray from the faith of their fathers. The firmness of an *hereditary* belief in one living and true God, such as never perished from the minds of the nobler spirits among the Jews, was necessary to its permanence. As the tenet of a school of philosophy, it would have been too vague to be efficacious. But becoming, as it did after the Captivity, a fixed *national* creed, patriotism co-operated with religious conviction for its preservation, and it was enabled to withstand both seduction and persecution, till the time was come for its expansion into a nobler and purer faith.

K.

* "Agitur de adultera, de muliere quavis, quæ alii fidem dedit, alios blandiloquiis pellicit." Rosenmüller, Prov. ii. 16.

2. Conway Morel's "*Authority and Conscience.*"

Authority and Conscience. A Free Debate. Edited by Conway Morel. London: Longmans. 1871.

It would have been more judicious if Mr. Conway Morel, instead of expressing at the outset his fear that few may look with favour on a book of controversial dialogues by an unknown author, had started with telling us, as he tells us afterwards, that the dialogues in this volume are not the manufacture of a single mind. Whatever might have been their value had they been simply the vehicle by which a solitary thinker chose to convey his thoughts to others, it is obvious that they must have been regarded from a point of view very different from that which mere fairness calls on us to take now. Even then it would not follow that they were undeserving of consideration, because they could not endure comparison with the great Dialogues which we are tempted to regard with perhaps an excessive worship. Happily, there is no need to institute such a comparison, for Mr. Morel assures us that he is "merely a *bonâ-fidâ* reporter, not a composer, of dialogues;" and this fact should of itself suffice to gain the attention of the reader, if the speakers exhibit enough of earnestness and an adequate grasp of the subject. Discussions of the great questions now agitating the theological and religious world, between men who belong to different religious or philosophical parties, can never be without their value; and probably good service would be done if we could have more such reports of conversations, if only we could be well assured that the printed work really gives the substance of the dialogues, and not merely the form which, in the opinion of the editor, they should have taken. It is perhaps a further guarantee of Mr. Morel's good faith, that his own share in the conversations is comparatively insignificant, and that in the end he confesses himself almost driven to yield the position which he had at first defended.

The result may be said to be a triumph for the Broad-church or liberal speaker. It would be fairer to say that the truth which the inquiry aims at is throughout represented as of infinitely more consequence than the opinions or conclusions of any of the individual speakers; and the best judges of the book may perhaps be found amongst

those who have themselves passed through various shades of thought and conviction in the religious and theological history of the last thirty or forty years. Of those who started then full of energy and zeal for the great cause in which they regarded themselves as allies of Gregory the Great and Hildebrand, of Andrewes and of Laud, some have found rest in the body which claims for itself in its visible head an absolute doctrinal infallibility, and some, again, may have drifted into a state of vague and indefinite doubt; but there are also some who, while they would admit that the basis of their theology was wholly changed, would assert that their title to be called Christians was altogether stronger for the change. It is at the least possible that the history of the latter may furnish a clue to the solution of the great problem involved in the relations of man with God.

That such relations exist is necessarily assumed throughout the discussion. The matter for inquiry is, whether or how far they are or may be affected by the schemes of theology maintained by the several churches or societies of Christendom; and clearly the first point to be ascertained is, whether all the propositions so set forth are essentially the same in kind. If all are received from the same source or in the same way, if all come to us on precisely the same authority or with the same attestation, controversy is clearly superfluous. If all men could be convinced of these facts, there would necessarily be complete theological agreement. By universal admission, no such agreement exists. Christendom is rent by civil wars; and the mere fact of this strife suggests the possibility that the nature of the propositions maintained, or of some of them, may explain the cause of the difference. It becomes therefore a matter of paramount importance to ascertain whether these quarrels extend to every detail of belief or opinion, or whether there are any points on which there seems to be a general, perhaps universal, harmony. If there be any such, it would follow that the whole body of propositions which make up the sum of Christian theology is susceptible of a twofold division, and the general acknowledgment that there is this twofold division becomes a significant fact. The existence of God, the goodness of God, the excellence of the qualities of which we speak as truthfulness or self-sacrifice or charity, are confessedly propositions not belonging to the same class with the

doctrines of the Trinity in Unity, of the Incarnation or the Atonement, or the endless torturing of those who at the moment of death are said to be not in a state of grace. It is also indisputable that of all the religious struggles which have desolated the world, not one has ever turned on propositions of the former class; it may therefore fairly be assumed that these are essential to religion. The others have all been made battle-cries in a warfare scantily softened by forbearance and pity. Can it be then that, after all, these propositions are not essential to religion; and if so, what reason can be given for the difference? These two questions the speaker who is here called Max takes upon himself to answer; and his answers are confessed, even by his Ritualistic antagonist, to deserve the most serious consideration. If it be added that the propositions belonging to that former class are pronounced to be indispensable because, though they may be, or rather must be, approved by the intellect, yet they are not in the first instance apprehended by it, and that propositions which can be embraced only by an effort of the mind are not necessary to religion, even though they be true, we have given what perhaps the speakers themselves would confess to be a fair account of their discussion. That it is worth while to sift the question from this point of view, few will be disposed to deny. If a distinction is here drawn between doctrines and dogmas, the former alone being assigned to the province of faith, we are driven to ask whether the drawing of such a distinction is not fully justified by the equivocations of existing theological systems? If we find the Church of England affirming that nothing should be required to be believed as an article of the faith except what may be read in Scripture or approved thereby, we cannot avoid the inquiry whether the tenure by faith is or is not here set forth as identical with the tenure by intellectual demonstration. If, again, universal intellectual assent may be evidence of the truth of a dogma, the failure or the withdrawal of this assent tends to call its truth into question. That this is the case with so important a dogma as that of the Atonement, is proved by the frank confession of Bishop Ellicott that all the various imputation theories, whether of imputed guilt or forensic righteousness, have been denounced as illogical and immoral, and that there

has been on this subject for some time a tacitly agreed-on armistice. This accomplished fact may be but the precursor of like questionings and rejections in times to come ; and the one question of vital moment still remaining to be answered, can be answered only by ascertaining what those doctrines are which can be approached only by a purely spiritual process. From the number of these are at once excluded all doctrines which betray revolting and dishonouring ideas of God ; and of all such ideas, one of the speakers (not the editor) says that it is difficult to resist the conclusion that, even when we cannot directly trace their source, they must take their rise in dogmas rather than in faiths.*

The clue here given the speakers have not attempted to follow ; and their omission to do so is perhaps a matter for regret. Ideas closely resembling or identical with the traditional Christian ideas of mediation and atonement are found throughout the heathen world ; and it is obvious that their origin cannot be ascertained except by tracking them back to their earliest forms, in the most ancient utterances of human thought. That these ideas are imbedded in the traditions of the deities whom Bunsen classifies as murdered and risen gods,† will scarcely be disputed. If these traditions can be shewn to be mere dogmas based on the observation of phenomena in the natural world, a path is opened which may lead to conclusions indefinitely affecting the traditional theology of Christendom. That the reader will receive much help in this inquiry from this admirable volume, may be asserted without fear. Nothing but good can be the result of discussions so manifestly prompted by that single desire to arrive at the truth which is evinced throughout these conversations.

PRESBYTER ANGLICANUS.

3. *Colenso on the "Speaker's Commentary."*

The New Bible Commentary by Bishops and other Clergy of the Anglican Church, critically examined. By the Right Rev. John William Colenso, D.D., Bishop of Natal.

So much time has passed since the plan was set forth, that many may fail to recognize in the volume now criticised by the Bishop of Natal the first instalment of the

* P. 124.

† God in History, ii. 458.

"Speaker's Commentary," which, six or seven years ago, promised to supply to all educated men an explanation of any difficulties which their own minds might suggest, as well as of any objections raised against a particular book or passage of the Bible. The proclamation seemed to assume that all the difficulties which might occur to the minds of any or all educated men with reference to the Old or New Testament must be susceptible of explanation; and, further, that all objections against particular books or passages of the Bible could be successfully met; and it might have been thought that it would be the more prudent course to prove these conclusions before asserting them.

Here, however, we have the result of some years of toil spent on the Pentateuch by the Bishop of Ely, in a work which, from the circumstances under which it appears, must, in the words of the Bishop of Natal, be regarded "as expressing the deliberate convictions of the Archbishops and Bishops of the Church of England." As, further, the idea of this Commentary was directly suggested by the publication of Dr. Colenso's volumes on the Pentateuch, and the work thus assumes to him the form of a challenge, it was natural that he should feel himself bound to submit to a rigid scrutiny a volume of which otherwise no notice would have been taken in the pages of this Review.

In truth, this performance of Dr. Browne is of the least possible interest or importance, except in so far as it shews the sort of defence which a certain section of the Anglican clergy think it worth while or necessary to make on behalf of what they are pleased to call the Christian religion or Christianity. We make use of this expression advisedly; for we need scarcely say that the interference of Uzzah was not more impertinent than is that of these writers who will have it that their hands only can uphold the ark of divine truth. In few words, then, the object of Dr. Browne's Commentary on Genesis is to maintain that the Pentateuch is the work of Moses, and therefore divinely inspired, and therefore also infallible. Whatever reservations and exceptions he may here and there make, he would regard it as no injustice to himself to say that its substantial infallibility, or, in other words, the general trustworthiness of its history, is an indispensable condition for the trustworthiness of the New Testament and the truth of Christianity itself.

With this view he has drawn up a Commentary which may be described as a history written in the conditional mood. Moses may have dictated the Pentateuch to Joshua; he may have merely superintended its writing; it may have undergone some recension in after times; Moses may have had certain documents relating to the patriarchal times which he may have incorporated into his history; and a thousand other things may have happened, as possibly in Windsor Forest Bottom may have listened to the wooing of Titania.

Among the various records of the book of Genesis, the story of the Flood becomes in its turn the subject of Dr. Browne's examination. It is obviously impossible to surrender the general accuracy of the narrative without sacrificing the basis of our morality here and our hopes for all time to come. The narrative is found in Genesis; that is enough; therefore the narrative is true; and this is the way in which Bishop Browne shews it to be true. First of all, the shape of the ark is singularly well fitted for its purpose. A certain Peter Jansen in 1609 built a smaller vessel of the same proportions, and found it most convenient for stowage, as it contained one-third more freight than ordinary vessels of the same tonnage; and, again, a certain John Temporarius "made a calculation according to which the ark would have afforded abundant room for all the animals then known and food for their voyage." Of course we have to think about the carrion which must be supplied for vultures, and the fresh meat for the beasts and birds of prey. Of the latter, clearly, there could be, according to the narrative, none, or in a day or two no species of the animals devoured would have remained. Hence the flesh-eating animals must content themselves with the Barnecide's feast for the twelve months. But what of this? Are not all things possible with God? and is there not a legitimate circle within which we may invoke the aid of miracles? If there be difficulties as to size, and "if the ark was to hold not only birds and quadrupeds, but insects and reptiles, possibly eggs or larvæ may have been preserved." The self-styled Biblical champions are put to strange shifts. The old belief used to be that God brought the living creatures into the ark; now, Dr. Colenso remarks, "we have to imagine Noah and his family going about the coun-

try searching for eggs and larvæ, and storing and preserving for twelve months the proper supplies of vegetable food for these multitudinous grubs and caterpillars, not to speak of the business of changing their food daily, well known to amateur keepers of silkworms." Why should it not be said that the ark drained and cleansed itself, and the food for all the creatures multiplied itself; that the offal had no smell and underwent no putrefaction? Like the skulls taken from Cromwell or Napoleon when they were little boys, it would but make the miracle the greater; and the anxiety to explain difficult details thus seems to be superfluous. Yet Dr. Browne is anxious to explain them; and thus for the lighting of the ark he urges that the solitary window mentioned in the narrative may have been a window-course. As to its covering—why, some transparent substance may have been used. The antediluvians were ruined by their cleverness, as De Maistre has more largely explained; only, as Sir Charles Lyell says, by some bad luck we do not dig up any works attesting their science. "Perhaps the invention was lost after the deluge, an event which must have reduced mankind to an almost original simplicity and rudeness." It is not easy to see why, when such intelligent men as Noah and his sons survived for so many decades of years. But then, again, "it is by no means clear that these windows were all in the roof or deck; they may have been in the gunwales." As to "above," it may not mean the upper part of the vessel, but may mean the top of the window-course. May not the words of an inspired historian mean anything? But how did Noah guard against leaks? Surely by putting pitch or bitumen over every part which he could so smear—that is, over all parts except the door through which he had to enter; and this "was by some providential or supernatural agency secured and made water-tight." This is well; but as the window-course let in only light, the creatures in the ark had thus no air. Doubtless their lungs were miraculously or providentially filled with a due supply for the twelvemonth. But, again, it is not always a very easy matter to keep wild beasts quiet. Perhaps; but the sense of danger often makes them submissive enough, and may not Noah and his sons have chosen pairs of very young animals? Why, yes; if they had at their command litters of the young of ravenous

beasts, &c., which we are not told that they had, or if they had gone about to choose them, whereas the narrative says that the beasts went in of themselves. But what were they to do for food on coming out of the ark? The plants and herbage would all be dead after lying for a year under an ocean of water. What of this? The water of the deluge may not have had the properties of ordinary water, or there may have been a new creation of plants and herbage. There remains the providing of food for the beasts of prey. At first sight, this seems a comparatively easy matter. They might devour their fellow-creatures; "but then," remarks Bishop Colenso, "if the two cats ate the two mice, the spiders the flies, the hawks the sparrows, &c., how would these different extinguished races be propagated 'after their kind'?"

In the midst of this plethora of hypotheses and possibilities, the reader may well feel like a fly in a honey-pot. Are we to suppose that the Deluge was universal? This is proved by the universality of the tradition; only the Egyptians had no tradition of a flood, for Ham seems unaccountably to have forgotten all about it. But may it not have been only partial? Certainly, for the old Jewish writers had a way of describing events only from the point of view of eye-witnesses; and a partial deluge gets rid of a great many unpleasant difficulties. Yes, perhaps; but it makes it less easy to see why Noah should be anxious to take in the creatures into the ark, when a few miles off the same creatures abode safely in their accustomed haunts. What matters this, however? The promise made to Noah on coming out of the ark cannot fail to prove "that the destruction of the lower animals was confined to a certain district;" but for all we know, it may also prove that the human inhabitants of other districts remained unharmed by the waters. Then as to the sign of the rainbow, it looks much "as if the words of the sacred record implied that this was the first rainbow ever seen on earth. But it would be doing no violence to the text to believe that the rainbow had been already a familiar sight, but that it was newly constituted the sign or token of a covenant." Indeed, no interpretation of the orthodox can do violence to the text; the wrong is done only by those who venture to insinuate that perhaps in such stories we may not be dealing with actual and contemporary history.

"Ohe, jam satis!" we exclaim, as under an overwhelming burden of nightmare. Are we honest men, really trying to ascertain facts? Are we Christian men, seeking to do reverence to the God of truth? Or are we jugglers and impostors, determined at all costs to support the credit of our knavery, and to insist that our idol is a worthy object of human worship? Is it possible, by all this endless equivocation and manipulation of words and phrases, to do anything more than excite the contempt and derision of the indifferent, and the stern indignation of all who hold that history is not a field for feats of legerdemain? When we remember that all this is done by a man who treats time and space much as Allah-ud-deen treated the demon of the magic lamp, who declares that the numbers of the Israelites who came out of Egypt were enormous, then that it would be "wrong to deny that the numbers in Exodus are inordinately great and proportionately puzzling," then that "the conquest could have been achieved only by almost countless multitudes;" and again, almost in the same breath, that "if for 600,000 men fit to bear arms, we might read 60,000, all would be clear, every numerical difficulty worth thinking of would vanish at once;" and again, that "60,000 would be as much too small as 600,000 seem too large a number;" that "there was an admitted difficulty in the large number," but that "it is very questionable whether the difficulties would not be greater on the supposition that the numbers were much less;" and further that, admitting the numbers to be inordinately great and proportionately puzzling, the miraculous character of the narrative justifies our accepting them, but that at the same time "the conquest of Canaan could, humanly speaking, only have been effected by the invasion of masses or hordes of an almost countless multitude,"—when we remember all this, we may well ask, "O Truth, are we to fight thy battles by wrapping everything in an atmosphere of equivocation and falsehood?" We are content to leave Bishop Browne to the judgment of his own conscience; but the hearts of all honest men will be moved with gratitude towards a writer who, like the Bishop of Natal, comes forth manfully to break a yoke which at once oppresses and corrupts those who bow beneath it.

G. W. C.

4. *Prof. Sbarbaro on Liberty.*

Della Libertà: Trattato di Pietro Sbarbaro, Professore d'Economia Politica e di Filosofia del Diritto nella R. Università di Modena. Introduzione. Bologna. 1870.

The Introduction to a Treatise on Liberty by Professor Sbarbaro, of the University of Modena, a portly octavo volume of five hundred pages, reminds one by its amplitude of Mr. Buckle's Introduction to the History of Civilization in Europe. Nor is the comparison inapt in some other respects, the work under our present notice manifesting a similar wealth of research and outspoken vehemence of conviction, though more discursive and rhetorical than analytical and argumentative. The work, indeed, strictly conforms to its avowed character of an Introduction, being mainly occupied with a review of other writers, the author evincing familiarity with a very wide range of authors, Italian, French, German and English, while proclaiming in almost every page his own intense sympathy with liberal sentiments of the broadest stamp, philosophical, political and religious. He hates tyranny with a perfect hatred, and upholds liberty of action, speech and thought, as the great panacea for all existing evils, the great regenerator needed for Italy and the world. "Philosophy and Liberty," he declares, "were born together and will perish together."

"The *true representative men of Humanity*, as Emerson would call them, in the nineteenth century are the disciples of Turgot and Adam Smith. They are the apostles of free trade, of the regeneration of the outcast, of universal peace, of individual right; they are the orators of the Manchester school; Richard Cobden, behold the most lofty, pure, venerable and glorious personification of the profound and noble tendencies of society at the present day: John Bright, Stuart Mill, Channing, Wilberforce, Delitzsch-Schultze, Bastiat, Pestalozzi, behold the true *Saints* of the civilization that is commencing."*

Perhaps Mr. Wilberforce, or his son the Bishop of Winchester, might look curiously at some of his co-saints. Our author quotes with approval the maxim of Mazzini, that "nations are not regenerated by falsehood," and deprecates violence as "falsehood in action." Individuality and Authority are henceforth to be at strife. Materialism he con-

demus, with Mazzini, as a "doctrine of slaves." He rebukes Jeremy Bentham for his depreciation of Socrates.

We cannot attempt to give anything like an analysis of a work which traverses so wide a field of review, but there is one strongly marked feature which strikes us as peculiarly significant in a Professor of a Royal Italian University, viz., the author's avowed and enthusiastic profession of Unitarian Christianity and admiration of Unitarian writers. He rebukes the trimming policy of another Italian writer, Count Mamiani, and contrasts his Theory of Religion with the freedom and boldness of his Theory of the State. He maintains the essential compatibility of the fundamental doctrine of Unitarianism with full independence of spirit and absolute liberty of investigation and reason.

"The history of Unitarian doctrines is itself a proof of their essentially perfectible and progressive nature. How great a distance from Arius to Socinus! How great an interval from the reformer of Siena to Channing! And what an immense space has not the human reason traversed from the Pastor of Newport to his own disciple Parker!"*

He then sketches the history of the Italian origin of Unitarianism in England, according to Réville, in J. Acontius, an Italian refugee at the court of Elizabeth, and from the same author quotes the statement that "the Unitarianism of modern times can boast of having been the faith of a Milton, of a Locke, of a Newton, of a Lardner, of a Priestley, of a Price, of a Holland," adding to these names, in a note, that of Samuel Clarke. In boasting that Italy originated Unitarianism in England, our author exemplifies the maxim of Tacitus, *omne ignotum pro magnifico*, when he speaks of England as containing "the most vast association of the Unitarian apostolate, which extends its beneficent influences to every corner of the inhabited globe." Again following Réville, however, he admits that "in England Unitarianism does not possess an extraordinary number of avowed representatives; *above all, because the ideas which constitute it are very greatly diffused in other churches, the Unitarians composing which prefer not to abandon them.*"† The italics are our author's. He re-affirms what he had previously written, that "Mazzini might have been the Channing of

* Chap. xxvi. p. 381.

† Pp. 382, 383.

Europe." He quotes from Réville the remarkable extension of Unitarianism in the United States, more especially in New England. He appeals to the wonderful diffusion and influence of the writings of Channing in proof of the welcome afforded in the present age to sincere and liberal piety, even when not accompanied by extraordinary mental power or splendour of thought and expression.

"Thoughtful Germany saluted Channing by the mouth of Bunsen as '*a personage of antiquity with a Christian heart; man like a Greek, citizen like a Roman, Christian as an apostle.*' Belgium learned to admire him by what Van Niemen wrote with so much warmth. Liberal and spiritual democracy offered him a tribute of praise by the mouth of Pelletan; the aristocracy of intellect and learning by the pen of E. Renan: whence his English biographer has with reason been able to say *that the name of Channing is as it were a household word in Europe, and that sympathies have come to him from most opposite quarters.* But would you know from what motive, besides the incomparable beauty of his soul and the largeness of his mode of comprehending Christianity, I admire the immortal apostle of Unitarianism and ardently desire to see his writings continually more known and his ideas prized? Because in them is all the greatness and all the educative virtue of the *individual* principle: because Channing is the complement of Cobden: he is the symbol of the alliance between individual liberty and evangelical charity; the type of Christian politics, which, differing from pagan politics, founded upon idleness, slavery, war, hatred of the foreigner, the omnipotence of the state, have for their principles labour, equality, peace, free trade, and universal brotherhood and the sovereignty of the individual. This is the great merit of Channing."*

The author then quotes a passage from Alexis de Tocqueville addressed to "the noble lady who made known to Europe the virtue of the American apostle," referring to a French Life of Channing from the pen of Lady Holland. After more in the same strain, our author says:

"For these reasons, we firmly believe that Unitarianism, besides being the most just, harmonious, logical and genuine form of Christianity, is also the religion which best adapts itself to the disposition, the needs and the inevitable necessities of the modern world and the new Liberty. It penetrates everywhere, spreads over all nations: confessedly or unconsciously, it is already the

* Pp. 391, 392.

belief of instructed men and of the most cultivated portions of society.”*

Further on he vindicates the character and writings of Tindal, Toland, Woolston, and the other English Deistical writers of the eighteenth century, as men who at the present day might have ranked as Christians among the most advanced schools of Unitarianism. In Germany, he characterizes Lessing as strictly akin to the Unitarianism of the present day, and says of him and Herder, “*These are the Holy Fathers of LIBERAL CHRISTIANITY*” in that country. From Lessing he quotes a striking passage on the priceless value, independently of its results, of sincere and assiduous search after truth. He specifies Lessing’s Education of the Human Race as the most original and suggestive of his works, and quotes his proposition, “That which *education* is for the individual, *revelation* is for the human race. And as education is successive and progressive, so revelation completes itself successively and progressively.” Our author proceeds :

“But the revelation of which Lessing speaks is not the incarnation, miraculous, or rather fantastic and absurd, of the Word, the spectacular appearance of a God-Man, but religion considered in its essential principles, such as it unfolds itself in the bosom of humanity under the inspiration of the Only God. Lessing had boundless faith in the interminable progress of conscience and the religious idea.”†

After quoting further from Lessing, he proceeds :

“Here I seem to feel the breathing of the faith which moved Parker to prophesy the possible appearance of a creature superior to the Nazarene himself in loftiness of moral excellence. I seem to hear the voice of universal progress, which by the mouth of Christ announced to the apostles : ‘I have yet many things to say unto you ; but ye are not able to receive them now : but when the *Spirit of Truth* shall have come, he shall declare to you all truth’—words which manifestly contain the affirmation of an eternally progressive revelation in humanity. To Lessing belongs the honour of having clearly distinguished the *Religion of Christ* from the *Christian Religion* in terms such as the Unitarianism of to-day has not been able to exceed in precision and energy. The Unitarians profess, in substance, to represent the genuine thought and the pure doctrine, religious and moral, of

* P. 402.

† P. 417.

Him who always announced himself as *Son of Man* and sent of God, who before the majesty of the Infinite profoundly humbled himself, who was tempted, prayed, suffered, wept, referred to God alone the epithet of *good*, who affirmed his ignorance of things which God alone knows, who never dreamed of making his followers adore him, nor of subordinating the communion of souls with God to any sacerdotal or dogmatic element or ritual, but to conditions purely moral and religious, which are re-assumed in holiness of the inner man, in hunger and thirst after righteousness and perfection, and in the launching forth of the soul to God. The religion of the spirit, therefore, of charity, of adoration of the Only God, in which Christ offers himself to humanity as the incomparable model, is one thing; the adoration of Christ himself, as if he shared in the fulness of the Divine attributes, is another. The first is the *Religion of Christ*, a progressive completion of Monotheism; the second has usurped the name of the *Christian Religion*, and historically stands as signifying the idolatry of Christ common to Catholics and Protestants; it is a real retrogression, a deviation or variation from the teaching of Christ, which, after remaining buried and suffocated for eight centuries under the prevalence of Trinitarian superstition, lived in the bosom of obscure sects and persecuted reformers, rose again with the awakening of intelligence from its long sleep and protracted Catholic oppression, and to-day shines forth, as we have said, in the most civilized part of humanity, a symbol and pledge of religious progress and renewal. It is called *Liberal Christianity*, precisely that it may not be confounded with Orthodox or Traditional Christianity, and better still Unitarianism, in opposition to the absurd dogma of the Trinity.”*

We had marked other passages still more earnest and vehement in asseveration and denunciation, and other quotations of pithy and significant sentiments from various writers, but enough has been given to shew the thoroughness and out-spokenness of the writer. We observe that, with his enthusiastic reverence for Channing and Parker, he does not manifest any acquaintance with modern English leaders of Unitarian thought, such as Carpenter, Tayler and Martineau. But if this remarkable volume may be taken as an indication of the prevailing tendency of religious thought among intelligent thinkers in free Italy, there would appear to be no consciousness among them of any philosophical or religious difficulty in the way of making a

* Pp. 418, 419.

clean sweep of the peculiar doctrines of self-styled Orthodoxy, and of contentedly and thankfully accepting what English Unitarians, in patient obscurity and amid arrogant scorn and reprobation, have long maintained to be the truth as it is in Jesus.

J. R.

5. *Some Theological Books.*

The author of "Views of the Deity"* draws attention in his Preface to the fact that he is "a layman addressing the laity." When cultivated laymen, who have successfully pursued scientific studies, approach the consideration of theological questions in the spirit and method of this volume, they eminently serve the cause of truth and promote the best interests of mankind. The title indicates that the book consists of two parts; the former of them deals with "traditional" views of the Deity, sketched from the Veda, the Old Testament, the four Gospels, and the hymn-books of modern Christians. The conclusion arrived at is, that the conception of God has been progressive: at first, He revealed Himself to man as a great Power in nature; next, men, becoming more observant of the vast and diversified operations of the universe, endowed *it* with divinity; then came the belief in a personal Deity, which belief gradually grew more spiritual, till Christ proclaimed the Spiritual Father. Since the time of Christ, however, the human mind has once more deified men, while others again invest the universe itself with reasoning faculties, and make Nature their God.† This portion of the volume, though to a large extent satisfactory as far as it goes, is too short for the great task it undertakes. A wider glance should have been taken at the religions of the world, and other sacred writings quoted. Nor are we satisfied that the views of modern Christians concerning God are to be judged of exclusively from their hymns. These express only one side of their conception of the Deity, that which appeals principally to the imagination and touches the feelings; an outsider, testing the theology of a sect by its hymn-book, may easily fall into error. We find Mr. Samuelson quoting

* Views of the Deity, Traditional and Scientific: a Contribution to the Study of Theological Science. By James Samuelson, of the Middle Temple. Williams and Norgate. 1871.

† Pp. 84—86.

Addison's "The spacious firmament on high," as "the grandest hymn of praise to God." If his literal interpretation of the words of other hymns be applied to this one, we shall conclude that all who sing it disbelieve the teachings of modern astronomy. There is surely caution necessary in viewing poetical utterances as expressing the theology of those who use them. And why are not prayer-books quoted as much as hymn-books? Why is there no reference to direct expressions of theistic belief by writers of the present day? Certainly the omission arises from no wish to misrepresent the opinions of any one, for every page of the book confirms the assurance of the Preface, that the author respects all sincere worshipers, and is anxious not to wound the feelings of any, since "every religion which has for its object the elevation of man, is in so far a true religion as it is the direct influence or inspiration of a perfect God into imperfect minds." *

The second part consists of a sustained argument to shew that all the discoveries of modern science, when rightly understood, lead to and confirm a belief in a personal God. No abstract can do justice to this argument; and we hope our readers will study it for themselves. They will find that the author's intimate acquaintance with science, and habit of weighing the value of evidence, make him a trustworthy guide, while he manifests a scrupulous caution not to take anything for granted, or to attach to any point more weight than is justly due to it. With an instructive sketch of the general scientific theories established by Grove, Darwin and many others, he unites some interesting details by way of examples; and sometimes drops incidentally pregnant hints on deep metaphysical questions. Any one who is haunted with the idle fear that science is atheistical in its tendencies, may here find an exorcist that will lay the ghost for him effectually.

The essays in the volume entitled "*Ecclesia*,"† are carefully written, and aim at a thorough treatment of their respective subjects. The authors, who are all distinguished men in the Congregational denomination, have produced a

* P. xv.

† *Ecclesia*: a Second Series of Essays on Theological and Ecclesiastical Questions. By various Writers. Edited by Henry Robert Reynolds, D.D. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1871.

series of very valuable and interesting papers. These qualities are, however, by no means equally characteristic of all the essays. That on the Incarnation, though displaying considerable scholarship, strikes us as decidedly inferior to the rest. In it, Dr. Alexander evades rather than discusses the difficulties that some minds meet with in relation to the subject; and while assuming, with but little attempt at proof, that it is taught in the Bible, cites at length in its support the writings of the Fathers. This appeal is the more curious, as in the same paper, and in others of the series, there is a manifest intention to meet and answer the arguments of High-church writers. The essay on Baptismal Regeneration by Dr. Mellor, and that on the Universities by Professor Wilkins, are marked by great ability. But the interest of the volume, to our mind, culminates in the Editor's contribution on "The Catholic Church," and Mr. Dale's on "The Idea of the Church in relation to Modern Congregationalism." Both these writers hold that religious sympathy is distinct from uniformity of dogma. They shew that the true test as to whether a man is a Christian, is the inquiry if he is under the spiritual influence of Christ, not what theological creed he assents to. It is true that they cannot conceive of this "supernatural life," as they term it, being found co-existent with the denial of certain fundamental doctrines; but that is because they regard these as faiths rather than dogmas, principles more than opinions; and, whether as the ground of admission to an individual "church," or as the pre-requisite for membership of the universal Church, they would ask what a man is rather than what he thinks, would look at spiritual condition more than dogmatic profession. Thus Dr. Reynolds says with emphasis: "There is a visible Catholic Church outside, or rather independently of, all so-called communions. The manifestations of the divine life in humanity, in society, and therefore in the relations subsisting between man and man, furnish a series of facts of consummate interest and vast extent, to which alone the full conception of the holy Catholic Church can properly apply."* Mr. Dale says: "The Church is a supernatural society composed of persons who, in response to their faith in Christ, are regene-

* P. 133.

rate of the Holy Spirit.”* So Dr. Reynolds, near the conclusion of his essay: “Without unity of dogmatic utterance, without unity of organic form, there is abundant room for the true unity, the absolute oneness of the visible Catholic Church. Wherever the divine life manifests itself, in the relations between man and man, there is the manifestation, there is the visibility we are in search of.”† While we rejoice in these noble utterances, we regret the writers did not go a step further, as we think they might do logically and consistently, and plead for the recognition of the Church of God, as comprising all who love and obey Him. They might have done this in the words of Peter, in Acts x. 34, 35. And that such a breadth of view, on the part of some at least of the essayists, was not to be despaired of, is shewn by the following passage: “We cannot any longer shut our eyes to the fact that historical men, saints and sages, who have received no discoverable light from the revelation of God in Christ, were not left to the mere teaching of nature. They had an awful reverence for their highest ideal of goodness, and struggled hard after some reconciliation with it. . . . The history of Persians and Hindoos, of Buddhists and Confucianists, of the Socratics, Stoics and Neo-Platonists, to say nothing of later times, convinces us that God has revealed Himself to and in the higher life, the unworldly sanctity, the sublime self-abnegation, the conformity with conscience and the Divine will, which He has conferred upon individuals.”‡ We must not close our notice without calling attention to the essay on “Creeds and Creed,” in which are many thoughtful passages we would gladly quote.

Two subjects, distinct, though closely related to each other, are discussed in “Ecce Messias.”§ The former part contains an elaborate research into the growth and successive modifications of the Hebrew expectation of a Messiah: for this purpose, the Old Testament writings are studied in what the writer believes to be their chronological order, and every passage that bears on the subject in hand is quoted at length, the translation being so far altered from that of

* P. 384.

† P. 170.

‡ Pp. 136, 137.

§ *Ecce Messias; or the Hebrew Messianic Hope and the Christian Reality.* By Edward Higginson, Author of the “*Spirit of the Bible*,” &c. Williams and Norgate. 1871.

the Authorized Version as seems necessary to bring out the full and clear meaning of the original. Thus we are enabled to see "what the Jewish prophets really did anticipate, and what the Jewish people really did believe." The result fully confirms the statement, "that the Jewish prophecies are far indeed from containing a clear and accurate anticipation of the gospel. Their most elevated descriptions plainly represent an expected outward kingdom of God on earth, in which the Mosaic law shall prevail over neighbouring nations, and the race of David be at the head of the most splendid monarchy in the world. To interpret these Jewish expectations as originally and designedly descriptive of the kingdom of God, as it was afterwards proclaimed by Jesus Christ, requires such straining of language from its natural and simple meaning, as is by no means respectful to the writers."* As the idea that these ancient Hebrew utterances may have "a double sense," and the doctrine of types, are likewise disclaimed, we are at a loss to understand in what sense Jesus Christ is afterwards spoken of as "the Messiah." It is, indeed, noticed that the Hebrew idea had in its later form become more spiritual; but it is at the same time acknowledged that a reaction from this tendency, before the coming of Jesus, had rendered it a mere hope of temporal ascendancy;† and if the kingdom and character of Jesus were not what Hebrew prophets had foretold, and not what the Hebrew nation was expecting, how can he be called the Hebrew Messiah? The second part of the volume, in which an answer is attempted to this question, appears inferior to the former part, both in design and execution. It aims at proving that Jesus declared himself the Christ of Hebrew prophecy and expectation, but that he claimed and fulfilled the character in a different sense from that in which the word Messiah had hitherto been used. The reason why so much stress is laid on this point seems incidentally referred to in the assertion, "to call ourselves Christians is to profess that we have found a Messiah."‡ But surely in the present day most persons who take the name of Christian do so to express discipleship to Christ, and to denote their individual relationship to him, not to shew their belief as

* P. 6.

† P. 263.

‡ P. 25.

to his having fulfilled Hebrew prophecy. It is true, indeed, that, according to etymology, we may mean, when we call Jesus "the Christ," that we believe he was especially appointed by God to do a certain work; but Mr. Higginson himself shews that this title, "the anointed," was not confined to Jesus;* and the whole tenor of the early part of his volume is ignored when the founder of Christianity is identified with the Messiah of the Jews.

It is much to be regretted that in the consideration of the New Testament Scriptures, the same plan has not been followed as that for the Old Testament, namely, to take them in chronological order. The Epistles of Paul are indeed thus treated, and we are thereby enabled to see how his notions regarding the second coming of Christ were modified as time went on. The same principle of arrangement would have caused the Gospels to be examined after the Pauline Epistles, and would have led to a separate consideration of each Gospel, that thus it might have been ascertained what change of opinion gradually took place among the early Christians in regard to the Messiahship of Jesus. The Gospels are quoted confusedly, as though all four presented exactly the same view, and it is generally assumed that their representations of the words and deeds of Jesus are all literally correct and all equally authoritative. No allowance is made for prejudices and mistakes on the part of the writers, except when the author's own argument requires it; then the supposition of an interpolation is made without scruple. Thus in the explanation of the eschatologies of the Synoptical Gospels, which are referred for their fulfilment to the destruction of Jerusalem, when it is perceived that the words, "they shall see the Son of Man coming in the clouds of heaven," will not bear this interpretation, it is asked, "What more easy to imagine than that, in recording Christ's prophecy of the spiritual coming of his kingdom, a Jewish disciple should innocently and involuntarily have tinged the record of his Master's words with his own prepossessions? Nay, how could it well be otherwise?"† By a similar boldness of imagination, an opponent might dispose of the texts on which the author lays most stress, as the innocent and involuntary exaggerations of Jewish disciples.

* Pp. 27, 33, &c.

† P. 287.

The interesting chapter on "Human Perfectibility" suggests a sense in which the fulfilment of ancient expectation by modern Christianity may be maintained, without meeting with the difficulties to which we have alluded. The whole volume bears marks of patient research, and, especially in the amended version it presents of some of the most beautiful parts of the Old Testament, it incidentally affords a very valuable help to unlearned readers, for whom, as the Preface tells us, it is primarily intended.

A striking contrast, in all respects, to the above work is presented by another volume* that owes its title to the same source, since it was originally intended, we are informed, to be called "*Ecce Homo*," &c. Its second title is a misnomer, for there is no thought in it, and we look in vain for any claim it has on our attention on the score of either scholarship or originality. The writer thinks it necessary to introduce a life of Jesus by a sketch of the religious history of man from the creation; for this he derives his materials exclusively from the Bible, quoting at great length and making such comments as these. From Cain's sin we may learn that "when men consult their own wisdom—'till the ground,' from whence they are taken—it leads to no good."† The story of the tower of Babel suggests—"various were now the fluctuations of the Church. In the beginning it had but one doctrine or speech, then it began to decline . . . from having one language the doctrines became a very Babel, so various and confused that no one had faith in what another taught."‡ His account of Jesus Christ is divided into three sections: 1. The Man of Sorrows; 2. The Mighty Man; 3. The Mighty God; but these divisions are not chronological. Probably three quarters of the volume is made up of texts, taken promiscuously from all parts of the Scriptures, and arranged together so as to form connected sentences. Taking the first paragraph that meets our eye as a specimen, we find it made up of texts from Isaiah, Zechariah, Malachi, Luke, Psalms, John, Romans, Matthew, in the order here named. We do not doubt the good intention and pious feeling of the writer, but we regret that they should lead to such a waste of paper and printing as this handsome volume displays.

* The Man : the Mighty God. Outlines of Thought. London : Longmans, 1871.

† P. 12.

‡ P. 20.

Did "William Brown" ever hear of Dr. Colenso and his work on the Pentateuch? If so, it is strange that in his account* of the Tabernacle and things connected with it, he should completely have ignored all rationalistic difficulties. He here publishes the substance of a "series of lessons originally given to a young women's Bible class," and describes every part of the tabernacle with a minuteness that might enable a reader to make a model of the building, as indeed Mr. Brown tells us he himself has done. The vivid interest displayed in the minutiae may, like any other antiquarian hobby, excite a smile in those who do not share it, especially as the information on which our author has to rely is on some points obscure and scanty, so that the conclusions at last are little more than conjectures. Thus it is a moot point whether the roof was flat or sloping, and it takes above a dozen pages to settle this important question. Important it is, for as every part of the building is "a type," has its doctrinal and religious lesson, there is no knowing what errors of creed and life men may fall into, if they are not taught correctly about the tabernacle architecture. The camp is described and pictured, and we are shewn how the 603,550 adult males, with their women, children and cattle, took their march each day and their rest each night, and no difficulty seems felt or suspected. Religious meditations are appended to each section. For example, after the description of the priests' dress, we are exhorted—"Be reminded by the embroidered coat, that in order to render acceptable service to God you must have clean hands and a pure heart; be reminded by the girdle, that you should ever be in a state of readiness for any duty to which the Master may call you; . . . be reminded by the bonnet," &c.† Truly, the young women of Mr. Brown's Bible class enjoy exceptional privileges!

We have often wondered why volumes of Sermons are printed; the author of the volume before us,‡ expecting

* The Tabernacle and its Priests and Services in relation to Christ and the Church. With Diagrams, Views and Wood-cuts. By William Brown. Edinburgh: Oliphant. 1871.

† P. 101.

‡ Sermons on various Subjects. By James J. Murphy, Ex-professor of Moral Philosophy and Ecclesiastical History in the Seminary of Holy Cross, Clonliffe, Dublin. London: Longmans. 1871.

the question will arise in his case, informs us mysteriously that he regrets he cannot disclose the true answer. He says, however, his primary design "is the production of intellectual pleasure." We fear that in this creditable design he will be utterly disappointed. A few passages have a kind of rough power that might make them effective when preached to a sympathetic audience, but they are spoiled by the execrably bad taste that pervades the sermons. Take a specimen from the sermon on "The Blessed Virgin Mary:" "Generally speaking, no clear, distinct charge is preferred against her in these present days, as was very much the custom in past days of ignorant, unthinking prejudice—it being pretty well known now that against her no clear, direct charge can possibly be sustained—but by sidelong sneer and cunning innuendo, attempts are often made to bring suspicion on her character."* "That life was passed in closest companionship with God. She gave Him His flesh and blood; she bore Him in her womb; her breasts supplied His earliest food,"† &c. "She is just the one sole creature who in a tangible sense has laid God under an obligation."‡ After reading such sentences, it seems hardly uncharitable to conjecture that the one all-sufficient motive for printing his sermons, to which the writer refers in the preface and which he declines to mention, may be the fact that he can no longer find any one to listen to his preaching of them.

The subject of Mr. Bisset's work § scarcely brings it within notice in these pages. We took it up, expecting to find an examination of the rules and methods for testing the credibility of historical narratives. But the greater part of it consists of lengthy dissertations on certain dark episodes of English history in the reign of James I. Frequent repetitions and a heavy style make it tedious reading.

W.

6. *Some Philosophical Books.*

This little volume|| deals with what is generally held to be a most fundamental question in metaphysics, and there-

* P. 89.

† P. 93.

‡ P. 95.

§ *Essays on Historical Truth.* By Andrew Bisset. London: Longmans. 1871.

|| *A New View of Causation.* By Thomas Squire Barrett. London: Provost and Co 1871.

fore we pay attention to it first. Mr. Barrett has collected from the chief English philosophers statements of their doctrines of causation, and in sufficient abundance to shew his opponent, Mr. Gillespie, that the philosophic world is not at all prepared with one mind to let the assertion, that "whatever begins to be must have a cause," pass as an axiom. And these quotations seem to us to be the most valuable part of our author's labour. The newness of his own view is hardly its commendation. The real point at issue between Hume with his followers and Reid with his, is not clearly seen. After refusing the definitions of causality given by Johnson and Mill and Hume, we are not favoured with the author's own, but only told, that of Hume's terms, efficacy, agency, and the like, the only two that cannot be passed by are "connexion" and "necessity." But "connexion" also has to go, because it is too wide a notion, and "necessity" only is retained as containing "the key to the difficulty." We are then told that "the idea of *necessity* is an essential portion—a *sine qua non*—of the causal notion." What this necessity is we are also told: that it is logical, in other words, in the mind, and not discoverable in phenomena. But how in the mind? Just as the necessity which compels us to see that the conclusion of a syllogism is already implied in the major premise. To put an illustration of our own: Creeds make hypocrites: the Church of England imposes creeds: the Church of England makes hypocrites. Now, if we insert the word *must* into the conclusion, The Church of England *must* make hypocrites, it is evident that this logical must is not the causal must, and that if necessity is a part of the idea of causality, it lies not in the implication of a syllogistic conclusion in the major premise. In fact, it seems to us that Mr. Barrett has been misled by Hume's use of the word *necessity*. It is explained by Hume's phrase, "necessary connexion," which is again synonymous with "power." So that "necessary" is equal in Hume's usage to "efficient," and necessary connexion is simply *efficient nexus*. The question in debate is not at all whether cause and effect are *necessarily* connected, but whether two sets of phenomena are actually joined in sequence merely, and not by a link of efficiency. The only part of the great problem of causation which can call for the use of the word necessity is, where the question arises, Is it a

necessity of thought to give universality to causality? Must I ascribe a cause to every existing thing? We are sorry not to agree with Mr. Barrett, for his book shews that he is an earnest, painstaking, thinking man.

The venerable author* leads us pleasantly from the dry wastes of metaphysics into the great world of men and women and divines. Though he puts the word "Problem" on his title-page, he is apparently a man who does not amuse or perplex himself or other people with problems, but rather sees clearly what is clear, and in plain, forcible, unproblematic language declares what he sees. It is evident to him that the National Church of England is not at present the agent by which the evils of society are to be removed. The Christianity that he can receive is not that of Paul, nor that of Jesus, unless he is allowed to reject some "questionable precepts" of Jesus. He looks to the increase of knowledge, to a system of education that shall make men obedient to the laws of nature, as the chief instruments in the future progress of mankind. His faith in the providential government of the world is strong and rational. His hopes for the future of mankind are firm and bright. There is not much that is original or very profound in his book, but it is full of intelligence, everywhere reflecting an earnest, active mind, and keeps the reader interested by constant *apropos* quotations from all sorts of contemporary literature and references to passing events. It is a book that may be read with interest and profit by all who trouble themselves about either the church or the world.

Some of us are weary of reading books on Christian Evidences, feeling as we do that that religion which requires to be proved to a man or defended is a very poor religion for him. It must strike some minds, too, as no pleasing sign of the times that we have not only societies for the propagation of Christianity, but also for its defence.† And judging from this book, if we held that a Society could most efficiently do this, there would be plenty of room to

* The Problem of the World and the Church reconsidered, in Three Letters to a Friend. By a Septuagenarian. London: Longmans, Green and Co. 1871.

† Modern Scepticism. A Course of Lectures delivered at the Request of the Christian Evidence Society, with an Explanatory Paper by the Right Reverend C. J. Ellicott, D.D., Lord Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1871.

question whether this Society is the one. We have read seven of the eleven lectures contained in this volume, and will say a word or two about four of these. The first is on Design in Nature, by the Archbishop of York. As was to be expected from a man of his reputation, we have an able presentation of what may be said for the proposition, that bulls have horns that they may butt, as against the counter proposition, that they butt because they have horns. For our own part, we cannot conceive the possibility of proving either statement. If science shews that they grow horns when they need them, and gradually lose them as the need ceases, it looks like a case against the argument from design. Still, in that case, no one could know that this law of supply according to necessity was not designed. And against such higher design, Goethe and those who have held the doctrine of evolution since his day, we suppose, have nothing to urge. And therefore we cannot agree with the Archbishop that men are now saying, "Whither shall I go from thy presence?" The next lecture we notice is occupied with shewing that "a revelation is a necessary part of the system of this world." Dr. R. Payne Smith is the author. The line of argument is, that as a fact of observation, faculties are always provided with a field for their exercise, and the necessity of using them is imposed on their possessors. Man has a conscience. This constitutes him a *responsible* agent: this responsibility supposes a person to whom he is responsible. This person is God. Again, conscience supposes a judge and a future state of rewards and punishments; "or else nature is a sham." This argument may be applied to any other power of man's moral and spiritual nature. "No man can doubt but that man has within him powers which exactly answer to *religion outside him*." The only thing that acts powerfully upon man's moral faculties is religion. Hence the need of God as absolute judge and a future state of rewards and punishments. We require a certain amount of knowledge about this future state: nature does not give it: so revelation must. It will appear to the reader that the threads of this argument somehow do not run freely. We assure him that we should not be faithful to our author if we disentangled them. Hopeless confusion is the charge we have to lay against Dr. Payne Smith's lecture. He apologizes at the end for the

"confused manner" in which he has put his argument. Not without good reason, we think. It is long since we read a production coming from a man of standing which was so badly reasoned, and so full of digressions from the subject in hand. Some of the notes to the lecture are rather amusing: e.g., "Physically the monkey is man's superior. . . He has four hands, and we have but two." The Lord Bishop of Carlisle instructed his audience on the subject of "The Gradual Development of Revelation." He divides this gradual revelation into four principal steps: Revelations to Adam and Eve, to Abraham, to Moses, and to Jesus Christ our Lord. There is no word about the gradual development of the doctrine of immortality, of the nature of acceptable sacrifice, of rewards and punishments, of God's relation to the whole race of man. The substance of the successive revelations, as the Archbishop gives them, is, that to Adam and Eve was given a religious consciousness; up to the time of Abraham the fact was made known that God rewards the good and punishes the evil; the Mosaic revelation did not differ from the Abrahamic; the revelations made from Moses to Jesus are not given in detail, but their culmination is the Son of God. The Rev. George Rawlinson handles the alleged historical difficulties of the Old and New Testaments. That those difficulties are very great to any but those who hold that the Bible is an infallible book of history, we are not aware: that to those who hold this view Professor Rawlinson's lecture will be of real service in removing their difficulties we cannot believe. The difficulty that will trouble those who think that the history of the book of Daniel must be historically true, is not touched at all; the difficulty, namely, that the author's prophecy proceeds on the assumption that the Medes first took, Chaldea and then the Persians followed the Medes. Nor has he noticed the fact, that where Daniel is mentioned by Ezekiel, his name occurs together with those of Noah and Job, and between the two, as of a hero who had long since passed away. Of both of these facts Ewald makes use in assigning the date of the book of Daniel and proving its unhistorical character. Does not Professor Rawlinson know what he says, or does he knowingly mislead his hearers, when he gives utterance to the following sentence: "*The strictly historical character of the later portion of the*

Old Testament narrative, especially of that delivered to us in Kings, Chronicles, Ezra and Nehemiah, and in the contemporary prophets, Jeremiah, Zechariah and Haggai, is generally admitted even by sceptics"? But we must stop. Alas for men, if the faith that saves them needed these defences!

J. FREDERICK SMITH.

7. *Miscellaneous.*

The English version of the works of Augustine, of which this* is the first instalment, bids fair to furnish a fitting and valuable supplement to Messrs. Clark's Ante-Nicene Library. With the exception of the "Confessions," the "De Civitate Dei" appears to be the most likely one of the writings of this Father to interest modern readers, seeing that in it we have a philosophy of Pagan and Jewish history set forth in a somewhat lively style by a powerful and original mind, deeply imbued with both heathen thought and Christian faith. It is somewhat surprising that hitherto there has been but one English translation of it, and that a very poor one. The present version, we believe, from the examination of several portions, to be an accurate reflection of the author's meaning, as literal as neatness of expression would permit. The reader will find in the book much obsolete speculation, both theological and philosophical, and will, we think, feel thankful to the translator for enabling him to light upon many passages of exceeding force and beauty, without being obliged to toil through the intervening wastes under the impediment of a foreign tongue.

Father Tondini's little work on the Eastern Church† is intended to shew that its different branches, in their dependence upon the Czar, the Sultan and the King of Greece, are not only unfaithful to their theory of episcopal government, but have no logical standpoint from which to find fault with the Papacy. For ourselves, we should say that he expends much curious learning—of a kind which we are

* The City of God, by Aurelius Augustine. Translated by Rev. Marcus Dodds, M.A. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. 1871.

† The Pope of Rome and the Popes of the Oriental Orthodox Church: an Essay on Monarchy in the Church, &c. By Rev. Cesarius Tondini, Barnabite. London: Longmans. 1871.

quite unable to criticise—in proving statements which very few would be found to dispute. His argument has two side-references to the Church of England: one, to the disposition to coquette with the Holy Orthodox Church lately displayed by some Anglican divines; another, to the subordination to a temporal supremacy to which the English Church submits no less than her Eastern sisters. But we cannot suppose that Father Tondini's reasoning will have any effect in healing a schism which has existed since the eleventh century, or in preventing certain worthy but not very wise clergymen from looking with eyes of longing to Athens and to Moscow. Fortunately the faith of the future, in England at least, does not depend upon the result of the controversy between Pope and Patriarch, or upon the courtesies which may be exchanged between Patriarch and Archbishop.

The third and fourth volumes of the English translation of Ewald's great work on the History of Israel* cover the same ground as the third volume of the original. The translation, as the Preface informs us, is by different hands, Mr. Estlin Carpenter taking the place of Mr. R. Martineau as editor. Wherever we have tested it, the version is correct; and if the style is somewhat cumbrous, it is at all events English, not German, and the defect will be readily pardoned by any who are acquainted with the difficulties of the original. And so industrious and conscientious an attempt to enrich English literature with one of the greatest historical works of modern times, deserves the heartiest encouragement.—Dr. Priestley's "History of the Corruptions of Christianity"† has been issued in a cheap form, and widely circulated by the British and Foreign Unitarian Association. It is a useful repertory of facts, and did good service in its day. But it very inadequately represents the state of theological knowledge at the present time, and certainly ought to have been accompanied, if republished at all, by much more elaborate explanatory notes than any we can find in its pages. Theology, like all other sciences, is progressive;

* The History of Israel, by H. Ewald, &c. Translated from the German. Edited by J. Estlin Carpenter, M.A. Vols. III. and IV. London: Longmans. 1871.

† A History of the Corruptions of Christianity. By Joseph Priestley, LL.D. F.R.S. London. 1871.

and it would be almost as great an injustice to Dr. Priestley to republish his researches on the Chemistry of the Air (which are an ineffaceable landmark of discovery) as level to the knowledge of the age, as it is to reproduce this History.

"The Oneness of the Race"* is a little volume of sermons by M. Eugène Bersier, in which he develops his theory of the Atonement. The sermons are eloquent, and admirably translated by Miss Harwood. But they present a phase of theological thought in which we, and we should think our readers, take little or no interest. To raise but one question out of many that might be raised, the time is passed at which a doctrine of Atonement which rests upon the actual existence of Adam and the historical fact of the Fall, can receive serious attention.

Mr. Martineau's admirable Address† at the opening of the present session of Manchester New College, though it appears to come somewhat late as an answer to Mr. Matthew Arnold's attack upon Dissenters, is not without its justification even from the narrower polemical point of view, inasmuch as it takes up the defence of Nonconformity from a position which its usual advocates have not hitherto sought to occupy. But it is much more than a reply to Mr. Arnold. There are Nonconformists who not only have no objection to the theory of a National Church, but look to its perfect realization in fact, were it any longer possible, as infinitely to be desired. And just now some of them have been greatly perplexed by the spectacle of men who hold doctrinal views as far divergent, to ordinary apprehension, as their own from the standards of the Church, retaining their preferment, with all its concomitant advantages. "Why Dissent?" may well be the question of those who do not care for Nonconformity for its own sake, but who have been kept out of the Church by doctrinal differences which appeared to them to be of the utmost moment, and yet are now practically made light of. To such we commend Mr. Martineau's thoughtful and eloquent Address. He will easily convince them that the time is not yet come for

* *The Oneness of the Race, in its Fall and in its Future.* By Eugène Bersier. Translated by Annie Harwood. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1871.

† *Why Dissent? An Address, &c.* By James Martineau. London: Williams and Norgate. 1871.

giving up the freedom of the Nonconformist position ; and that if the Promised Land is not yet in sight, and there is no alternative but to remain in the wilderness, *that* at all events is better than a return to the flesh-pots and the bondage of Egypt.

Dr. Caird sends us another admirable sermon, preached in the University chapel at Glasgow. Its subject is "Christian Manliness,"* and it is evidently addressed to a congregation of young men, some of whom were leaving home for the first time, to encounter the temptations of independent life in a great city. No wiser counsel could be given, or more accordant with the spirit of that fundamental Christianity which underlies the differences of churches. If Dr. Caird continues to preach such sermons as these, and carries out his intention of inviting into the University pulpit distinguished preachers of other communions than his own (an intention frustrated, we were grieved to see, in the case of Dr. Ewing, the eloquent Bishop of Argyle and the Isles, by the narrowness of a brother prelate), he will make the University chapel a very focus of spiritual light and heat for all Scotland. We have also received, and desire to commend, Dr. Sadler's sermon on "the Relation of Jesus Christ to the Religion of this Age,"† and Mr. Orr's on "Liberalizing Ideas in Religion."‡ Mr. Coupland's two sermons, "Aims of the Church,"§ are more marked by a high ethical feeling than by definiteness or coherence of thought ; though we can easily understand that they would have been impressive to those who heard them. Lastly, "What is Brahmoism?"|| is a lecture delivered in Calcutta, and now anonymously printed, in which great stress is laid upon the more conservative and less cosmopolitan side of Brahmoism. The lecturer is evidently of opinion that the less the new

* Christian Manliness : a Sermon preached before the University of Glasgow on the first Sunday of Session 1871-2. By the Rev. John Caird, D.D. Published by Desire of the Senate. Glasgow : Maclehose. 1871.

† The Relation of Jesus Christ to the Religion of this Age : a Sermon, &c. By Thomas Sadler, Ph.D. London. 1871.

‡ Liberalizing Ideas in Religion : a Sermon, &c. By John Orr. London : Whitfield. 1871.

§ Aims of the Church : Two Discourses. By W. C. Coupland, B.A., B.Sc. London : Whitfield. 1871.

|| A Lecture in Reply to the Query, "What is Brahmoism ?" Calcutta. 1871.

preachers of Theism fraternize with Christians, and the more they draw the evidence of their faith from Hindu sources, the better will be their chance of winning India to their side.

E.

VIII.—LETTER TO THE EDITOR.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE THEOLOGICAL REVIEW.

MY DEAR SIR,

I HAVE received a courteous communication from Professor Rawlinson, containing remarks, some corrective, others supplementary, upon my article on Cuneiform Inscriptions in your last number. I am desirous of laying them before your readers.

I had observed (p. 500) that no bilingual monument had been discovered to confirm the conjectures of Assyriologists. Professor Rawlinson is desirous that it should be known that there has been nothing conjectural in the process of discovery. Of the triple inscriptions at Behistun and elsewhere, one is always in the Achaemenian character; and as this is read with certainty, it has served as a key to the interpretation of the other two. This explains what had been to me a mystery, the manner in which the clue to the Assyrian and Babylonian inscriptions had been found. At the same time, I must observe that when I spoke of *bilingual* monuments, I did not mean the reading of one cuneiform inscription by another, but by some counterpart of the Rosetta and Canopus tablets, in which the unknown character and language are given in unmistakable equivalents. In short, I had in view such bilingual inscriptions, for instance, as the *stela* which Darius (Herod. iv. 87) set up on the Bosphorus, "inscribing one with Greek, the other with Assyrian letters." Some fortunate chance may yet bring them to light and dissipate all doubt. The weights spoken of (p. 499, note) are not the only examples of double inscriptions in Phœnician and cuneiform. Sir H. Rawlinson, as his brother informs me, has published fragments of Baby-

lonian bricks containing contracts in both characters. Their chief value is in illustrating the Phœnician slave-trade, four of them being contracts for the sale of slaves. Sir H. Rawlinson says they have added very little to our knowledge of the Assyrian alphabet or language.

I have said (p. 503) that Professor Rawlinson expresses a doubt whether the tenth chapter of Genesis may not have been the work of Ezra. My expression was certainly too wide. His words apply only to the eleventh and twelfth verses. But as regards my argument, the error is of little importance. When it is admitted that a document may have been interpolated, its value as historical evidence is gone; it is a purely arbitrary proceeding to throw doubt on one portion as a possible interpolation, and use another as genuine. The advocate who has damaged his own witness must be content to forego his testimony altogether. The first and last verses of this chapter shew that it is *one* document, and there is no ground from tradition, manuscript or version, for separating vv. 11 and 12 from the rest.

I think these are the only points in Professor Rawlinson's communication which it is important to bring before your readers. It is satisfactory to know that, allowing for the widely distant points from which the author and the reviewer start, he admits the general fairness of the criticism.

I am, yours faithfully,

JOHN KENRICK.

THE
THEOLOGICAL REVIEW.

No. XXXVII.—APRIL, 1872.

I.—ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF OPINION IN THE
EARLY CHRISTIAN CHURCH, AS INDICATED BY
A COMPARISON OF THE DIFFERENT BOOKS OF
THE NEW TESTAMENT.—II.*

I REMARKED at the commencement of my first lecture, that it was a groundless assumption to suppose the writers of the New Testament had any conscious reference to a remote posterity and its possible wants in the composition of their several books, and that it was apparently their one and only thought, to prepare the men of that generation, by an earnest expression of their own individual convictions, for the grand and awful crisis which they believed to be impending over humanity. No one, I think, can read through the New Testament in an unbiassed spirit, without perceiving that its fundamental idea, expressed under various forms and called forth by various occasions, is the approaching end of all things—a last judgment, to be administered by the risen Christ; and that its one exhortation to men, however changing the tones in which it may be uttered, is to repent and believe, that they may be saved. For myself, I do not hesitate to affirm that the entire literature of the New Testament is a product of this intense belief, and saturated with it in every part; and that till we have learned so to regard it, and have discharged from our minds the endless assumptions which a subsequent theology have attached to it, we are not in a position to understand it,—we have not gained the true point of view for interpreting its language and comprehending its doctrine.

* By the late J. J. Tayler, B.A. Vid. foot-note, p. 1.

In tracing the order of historical development, we must reverse the order of our canonical books. The last book in the New Testament is one of the oldest that it contains, following at an interval of a very few years the latest of the Epistles of Paul ; and the difference between them is this—that whereas the letters of Paul have sprung at once out of business and controversy, expressing in the directest and most unstudied form the profound conviction which possessed his being, with immediate reference to the demands of outward circumstance—the Apocalypse takes us out of the world of reality, and places us on the lofty eminence of a contemplative spirit, beholding in clear and open vision the approaching downfall of the great powers of earth. Nothing can be more interesting than this juxtaposition. In the fervid and sometimes hurried correspondence of Paul, we are nevertheless able to catch a distinct and steady view of the great principles which broke down the peculiarity of Judaism, and transformed by the power of faith and love the hard and sensual nature of Heathenism. In the Revelation of John, we have, on the other hand, a vivid delineation of the feelings of a devout Jew, anticipating in the very fall of his country's capital the triumph of his own sublime monotheism, and the fulfilment of the grandest promises of his country's prophets in the overthrow of heathenism, and the establishment, under Messiah's reign of a thousand years, of the kingdom of God on earth. In these writers, John and Paul, in the very oldest portions of the New Testament, we have the germs of a Judaic and a Gentile Christianity—the seed of that sharp antagonism which convulsed the early Church to its centre, and which it took a century and a half to reconcile in the broader compromise of Catholicity. In the order of thought, though later in time, the work of John is anterior to that of Paul. It represents the earliest phase of Christian belief in the apostolic age ; and, on this account, it is invaluable. It is the oldest and most authentic record that we possess of Jewish Christianity.

Now, there is one feature in the doctrine of the Apocalypse which it has in common with the teaching of Paul. It has no reference to the earthly life of Christ—to the missionary labours in Galilee of the Prophet of Nazareth. The whole thought of both apostles is concentrated on the

risen and glorified Christ—on the fact, that although the wickedness of the rulers of this world had put him to death, it was all in the pre-ordained order of Providence, that he might rise again from the dead, and exercise a more spiritual authority, and come again with augmented majesty to judge at last the living and the dead. There is nothing more remarkable and significant in the history of Christianity—looked at even from the philosophical point of view—than the invincible tenacity with which this belief in a risen deliverer and future judge seized on the popular mind of that day. It was the grand lever by which the apostles lifted up the heavy mass of wide-spread apathy and formalism, the one inspiring trust with which the emissaries of the new faith went forth to evangelize the world. What had preceded the death and resurrection of Christ, even his discourses and miracles, was at first comparatively lost sight of. It was eclipsed and hidden in the glory of the wonderful and mysterious sequel. And what is singular, this persuasion seems to have told as readily, and with as full effect, on the heathen as on the Jewish public. There had evidently been a sort of preparation for it in the spiritual condition of the world—seeds of hope and awful expectation latent in the minds of men, which burst into faith and ripened into steadfast conviction when the great doctrine of immortality and a retributory judgment came before them in a definite, positive form, blended with their highest human affections and their deepest moral consciousness, and enforced by the unmistakable sincerity and profound earnestness of its earliest preachers. This sublime trust animates as with a secret life all the varied instructions and histories of the New Testament. It is the key-note of the Christian system. It is the one grand conviction on which the whole ensuing superstructure of Christian development is based. It is the witness of this vivid, all-absorbing faith, so characteristic of the oldest Christian preaching, which renders the Apocalypse and the letters of Paul pre-eminently valuable and instructive. We see here what it was which gave the first impulse to the great movement which gradually revolutionized the whole civilized world. In their conception and representation of the risen Christ and the future life, John and Paul do not entirely agree. I have already remarked in the foregoing

lecture, that John's sensuous imagery and concrete description of Christ's reign of a thousand years in the New Jerusalem, so familiar to the thoughts and so grateful to the associations of a Jew, are dissolved by Paul into the vaguer and more general assurance, that Christ will raise at last the living and the dead, and having reigned till he has put all his enemies under his feet, will then finally surrender his delegated rule to the Father, that "God may be all in all." This is evidently a view better adapted to the heathen mind; and, though in the central trust on which it rests substantially the same with the former, more capable, owing to its freedom from the definite rigidity of the Jewish conception, of progressive expansion into new forms to meet the growing wants of society. I notice this, as the first stage of development in the fundamental idea of Christianity.

So long as this solemn expectation retained its pristine force, and its immediate fulfilment was looked forward to from day to day (and we know from the evidence of the New Testament itself that it took years to allay men's apprehensions on this point, and accustom them to await the event with calmness in a remote and indeterminate futurity), there was little thought of history, and still less of doctrinal discussion, in our modern theological sense. Earnest men were busy in delivering everywhere the message which had been confided to them—"Repent, believe and be saved." From their lips a living tradition spread through the world, that the Christ had come, had been put to death, had risen again, was now with his Father in heaven, and would shortly re-appear to judge the whole earth. Every extant record shews, as we might have inferred from the very nature of the case itself, that this was the substance of the apostolic preaching at the first outbreak of the new religion, not summaries of Christ's earthly ministry, such as our present Gospels exhibit to us. But as time rolled on, as the generation of those who had personally known Jesus began to die off, and as the religion expanded the circle of its influence ever wider and wider from the centre where it first arose, there would be a natural curiosity to know something more full and definite respecting the remarkable personage with whose name such sublime and awful expectations were associated. In this desire the col-

lections which ultimately resulted in our three first Gospels, originated; and these introduce us to a second stage in the historical development of the religion. This second stage—as we may justly call it in reference to the time when the books which record it were written—involves, however, a sort of reactionary feeling towards a still earlier period. I think it evident that the apostolic party, headed by Peter and James and John, which formed the earliest church at Jerusalem, had been thrown back with considerable vehemence by the shock of Christ's ignominious death, into a more rigidly Jewish conception of the Messianic hope, and had been driven by returning prejudice and fear to narrow the breadth and genial humanity of their great Master's original teaching. This tendency was confirmed and deepened by the accession to their party of numerous conversions from the Pharisees, who sought with characteristic sagacity to turn to their own ends the popular credit and influence of a rising and indomitable sect. The earlier chapters of the book of Acts seem to me to contain unquestionable evidence of this fact. Hence we can account for the pertinacity with which the Judaizing zealots thwarted the noble mission of Paul, and the suspicious jealousy with which, as we can still clearly see even through the softened representation of the Acts, the same party watched and followed and endeavoured to neutralize the preliminary movement of Stephen and Philip. Hence, too, the strong tinge of Judaic narrowness and rigidity which always adhered to the Ebionites and the Nazarenes, the lineal descendants and genuine representatives of that first generation of believers who composed the original church at Jerusalem. If I am right in this view, the movement of Stephen, and still more that of Paul, was less an innovation than a recurrence to the real spirit and meaning of Christ's own teaching. More is involved in this view than strikes the mind at first. When the members of the primitive church at Jerusalem recovered from the terror and astonishment into which the crucifixion had temporarily thrown them, their grand trust and support was, that their Master had not perished, but was with God in heaven, whence he would shortly return to complete the Divine purposes and establish his Messianic reign. But this hope they conceived and expressed in the traditional Jewish form, of which we have so vivid a repre-

sentation in the Apocalypse of John. Paul too was converted, and arrested in his fierce career of Jewish zealotry, by the revelation made to him, that Christ was actually risen and would be the final judge of the living and the dead, though he realized that expectation to himself in a different way from the Jewish party, and demanded both of Jew and Gentile a different preparation of heart and life to meet it. Still, both by the Jewish and the Pauline Christians this was the great doctrine preached to the world; this was what absorbed their thought and inspired their efforts; this it was that distinguished belief from unbelief. Now, so long as this was the predominant idea of the Christian world, attention was exclusively fixed on the risen, the heavenly Christ, and was averted from the details of his earthly ministry as something already past and superseded. Christ himself came inevitably to be regarded as a heavenly being. He dwells at the right hand of the eternal throne; he mediates between God and man; he carries up the prayers of mortals to the Father; and his whole nature is enveloped in that mystic halo, half human, half divine, or rather perhaps divine and human in one, which is so conspicuous a feature in the fourth Gospel and its associated Epistles, in the Epistle to the Hebrews, and in the later letters of the apostle Paul. But when we turn to the Synoptical Gospels, another, the human, side of Christ's person is brought prominently into view. Even the miraculous with which his whole ministry is surrounded and pervaded, does not destroy this effect; it is the power of God working in and through humanity. The whole impression left upon us is that of a holy and loving man, conscious of high gifts and a destined mission, overflowing with human sympathies and affections, exercised by human trials and stricken by human griefs. The very title which is so constantly given to him in these Gospels—"Son of Man"—notwithstanding its traditional Messianic significance, seems in a special manner to have been appropriated by him, from the deep consciousness of his intimate relation to our humanity. Had there been no other record of Christ than that delivered to us by the three first evangelists, there could have been, I think; but one opinion respecting his nature, that he was a simple, genuine man, highly endowed for a great purpose. The desire to possess some

biographical particulars respecting Jesus of Nazareth first became active and general in the Church, for reasons which I have already explained, when the gush of primitive enthusiasm which accompanied the realized belief of Christ's resurrection had in some degree subsided, and his earthly history was beginning to recede into a remoter past. Fortunately, preparation had already been made for the gratification of this desire. One of our Lord's earliest followers, the apostle Matthew, had,—we are informed on very old and reliable authority, cited in my last lecture,—preserved in writing full notes of his preaching; and another very early disciple, John Mark, the companion and interpreter of the apostle Peter, took down from his Master's lips, as we learn from the same source, whatever he heard him say respecting the words and actions of Christ. Of the most important thing, therefore, in Christ's life—his actual teaching—we have a record at first hand. And there is another circumstance worthy of note. The relationship of the three first Gospels to each other, it is well known, is one of the most difficult and complicated questions of Biblical criticism—how it is that, with such disparities both of matter and arrangement so constantly occurring between them, there should often be for sentences together an agreement in the very words. Now, it is satisfactory to observe, that where they occupy common ground, this verbal coincidence is most conspicuous in the language of Christ himself. It seems to me impossible to resist the conclusion, that all three had access to some common repository of the most remarkable sayings of Jesus, which they used for their own purpose, and variously distributed according to their several conceptions of his history. For we must not compare those times with our own, or the simple, casual rudiments of a Christian literature with even the contemporary usages of the great literary world of Rome. The Christians were an obscure and persecuted sect, consisting mainly of the humbler classes of society, among whom there was little literary talent and no literary ambition. There was nothing like a formal publication of the Gospels in the first instance, as books on the Evidences so constantly represent it. This did not occur in any proper sense till at least a century later. The Gospel, as the word is used in the Epistles of Paul and in the Acts of the Apostles, was oral, not written;

diffused not through the bookseller, but by the power of the living voice. The germs of our present synoptical Gospels were private collections of Christ's sayings and doings, cherished by individuals, communicated as something exceedingly precious to their most intimate friends, and floated down in different directions on a stream of tradition which was constantly receiving fresh accessions from other remembrances of that imperishable past. One of these collections would seem to have attracted peculiar attention from its pre-eminently authentic character; and hence the common citation of it in our Synoptics, still distinctly traceable in the verbal coincidences between them. It is interesting to compare the earliest notices of our Matthew and Mark with the preface to Luke's Gospel. They discover the opposite ends, if I may so describe it, of this obscure process of formation. Papias shews us how our two first Gospels originated. Luke informs us how he traced back the different traditions that had come down to him, to their primitive source in the "eye-witnesses and ministers of the word," and then combined and arranged them, in what he deemed the fittest order for the instruction of his contemporaries. Scripture, in our sense of the word, as an authoritative writing, was of comparatively late origin in the Church. When it finally began to operate as a new element of ecclesiastical development, it arrested and consolidated divers streams of still fluent tradition, some retaining what others had dropped, and some omitting unaccountably what others still kept, and all differing very considerably in form and contents from each other. It may be possible to some extent to account for these diversities by the special purpose which the several writers had in view. A final selection was made out of this miscellaneous evangelical literature by the Church in the latter part of the second century, under circumstances to which I shall have presently to allude. It does not at all follow that additions which are peculiar to one evangelist, and which evidently harmonize with his peculiar object—like the sections in Luke, referred to in the last lecture—are on that account alone to be regarded as unauthentic. The author may have received them through a channel of tradition which was not open to others, or which they did not care to explore. The broad, catholic spirit which distinguishes the parables

and discourses peculiar to Luke, would be naturally distasteful to the Jewish Christians under whose influence some of the earliest historical memorials of Jesus must of course have been made; and Luke, therefore, though he stands alone in recording them, may really, after all, have given us some of the freshest and most striking examples of the characteristic teaching of Jesus. On the whole, then, in our three first Gospels we probably gain the nearest approach to the human life and working of the great Prophet of Nazareth, retraced through tradition and some written memoranda, when the Church had recovered breath and composure sufficient to look back on the past.

In the third stage of development, the writers of the New Testament go back once more to the contemplation of the heavenly Christ, that inspired the first, fresh enthusiasm of the Church; his history again receding into dim background, or only those points of it—as in the fourth Gospel—being selected and dwelt upon, which served to unfold, during his transient passage across this earthly scene, this more elevated conception of his person and work. The Synoptical Gospels, if not in their final, completed state, yet in their process of formation and their growing influence, connect as by a transition-link the extreme points of Christian development within the limits of the New Testament. The main constituent elements of the Christian idea—Christ himself, his relation to humanity, and the conditions of admission into the spiritual world—had now passed out of history and controversy into the region of high speculative thought. We have one phasis of this change—the Alexandrine—in the Epistle to the Hebrews. We behold it in a still nobler, what we may justly regard its ultimate form, in the fourth Gospel. I call it ultimate, because it is evident from the sublime repose of its pervading spirit, that for its author the harassing period of controversy was over and gone, and that his faith had found the solution of earlier doubts and foregoing conflicts in the discovery and realization of that grand cosmical unity which embraces all spiritual natures in a bond of sympathy and love. As the principle of development had thus visibly commenced, and as we know it went on through subsequent ages of the Church, and has never ceased to the present day—the question may be asked, Why in our received Scripture did it

stop with the fourth Gospel? What is the line which seems thus arbitrarily to cut off our Scripture from many beautiful Christian writings which followed it? In one word, what is the Canon, and why does it exist? This question is partly one of fact and partly of reason. As a fact, it is matter of history, that the heads of the Church towards the close of the second century, deeply impressed with the mischievous and disorganizing effects of the violent controversies which had raged for a hundred years and frustrated their design of consolidating a Catholic or universal Church, made an united effort to collect a body of writings which should give an authentic account of the origin and earliest promulgation of the religion, and form an ultimate standard of appeal for the settlement of all disputes among Christians, relative to doctrine or practice. The critical tests of our modern learning were wholly unknown to the good and earnest men of that day; but there is every evidence, internal and external, that they executed their task in good faith and with simplicity of purpose. The breadth of their spirit is shewn in the freedom with which they have admitted very different types of Christian opinion into their collection; and although they had obviously no critical faculty, they possessed that strong spiritual sense which enabled them to discriminate almost intuitively what was, and what was not, properly Christian; what did, and what did not, bring with it a genuine flavour of the apostolic age. As a reason in the nature of things why the Canon should have been fixed when it was, we may remark, that it occurred at a time when the living development of primitive Christianity seemed to have reached its natural limit, when the conflicting Jewish and Gentile elements by which it had been so long distracted were at length subdued and harmonized in the dominant feeling of Catholicism—while the Church was still free and unpatronized, even suffering and persecuted—before the hierarchal principles which marked the next century under Cyprian had had time to shew themselves—still more before the union of the Church with the State in the reign of Constantine would have subjected to just suspicion any collection of authoritative books put forth under such auspices. As it is, this body of writings, notwithstanding their various dates and often uncertain authorship, and the clear traces of legendary influence on

some of their narratives, stands out as an authentic witness to all time of the intense feeling and belief of the apostolic age, of the vivid faith with which it embraced the person and work of Christ—of the earliest bursting forth from its divine source of that irresistible flood of enthusiastic conviction which swept away the time-honoured monuments of heathenism and prepared the soil for a new moral world.

I have said the pervading idea of the New Testament is the expectation of an approaching crisis in the state of the world, involving a last judgment and a final separation of the evil and the good; and that the books which compose it are the product and expression of that belief. No one, I think, who reads the New Testament in a candid and unbiassed spirit will dispute this statement. Take, for example, the Epistle of James, the most general and practical in its tone of all the writings of the New Testament. At the close of exhortations that might suit any age, what do we find even here? These words: "Be patient, brethren, unto the coming of the Lord; be patient, establish your hearts, for the coming of the Lord draweth nigh." Now, here occurs at first sight a serious difficulty—according to the ordinary interpretation of Scripture, an insuperable difficulty. This awful expectation on which the hopes and fears of the early Christians were so intently fixed, and which was the great means of their conversion to a holier life, was not fulfilled. Generations passed away. Year after year multitudes assembled in the churches on Easter eve, awaiting with breathless awe the sound of the last trumpet and the descent of the Lord from heaven. But still he came not. So that, as we learn from one of the latest of the books of the New Testament (2 Peter iii. 3), scoffers arose in the last days, who said, "Where is the promise of his coming? for since the fathers fell asleep, all things continue as they were from the beginning of the creation." In the course of the third century, when Christianity, having shaken off the fervid enthusiasm which ushered it into being, began to take its place among the regular and permanent agencies of the world, we find treatises in circulation, of which it was the object to recal believers from their too great seclusion from secular affairs, and to encourage them to apply their higher principles to the state of things as it actually existed, and as, for an indefinite futurity, it was

likely to continue to be. This was a virtual admission that the expectation of the earliest believers had been founded, in one sense at least, on a delusion.

How, then, are we to deal with this fact? For it affects the very foundation of the letter of the New Testament. The difficulty is to be solved by recognizing the distinction, which all historical development of necessity involves, between the inherent principle of a religion, its spiritual essence, and the outward form of conception and expression stamped on it by the circumstances of its origin and of its transmission from age to age. Religion affects the permanent elements of our nature, our affections, our moral sense, our yearning for inward peace, our aspirations after the infinite. These we may call the constants of humanity. The efficiency of a religion is derived from the intensity and steadiness of their action, as its purity consists in the perfection of the Divine Object to which they are directed. Both these ends are accomplished in Christianity by the reality—the living hold on the mind of believers—which it has given to things unseen, and the close personal relationship which it has established between the human soul and the infinitely holy and loving Father of the universe. Christ's life, which is his gospel in action, his gospel proved possible, realizes for us the two great convictions on which all true religion must rest; the habitual sense of a living God and of our filial connection with Him, and the habitual consciousness of our immortal destiny. Now, these two convictions imply a spiritual affection and determination of the constants of our nature, and may co-exist with every conceivable modification of intellectual development and doctrinal conception that is not at war with their own essential force. Nay, it is obvious (and the history of religion shews it) that the conceptions through which these spiritual convictions can be brought home to a man's inmost soul, through which he can grasp them as realities, must bear some definite relation to his own intellectual culture and the state of contemporary opinion. A medium is needed to introduce them as a vital element into the mental atmosphere which he habitually breathes. The spiritual measure of a man is one thing; the intellectual, another. Of two men, not he who has the most correct and enlarged comprehension of the moral and physical relations of the uni-

verse, is the most religious ; but he who has the most vivid and constant sense of his own personal relation to the great invisible Author, Governor and Judge of his immortal soul.

And now, just consider the circumstances under which Jesus Christ came into the world—in other words, the social conditions under which the problem of man's spiritual redemption had to be worked out. The whole mental atmosphere of the age into which he was born was charged with elements of belief which had penetrated deeply into the popular persuasion both of the Jewish and the Gentile world. In the Jewish and Gentile world alike there had been a course of spiritual training and preparation running on in parallel lines for centuries. The warnings and promises of old Hebrew prophets, and the dimmer announcements, with less perfect insight, of a grand providential retribution which issued from ancient oracles in Phrygia, met and mingled in Alexandria, the prolific womb of the determining influences of human thought for the future civilization of the world. It was here that the Greek version of the Old Testament opened the spiritual depths of the Law and the Prophets to the searching eye of Greek philosophers. Here too the lighter literature which satisfied the wants and moulded the opinions of the multitude had its source. And it must be remembered that for centuries the book-trade of the world had its seat in Alexandria. It was to the Greek reading public of those days what Leipsic is now to Germany (or perhaps, considering the popular character of many of its productions, we might also say—making due allowance for the great difference between books multiplied by the press and books transcribed by the hand—what Mudie is in our day to the readers of Great Britain and Ireland). It was from Alexandria that the Sibylline verses, heathen in their nucleus and connected probably in their origin with the worship of Apollo in Asia Minor, and then successively interpolated with Jewish and Christian additions, were widely circulated through every part of the Græco-Roman world, prepared the way for the preaching of Paul and the directer influence of Hebrew prophecy, and diffused through the heathen public that strong expectation of an approaching crisis in the state of the world, which gave the Christian preachers an immediate hold on previously developed belief, and enabled them to find a ready

sympathy and answering conviction. The form of this expectation was determined by the popular traditions of the age, Jewish and Gentile ; but it involved an essential truth that has its root in the eternal order of the moral government of the universe, and was justified by the profound corruption and enormous wickedness of the existing civilization. Such was the belief deeply pervading society, which met the religion of Jesus when it went forth on its mission of spiritual regeneration. He brought to it from his pious home and the devout influences of his childhood and his youth, the hereditary trust of his fathers, consecrated by the venerable words of prophets and psalmists, that a kingdom of God must be at hand to redress the wrongs and assuage the sufferings of humanity, and the solemn consciousness, which strengthened in him as he advanced deeper into his work, that he had been summoned by God to bring on to its final issue the grand retributory scheme of Divine Providence. It was through the force of deep-rooted beliefs that he got at the hearts of his contemporaries. Such was the spiritual instrumentality by which God had appointed him to accomplish his work. This it was which brought him into contact with actual realities. No other was open to him, except through a stupendous miracle that would have unmade the whole mind of the age, and swept away at a stroke beliefs that were the solid deposit of the slow accretions of centuries. But here—to recur again to what I have already remarked—we must distinguish between the form of a belief, its outward doctrinal envelopment, and the essential truth which it involves. Christ nowhere lays stress on the mere form of his teaching ; he is never doctrinal, in the modern sense of that word. He professes not to know how and when the Father will work out his purposes. “Of that day and hour,” he says, “knoweth no man ; no, not the angels which are in heaven ; neither the Son, but the Father.” What is eternal and unchanging in his words, what came to him direct from God, is that which underlies all these forms of Jewish conception—his profound consciousness of the personal, the filial relationship of the human soul to the Father-God ; of the close moral sympathy between God and man ; of the necessity to this peaceful intercourse with God, of a heart purged from all malignity and hypocrisy, purified to its inmost depths by penitence

and humility, by faith and love; of the glory of self-sacrifice in the cause of truth and justice and humanity; of the permanence and inherent grandeur of things spiritual; and of the final translation of the virtuous to an everlasting communion with God, when things seen and temporal have passed away. And these truths were not words only in Christ. They were his life. They were the substance of his moral being; the deep substratum in which the words and actions that made up his occasional intercourse with the Jews of his own day, and are recorded in our Gospels, had their vital root. This holy life left behind it an intense conviction—by whatever means we may suppose Providence to have produced that conviction—that its spiritual relations with the world were not interrupted by death, and that through the worldly ignominy of the cross it had passed to new power and glory and blessedness in heaven. Such was the impression which that life and death, coming into contact with the pre-existing beliefs of the age, left permanently on the spiritual consciousness of humanity, and which marks a crisis in the history of our planet by breathing a new and more powerful influence into its moral development. Of the earliest effects of that impression, till it had fixed itself among the permanent conditions of human progress, we have a record in the New Testament, blended with the strong belief which then possessed the most religious portion of society, that a solemn judgment was awaiting the accumulated iniquities of mankind; and we can trace the working of that impression through three successive stages of development in our extant books. In the Apocalypse and the oldest portions of Matthew, we observe its effect on the Jewish mind and the Jewish form that it took. In the Epistles of Paul—with a reflected light from the same source in the writings which bear the name of Luke—we have evidence of the sharp conflicts of opinion, of conservative with progressive tendencies, which ensued on the first attempt to carry the gospel beyond the limits of Judaism into the heathen world. Lastly, in those most beautiful writings which have come down to us under the name of John, and which, however deeply impregnated by the philosophical ideas of their age, may possibly have been first stimulated into existence by the reminiscences of his extreme old age, we see how the religion of faith and love

finally triumphed over all earlier antagonisms, and reached at length its equilibrium of central repose; how the narrowness of Judaism and the hardness of controversy were lost and dissolved in the consciousness of the higher unity which embraces all spiritual natures—man and Christ and God—in one comprehensive bond of moral sympathy and love.

It will be felt by those to whom this view of the progressive development of our New Testament literature has been presented for the first time, that we are thus deprived of the distinctive benefit of a Scripture as usually understood; that instead of being referred to a definite rule of faith and practice authoritatively conveyed to us, we have to compare the statements of different writers at variance with one another, and all deeply tinged with the temporary beliefs and feelings of their own age, and are thrown in the last instance on our own spiritual sense for the discrimination of what is human and what is divine. But the difficulty is more apparent than real. At least it applies as much to the old theory as the new. Has the most rigid faith in the verbal authority of Scripture succeeded, after the repeated attempts of three hundred years, in bringing men to an agreement as to what is fundamental in Christian doctrine? Have sects increased or diminished under this system? What is really divine, what is a true breathing of the Spirit of God, in the words of Christ and his apostles, carries with it its own witness to the heart and conscience of man. No earnest, devout spirit, intent on truth and self-surrendered to God, ever finally missed or mistook it. The wise and good in all ages of the Church have found it through the ever-varying media of their creeds and their philosophical theories. In the simple religion of holiness and love as the one thing needful, Baxter and Wesley found repose at last from the strife and controversy in which they had been involved through life. Whatever lives in humanity must grow; and there can be no growth without change and progressive development. Christianity was not given to the intellect of man as a perfect type of doctrine, rounded off and complete, unsusceptible of addition or subtraction (in which case it must have remained for ever in the high regions of abstract speculation, far aloof from the wants and the capacities of the great mass of human beings); but

it was cast into the soil of our ordinary humanity, as a seed, full of procreant life and power, which struck root in what I have described as the constants of our nature ; and gathering to itself and permeating with its spirit all the associated beliefs and ideas of the age, wherever they were not destructive of its own deep life, has shot up from age to age in endless forms of doctrinal conception—sometimes, it is true, darkened and perverted by too close an intermixture with the ideas of the time, yet ever with marvellous power of internal expansion and refinement and of self-adjustment to the altered conditions, intellectual and social, of our human world. No one, I think, can contemplate this great fact, all that led to it, all that it implies, and all to which it points, without beholding the entire history of the world in a religious light ; without a solemn consciousness of the high Providence which from the first has been directing the seeming accidents and chances of our mortal lot, and is shaping all events to the training of our race for a higher destiny than we are yet able to conceive.

It is true, this view of the Scriptures must introduce considerable change in the modes of religious agency. Less efficacy will be attached to the mere distribution of Bibles, as if outward contact with a book must be followed by some magical change on the human soul. To a hardened and carnal nature, the word of God is a sealed book. He cannot open it. He cannot read in it. The spirit of Christ breathed on him by the living voice of a brother man, must first soften and purify and enlighten his heart, before the word of Christ can become a blessing to him. The spirit is before the word. The missionary must precede the Bible. Even with Christians, with those who justly revere the Bible as the best of books, more selection should be exercised than is usual, for its profitable reading in the public services of religion. What we may call its golden passages, passages through which the spirit of the Living God streams directly into the human soul, should be gathered by the consenting voice and authority of devout and thoughtful men into a recognized Anthology or Christomalby for the use of the Church in its public worship ; while its history and the other elements of its multifarious literature, invaluable as an illustration of the religion imbedded in them, instead of being introduced into devotional services,

where their intrusion is often felt to be unseasonable, should be reserved for didactic and critical exposition in lectures specially devoted to the purpose, such as are becoming more and more a necessity to a thorough and rational instruction in religion. Much might be said on both these last topics. I have only time to allude to them here, as changes that must eventually follow the wider diffusion of the views respecting Scripture which I have now ventured to express, and which I believe to be founded in truth.

But the most important result which I anticipate from the prevalence of these views, is the greater breadth and catholicity of spirit that must accompany them. The whole texture of the New Testament is a standing protest against the narrow dogmatism of our day. The authors of its several books were scarcely less divided from each other on several important points of doctrine than we are now. But they were all alike faithful and earnest followers of Jesus Christ. They all alike helped to build up his church; and their words, one in spirit, though differing in conception, have found a common receptacle in the venerable book, which is still to all of us, in the midst of our conflicting creeds, the source of our highest motives and most precious consolations. If this book teaches us anything with certainty, it is, that nothing is fundamental but the spirit of Christ himself, the spirit of love and holiness, of self-sacrifice for others' good, of unbounded confidence in God, and of firm trust in the immortal destinies of the human soul. It is by the spirit of Christ that we must interpret the words of Christ. This alone can open to us their inward meaning and draw out their secret power. When the spirit of Christ has vanquished the spirit of sect, men will not indeed become indifferent to opinions—for every religious man, like Peter and Paul and John, will try to make his own as clear and definite to himself as possible; but they will cease to wrangle about them. They will regard them as something belonging to the individual, something amenable to the silent tribunal within his own breast, but, if his life be loving and pure, in no wise affecting his amicable relations with the Church and the world. These are trite and obvious truths. But how little are they felt and acted on! The greatest Reformation has yet to come; and it will come, not like the first, with the substitution of the despotism of

a book for the despotism of a priest, but with the substitution for a book of the living spirit which produced the book; with the substitution for a noisy battle-field of blind and ignorant combatants darkened over by the clouds of prejudice and fear, of a wide and well-cultivated garden, blooming with the products of united Christian energy and bright with the genial sunshine of Christian love.

II.—HERDER AS THEOLOGIAN.—I. BIOGRAPHICAL.

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THERE are many signs that educated Englishmen generally are growing daily more alive to the fact that the thinker and student of modern wisdom must make himself acquainted with German thought. The present position of this he can understand only as he studies the great leaders of it who lived during the last half of the preceding and the first half of the present century. Nay, more; the Germans themselves confess that there are many veins of

truth in the works of their great leaders of this period still waiting to be worked. Lessing, Kant, Herder and Goethe, are still marching at the head of German thought in many fields. The present is for the Fatherland of Thought the age of Epigoni.

In art, Goethe, without doubt, best deserves reverent study; in metaphysics, with all his faults, Kant will yield the richest harvest for labour bestowed on this ungrateful soil; in the *studium humanitatis*, which with him is *scientia rerum divinarum et humanarum*, including anthropology and theology in the widest sense, Herder was and still is one of the greatest teachers, and not least for the reason that he communicates his spirit as well as his doctrine to his disciples. Accordingly we set to work with the hope that others may be glad to share with us the pleasure and profit of an examination of Herder's sixty volumes, for the purpose of getting acquainted with his theology especially. And because Herder's idea was that this science is the most human of all sciences, and the ideal theologian the most truly a man of all men, we must needs introduce a view of his theology with a glance at him as a man.

Jean Paul Richter with his uncommon wisdom saw that two exclamations of Herder's were profound revelations of the deep places of his personal history: "Would that I had been born in the Middle Ages!" "If I might only see a ghost!" The man who gave utterance to these wishes had as historian sketched the history of the Middle Ages in darker lines than any of Gibbon's, and in metaphysics was in greater accord with Hume than Kant, and in psychology was a physiologist. In few men's natures have so many conflicting elements been present as met in Herder's: thoughts and affections, strong clings to the old and restless tendencies towards the new, a passion for improvement and a dread of innovation. As historian, he wrote bitter things against Christianity; as poet and Christian, he loved it with the fervour of a woman; as a lover of science, he studied physiology as the key to psychology; as husband, father, pastor, he cried for light to assure and guide him in that atmosphere in which the lights of science cannot live. His writings present him in conflict with nearly every class of students of his time, not from ignoble quarrelsomeness, but from the rich fulness, the fine sen-

sitiveness and grand breadth of his nature. He felt with such rare sympathy the truth of all error and the error of all truth, that he could not agree with even those who were most nearly one with him. Nay, he was bound, such was his nature, to contradict and condemn himself. It was his painful lot too to take an undue share in that unhappy war which has always been laying waste the friendships of society—the war of theologies. Like his great friend and, in some senses, master, Lessing, he was attacked by turn, or at once, by the Orthodox, the Rationalists and the Pietists, and by every section of these three parties. Think, too, that he who was the apostle of humanity and the humanities found himself in the office of a Lutheran clergyman in the days of Pastor Goeze ! As great an enthusiast of the classics as Winckelmann or Goethe, as devoted a lover of ballads and romances, with their heathen morality, as Sir Walter Scott, a greater believer than Sir William Jones in the presence of divine revelation in the sacred writings of Egypt, India, Persia and China, finding in Shakespeare a bible for this age, reading the book of nature and history with the profound conviction that he is at the source of all words of God,—could the Augsburg Confession and the duties of a Lutheran pastor sit lightly upon him ? We see here a fruitful source of unhappiness, and, if he will raise his office to the height whither he himself has climbed, of Herculean labour, for which, perhaps, he is not built. We have here, therefore, a life of struggle. Of Herder, certainly not less than Goethe, we should be inclined to say, *Voilà un homme qui a eu de grands chagrins !* It has a deeper meaning than appears on the surface, when Herder heads a chapter on *Symbolische Bücher* with the line, “The brave man struggling in the storms of fate.”

Johann Gottfried von Herder was born at Mohrungen, a small town in East Prussia, August 25, 1744. His parents were poor, industrious, godly people. His father was by trade a weaver, but had left that calling to become the master of an elementary girls’ school and the precentor and verger of the Polish church in Mohrungen. His mother was the daughter of a shoeing-smith. Young Gottfried attended the school of the town, in which were taught reading, writing and arithmetic, the elements of Latin, a smattering of Greek, some history and geography ; all by the help of the cane,

and under the impression that memory is the only faculty with which schools have to deal. In a word, the school was of the "Hinterschlag" type. Happily, young Herder could educate himself. He was a quick, sensitive, imaginative lad, with a very wolf's hunger for knowledge. But he ever found it hard to forgive the wrongs of his school life, and could think of his masters only as "pious tigers." At the age of sixteen, the Dean of Mohrungen, one Trescho, an ascetic and Pietist, took him into his house as his *famulus*, not with a view to the boy's benefit, but for the help he could render him in copying manuscripts for the press. This pietistic, hypochondriac pastor got what he could out of his young famulus's skill in penmanship, and did what he could to discourage his ambition to become a scholar. In spite of this cold water on the youth's passion for wisdom, in spite too of the poverty of his parents and the horrors of the "Great Frederick's" conscriptions, he got away from his Egypt into his Promised Land of Königsberg University. A regiment of Russian soldiers, returning from the Seven Years' War, were quartered in those days at poor Mohrungen. Their surgeon was a visitor at Trescho's, and was taken with young Herder's appearance. He asked questions, and discovered that the boy could put into Latin for him a medical essay. At once the offer was made and accepted, that Herder should accompany the surgeon to Königsberg, study medicine at the University, help him with his essay, and get cured of a fistulous eye with which he was afflicted. But, alas! at the first surgical operation he attended, the poor sensitive youth fainted, and the very idea of witnessing a second was more than his highly-strung nerves could bear.

In a moment all his high hopes were dashed. Utterly forlorn, he was wandering the streets of Königsberg when an old schoolfellow met him. The brave friend urged him to enter himself as a *studiosus theologiae*. But with ten thaler in his pocket? Yes. He matriculated. The assistance of his friend and a few gifts from Mohrungen helped him to keep body and soul together. Often for days in succession he lived on bread and water. But by degrees he got work, writing for the Königsberg newspaper. And he had not been in the University a year when he was appointed teacher in the Grammar-school there.

Of his friends in Königsberg two only can be mentioned here. They were Kant and Hamann. Hamann was deeply impregnated with Rousseau's disgust with civilization and passion for nature; but at the same time he was a strictly moral and deeply religious, even pietistic, man. Together with religious mysticism he combined that great intellectual boldness which is so often found in mystics. The "Magus of the North," however, hated and scorned the prevalent rationalism of his day. He loved Shakespeare, but his book was the Bible. By natural gifts and religious and intellectual history, he lived in intimate fellowship with the prophets of the Old Testament. Goethe thinks that the great underlying principle of all Hamann's thinking is, that everything a man does or says must spring from the combined exertion of all his faculties: the production of one faculty—of a divided nature—is to be reprobated. The prophets of the Old Testament were men acting and speaking with the whole energies of their natures combined. Herder hardly acquired this peculiarity from either the Hebrew prophets or Hamann. It was natural to him as to others like him. But his love of Hamann and the Old Testament nourished the peculiarity, and is explained by it. Herder does not always equally exhibit this characteristic. In his earlier works it is more predominant than in his later. But his life through, the keen steel of his intellect will glow and burn with the heat of his heart. He cannot help the light of his imagination playing bewilderingly about the path of an argument. His very style betrays him. Poetry breaks up and mars his prose. He argues with his feelings and feels with his syllogisms. In all this, Hamann and Herder were brothers. And they were not alone in that *Sturm und Drang* period of German literature.

How unlike both Hamann and Herder was the Königsberg philosopher, Kant! Yet his influence over young Herder was considerable. The great thoughts of the philosopher aroused and fired the susceptible mind of his pupil. Some of them he converted into poems. The too metaphysical ones he escaped from by rushing into the fields and woods. Kant recognized his abilities; and one morning read aloud in the *auditorium* his poetical version of the lecture of the day before. But it was Kant's physical, rather than his metaphysical, theories that found most

congenial soil in Herder's mind. The greatest benefit Kant conferred on him, next to opening his mind to large views of nature, was introducing him to English and Scotch philosophers. His life through, Berkeley, Hume, Shaftesbury, remained his favourite philosophers. While Kant was making him acquainted with our philosophical countrymen, Hamann inspired him with an unbounded admiration of our poets, above all Shakespeare.

After two years' stay in Königsberg, in the autumn of 1764, Herder received a call to become collaborator in the collegiate school of Riga. With his introduction to this position commenced one of the trials that subsequently annoyed and distressed him at every turn of his life. The clergy of Riga, like the clergy elsewhere, distrusted his orthodoxy and threw obstacles in his path. But in spite of them he won general and deep esteem. In 1767, he was invited to the post of Rector of a school in St. Petersburg. The good people of Riga, however, were not inclined to part with him. They founded for him a co-pastorate as an addition to his work and income. As teacher and pastor, he lived in Riga until June, 1769.

In May of this year he suddenly resigned his offices. The suddenness of his resignation, together with the fact that no one knew whither he was going, created a great deal of speculation and slander. It was in those days a most strange occurrence for a pastor to throw up one charge before he had secured another. Herder's enemies, his orthodox brethren, shook their heads, and intimated that he had wholly deserted his sacred calling, for which, they had all along known, he had no aptness and no love. From their point of view, they were not far wrong. Herder's letters shew that the clerical office as it then was, was as unsuitable a position for him as could very well be invented. Yet, from his point of view, it might be converted into one most fitted for the exercise of his talents and tastes. In a letter to his old friend and professor, Kant, he has been expressing the satisfaction with which he follows the humanism of Montaigne, Pope, Hume and Shaftesbury, and his dissatisfaction with some of Kant's hypotheses and proofs, especially where they touch on what is human; and then goes on, in a sentence which tells us how he regarded the pastoral office, to say :

"Since I assumed the clerical profession for no other reason than because I knew, and see still more clearly by daily experience, that in the present condition of our civil constitution it is from this position that culture and intelligence can be best brought home to that respected portion of our people which we call the populace,—this human philosophy is my fondest occupation."

This passage is most interesting, as shewing the motives that induced Herder to become a pastor. However often afterwards he might have doubts as to the educational value of his calling, the purity and nobility of the end he had in view when he entered upon it cannot be questioned. Did not the Hebrew prophets often lose heart in their work? The following passages from Herder's correspondence in Riga, rightly viewed, simply reveal the honesty and true manliness of his heart, together with the difficulties of his human lot:

"Do not envy me my Greek Muses: they are poor maids, who were probably never quite favourable to me, and since I have become pastor, threaten to grow more and more unfaithful. One could scarcely believe how much a man's head may be turned by clerical bands. Since miserable school work and too serious ecclesiastical duties make havoc of me, against my will I have acquired such a wrinkle of seriousness that I get quite concerned for all my fun."

To Nicolai:

"Would to God I could live near to you, whether as pastor or layman, and enjoy the society of the men of taste in Berlin."

To another friend:

"The place where I live, my profession, my work, the people whom I meet, everything is distasteful to me, and nothing seems to me more inexplicable than that I have in some way chained myself to Riga by my noble clerical profession."

To Nicolai again:

"Lessing would never have been the man he is, if he had been shut up in the pent-up atmosphere of a small town, to say nothing of a study, and been obliged to hatch insects and what not in the wrinkle of his spirit. And, my God, what profession brings wrinkles and furrows more quickly than the clerical? Even Spalding, even your Resewitz,—name whom you like, the wrinkle is there, the serious official mien is on the face of the whole author! And, misery, the preacher's wrinkle is worse than the academic."

True son of nature, devout worshiper of Apollo, how touching is his dread of wrinkles—especially mental wrinkles! Physical and mental powers and manifestations are to him so closely akin, that the sad trial he bore in his fistulous eye assumes a painfulness it would not have had in ordinary men. But that trial will come before us again.

We cannot stay to do more than mention the two works which Herder published while at Riga. These were the *Fragmente zur deutschen Literatur* and the *Kritische Wälder*. They at once ranked him with the great men of his day, and won for him name and fame, but also a storm of opposition and abuse. We need only say here, that Lessing wrote, "Herder is the only man who would repay me for bringing out my whole stock of musty learning;" and again, "When I write anything, my first question is, What will Herder say to it?"

The sermons preached at Riga are true to the one great aim of his life—to reduce all religious beliefs and practices to great human necessities. The three that are preserved are on Prayer, the Divinity and Use of the Bible, and his Ministry at Riga, this last being his farewell sermon. A comparison of them with his letters and unexecuted literary schemes of the same period, reveals a free use of the principle of "accommodation." To avoid causing offence to the weak, and giving his enemies the weapons against him they were eager to catch at, he kept much back, and by his phraseology to a certain extent misled the simple and illuded the captious. How the responsibility of this unhappy defect is to be divided between him and his age, fortunately we have not to decide.

Having got free of the uncongenial labours of his school and pulpit, his six weeks' voyage from Riga to Nantes acted on him like a second deliverance from Egypt. The spirit of the wide world of waters descended upon him. His journal of those weeks should be read, as it was written, in the feeling of Byron's fine lines:

"O'er the glad waters of the dark blue sea."

What retreats into the desert have been to great religious workers before they entered on their mission, this retreat into the ocean was to Herder, the apostle of humanity. The journal he then kept is a truly astonishing production.

We find there a view of the world and a plan of life with much of the infinitude of the sea about them. There is the record of deep glimpses into the nature of man, and the great revelation of it, literature. Owing to these glimpses, Herder is the greatest of all literary interpreters, and his countrymen can lay claim to rank with him in this respect because they have followed in his track. The great principle that man is a child of the elements and influences amidst which he lives, and that his literature is the reflection of his individual nature, was first clearly seen and applied by Herder, and to his mind it was most clearly revealed on this sea voyage. We also get insight into Herder's own nature as we read this journal. He reviews his past life, not sparing himself. One sentence especially concerns us. He resolves to be a preacher of humanity, and to seek in the Bible "religion and virtue, examples and blessings, which are *for us*," to become a "preacher of the virtue of *our age*."

Having arrived at Nantes, he studied the French language there four months, and then went on to Paris. Here he made the acquaintance of Arnauld, Diderot, Thomas, d'Alembert probably, and other noted men. The following quotation from some Observations on the French Theatre which he made at that time, are not without meaning in reference to himself and his time :

"What school of morals better than the theatre is there in the world? Here, where vices and virtues, fools and villains, good men and heroes, appear in person, portraiture, life, action, history, for the eye, ear, soul! Illusion! O what could be more useful than to give more illusion to the theatre? Whoever does that works for the human race. Go into the theatre, expect a Tartufe, a Zaire! Then go to church and expect a frosty sermon; then go to mass and expect to hear nothing, and to see what you have always seen; then go to the tomb of St. Geneviève, and fall down and recount her caricature virtues. Where have you anything more? Will a time come when cloisters and pulpits will be destroyed, and the theatre be purified and brought to perfection of illusion?"

During his stay in Paris, he was invited to become travelling tutor and chaplain to the son of the Prince Bishop of Eutin. He accepted the invitation, spent some months at Eutin, won the esteem of the little court, the

dislike of the clergy, and the charge of Socinianism. He attended the Prince on a tour into South Germany, calling at Darmstadt, where he met his future wife, Marie Caroline Flachsland, and finally separated from the Prince at Strasburg. Here he spent six months, writing, reading with Goethe, suffering agonies under fruitless operations on his eye, and alternately raptures and torments from his love for Fräulein Flachsland. Readers of Goethe are familiar with the famous description of Herder that is found in *Aus meinem Leben*. It is a fine picture, but it is not all *Wahrheit*, and must be read under the correction of contemporary correspondence. Herder introduced Goethe to Sterne, Goldsmith, Swift,—a favourite author of Herder's,—Shakespeare, Homer and Plato. Goethe's famous critique of Hamlet in the last instance dates back to Herder, and his praise of the Vicar of Wakefield was anticipated in Herder's letters to his affianced bride.

In February, 1770, Herder was offered the post of Court preacher and Consistorialrath at Bückeburg, the residence of the Count of Schaumburg-Lippe, with "full freedom to teach in theology what you think." The five years he spent at Bückeburg form a distinct chapter in his history as a man and theologian.

He had made a name as a critic and literary man. But his fame began considerably to belie him. His troubles at Strasburg, the great change that was coming over the whole mind of Germany, bringing in the *Sturm und Drang* period, with its deeper feeling and greater earnestness, his own desire to find the work of his life, converted him into a more deeply religious man, and led him to devote himself, with his characteristic *abandon*, to theology and his clerical profession. This change is evident in his correspondence and published works; though in the correspondence there are expressions of disgust with his pastoral duties, and frequent outbreaks of a bitter philosophy rather Stoical than Christian. The Count had invited him to Bückeburg for his literary qualities, and wished him to let his clerical work go. The Count, too, was a soldier, a tyrannical governor, without any ideality or enthusiasm. He was the only man with whom Herder could associate on equal terms. Hence all Herder's hopes and aims in accepting this position were bitterly disappointed. His first year in Bückeburg was as

lonely, dark and hopeless, as could well be. The Count was disappointed in him and he in the Count. The people of the town could not understand his sermons. He could not improve the schools for want of money. But by and by his lot grew less burdensome. His sermons won for him a devoted disciple in the Countess. She had been educated by the Pietists, and modified Herder's feelings towards them. He began to write his sermons with her in his mind's eye. No doubt they thereby assumed a somewhat more mystical and less rationalistic tone. Still he was not fundamentally untrue to his position. And the result of his teaching was, that the pietistic Countess saw her theological creed daily growing beautifully less, and certainly gave up the methodistical elements of her Pietism. His position was further rendered less intolerable by his marriage and the growing confidence of the Count.

The work most characteristic of this period is the *Älteste Urkunde des Menschengeschlechts*. It is a true child of this wild, strong period of German literature. Goethe (*Biographische Einzelheiten*, 8 June, 1774) gives the best brief account of it:

"I retained my letter to send you your portion (of Herder's book) over the sea, but I am unable. It is such a mystical wide-beaming whole, a revolving world, alive in the wealth of its intertwining branches, so that no sketch on another scale can give any idea of this gigantic thing, nor can a faithful silhouette of individual parts produce a melodious sympathetic echo of it in the soul. He has gone down into the depths of his feeling and turned up all the high and holy power of simple nature, and led it forth from the creation over the wide world, now as in the song of twilight dawn and summer lightning, and then again as in the rosy morn of smiling Orphic music. But first he swept away, with fire and brimstone and deluge, the infamous brood of modern spirits, Deists and Atheists, Philologists, Text-amenders, Orientalists and the like."

In examining Herder's theology, the exceptional, wild, immeasurable character of this period must ever be remembered. With Lessing and Goethe, he had acquired a boundless contempt for the shallow Rationalism that was then prevalent. Socinian interpretations of the fourth Gospel, Deistic religion and morality, unhistorical explanations of biblical miracles, the whole spirit of the time shallow, un-

faithful to history, with no insight into other times, and no genuine taste for poetry, filled him with righteous indignation. Like everything in those years, his revolt was into the opposite extreme; and his language must not be interpreted prosaically.

In 1772, Herder became acquainted with the great classical scholar Heyne, and visited him at Göttingen. And from that time efforts were incessant to get Herder to Göttingen. Towards the end of 1775, more decisive steps were taken; but the negotiations dragged on through the next year, and were then broken off by the call to Weimar. These negotiations were to Herder of a most annoying kind. Orthodox men about the king, our George III., had created in the royal mind doubts as to Herder's orthodoxy. In consequence of this, he received an invitation to a theological chair and the University pulpit in Göttingen on condition that he would evince his theological soundness in an examination or *colloquium*. For a long time he protested indignantly against the suspicions of his heterodoxy. He urged that the authorship of a system of divinity was no proof of orthodoxy. He claimed to be treated according to "the laws of Germany."

"Whoever assents to the Confessions of Germany must be deemed orthodox until the contrary has been proved; and let them prove this of me. I will shew them that I can assent to symbolical books with heart and mouth; which many cannot do."

Two years after the date of this letter, Herder dealt with this question of subscription in his *Provinzial-blätter*. He holds that the creeds arose out of temporary necessities, and are expressions of temporary forms of belief, and that no man can reasonably consider them to be rules of thought and faith. They indicate the spirit of a church, but must be always applied as their authors would apply them under the altered circumstances of the present. They are also political insignia and monuments of bygone conflicts and victories. When he wrote these letters, he was opposed to any revision or abrogation of the Confessions. Later in his life he thought otherwise.

In the autumn of 1776, Herder entered on his duties as Court preacher, Consistorialrath and General Superintendent in Weimar, whither the Grand Duke, at Goethe's

instigation, had invited him. As so many times before, so again, his reputation for heterodoxy and the influence of the clergy prepared for him a disheartening and annoying introduction to his new work. His church had been some time without a pastor; and instead of coming back to welcome him, the flock that should have been his, sought permission from the authorities to continue under the care of the pastors whose ministry they had attended during the interregnum. The result was that they had to be driven under Herder's care, by command from the Government. As it was with his congregation, so was it in the consistorium. He was alone, and opposed on all points by his colleagues. That he should devote himself as he did to the improvement of the ecclesiastical and educational condition of the town and duchy of Weimar, is one of the noble traits of his character. We must remember, however, that the reigning family, with Goethe, Wieland and many other enlightened men, were his warm supporters.

Unhappily, Herder's letters to Goethe with reference to his removal from Bückeberg to Weimar have been lost; Goethe's to Herder, however, remain, and we must quote a few passages from them.

"I have spoken well of your political prudence in spiritual matters; for the Duke is fully determined to have no clerical squabbles as to orthodoxy and the devil."

A few days afterwards:

"Dear brother, give me the name of only a *single* theologian who has a reputation for *orthodoxy*, and is your friend, and will give you a good word if he is applied to."

Then follows a most amusing poetical epistle announcing Herder's call to Weimar. What would the good under-shepherds of Herder's diocese have said had they known that Goethe hailed their superintendent as the Messiah who was coming to Weimar, riding, not on one ass, but on a hundred and fifty (the subordinate pastors themselves)? Wieland, writing to Merck, repeated Goethe's joke. "The Messiah, Herder, will make his entry here on Palm Sunday on 150 asses." A few weeks later, having asked Herder to come as soon as he liked, Goethe writes:

"You will find some good folks here who will receive you with open arms. You need only be what you are: that is

policy (Politik) here at present. N.B. The common people fear they will not understand you : therefore be simple in your first sermon. Tell them the most commonplace things in your manner ; and then you have won them. The clergy are all a hopeless set. Still the younger of them are not dead against you."

About the time of his removal to Weimar he shook off much of the intemperate, mystical anti-rationalism and the vague semi-orthodoxy, that may have done him honour as a proof of his horror of shallowness and starved intellectualism, and greatly served the cause of truth, yet surely much disfigure and mar the productions of the Bückeburg period. The process by which he returned to the sanity and philosophic clearness of his latest works was gradual. It is evidently commencing about the year 1776. In a prize essay of the year 1778, there is a return to his old classical studies. His mockery of physics and metaphysics does not hinder a serious study of Kant and Haller. The *Briefe über das Studium der Theologie*, published in 1780, have lost the former lawlessness of style and immoderation of thought. There is even acknowledgment of the exaggerations of the stormy years.

"What does it mean that we have made the name Deist a byword. Are we then not Deists? Or are we Atheists, Tritheists, Polytheists? Was not Christ himself a Deist in the truest sense of the word? And was it not his purpose to make his followers pure, perfect Deists?"

A very interesting letter to Moses Mendelssohn, dated 21st Feb. 1781, from which we give one or two extracts, is not only a proof of a change in his habit of thought, but also supplies hints as to the spirit in which Herder wrote and must be read.

"It was foolish of me in my last letter to wish to avoid your opinion on my *Urkunde*. In so doing, I lost sight of the wise, candid and generous Mendelssohn, and had in view the noise which whistled about me, especially from Berlin, on account of this book. And yet no one but myself knows the real design of the work I must admit that your position is immeasurably freer and purer than mine can be in my profession, in which I have to bear and forbear to a great degree, lest still greater and more essential duties of life should be left undone : still a wise and generous man, like yourself, is able to translate himself into and understand my position. I think too that from my letters,

and perhaps my writings, you will have perceived that I think and speak with wise caution, and certainly I can say with the endeavour to get into the position of those who think differently. Our poor terrestrial globe revolves still so far from the sun, and our climate and seasons are so changeable, that we ought not to distress or persecute each other in reference to our opinions. And we shall certainly, sooner or later, come by our various passages and labyrinths to *one citadel of truth.*"

In 1782, followed his well-known work, *The Spirit of Hebrew Poetry*, a work full of wonderful insight into the spirit of the Old Testament, and itself a garden planted with flowers, shrubs and trees of poetry, criticism and philosophy.

The next year, Goethe and he were working together at Spinoza and natural history, developing a common view of the universe, with Spinoza's so-called pantheism as its philosophical and religious basis, and the theory of evolution as its scientific principle. More and more, Herder confesses, he had to unlearn his theology; and a constant wish with him was that his circumstances would allow him to devote a few years to the exclusive study of natural science.

The richest fruits of all his literary, scientific and philosophical studies he gave to the world in his greatest, but, alas! unfinished work, *Ideen zur Geschichte der Menschheit*. The first part of four appeared in 1784. It was the first work that treated mankind as an organism placed in the midst of a universe of powers and influences that form and transform it. Herder was the first to conceive man as a product of his astronomical, geographical, physiological and historical position. He endeavoured in this work to sketch the history of mankind, and the various races of mankind, from this point of view.

In 1788, Herder followed Goethe's example in making a tour into Italy. Unlike Goethe, it brought him comparatively little pleasure. And he was glad to get home again. Deep and true as was his sympathy with classic art, he was too little of a "*Weltkind*," and too little of the pure artist, to find what Goethe found in Italy. While he was away, a professorship was again offered him in Göttingen, and this time with no obnoxious tests of orthodoxy, but the strange confession that he was the "solitary stay of sound theology." The Grand Duke and his Weimar friends prevailed on him to decline the invitation.

Before Herder started for Italy, and for nearly two years after his return, the fourth part of his "*Ideen*" was lying in his desk ready for the press. Schiller knew it was ready, and Goethe had read it. No doubt Goethe's remarks on it to Herder explain the delay :

"You have treated Christianity as it deserves, and I give you my thanks. I have had opportunity of seeing it on its artistic side, and there it is pitiable. It cannot be gainsaid : the myth of Christ is the cause wherefore the world may stand ten millions of years to come, and yet no one come properly to intelligence."

It must, however, be remembered that the Christianity that Herder passes so severe a sentence upon, is that of the church, not that of Jesus. Like Lessing, he distinguishes carefully between the religion of Jesus and the religion about him, or Christianity. So high does he place Jesus, that he says at the commencement of his review of the history of the church :

"As far as is possible we will not name thy name. Before the whole history which sprang from thee, may there stand only thy silent Form !"

Soon after the publication of this volume of the "*Ideen*," Herder's friendship with Goethe began to cool. Herder had become an earnest hater of Kant's philosophy. He thought he saw that the critical philosophy, and its descendant the Fichtean absolute philosophy, were fast sapping the foundations of all sound religion, morality and science. Schiller was a Kantian ; Goethe would not oppose Kant, and drew nearer to Schiller. The world was going mad with philosophy. Herder took up his fiery, sarcastic, controversial pen against Kant. It is now getting to be confessed that Herder inflicted mortal wounds on Kantianism ; but not on Kant, Herder's book being neglected on account of its bitterness.

Owing to this controversy, many annoying occurrences in his clerical office, and failing health, his last years were sadly overcast. His theological publications during these years are amongst his most valuable. They are written in a clear, simple style, and are free from the ambiguities of his earlier works. Years, though, alas ! he has not numbered a fair share, may have tamed down his fancy and

cooled his passion; but his intellect retains its clearness, and has acquired greater precision in its work. When we come to deal with his theology, we shall have to look carefully into these productions of his ripest years. For the present, let Jean Paul Richter give us his estimate of one of them :

“ Your printed *Erlöser* (Redeemer) has followed in the footsteps of the living one—he has redeemed me from errors. On this head I was less in the night than the fog, which only hides the day. Each of your words is both esoteric and exoteric, and gently imposes on an error another meaning, which is the destruction of the error. One party have made the Gospel History a miracle factory without an aim or purport, and a mythological narrative of supermundane incomprehensible *dii ex machina*; the other party, in revolt from this error, instead of denying false conclusions, have denied and maltreated the true history. As a mediator, you reconcile theology with philosophy, inasmuch as you make the Redeemer simply the *Protomedicus* of our diseased souls, and his institution the moral *Clinicum*, and of the God-man you make a man of God, and of the apostolic mission a higher and more universal Pythagorean fraternity. You have beautifully divided between heaven and earth, which (according to the Egyptians) were in the beginning one, and made Jesus for the second time man, in spite of the edict of July 9th.* And let no one put on him again a divinity of rouge that can only hide all his noble features. On p. 243, you have gently hurried over that mistake of his, by which the fall of Jerusalem and the end of the world were brought into close conjunction, and the ruined temples and Christian historical books were lessened, and which witnessed the tenth century; but you have excused this error in every Christian party in your *Briefe an einen Theologen*. Wholly new—in reality everything—is your treatment of the *proscholium* of John, p. 453 sq. You deal with the Temptation in a striking way, and your sketch of Christian morality is heavenly. It is only in reference to the miracles that I should have liked, for my own instruction, a thinner Pythagorean veil and a smaller *disciplina arcani*. There is a German author, with whom I know you are acquainted, who, like the angels, as the scholastics say, stands before a sea which reflects as on a mirror all nations, and this author, while we spare and excuse individuals and maltreat peoples, studies and defends

* The so-called *Wöllnersche Edict* of July 9, 1788. See Church Histories, or *Conversations-Lexicon*.

both, and instead of that tolerance—the very name of which is an intolerance—preaches and practises something more human and higher, that noble *Anthropomorphism* to which every individual man, every nation and every age are subject. At least the name of this author shall be known to you: he is called J. G. Herder.”

Herder's last works were the *Adrastea*, a periodical forming almost a history of the literature of the eighteenth century, and the *Cid*, a poetical version of the old Spanish Romances, his most popular work.

Through dark days of failing health, he occupied himself with literary plans. He had so much material collected; all his productions had been but rude fragments of a lasting work; he was but in his sixtieth year. It is characteristic of the man, that in the last weeks of his illness he would often say: “O that a new, great spiritual idea would come to me, which would seize and quicken my soul through and through! Then I should be well at once.” It is a sad yet noble symbol of his history, that as his end drew near, and he thought of his unfinished work, he often threw his arms round his son, Doctor Herder's neck, and cried, “My friend, my dearest friend, save me still, if it is possible!” Of him, as of few with equal meaning, can it be said, that he laboured, and others entered into his labours. All his life he was laying foundations for others to build upon.

He died on Sunday, December 18, 1803. The motto engraved on his seal was *Licht, Liebe, Leben*. In the power of this triad he fought his fight; they were the aim of his efforts, and the living principle of his being and character. What the theology was that was held as the faith or hope of this living, loving soul, seeking by all means and through the wide world for *light*, we hope to see in the next number of this Review. What has been said about his life, it is hoped will prepare the way for a better appreciation of his theology. With this end in view, we have selected our facts. A general biography of the great man, however short, would have to record much that we have passed over in silence.

J. FREDERICK SMITH.

III.—COLENSO ON THE PENTATEUCH. PART VI.

The Pentateuch and Book of Joshua critically examined.
By the Right Rev. John William Colenso, D.D., Bishop
of Natal. Part VI. London: Longmans. 1871.

THE results of the critical methods which have been applied of late years to the history of the Old and New Testaments exhibit at least one striking point of likeness. The rigid scrutiny to which this history has been subjected has for the most part come from men who have been in no respect influenced by the cynical doubts or blank negations of a so-called materialistic philosophy. Retaining an earnest and hearty faith in the righteousness and love of a living Father who seeks the highest good of all His creatures, and feeling that on this faith only can even human society and morality ultimately rest, they have been not less convinced that nothing related of Him can be true which imputes to Him either vacillation of purpose or unworthy and vindictive motives. That such imputations seem to be made in various parts of the Bible, is admitted by all alike; although on one side, of course, it is admitted with the reservation that further search prosecuted in a loving and obedient spirit will reveal satisfactory solutions for all such apparent contradictions. But this plea has failed to carry conviction to the minds of the few, who have felt that this was the very point to be proved, and that the assertion could not be made until all the narratives had been examined. Both as regards the Old Testament and the New, the results of this examination are singularly harmonious. In few words, they fasten our attention more and more on the most ordinary matters of fact; while the narratives which relate extraordinary or supernatural or miraculous events are almost wholly divested of importance. Hence the criticism of Biblical history becomes continually more dissociated from all questions of the possibility or impossibility of miracles; and in the interests of truth it must be considered a happy circumstance that the authority of these narratives should no longer be mixed up with a controversy of which it seems almost useless to expect a settlement. The credibility of the Gospel histories turns not at all on the occurrence or non-occurrence of any of

the miracles recorded in them. The issue depends entirely on the fidelity of these records in matters which may belong to the lives of the most ordinary men in the most ordinary times. There is nothing astonishing in the statement that Jesus kept his Messiahship a strict secret during the whole of his ministry, except from three of his disciples, who were charged to be silent about it till after the resurrection. There is nothing wonderful in the statement, taken by itself, that he publicly declared his mission and office as the Messiah wherever he went ; that it was known to John the Baptist and to some of the apostles before they received their call ; and that throughout his ministry it was made the subject of vehement and angry controversy whenever Jesus appeared as a teacher in Jerusalem. But if it be found that both these statements are persistently maintained about him in two sets of narratives, to both of which equal authority is assigned by the sentiment or the tradition of Christendom, then the critical historian feels that the ground is shaken beneath him in reference, not to astounding or bewildering miracles, but to incidents which are as common matters of fact as the invectives of Henry VIII. against Luther, or the application of vaccination by Dr. Jenner. If it should be found that similar contradictions run through the account of the relations of Jesus with the Baptist, that all the persons in the history exhibit everywhere a singular forgetfulness of all extraordinary or marvellous occurrences, and that the narratives of extraordinary incidents are perplexing, not so much as telling us of things which do not usually happen, but as being inconsistent with, or as contradicting, the context, then, of course, a presumption is raised which necessarily disposes of the miraculous incidents without the trouble of directly examining them. It is not too much to say that this is now substantially the attitude of critics of the New Testament history, and that it shews a singular lack of judgment and prudence to harp on the question of miracles, when a far more pressing danger calls for the employment of very different weapons.

If the adherents of the old tradition fail to see that the results of criticism applied to the Old Testament history exhibit precisely the same phenomena, their blindness must, it would seem, be judicial. Sooner or later, that criticism must have taken this direction ; but beyond doubt it is

to the Bishop of Natal that we owe the hastening of the process which in a decade of years has done more than the work of an ordinary generation. But for him, historians and theologians might have gone on with a general knowledge that the narratives of the Pentateuch or of the other historical books were not to be regarded as in every respect absolutely trustworthy, and contented themselves with treating passages thus seemingly brought into suspicion as belonging generally to the class of exaggerating legends. In Professor Kuenen's emphatic words, the researches of the Bishop of Natal shewed that the matter was not to be settled in this way, and that "just exactly those notices were the most unhistorical which professed to be authentic documents, and were distinguished, to all appearance, by the greatest accuracy." Thus it was precisely the so-called *Grundschrift*, or Book of Origins, which attracted to itself the full force of his attack, and shewed itself least capable of withstanding it. Nothing can be more just and more true than the words in which Professor Kuenen goes on to shew the effect which the earliest chapters of Dr. Colenso's work on the Pentateuch had on his own mind. "When I read that the Israelites numbered 600,000 warriors, and it appears afterwards that this number must be exaggerated, I set this datum to the account of the embellishing and hyperbolical legend. But when there are laid before me two lists of musterings, as in Numbers i. and xxvi., which define accurately the numbers of each separate tribe, and at the end give nearly the same sum-totals, the state of the question is entirely changed. Then I must choose between one of two things: either my difficulties must disappear before the prime-document which lies before me, or, if this cannot be, then I must deny that it is a 'prime-document,' and must call it by its proper name—a fiction. There is no third course possible. Well, then, Colenso's criticism places us right in front of this dilemma. I had myself formerly noticed some of the difficulties presented by him. But, as they are here put together, and set forth with imperturbable calmness, they gave me at once a presentiment, and brought me by degrees to the conviction, that our criticism of the *Grundschrift* had stopped short half way, and, in order to reach its end, must go through with its work."

The wretched shifts to which the adherents of the traditional notions must be reduced in all efforts to explain the difficulties of these seemingly matter-of-fact documents, are made pitifully manifest in the Bishop of Ely's attempts to deal with the numbers of the Israelite warriors at the time of the Exodus. On the flat contradictions into which he is betrayed we have said enough already;* but for all honest and unprejudiced thinkers the point of interest and importance lies elsewhere. We may put aside the web of sophistry and equivocation in which the champions of these supposed histories entangle themselves, with nothing but a feeling of pity for those who are so caught, and a fixed purpose to avoid at all costs any such tampering with our own sense of truth and right; but when we turn to the narratives which are thus defended, we are confronted with the plain fact, that histories containing manifest fictions in documents which seem to be the merest annalistic records, can carry with them no exceptional authority, and can have no claim whatever to be treated with a reverence not accorded to other books. Not many instances of such fictions are needed to prove that the true historical sense has not been awakened in a people among whom they grow up; and surely it is anything but a rash inference that among the Jews it was never awakened at all. At no time, by general admission, was there among them any idea of literary property. The words of a writer were never regarded as sacred from the interference of men of his own or of later generations. Their sacred books are practically a storehouse of pseudonymous literature, a great portion of which could by no possibility have been written by the men whose names they bear; and though very possibly critics like Ewald may be tempted into too minute subdivisions in their attempts to ascertain the authorship of books or parts of books, yet it must be remembered that the literature of a really historical age would furnish comparatively little scope for such criticism as this. Greek literature is certainly not without its pseudonymous works; but the critic who would assail the genuineness of the histories of Herodotus and Thucydides as a whole would make out but a poor case.

* *Theological Review*, January, 1872, p. 135.

A fact still more important is the occurrence, in the early traditions of all nations, of precisely those difficulties which an honest and truth-searching mind discovers in the narratives of the Old Testament. Everywhere we meet with deposits of plausible fiction; and thus the traditional histories of Greece and Rome are discredited, not by the tales which they tell of improbable and astounding incidents, but by the manifest lying of their driest and prosiest documents. The details of the Servian constitution are as dull reading as any English Acts of Parliament; they are about as trustworthy as the story of Robinson Crusoe or the exploits of Jack the Giant-killer. The so-called Egyptian and Persian annalists found amusement, probably, as well as profit, in fabricating schemes of chronology; but, like that of the Hindu, their work is ponderous and awkward by the side of the more ingenious composition of Roman fiction-makers. We can see almost at a glance through the artificial chronology of the English conquest of this island; and we are tempted to look on an arrangement of events in a cycle made up of periods of eight years as a poor and tame contrivance; but we cannot deny the praise of cleverness to the Roman scheme, which divides the whole history from the founding of the city to the capture by the Gauls into three periods of 120 years, and, having assigned two of these to the kings, proceeds to plan out the reigns to suit this bed of Procrustes. As these are seven in number, the ending of the first period of 120 years must occur in the reign of the fourth king; while the reigns of Romulus and Numa together make up the heroic secle of 77 years, 37 of these being given to the former, because these with the one year of interregnum made up the 38 *nundines* of the cyclical year. The curious reader may, if he pleases, trace out further this Chinese puzzle in the pages of Niebuhr, who dismisses the whole scheme as throughout "a forgery and a fiction."* It is, however, no more a fiction than are the lists of the tribe census as given in various parts of the Pentateuch; and the point specially demanding attention is, that the years of each Roman king's reign were assigned, at the very earliest, after kings had ceased to reign

* History of Rome, Vol. I., Beginning and Nature of the Earliest History. See also *Edinburgh Review*, January, 1867, p. 129.

at Rome at all, and probably even after the Gallic inroads, although it is possible that the period from the expulsion of the kings to the taking of the city may have been arranged according to a model already existing.

When, then, we have in the Pentateuch, or rather in certain portions of it, an elaborate ecclesiastical and ceremonial legislation, involving institutions of a most striking character (as in the three great annual gatherings at Jerusalem, in the Sabblatical year and the year of Jubilee), and exhibiting a complicated and most costly organization ; and when, on the other hand, we have before us a series of historical books * belonging professedly to a later age, in which no notice is taken of this organization or of these institutions, but which exhibit throughout a state of things which the most ingenious twisting has been unable to reconcile with the fact of their existence, it becomes impossible to shut out the suspicion that this elaborate legislation may itself be one of those plausible fictions of a later time, for some of which we have already had adequate evidence.

To exhibit the grounds which seem to convert this suspicion into certainty, is the main object of the Bishop of Natal in this sixth portion of his work on the Pentateuch ; and the general harmony of his conclusions with those of Dr. Kalisch, in spite of large differences of method, is a fact on which we are justified in laying special stress. In both, the evidence, strong and almost irresistible though it may seem in its several parts, is essentially cumulative ; but the point which seems most prominently brought out by the Bishop of Natal is the composite character of the books which contain the Levitical legislation. It may at first sight appear a rash undertaking to attempt a sequel to the task of Bentley, and after shewing that the epistles of Phalaris were not written by Phalaris, to assign them to some other writer. But if these epistles contained not a few, but many, remarkable peculiarities of language, and if these peculiarities were almost all found in one other Greek

* This series, of course, does not include the books of Chronicles ; but even the most conservative critics will hesitate to deny that the books of Judges, of Samuel and the Kings, constitute an independent series. All that they could venture to assert is, that the version of the Chronicles may possibly be reconciled with the accounts given in the other books ; but until this has been done, the arguments of Dr. Kalisch and the Bishop of Natal are not touched.

writer and in one writer only, there would be at least a *prima facie* case for further examination. It is obvious that each case can be decided only on its own merits; but it is equally plain that in each we have only to look to the evidence. If, then, the assertion that Ezekiel is in all likelihood himself the author of a given passage in Leviticus may seem at first sight startling, we have to fall back first on the amount of proof adducible for the general conclusion that a considerable portion of the Pentateuch was put together in a comparatively late period of Jewish history. This evidence it is manifestly impossible to compress into a few sentences; but it lies open to a rigid scrutiny in the books themselves and in the pages of Dr. Kalisch. The mere fact that in Deuteronomy the "priests the Levites" are bidden to furnish every king with a copy of the law for his daily reading, and that Josiah, when in his eighteenth year the book of the law was found, was astonished at its contents, which were perfectly strange to him, is of itself proof that the practice was unknown to earlier generations, and that the precepts relating to it were not in existence. But the so-called earlier books of the Pentateuch contain commands and point to a state of society later than any indicated in the book of Deuteronomy; and thus Dr. Kalisch finds the inference irresistible, that a natural, organic and historical progress can be conceived and traced only if the priestly commands of Deuteronomy are regarded as the earlier, those of Leviticus and Numbers as the later ones. All these regulations, again, can be harmonized with the accounts of the historical books only "if they are placed in the latest times of the Hebrew monarchy, and partly in the period after the Babylonian exile. Not even Ezekiel, in his description of the ideal state, which he certainly desired to invest with the utmost splendour, ventured to raise his proposals so high as Leviticus and Numbers demand in reality. His festival sacrifices are moderate compared with those of the hierarchical books; . . . he is neither aware of, nor does he insist upon, an idea like that of the Pentateuch, of a Levitical tribe and one priestly family destined to retain their high dignity for all future times, and he does not invest the office of the High-priest with particular eminence or priestly power. Do these circumstances not irresistibly force upon us the conclusion

that not even Ezekiel knew the books of Leviticus and Numbers as complete compositions, as otherwise he would certainly have been led to adhere to their arguments, and at least to reproduce their spirit?" *

But the very fact that he did not know them as complete compositions makes it the more likely that he may have himself written some portions of books which are manifestly the result of reaction; and to the establishment of this fact the Bishop of Natal addresses himself at the outset of the present volume. His main position is, that a careful analysis of Leviticus xxvi. shews that almost every peculiar expression in this chapter finds either its counterpart, or even its exact parallel, in Ezekiel, while many of these occur nowhere else in the whole Bible, and others are found nowhere else in the Pentateuch. The force of such an argument lies necessarily in its cumulative character; and to exhibit only a few links in it is to do it a manifest injustice. Yet some of these expressions are so remarkable as almost to carry with them the conviction that the style of two different writers could scarcely exhibit such singular points of likeness. In both, and nowhere else, we have the phrases which speak of causing evil beasts to cease from the land, of the sword and pestilence and blood crossing in the land, of breaking the couplings of the yoke, of sending evil beasts on the people to bereave them, of giving their carcasses beside the carcasses of their idols, of breaking for them the staff of bread. We can scarcely shut our eyes to the force of the Bishop's inference, that "these seem to make it highly probable that this chapter has really come from Ezekiel's hand." "It is surely extravagant," he urges, "to suppose that a writer so profuse and so peculiar, as this prophet is acknowledged to be, should have studied so very closely this particular chapter of Leviticus, out of the whole Pentateuch, as to have become thoroughly imbued with its style and familiarized with its expressions—so thoroughly, indeed, as to have actually adopted nearly fifty of them as his own, of which eighteen, at least, occur nowhere else in the Bible."† The application of this method to other parts

* Historical and Critical Commentary on the Old Testament,—Leviticus, Part I. p. 658.

† Part VI. p. 9.

of the book of Leviticus seems to shew that chaps. xviii.—xxii. have some peculiarly close connexion with the xxvith chapter and with Ezekiel; and to justify the assertion of Graf, that in these chapters “there is exhibited so strange an agreement in thought and expression with Ezekiel, that this can neither be accidental nor be explained by reference to the sameness of the circle within which Ezekiel and the writer worked, but leads necessarily to the inference that Ezekiel himself was the writer.”

But if this be so, no *a priori* improbability militates against the Bishop of Natal's position, that “the whole of the priestly legislation of Leviticus and Numbers, together with the description in Exodus of the construction of the ark and tabernacle, &c., has been written either in Ezekiel's time or after it, that is, during or after the captivity.”* If this be denied, we are brought back to the old dilemma. If those descriptions be in the main true, how are we to account for the complete ignoring of the existence of the Tabernacle, as there described, in all the books, from those of Judges to the end of the Second Book of Kings? We might cite the sleeping of Samuel in the Tabernacle and the going out of the lamp, as plain infractions of the law in Exodus; or the warning that Eli's descendants would crouch to the High-priest for a piece of bread, as inconsistent with the book of Numbers, which gives them all a right to share the abundant portion of the priests; but it is really needless to extend the evidence, when, in Dr. Colenso's words, the whole labour of the conservative critics is “painfully spent, not in accumulating manifest and overwhelming proofs of these laws having been recognized as authoritative and divine, at least by the most devout princes and priests and prophets, and in Israel's best days, but in trying to extract some faint evidence of this kind from words which do not really yield it, and explaining away the glaring contradictions to the traditional view which appear in every page of the history.”†

But if an air of plausibility is thrown over the early history of tribes and nations by arbitrary fictions, these fictions are in their turn often regarded as explaining satisfactorily events in their later history by critics who are

* Part VI. p. 15.

† Ibid. p. 20.

eager to seize the seeming evidence in their favour, without pausing to think of the difficulties which they may thus be brought to face. Thus Mr. Fergusson, having identified to his own conviction the mosque of Omar with the original church of Constantine, has no hesitation, after comparing the temple of Solomon with the tabernacle of Bezaleel and Aholiab, in saying that the arrangements of both are identical, the temple differing only in being exactly twice as large as the preceding structure. "So exact," he insists, "is the coincidence, that . . . it is a singular confirmation of the minute accuracy which characterized the writers of the Pentateuch and the Book of Kings and Chronicles in this matter." That one of the two buildings was copied from the other, no one disputes; but if the temple was copied from the tabernacle, Mr. Fergusson has to explain the absence of all reference or even allusion to this fact in the account of the building of the temple in 1 Kings vi.—viii. Nay, even according to the chronicler, as Graf has noticed, "David had already made all preparations for building the temple, and left to Solomon only the carrying out of his wishes. David, however, does not direct Solomon to take the tabernacle as a model, but gives him before his death an accurate description in detail of all parts of the building, which he owed to a special revelation of Jehovah, 1 Chron. xxviii. 11, &c."

In short, Mr. Fergusson's statement must be reversed. The form of the tabernacle was copied from that of the temple. The character of the Levitical legislation is due, not to a lawgiver of the time of the Exodus, but to the wants felt by the reformers and prophets of a much later age. The antecedent difficulty of determining the order of composition in the several books of the Pentateuch is thus indefinitely lessened. Whether the Bishop of Natal has completely overcome it, is a question which he would desire as earnestly as any one else to leave to the judgment of the reader. It is unnecessary to say more here than that the chain of reasoning is carried on patiently and without break through the whole work, and that we have from the beginning to the end the words of an honest man addressing himself to honest men on a subject than which none can involve more momentous issues.

PRESBYTER ANGLICANUS.

IV.—THEISM, ATHEISM, AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL.

THERE is no doubt that since those who call themselves simple Theists have searched more radically into the current theological conceptions of a Deity, what is commonly called Atheism has for them lost some of its terrors. Not long ago, Professor Newman acted as chairman at a discussion which occurred at Bristol between Mr. Bradlaugh and an orthodox preacher, concerning the existence of a Deity; and recognizing in the Atheism of the Secularist a just scorn of a purely fictitious deity, he subsequently said—in a lecture afterwards published by Thomas Scott, of Ramsgate—that a general epidemic Atheism might become necessary as a hurricane to sweep the world clean of the gross and immoral images adored as deities in Christendom. The Rev. Thomas P. Kirkman warns us that “There is no danger of Atheism. It is mainly a big bogle which has been set up by the priesthoods. So far as it is a reality, it is but the Fenianism of trampled thought; one of those dread indications, which tardy Nemesis delights to raise, of the intensity of ancient wrong.”* Even more significant, as it seems to me, is a passage in a recent discourse by the popular preacher of Birmingham and favourite lecturer of the institutes, George Dawson. Commenting upon the words, “The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God,” Mr. Dawson says: “To tell this to every man who does not believe in God is charming; it saves all argument: after that passage, argument is useless. It is an ignorantly used passage very often, for there are Atheisms and Atheisms. They differ very widely in character, and the Atheism of one man may be better than the Theism of another.”

The importance of this new tone on the part of men of pronounced Theistic convictions toward the class of thinkers who might be supposed antagonistic to them on a vital point, is the indication it gives of two new facts in the inquiries: 1, that the mental confusion which identified Atheism with Antitheism has cleared out of the minds of

* See his admirable pamphlet, “Church-cursing and Atheism.” By the Rev. Thomas P. Kirkman, M.A., F.R.S., Rector of Croft-with-Southworth, near Warrington. Published by Thomas Scott, Ramsgate. 1869.

philosophical Theists ; and, 2, that these, who are to carry forward the affirmative of a most important question, have abandoned the superstition that the issue between them and their opponents is one upon which the equanimity or pleasure of a Divine Being in some way depends. So long as the moral sentiment was enlisted in the controversy, the denier of the existence of a Deity regarded as an enemy of some secretly acknowledged God, and God himself supposed to feel insulted or gratified by the varying fortunes of the debate, the balances between the two sides could never reach a perfect poise, so that the relative weight of their arguments might be tested by the laws of simple reason.

The object I have at present is by no means to enter upon the main question between the Theist and Atheist, but to point out the present phase of an old battle between them, and suggest a possible termination of it under the new treaty which seems to have been made between some of the leaders. I do not know how I can better present the subject than by condensing from Mr. Henry Alabaster's very remarkable work on Siamese Buddhism,* the account of a theological dispute between a Christian missionary and a Buddhist named Chao Phya Thipakon.

Chao.—You missionaries praise the grace of Jehovah and Christ, and say that the Lord waits to hear and grant the prayers of those that call to him. But are those prayers granted? So far as I see, they get no more than people who do not believe in prayer. They die the same, and they are equally liable to age, disease and sorrow. How, then, can you say that your religion is better than any other? In the Bible we find that God created Adam and Eve, and desired that they should have no sickness nor sorrow, nor know death ; but because they, the progenitors of mankind, ate of a forbidden fruit, God became angry, and ordained that thenceforth they should endure toil and weariness, and trouble and sickness ; and from that time fatigue and sorrow, and sickness and death, fell upon mankind. It was said that by baptism men should be free from the curse of Adam ; but I do not see that any one who is baptized now-a-days is free from the curse of Adam, or escapes toil and grief, and sickness and death, any more than those who are not baptized.

Missionary.—Baptism for the remission of sin is only effectual in gaining heaven after death, for those who die unbaptized will

* *The Wheel of the Law.* London: Trübner.

certainly go to hell. . . . It does at times please God to accede to the requests of those that pray to him, a remarkable instance of which is, that Europeans and Americans have more excellent arts than any other people. Have they not steam-boats and railways, and telegraphs and manufactures, and guns and weapons of war superior to any others in the world? Are not the nations which do not worship Christ comparatively ignorant?

Chao.—Where is the witness who can say that this knowledge is the gift of God? There are many men in Europe who do not believe in God, yet have subtle and expanded intellects, and are great philosophers and politicians. How is it that God grants to these men, who do not believe in him, the same intelligence he grants to those who do?

Missionary. (No reply to this.)

Chao.—Among the men and animals God creates, some die in the womb, and many at or immediately after birth, and before reaching maturity, and many are deaf, dumb and crippled: why are such created? Is it not a waste of labour? Again, God creates men, and does not set their hearts to hold his religion, but sets them free to take false religions, so that they are all damned, while those who worship him go to heaven: is not this inconsistent with his goodness and mercy? If indeed he had created all men, would he not have shewn equal compassion and goodness to all, and not allowed inequalities? Then I should have believed in a creating God; but as it is, it seems nothing but a game at dolls, or a manufacture of dolls to play with.

Missionary.—With regard to long and short lives, the good may live but a short time, God being pleased to call them to heaven, and sometimes he permits the wicked to live to a full age, that they may repent of their sins. And the death of innocent children is the mercy of God calling them to heaven.

Chao.—How should God take a special liking to unlovable, shapeless, unborn children?

Missionary.—He who would learn to swim must practise in shallow places first, or he will be drowned.

Chao.—It is said in the Bible that God is the creator of all men and animals. Why should he not create them spontaneously? Why must there be procreation and agony, and often death, to mothers? Is not this labour lost? I can see no good in it.

Missionary.—God instituted procreation so that men might know their fathers and mothers and relatives; and the pains of childbirth are the consequence of the curse of Eve, for whose sin her descendants suffer.

Chao.—If procreation was designed that men should know their relatives, why are animals, which do not know their relatives, produced in the same manner? And why do they, not being descendants of Eve, suffer pain in labour for her sin of eating a little forbidden fruit?

Missionary.—It is waste of time to converse with evil men who will not be taught.

Whereupon the missionary leaves Chao to his "darkness." Can any unbiassed mind fail to regard the Buddhist's Atheism as superior to the missionary's Theism? Chao has his eye unwaveringly fixed upon a standard of pure justice and nobleness; he respects truth and consistency; and is not loyalty to the Highest, however impersonal, better than homage to a personal Being representing what is repulsive to reason and the moral sense? Had the deity held up by the Missionary before Chao taken sudden physiognomical shape, it would have been as ugly an idol as either of them ever saw; and in listening to the Buddhist's charges against it, we feel that each is uttered from the elevation of a reverence for the Highest. And if a man have reverence for every exalted ideal, what can Theism add? Only certain hopes; and if he can spare these, what have others to say? No worship can be more purely disinterested than that which adores an impersonal virtue which can neither threaten or reward. As for the deity of Chao's antagonist, one can only label it with Robert Browning's creed, that

— a loving worm within its sod
Were diviner than a loveless God
Amid his worlds.

As expressed by Chao, there is surely something impressive in Buddhist Atheism. It seems to have built a central throne in the universe which waits for a fit occupant. Chao and his friends will at least enthrone no being unworthy of that seat; for that seat is built of all sacred instincts and affections found in themselves; and until the darkness shrouding the earth and the mind can lift somewhat, and thought shine far enough to illuminate the agonies of life and the mystery of evil, they will abide with their ignorance. "Permit me," said Confucius to a disciple, "to tell you what is knowledge. When you understand a thing, consider that you know it; when you do not understand a

thing, consider that you do not know it: that is knowledge." Surely it is better to kneel before a crowned human ideal, seeing no form beyond it, than to have a deity who can give no satisfactory explanation of his apparent discord with that ideal. It is better to have no God than one who must be surely unseated. The thought with which Fichte startled the students of Jena, "Courage, my friends; though there be no God, there may be one after a time," is infinitely more encouraging than the dreary cry of the Secularist and the Communist, "My poor trampled brothers, there is indeed now (for all practical purposes) a God, the inequalities and evils of whose universe are faithfully imitated by his bishops and priests, who oppress our bodies and minds in his name; but be of good heart; we shall one day be free of Him!" *

With such respect for the spirit of the Buddhist's negation, we can the better see that it reaches far beyond the position of the stupid missionary whom he silenced, and raises the old problem of evil, which more than anything else underlies the philosophical Atheism of every age. What Chao is saying in Siam, finds an echo in a voice which, of all others perhaps, speaks most sanely to the Western world on subjects of this kind.

"The habit of snake and spider," says Emerson, "the snap of the tiger and other leapers and bloody jumpers, the crackle of the bones of his prey in the coils of the anaconda, these are in the system, and our habits are like theirs. You have just dined, and however scrupulously the slaughter-house is concealed

* The Rev. James Freeman Clarke, in his very valuable work, "Ten Great Religions," seems to me to overstate the sadness of Buddhism as illustrating its want of any conception of God. He could not, I think, have read the works on Buddhism which Mr. Trübner was bringing out in this country about the time when his own was being published in America. But I am glad to find, on referring to his work after the above was written, that the view I have taken of the so-called Buddhist Atheism is confirmed by one of the devoutest of American scholars. "Buddhists," he says, "are not Atheists, any more than a child who has never heard of God is an Atheist." At the same time, this oriental religious No-Theism seems to me infelicitously illustrated by the child's ignorance: it is the result of a sceptical reaction, and identical with the sentiment of Faust:

"Who shall name Him,
And dare to say,
'I believe in Him' ?
Who shall deny Him,
And venture to affirm,
'I believe in Him not' ?"

in the graceful distance of miles, there is complicity—expensive races—races living at the expense of race. The planet is liable to shocks from comets, perturbations from planets, rendings from earthquakes and volcanoes, alterations of climate, precessions of equinoxes. Rivers dry up by opening of the forest. The sea changes its bed. Towns and counties fall into it. At Lisbon an earthquake killed men like flies. At Naples ten thousand persons were crushed in a few minutes. The scurvy of sea, the sword of the climate in the West of Africa, at Cayenne, at Panama, at New Orleans, cut off men like a massacre. Our Western prairie shakes with ague and fever. The cholera, small-pox, have proved as mortal to some tribes as a frost to the crickets, which, having filled the summer with noise, are silenced by the fall of the temperature of one night. Without uncovering what does not concern us, or counting how many species of parasites hang on a bombyx, or groping after intestinal parasites, or infusory tribes, or the obscurities of alternate generation—the forms of the shark, the labrus, the jaw of the sea-wolf, paved with crushing teeth, the weapons of the grampus and other warriors of the sea, are hints of ferocity in the interior of Nature.”

Considerations like these have driven far more men of intelligence and sympathy than openly confess it, into that sceptical or negative state of mind toward the theory of a deity, which might be most truly described as philosophical Atheism. In an age and country where Atheism is still a term of social terror, that part of it which is deepest may be found expressed in something louder than words to the reflecting, in the utter alienation of heart and life from a standard which may still receive lip-service. But the fact that this Atheism, so called, is in a most important sense related to the feeling of humanity, an essentially sacred feeling, finds a remarkable confirmation in the fact that Buddhism, without a God, has been alone able, apparently, to mingle human sympathy and tenderness with Oriental religion of any Aryan type. Let any one read the beautiful parables of that religion,—let him read the “Story of the Probationer Tissa,”*—and then ponder the phenomenon that such compassionateness first appears in the region where it is found with a religion which rests upon nominal or metaphysical non-Theism. Sympathy, the soul of

* Buddhagoshā's Parables. Tr. from Burmese by Captain T. Rogers, R.E. With an Introduction containing Buddha's Dhammapada, &c. By F. Max Müller, M.A. London: Trübner.

religious force and enthusiasm, proves to be the very feeling which has become, in view of the anomalies of the world in relation to the theory of a deity, most restless and dissatisfied. And it is such difficulties in such minds—misgivings nourished by a reverence of which the easy assenters are incapable—that have by no means been met by the Theistic philosophy of the present day.

Before venturing this assertion, I have re-read Theodore Parker's volume written against Atheism. Parker devotes a large part of his work to a discussion of the Economy of Pain; and though he says many wise and true things concerning the uses of many forms of it, there are other forms that so completely defy not only his knowledge but his imagination, that he can find no refuge but in the old theory of a future world to compensate sufferers. Even for the dumb brutes, considering their grievances, he demands a balance to be paid in the future.

Surely this is a frail reed to lean upon. Assuming the future life to be proven, what reason can there be to suppose that it is ruled by laws other than those which prevail here? Is not every planet swayed by gravitation as well as the earth; is not each world rolled between light and darkness? Why not then between good and evil? Why should the ferocity of the universe be concentrated upon this or that locality of space? So far as analogies can guide us (and they are all we have), the existence of pain and pleasure on earth denotes that these are principles in the universe. The difficulty of Parker's hypothesis—substantially the old Dives-and-Lazarus theory—lies not alone in the fact that there is no reason whatever to believe it true, but in this also, that there can be no compensation for an unnecessary evil. *Ex hypothesi*, there are agonies suffered by little children and animals, and moral degradations of man and woman, which can serve no moral purpose. Why then might they not have been passed over altogether? Why injure simply that you may redress?

It is a singular phenomenon of contemporary religious history, that a man of such vigour and clearness as Theodore Parker should have suffered arrest in this old device of priests for explaining the failure of their prayers to relieve the sufferings of the pious. It is very certain that unless the priesthood had resorted to a future region for

the punishment of the worldly and the reward of the unworldly, it could not have survived the plain discord between its teachings and the facts of life. But the wonder is that Theodore Parker should not have found the moral attitude implied in this doctrine revolting. Professor Newman has noted the essential irreligiousness of an idea that makes the soul a plaintiff and God a defendant. Shall the good man be thought of as approaching God with the words, "I have been treated unjustly. I deserved more than I got. The wicked man had the best of it; now make it square by giving *me* the most!" But even this is surely less shocking than the implied belief that man is to look to a future world to redress the pains and evils of this. Is it rash to affirm that if one-half of the means, energy and devotion, diverted entirely to a future world, and so wasted, had been—were now—applied to the planet for which they were provided, man would have nearly won already the heaven of his dream?

The belief in immortality is of course not at all involved in the rejection of the sacerdotal theory of the future life as a region where moral laws and their sanctions are different from what they are in this world. Whether the idea of immortality arose from the observation of astronomic recurrence, or from the love for the unconfined, or from yet deeper sources, it certainly existed before this bad use was made of it; and it will live after man has recognized that every real law is contained in each atom of the universe, and justice done in every moment of time.

Miss Frances Power Cobbe, who may be regarded also as representative of a large class of Theists—the more conservative class—has lately stated in a general way the solution of the problem of evil to which her own mind at least points, if it has not arrived. In her recent essay on "The Devil"* occurs the following pregnant passage:

"With the disappearance of the Devil, the plain and hideous fact of the existence of evil is left staring us in the face. God help us to take the next great step safely! Is it too presumptuous to surmise that its direction will prove to be that of a retrocession from the arrogant dogmatism which has caused us, first to give to the Divine Might the name of 'Omnipotence,' because, forsooth, we know nothing of its bounds or conditions,

* *Fortnightly Review*, No. XCIII. (August, 1871).

and then, secondly, to argue back from that purely arbitrary metaphysical term, that He could do this or that, if it so pleased Him, since He is 'Omnipotent'? Who has given us to know that God is absolutely able to do everything? The simple proposition (which it might seem the blindest could not have overlooked), that no conceivable power, of whatever magnitude, can possibly include contradictions, might have taught us more modesty than we have hitherto shewn in scanning the order of Providence. When we have thoroughly taken in the idea that God could not make twice two five, nor the three angles of a triangle more than two right angles; then we may begin to ask ourselves, May not contradictions equally great, for all we can know, be in the way of every removal of evil which we could vain demand at the hands of the Lord? And may not the accomplishment of the highest of all possible good, the training to virtue of finite spirits, be as incompatible with a thornless and sinless world, as would be the making of a circle and a triangle having the same mathematical properties?"

This solution seems to me to possess an important advantage over that of Theodore Parker, insomuch as, though also hypothetical, it recalls us farther toward the safe ground of our ignorance. It is, indeed, only another way of saying, "We don't know."

But the question arises, How is this attitude toward the problem of evil consistent with the clear formulas concerning the Divine existence with which Theism at present stands before the world? No one has written more pronounced affirmations on this subject than Miss Cobbe herself, and she has maintained that man may form a conception of the deity distinct enough to regard him as a person to whom we may pray. There probably never was a prayer which was not for the removal of something the petitioner thought an evil; even the prayer for patience and resignation under sorrow, or for the removal of sin from the heart, being such. After composing a book of Prayers, Miss Cobbe tells us substantially, that every such petition may be a demand for contradictions offered to One who may be powerless to grant it. There is a law above this deity. He must yield to mathematics. Then why, the Atheist may ask, conjure up such a Being at all? Can he be more at best than a high archangel subservient to a yet higher Necessity? Shall we pray to a great Second Best? Nor is this an objection merely to the consistency of the par-

ticular authoress quoted ; it applies to the entire class of Theistic thinkers who leave the deity vague and ineffable for philosophical purposes, while they define him clearly for purposes of ethics and piety. It is, indeed, quite probable that the separation between the Supreme Laws and the Supreme Being suggested by Miss Cobbe's statement, may be less definite in her mental conception than it has become in the attempt to put it into words: as it stands, it reduces God to something like the position assigned to Christ in the Arian theology—the mighty expression and agent of a Being higher than himself. But why not adore the highest at once—the Laws to whose supreme exactions every being, “of whatever magnitude,” must submit?

However satisfactory Miss Cobbe's statement may be, in so far as it warns us to respect the limits of our knowledge, it seems to me to limp by reason of its implication that there is in the universe an Intelligence and Will distinct from and limited by the laws of Nature,—as if, like a kind-hearted man, the Deity were compelled to look upon evils which he would fain prevent but cannot.

But surely we can have no idea at all of a Supreme Being, except as represented in those very laws of Nature. The whole question between the Atheist and the Theist is, Is there Mind in Nature? Is there anything in the order of the universe corresponding to the order of Thought? Is there anything outside of our own brains, in the heavens above or the earth beneath, upon which we may fix our eyes and say, This is cosmic, not chaotic ; this is wise, not blind? If there be Mind in the universe, if there be anywhere in it benevolent purpose, these are manifested to us by natural supreme laws. And if there be any of these laws which to our partial and dim knowledge work evil and pain to man, what can the Theist say, except that this is one of the many regions where his knowledge cannot penetrate? This ignorance at one point does not invalidate his knowledge at another. It does not impair my knowledge of gravitation that I do not also understand the variations of the compass. Neither does it weaken my perception of the benevolence expressed in a flower, that I cannot yet see the benevolence expressed in a pestilence. I see Mind in Nature ; I see Love in it. How that Mind is related to the material combinations around me, I do

not know : I do not doubt the existence of my own mind, though I cannot tell how it so blends with my visible body as to be able to lift my arm. How that Love which I see in Nature can co-exist with human suffering or animal pain, may be a puzzle to me. Yet it is not a puzzle of which the solution is inconceivable ; for all of us know that we sometimes ourselves inflict pain on those we love, and because we love them. And if we wonder that Supreme Love includes what we call pain and evil, our little children no less wonder that our love can permit them to be checked in any of their desires.

Now, admitting that evil is as yet an unexplored realm, an aspect of things not yet conquered by thought, it must at the same time be affirmed that this applies only to the original cause of evil. When we are asked, that is, Why could not a good God have managed to get along without evil? our reply is, We do not know. We do not know whether he could or could not have arranged a painless universe ; we do not know God at all as apart from this universe ; we do not conceive of him as a great mechanic who one day resolved to create a mechanism to be called Nature ; we know only that things exist as they are, containing bitter and sweet, pleasure and pain ; and that through these are shadowed forth Thought and Heart just so far as we have been able to comprehend them. Seeing so much, we remember that we have come to see it only very gradually. We know that the human mind once saw disorder in many regions where it now sees order ; that knowledge reveals good in many things which ignorance once held altogether evil. Consequently we are warranted in believing that more and more experience and increasing knowledge will make clear the surrounding realm of darkness.

But even now, as I have said, this darkness rests only upon the final cause of evil, that is, upon the inquiry why the ends secured by evil were not reached by a more merciful method. If, in reply to the question, Why is not the universe painless? we must answer, We do not know ; in reply to the question, What good end does evil serve? we may answer, We know very well. That explanation of evil which theology has for ages vainly sought, and to which it has got no nearer than the figment of a Fall and the contrivance of a Devil, Science has at last

discovered clearly and unmistakably. In tracing the beautiful evolution by which from the lowest form in nature endless varieties have been produced—following step by step the ever-widening spiral stairway on which the animated dust climbs at last to a human brain—Science has shewn that each step of that progress was stimulated by some pain or danger. The steady effort of the animated being to escape cold or hunger or some enemy, gave to one animal its fleetness, to another its strength; each activity was born of the effort to conquer an obstacle; and after the animated world had combined to make man, his wit, his invention, his foresight and reason, were successively and cumulatively evolved under the stimulus of his fears and his perils. Our greatest powers each mark a victory over some besetting evil. And after man was thus formed, his historic progress was the result of a perpetual battle with so-called evils. The hardness of earth made him a labourer. Tyranny roused him to love freedom. Passion, by the very evils to which it led, named its own checks, and laws were born of sins. If we could now by a word remove from the world all that has been done for it by pain and evil, we should behold man relapsing from the height he has won by struggle with unfriendly elements and influences,—falling back from point to point, losing one after another the energies gained by mastering evil, and sinking through all the stages of retrogression to some miserable primal form too insignificant to be attacked, too nerveless to suffer.

And if such be the light which Science has cast on the world's dark track of pain and sin, there are strong reasons to believe that the same light need only be steadfastly applied to evil as it appears in its more mysterious individual forms, for these also to be revealed as necessary parts of the method of benefit. Let it be admitted that there are cases of individual suffering which we cannot attach to any definite benefit; that before the babe in its anguish, or the dumb animal in its agony, we must stand silent, unable to give any explanation. Yet we know that in Nature the parts are of the same character with the whole; the elements of the sea are in each drop of its water; and if we could analyze completely the experience of each suffering individual, and see the whole outcome of it, we might find

reason to conclude that there is no pang without some advantage to the being enduring it. Certainly the interpretation of our own experience suggests the probability that such is the case. It is doubtful whether there ever was a pain in our lives, which we have entirely got through, from the memory of which we would part. The lessons by which we live daily were chiefly learned in the severe school of trial. Our sorrows have passed out of our more outward life only to be absorbed inward, and they become component parts of the character and being that we are. If such be the fact in ourselves, we may at least hope, or even presume, that it is the same with others; and we may imagine that a like advantage, though in fainter degree, is secured by suffering even to those low and immature ones whose pain seems most purposeless.

In the issue between the Theist and the Atheist, a great advantage was given to the latter by the old theory of separate and special creations. So long as the Theist maintained that his God was an omnipotent Creator who formed each particular creature by the word of his mouth, there were endless questions which might be asked, for which no answer could be found. A friend of mine told me that he was led to perceive how far he had been dogmatizing beyond the limits of his knowledge, by a question once put to him by his little grandchild. He had been visited by a lady whom he much esteemed, but who was sadly deformed. When the poor hunchback was gone, the child said to him, "Grandfather, did God make everybody?" "Yes," he replied. "Did he make Miss ——?" naming the deformed lady. "Yes, child," was the reply. "Then," said the little one sharply, "why don't he take her back and fix her up better?" "The question," said the old gentleman, "was unanswerable; and I wished then that when she asked me whether God had made Miss ——, I had said, I didn't know."

It is a hard thing for our pride to say, after these long ages in which priests have pretended entire familiarity with the attributes and ways of God,—a hard admission for theology, after heaping up vast libraries filled with precise information about the power and procedure of the Deity; but to those lowly words we must all come at last—I don't know! Such a confession of ignorance will deny many

theories and dogmas, and so many times will it be called Atheism. No matter for that. When we cease to spend our strength on the Unknowable, we have all the more to devote to the Knowable. It is certain that the new respect which Theists are beginning to accord to those termed Atheists—the thinkers, really, who have alone rendered it possible for an intelligible Theism to be stated at all—must be followed by an adoption of some of the traits of their once abhorred antagonists. Theism is not yet free from the hereditary taint of dogmatism; while moving forward, its eye is turned backward, as if it thought only of proselyting the orthodox, rarely of justifying itself to the disinterested criticisms of untheological reasoners. It needs also intellectual humility. While impressed by the Supreme Mystery, it must have more reserve toward it, and avoid the enthusiasm into which some Theists have run of supposing that the human being can come into relationship with essential moral force by the forms and petitions which have succeeded the offering of victims to allure heavenly fire. Nay, Theism must go yet further, and learn the deeper meaning of the Persian psalter: “The eyes of Purity saw Thee by the lustre of Thy substance: dark and astounded is he who hath seen Thee with the eyes of the Intellect.” For it seems true that what the religious world has distinguished as the Heart, may in pure and high hours feel the impression of truths which the Intellect cannot grasp. As expression may rise into poetry, or speech into song, the moral sentiment may also have its joy. Such exaltations do indeed accompany the first intimations of every kind of truth, each glimpse or gleam seeming, before its form and limits have been disclosed, to light up every dark corner of the universe. But it is important for Theists to preserve themselves from the perils of emotional passion, and especially to guard against the temptation to prove to fanaticism that its fervours are compatible with more rational opinion. They will do well to heed the tradition of the great, that the highest influences love to hover near the spirit most withdrawn from wanderings and vain speculations; that the profoundest gleams have opened for eyes that looked not on the far but the near; that the good genius has been most favourable to those who ply with reverence their work in life.

MONCURE D. CONWAY.

V.—ISLAM IN INDIA.

1. *Our Indian Musalmàns. Are they bound in Conscience to rebel against the Queen?* By W. W. Hunter, LL.D. 1871.
2. *Indian Musalmàns. Being Three Letters reprinted from the Times, with Four Articles on Education, and an Appendix containing Lord Macaulay's Minute.* By W. Nassau Lees, Fellow of the Calcutta University, late Principal of the Mahomedan College at Calcutta, &c.
3. *Essays on the Life of Mahomed.* By Syud Ahmed Khan Bahàdur, C.S.I.

DR. HUNTER'S book on "Our Indian Musalmans" was read with much interest, and even with anxiety, by all persons to whom secular and religious politics are a matter of serious concern. The author is already well known in England as a writer on Indian topics: although still a junior officer on the Civil Service list of Bengal, he has reached a grade of literary reputation never before (perhaps) so fully attained by an Anglo-Indian official. Any book which Mr. Hunter sends from India for publication at home, is widely read and carefully considered by the best judges. Hitherto those who have acquired special personal knowledge of India, have very rarely possessed also the gift of imparting it in the style and shape demanded by the high standard of even popular literature in these days; and of the few good writers who have intimate practical acquaintance with Indian administration, hardly one has succeeded so well as Dr. Hunter in drawing immediate general attention to Indian affairs. Macaulay is, of course, a signal exception: his famous essays actually created the public opinion almost universally held to this day upon the great political strokes by which certain resolute Englishmen toward the end of the last century carved out and consolidated our empire in Asia: those great historical cartoons of the exploits of Warren Hastings and of Clive have stamped their impressions ineradicably upon the mind of ordinary readers, insomuch that if the average Englishman knows anything of such things, he implicitly believes Macaulay's version of them; and it would be vain to protest

that, though this historical oil-painting (as Carlyle calls such works) is magnificent, it is not history. But so strong and enduring is the influence of trenchant phrase and picturesque language, that nearly all the mistakes and discoloured statements contained in Macaulay's sketches of thirty years ago, have been vigorously reproduced by Mr. W. M. Torrens, M.P., in a book* which he has published within the last two months.

The motive and reason of Dr. Hunter's treatise are explained in one of his earliest pages, where he says that "the Musalmans of India are, and have been for years, a source of chronic danger to the British power in India." This danger is caused by "the spirit of unrest," which Dr. Hunter proceeds to exhibit in its threefold form: in the formation of a Rebel Colony on our North-western frontier, which has involved us in constant disasters; in the treasonable organization of Musalmans within our interior districts; and in the legal discussions that have arisen upon the question which Dr. Hunter has chosen for the title of his work—"Are the Indian Musalmans bound in Conscience to rebel against the Queen?" He goes on further to examine the grievances of the Mahomedans under English rule, and to point out means of remedying them. In short, he inquires into the sources, historical, political and social, whence has flowed the disaffection, which Dr. Hunter holds to be deep-seated, wide-spread and imminently perilous to our government. In accordance with this programme, the opening chapters of the book are allotted to a brief and animated description of the foundation and fortunes in Arabia of the sect called *Wahábis*; of their establishment on our North-western border by a famous saint and martyr; of the rapid spread of the Wahabi doctrines throughout India by fanatic missionaries; and of the constant petty wars and internal seditions which have been traced entirely to this Wahabi propaganda. I shall not follow Dr. Hunter along his narrative of these events, which should nevertheless be known to all readers who desire to comprehend whence came Wahabism into India, and how it has fared there. I am bound, however, to observe that there are certain peculiarities in the style and manner of

* *Empire in Asia*, 1872.

this spirited historical sketch (and indeed more or less throughout all this book) which must be taken into account by home-keeping Englishmen who desire to draw accurate and safe conclusions upon the subject which Dr. Hunter has handled ably and attractively.

Dr. Hunter is before all things vigorous, clear and definite; he rejoices in strong lights, in highly-finished episodes, and in full-length portraits of personages. He excels in the art of lively translations from Indian history by skilful and effective use of European metaphors and phrases for Asiatic events and institutions, whereby he makes his ideas and allusions quite luminous and suggestive to educated Englishmen who begin with this work their study of an unfamiliar topic. But it is impossible that the original facts and local peculiarities should not suffer even by the most skilful paraphrase or travesty; for you cannot dress up Indian figures in European costume without some damage to their native character and complexion. So that the similes and historical illustrations in which Dr. Hunter luxuriates are often more striking than exact; they convey some notion of the truth, but not the whole truth; and, moreover, the author is at times sorely vexed by an hyperbolic fiend which he would do well to cast out. With these premonitory observations, the book may be commended to all persons seeking in England to gather evidence and frame a judgment upon some of the complications and contrasts which are incessantly growing out of that extraordinary accident—the subjection of India to Englishmen.

The pamphlet by Colonel Nassau Lees is a reprint of three letters in the *Times*, which were called forth in 1871 by Dr. Hunter's book, and of four articles on Education which originally appeared in Indian journals. He has appended to them a *Minute* written in 1835 by Macaulay, when he was in India, upon the system of higher State education to be adopted in that country. Colonel Lees was Principal of the Mahomedan College at Calcutta, and is altogether entitled to a respectful hearing upon the condition and feelings of Bengali Mahomedans: his argument, which we shall examine at length farther on, is mainly directed towards exposing the mistakes of our educational policy in India, and the fallacies contained in Macaulay's *Minute*, which had immense effect at the time; and toward

demonstrating how the system of instruction which has hitherto been employed has had the grave consequence of depressing the social and political status of our Mahomedan fellow-subjects.

Now as I have undertaken to give in this paper some account of what may be termed the "Mahomedan question" in India, and as Dr. Hunter and Colonel Lees both put the case on the Mahomedan side quite as strongly as it can fairly be made out, it may be convenient to take from these authorities a precise statement of the main grievances which the Indian Musalmans are said to allege. I remark, with all other critics on Dr. Hunter's book, that he draws his facts from the province of Lower Bengal, and applies his inferences to all India—a process somewhat defective in logical fairness. However, here is his chief indictment against the British Government, drawn up after the style of Macaulay, though this is no necessary imputation on the substance :

"There is no use shutting our ears to the fact that the Indian Musalmans arraign us on a list of charges as serious as have ever been brought against a Government. They accuse us of having closed every honourable walk of life to professors of their creed. They accuse us of having introduced a system of education which leaves their whole community unprovided for, and which has landed it in contempt and beggary. They accuse us of having brought misery into thousands of families by abolishing their Law Officers, who gave the sanction of religion to the marriage tie. . . . They accuse us of imperilling their souls by denying them the means of performing the duties of their faith. They charge us with deliberate malversation of their religious foundations, with misappropriation of their educational funds. They declare that we have shewn no pity in the time of our triumph, and with the insolence of upstarts have trodden our former masters into the mire. They . . . arraign us for want of sympathy, want of magnanimity, mean malversation . . . and for great public wrongs spread over a period of one hundred years."*

These are the accusations with which I propose to deal hereafter in some detail ; they make up the gravamen of the plaint stated for Musalmans by their able advocate ; and the matter cannot be debated without joining issues

* *Indian Musalmans*, p. 145.

on these points. But I must first say that I doubt whether these sharp-set sentences really present to us the actual feelings and utterances of the general body of Mahomedans; I am more inclined to affirm that they derive their force and weight principally from the skill and the imagination of the writer. The words quoted are the language of a Pole under the Russian régime; of a Greek under Turkish despotism fifty years ago; of an Irish Papist under the furious penal laws of the last century; of some crushed nationality, or of some people vindictively oppressed and ground exceeding small in the mills of political tyranny. Stronger expressions could not have been employed if we Christians had done unto the Indian Mahomedans as their ancestors did so often to Christians; if we had persecuted them as Aurungzebe persecuted Hindus, or treated them with the hatred and savage cruelty shewn to unbelievers by Hyder Ali or Tippu of Mysore. Whereas the Musalmans of India in the present day are (excepting the lowest classes) very good Oriental politicians, with fair knowledge of the world and of Asiatic history, and with some traditional experience of what bad governments really are; they could not possibly so misunderstand our antecedents and their own, and their present circumstances; they judge us by the Eastern standard of *fas* and *nefas* as applied to rulers, and they appreciate the situation not incorrectly. They envy our supremacy; they dislike some parts of our levelling administrative system; they are prejudiced against all Christians by the religious rivalry of a thousand years; against English Christians by the sense of subordination to infidels, and against English residents in India by violent contrasts in the habits and manners of East and West. But many of the charges alleged by Dr. Hunter seem to me too profoundly unreasonable and far-fetched to be entertained, even as popular delusions, by the mass of Mahomedans; while the words, "want of sympathy, want of magnanimity, mean malversation of funds," and "great public wrongs spread over a century," appear to me to convey only ideas put into native mouths by an English orator.

Colonel Nassau Lees writes in a cooler tone, and regrets that Dr. Hunter should have "out-Heroded Herod" in the fervency of his pleading for Mahomedans; but Colonel Lees also supplies a list of specific counts upon which the British

administration is arraigned—the more important of them being our treatment of the education and the endowments of Musalmans. Both authors admit that above and around these particular grievances there are other sources of dissatisfaction and disloyalty which were inevitable, and flowed naturally from the facts of Indian history; yet I think that both of them incline too much to trace discontents to blunders and faults for which the English can be directly blamed. Dr. Hunter, especially, seems to confound the essential with the accidental, to attribute to local and temporary causes symptoms which are inherent in and inseparable from our relations with the Musalmans, and to interpret their indistinct regrets and uneasy murmurs by the notions and literary expressions of a highly cultivated European bred in a totally differing environment. The consequence has been, that he views, and makes his readers view, many things through a false perspective, and estimates the weight of his facts in a deceptive balance. Or where he preserves a truer eye and hand for dealing with phenomena, his sense of proportion tempts him to exaggerate and over-colour English shortcomings and errors, in order to present adequate causes for the extreme results which his line of argument attributes to them. Now it cannot and need not be denied, that much sullen disaffection prevails among the Mahomedans in India: we all know that the colony of outlaw Wahabis founded beyond our North-western frontier among the wild hill tribes, must obviously be still as bitterly hostile to the English in the Punjab as it was to the Sikh government which preceded us; while Mr. W. Palgrave* has told us long ago, that throughout Asia the spirit of Wahabism is a spirit of uncompromising fanaticism, which seeks by all means, secret or overt, to upset any rule, whether of Turk or Englishman, that restrains ignorant and furious intolerance. It is true also that these Wahabis have formed secret conspiracies of a serious kind in the province of Bengal, and that their plotting is connived at or willingly ignored by a crowd of non-Wahabi Musalmans, who desire the predominance of their religion, and have no objection to allow the Wahabis to try their hands at pulling the chesnuts out of the fire.

* Travels into Eastern Arabia.

It is certain that the Indian Musalmans do as a mass still nourish the sore feelings and the heart-burning which accompany everywhere the fall from high position, the loss of prestige, and the descent of a despotically dominant class to mere equality with all others before a firm law. Unpleasant reverses of this kind occur constantly in the history of societies as of individuals; they are inseparable from the competition and struggles for mastery which have hitherto been the conditions of all progress in this world. They are perhaps almost as acutely felt by a community which is bound together with the tie of a common faith, as by a tribe or by a modern nation; though it may be questioned whether nationality, which is a bond quite unknown to Indian Mahomedans, be not much the more sensitive constitution. But undoubtedly all these things make up for the Musalmans of India a case which requires delicate and forbearing treatment by superior conquerors; and we may concede that the English Government, with all its good intentions and high integrity for the last sixty years, has often failed to treat such difficult and complicated disorders with skill and tenderness. We are not famous, if Mr. Matthew Arnold reads us aright, for sweetness and sympathy in our dealings with subject peoples; we are too much inclined to rely upon the force of material interests for our work of fusion; to fancy that personal liberty and comfort will compensate for the wounds which our success must necessarily inflict on the pride and the prejudices of those whom we supplant in political supremacy: we reckon too much on the interests of men, and too little on their passions. It may be owned that we are not very light-handed ministers to the Oriental mind diseased. But this is a very different matter from confessing that we are responsible for the disease itself, or that it exhibits any peculiar symptoms or mysterious virulence that could only be accounted for by our reckless neglect and ignorance, or by sheer malignity.

We may at once assume that our conquest of India has been distasteful to the Mahomedans, and that their hostility may be, in certain contingencies, dangerous to ourselves. For the present we cannot help this; all that we can do is to inquire how far these unavoidable resentments can be allayed; whether the specific grievances that exist

are just and reasonable ; and if we have wronged them by our acts, we must do them right. But nothing can be more vain or more impolitic than to foster in their minds the notion that we English are to blame, as administrators, for the condition in which the Indian Musalmans now find themselves, or to encourage them to mistake natural sentiments of disappointment, of depression and of wounded religious pride, for the just indignation of an oppressed people or a persecuted sect.

To obtain a clear view of the "situation" now before us in India, we must go a few steps back. Politics and religion are with the Mahomedans (as Mr. W. G. Palgrave has lately said) two sides of the same medal ; it is impossible even to approach the religious side of the Mahomedan position in India without surveying first its political aspect.

The rule of the English in India so immediately followed the fall of the Mahomedan suzerainty, and has been so widely built up on the ruins of their great empire, that the popular mind naturally imputes to us all the misfortunes of the Mahomedans. But all readers of history know that the Moghal Empire had been severed piecemeal and dilapidated by the middle of the eighteenth century, and that province after province fell into our hands because the Musalman government was rotten to the heart and paralyzed in every limb ; while we alone were able to drive off the Maratha vultures which were tearing the moribund carcase. We saved from certain imminent destruction the Nizam, the greatest Mahomedan prince then, as now, in India ; we supported and even set up again some minor kinglets, who from being viceroys had made themselves independent ; others we pulled down and pensioned off : our policy was governed by the currents and changes of a long and perilous struggle. Of course the benefits we conferred have long been forgotten, while the injuries remain ever fresh. That the pensioned descendants of usurpers or of puppets should now be regarded by their fellow-religionists as the ill-used heirs of legitimate dynasties, is comprehensible enough ; that acts of State which were moderate and by comparison merciful in the old days of war and tumult, should now be condemned as unscrupulous and greedy, is to be expected. We all know what sort of legacy David bequeathed to the sons of Zeruiah, whose ready swords cleared away rivals

and rebels from his path to the throne ; and England seems occasionally to display a liking for that same kind of pious atonement. Those who resolutely uphold an empire recently founded, must bear the consequence of such odiums and qualms of conscience ; but the ancient smouldering resentments will die away as the edifice settles down. At this moment, however, when England is almost too ready to do penance for the high-handed misdeeds of those who won India for her, when the Mahomedans have neither forgotten the old order of things, nor have become properly reconciled to the new, it is unfortunate that many causes combine to bring home rather sharply to Indian Musalmans the natural consequences of their political downfall. So long as the old fighting times lasted in India, we heard little of widespread grievances. The Musalman in that country was an adventurer by descent and by profession ; he or his fathers (I except here the tribes of conquered Hindus) had always entered the country from Western Asia in search of military or civil employment ; he was very rarely a colonist or a merchant ; he was usually a soldier of fortune. During our long Northern wars, the Musalmans enlisted willingly in our armies, and followed our victorious standards against Goorkhas, Sikhs and Marathas ; they marched with us to Cabul and Candabar, cities of the Muslim ; and to this day they fight for us most gallantly against the wild tribes on the debatable frontier lands between India and Afghanistan. Dr. Hunter makes much of the fanatic Musalman hatred which provoked us into the Umbeyla campaign of 1863, and which he traces back to the malevolence of our own subjects ; but he might have mentioned how, when a famous outpost of our position was re-taken by the British Indian troops after a bloody struggle, a Mahomedan was one of the two officers who then led as forlorn a hope as ever men staked their lives upon. Thus in active military service the Musalmans have always been loyal enough ; and they held office under us contentedly, so long as we kept up the native system of civil administration, in days when surveillance was lax, the standard of education low, and officials more powerful than ever because they represented irresistible chiefs. But the second Punjab campaign of 1848 laid all India at our feet ; the great wars of conquest were finished, and after them

came "the cankers of a calm world and a long peace;" at home the reins of civil and military discipline were tightened, so that not much was to be got under us by the pen and still less by the sword; while we gradually annexed Najpore, Jhansi and Oude, thus abolishing courts and camps which still afforded some chances for the irregular ambition of a lucky captain or an adroit courtier. Long ago, General Arthur Wellesley had pointed out in his Despatches how the discontent of the dangerous classes in India, of the men who live by an unscrupulous head or hand, must become more and more exasperated by the constant spread of our arms and authority; by the imperious régime which maintains the peace of India, which insists upon universal order and truce among allied states as well as in subject territory. And all this process of transition from the old immemorial way of life to the new, pressed with peculiar stringency upon the Musalmans, to whom, from warlike chiefs of gathered clans like Nadir Shah and Ahmed Abdallah, down to the poorest highlander who followed their standards from Central Asia, India had for centuries been the Eldorado where stirring times brought speedy fortunes. All this spirit of unrest (to use Dr. Hunter's phrase) was brooding over India when the Great Mutiny broke out among our Hindu sepoys. The disaffected Mahomedans at once caught the infection of rebellion, and almost immediately seized the lead of it, using the wild, aimless fury of the soldiery for their own compact and straight-pointed political designs. The consequence was, as all can recollect who were in India in 1857-8, that the English turned fiercely on the Mahomedans as upon their real enemies and most dangerous rivals; so that the failure of the revolt was much more disastrous to them than to the Hindus. The Musalmans lost almost all their remaining prestige of traditional superiority over Hindus; they forfeited the confidence of their foreign rulers; and it is from this period that must be dated the loss of their numerical majority in the higher subordinate ranks of the civil and military services. Before the Mutiny they largely outnumbered the Hindus in all the best offices which could be held by a native. Since that time they have fallen to a minority, which the adverse current of circumstances seems likely further to diminish; and assuredly they must work hard to recover the ground

which was cut from under them when in Northern India they made that last desperate spring after the shadow of a lost empire.

This brief historical retrospect was necessary, because the present religious temper of the Mahomedans is the reflection of their political and social misfortunes. It is easy to understand how these misfortunes must have stirred up and heated fanaticism in certain sections of a community bound together and circumscribed into one pale, not by nationality, but by their faith; so that the wreck of their Indian supremacy is a direct catastrophe for the religion which enjoins them to set up and pull down kingdoms in its name. As Colonel Lees observes, the laws of the Koran were framed for conquerors; and though texts can always be found to warrant prudence and the tactics of common sense, yet such interpretations conflict painfully against the whole tone of their Prophet's message, and jar upon the whole framework of his system. Much learning and logic have been expended by Mahomedan schoolmen of late upon the "nice sharp quilllets of the law" of Islam, to inquire whether it permits submission to an infidel yoke, or absolutely enjoins resistance even when resistance is not politic and the yoke easy. And Dr. Hunter writes,* almost as if he verily believed it, that "the obligations of the Indian Musalmans to rebel or not rebel hung for some months on the deliberations of three Suni priests in the Holy City of Arabia" [he refers to the fact that the doctors of Mecca were consulted as to whether Mahomedans might lawfully yield us quiet allegiance]; and he devotes a whole chapter to balancing the import of various expositions by different schools of the texts which bear on this point. He seems rather to enjoy alarming home-bred English readers by inclining the weight of authorities toward the conclusion that a war of extermination is a necessary act of faith. But, on the other hand, Syud Ahmed, in a series of letters published in India last year, undertook to demonstrate that the duty of *Jihād*, or religious war, is not at all imposed on Mahomedans by their actual relations with the English in India, and that Dr. Hunter's inferences from the Koran and its commentaries are overstrained and even quite un-

* Our Indian Musalmans, p. 11.

warranted. He maintains, moreover, that the *Fatwas*, or authoritative decisions which declare that Indian Musalmans are in no way bound to rebel, were not elicited by the anxiety of the Musalmans to relieve tender consciences or doubts as to their duty, but by the constant suggestions and nervous fancies of the English, who pressed the point upon them, until they were obliged to set themselves right before the world. And we see how this explanation becomes probable, when we find Colonel Lees telling us in one of his Times Letters* how he argued the case of the Indian Muslim in solemn earnest with the *Sheikh-ul-Islam* at Cairo, each disputant brandishing his own text; one being, "Kill them wherever you find them;" the other, "Ye are in no wise bound to rush upon your own destruction." Of course the result of setting flat against each other a negative and a positive command like these was to produce a dead-lock, a logical stalemate; but such games have no influence on the real business of the world. All the debaters admit that in practice no body of Mahomedans is likely to be driven into hopeless revolt by an ecclesiastical decision, as if execution followed a decree of the Sheikhs against a government as necessarily as it follows a judgment of the Privy Council against heretical clerks.

For the truth is, that all this painful examination of texts and authorities only illustrates what I have remarked upon before, the tendency of certain writers to attribute to special and local causes those sentiments of indisposition toward us, and of religious aversion from us, which belong naturally to the general constitution of the Mahomedan faith in its present intellectual phase and in its actual circumstances in India. These things have really very little to do with readings of the sacred books, or with the *Fatwas* of Mecca. The Mahomedans, with their tenets distinctly aggressive and spiritually despotic, must always be a source of inquietude to us so long as their theologic notions are still in that uncompromising and intolerant stage when the first duty of devout believers is to prevail and, if need be, to persecute. To most Englishmen of the day, this condition of thought may appear a strange anomaly; it is only an anachronism; the unquiet spirit now abroad in India is no

* P. 7 of the pamphlet.

other than that spirit which troubled all Christian Europe for so many centuries, and which even in England has not yet been quite exorcised by the modern doctrine of toleration, or the modern affection of indifference. It is the spirit which so long upheld passive resistance to a heretic ruler to be a sin against God ; because (to quote the words of Calvin*) "although obedience toward princes accords with God's service, yet if any princes usurp the authority of God, we must obey them only so far as may be done without offending God." Thus when anything that touches the interests of a religion is assumed to offend the Deity, while in his service all acts are held to be justifiable, no unbelieving government can hope to avoid offence. A government so placed—and the Indian Government is so placed—will always find itself exposed, whatever it may do, to great misrepresentations ; to a sort of general reprobation, rather conventional and for consistency's sake (perhaps), than real and heartfelt, from the mass of even reasonable and easy-going religionists ; and to virulent overt sedition from the extreme zealots. In India, as in Europe, the thorough-going hot gospellers may be few and unpopular, as are the Wahabis ; but, like a feeble fire under a large caldron, they serve to keep lukewarm the sentiments of the great majority, who are nevertheless very far from boiling up into dangerous explosion, or from allowing themselves to be driven by theologic fervency into following the lead of forlorn hopes against impregnable secular facts. But while the Musalmans evade by elastic glosses (as even Christians occasionally do) any conclusions which seem plainly desperate and beyond reason in practice, yet the sentiment which justifies to itself violent assertion can never be entirely dormant in an exclusive monotheistic religion, which claims as a right and duty universal spiritual despotism, while it has been levelled down by an infidel government to mere denominational equality. But it would be contrary to all experience, if this sentiment did not occasionally stir up the corresponding antipathies which civilization and the considerations of sound policy have very nearly laid to sleep among Europeans. It would be rash to declare that Christians in India are yet altogether free

* D'Aubigné. Reformation in Europe.

from the old spirit which included crusading among the solemn duties of a faithful ruler; and there have very lately been English officials who would have desired nothing better than to try conclusions with the Wahabi at his own weapons on his own extreme principles, to prove which doctrine was orthodox "by apostolic blows and knocks." Impartial Mahomedans must needs recognize the expediency of making allowance in Christians for that same tincture of sincere intolerance and conscientious irreconcilability with the professors of doctrines thought to be false, which they themselves hold to be very excusable in matters theologic. But this lurking belief of the duty on both sides to contend against each other *à l'outrance*, this conviction that each religion is bound to destroy the other, must necessarily embitter the resentment of the party which is nevertheless in political subordination; it must rouse and foster suspicions that the more powerful faith will use unfairly its secular predominance. In spite of all disclaimers put forth by the English Government, our ill-wishers have always raised against us the cry that we desire to compel persons to embrace our religion, and this is still widely credited by the ignorant crowd. In a volume of Travels in India just published by a Parsee of Bombay, the writer mentions how "strongly impressed" were certain Mahomedans, with whom he conversed, "with the belief that their rulers were now intent on making the people of this country converts to Christianity by all means in their power." Nor can we wonder that this sense of keen emulation between Christianity and Mahomedanism in one country is driving forward, as by a gale of wind, that spring-tide of Mahomedan revivalism which is now known to be flowing high throughout all the countries which profess Islam, even in those where the faith is triumphant and holds undisputed monopoly of the State's support.

Moreover, these two great rival religions have at last found in India not only a common mission field, but also a common arena and audience for polemical controversy. Hitherto the writers on either side have scarcely ever joined fair issue in argument, or opposed each on the same ground; the Christians have demolished the pretensions of Islam to Christians, at their leisure; the Musalmans have denounced Christianity before Musalmans; the two hos-

tile camps were separated by different tongues and by a great interval of distance between their respective headquarters. But now the Englishman in India is an Arabic scholar; and the Indian Mahomedan studies English works. Sir William Muir (now Lieutenant-Governor of the North-west provinces) writes a Life of Mahomed, with critical examination of the canonical scriptures upon which the traditional evidences of Islam are based; and he has at once found a gainsayer in Syud Ahmed Khân Bahâdur, a distinguished officer of the government over which Sir William presides. Although Syud Ahmed was himself born too late for acquiring that knowledge of English which would enable him to meet English critics with English writing, yet in Arabic he holds himself on a par with the accomplished author of the Life of Mahomed, whom he shews no reluctance to meet on neutral Asiatic ground with his own weapons. Instead of bigoted contempt and invective, we have now fair literary argument and a beginning of scholarly exegesis. Syud Ahmed naturally dissents widely from the view taken of Mahomed by the Christian biographer; and the effect of Sir William Muir's work upon his mind "was to determine him to collect, after a critical examination of them, into one systematic and methodical form, all those traditions concerning the life of Mahomed that are considered by Mahomedan divines to be trustworthy."* The completion of this plan was hindered by several obstacles; but he has presented (1870) to the public twelve Essays, which constitute the first volume of his Life of Mahomed, chiefly intended (we infer) to correct and refute the errors of Sir W. Muir. It was perhaps imprudent for the able Mahomedan champion to rely upon second-hand learning and on interpreters for his material for a critical dissertation in regard to the meaning of the Greek versions of the Christian Testament; as when he insists that in the passage which says, "It is expedient that I go, for if I go not the Comforter will not come,"—the word *παράκλητος* is a corrupt reading for *περικλυτός* = the famous one = Ahmed = Mahomed; and that Christ is thereby proved to have prophesied of Mahomed as the necessary successor and complement of his own divine mission.† This method of

* Preface to the Essays, p. xix.

† Essay on the Prophecies.

verbal disputation, which makes the acceptance or rejection of a mighty revelation to the leading races of the world depend upon a copyist's error or a monkish forgery, has fallen somewhat out of favour in modern European polemics: we want a broader basis for our theories of religious cataclysms. But Syud Ahmed is more successful when he desists from his attempt to prove the mission of Mahomed out of Christian scriptures, and takes to retorting upon his adversary the generalizations and philosophic reflections about superstitious tendencies and the growth of religious romance by which Sir William Muir casts doubts and discredit upon the authenticity of the Mahomedan canon. Thus Syud Ahmed extracts from the *Life of Mahomed* such passages as (for instance) these: "The habits of the early Moslems favoured the growth of tradition." . . . "On what topic would early Moslems descant more enthusiastically than on the acts and sayings of their Prophet?" . . . "The mind of his followers was unconsciously led on to think of him as endowed with supernatural power; here was the material out of which tradition grew luxuriantly . . . the memory was aided by the unchecked efforts of imagination." . . . "Superstitious reverence was the result which lapse of time would naturally have upon the . . . narratives."* And then he asks with some point whether the miraculous deeds of Moses, or the prodigious histories of other great prophets whom Christians revere, must not also be contemplated by Sir W. Muir through the same medium of calm and large-minded rationalism. He claims, in short, for Mahomed the same indulgent and respectful consideration which is accorded by all zealously devout persons to the records of the words and acts of those whom they incline to hear as a preacher sent from God; or else he desires that all miraculous histories shall be subjected to the same dissolvent analysis. Sir W. Muir was not defending Christianity in his biography of Mahomed, and had naturally set out upon his excursion against the Muslim without entrenching himself at home; but the flank movement of Syud Ahmed is for the moment effective, and may perhaps be regarded as a novelty in the Oriental tactics of literary crusades.

But to return from this digression to the main line of

* Supplement to the *Essay on Traditions*.

my essay. I have now gone hastily over the historical conditions and consequences of our position in India, which account very sufficiently to my mind for our unpopularity among a large class of Mahomedans. I myself should rather say that the inconsiderate mass of them are against us, than that the "best men are not on our side," as Dr. Hunter too invidiously affirms. That author appears to lay too much stress upon the significance of the spread of Wahabism in Lower Bengal, among an effete and unwarlike Mahomedan population. Syud Ahmed, in his letters to the Indian Pioneer (1871), denies that even the Wahabis consider that their situation under the English in India justifies a holy war; and he mentions that in 1857, when the mutineers held Delhi, Bakht Khan, the rebel commander, endeavoured to compel the Moulries of that city to declare lawful a *Jihād* against the British; but was boldly withstood and opposed by two leading Wahabis. If these two learned doctors came forward spontaneously at such a time to deny the legality of the *Jihād*, the instance is a very strong one; but if the fact was that they had been called upon by Bakht Khan, a famous mutineer, to put their signatures to such a declaration while the English were bombarding the city, it is possible that they had reflected upon that text quoted some pages back from the Koran, about true believers not being bound to rush upon destruction. But whatever may be the real convictions of Wahabism, without doubt its followers are few throughout all India, and are intensely unpopular with all other sects of Mahomedans in provinces where Musalman loyalty is infinitely more important to the security of our Government than in Bengal proper. In many parts of India, the appearance of a Wahabi preacher is the signal for sharp internal discord; the *odium theologicum* breaks out at once. It is some years since the Nizam's government at Hyderabad expelled the Wahabis for breeding endless strife in that great Musalman city, where it is not safe to attend religious revivals without sword and buckler. Not a year ago, a Wahabi teacher came down to the province in India with which I was then officially connected. He was an earnest reformer, and the abuses which he denounced were patent; but in a few weeks he had quarrelled with the chief Moulvies of their district over questions of theology and eccle-

siastic discipline, with all the Pharisees, and with Demetrius the silversmith, upon backslidings connected with worship at shrines, and the ungodly gains made by trading upon superstitious usages. All parties virulently accused him of sedition against Cæsar. The British officials, taking a broader view of their duty than did the Roman Gallio, not only refused to interfere in a dispute about religious law, but also took measures to preserve order and prevent violence to any man. The Wahabi was protected by the police; nor was there again any beating of Sosthenes before the judgment-seat.

I have thus attempted to set forth my view of the causes of Mahomedan discontents with us in India, by shewing that these causes are for the most part innate and congenital with the growth of our empire there. But Dr. Hunter and Colonel Lees have brought up prominently a series of particular grievances, and these I am bound to examine. Dr. Hunter, especially, devotes a whole chapter to the wrongs of the Mahomedans, which he declares to have been inflicted by blunders criminal enough to free our subjects from their obligation of allegiance.* Now many of the most important facts and figures on which he relies in this section of his work have been briskly challenged, whether or not successfully I cannot positively say; but without going into these details, I propose to look into the substance of some of the graver charges laid by him and by Colonel Lees against the Indian administration.

Colonel Lees and Dr. Hunter both deduce very serious and wide-reaching consequences from the educational policy inaugurated in 1836 by a very characteristic Minute of Lord Macaulay, who then held office in India. The question was, how to apply the State grant toward higher education; whether the public instruction to be subsidized by public money should be English or Oriental; whether the languages, science and philosophies of the West or of the East should be encouraged by the State. Macaulay was altogether in favour of the West; and he beat down all opposition by his brilliant and impetuous attack upon Orientalism. He said that a single shelf of a good European library was worth the whole native literature of India and

* *Indian Musalmans*, p. 143.

Arabia ; that it was not decent to use the public funds for bribing the Indian youth to read books full of monstrous lies and blunders ; and so on with startling antitheses as usual, securing a great triumph to the Anglicists. From that day English (to use the words of Colonel Lees*) “has been recognized as the medium of higher education in India, and the subjects taught in it have been entirely European ;” and Colonel Lees declares the effect of this change was “the gradual and steady transfer of the civil government of the country from Musalmans to Hindus.” Now this sweeping assertion illustrates to my mind the rhetorical practice of which I have complained elsewhere in this essay, of tracing back great events to slender origins of a special and narrow kind ; and certainly the very contrast between minute causes and universal effects does strike the imagination of readers. I myself should be inclined to demur, with all deference to authority which I really respect, both to the manner of inference and to the fact assumed in the conclusion. But I agree that the change of system, as it was carried out, was impolitic, for reasons which are just of the sort which Lord Macaulay, with all his genius, never could see or understand, because he lacked sympathy with the deeper and more delicate fibres of political relations. To him all Oriental literature was almost entirely worthless, and this was quite enough for him ; that a sentimental attachment for their ancient book-lore might exist among the people of India, never occurred to him as a point calling for wary consideration. This blind side of a brilliant writer on politics is very well displayed by Macaulay’s conduct in a similar case, when it was proposed to buy certain invaluable Irish manuscripts for the British Museum. Lord Macaulay (says Mr. M. Arnold†) declared that he saw nothing in the whole collection worth purchasing, *except* the correspondence of Lord Melville on the American war. Ancient Celtic literature seemed to him mere rubbish ; and he thought Sanskrit or Arabic treatises little better. So he prevailed on the Government of that day to de-Orientalize University education ; and here he was wrong. It would have been

* Pp. 24, 25, of the pamphlet—Letter to the Times.

† On the Study of Celtic Literature, p. 179.

far wiser to permit Musalmans, as Colonel Lees has since proposed, to graduate in Oriental classics ; and we might have continued ample State provision for the religious education of their youth, according to the course of study approved by their customs and their religion. We are as yet hardly so firmly established in India as to be warranted in undertaking the propagation of true science and undenominational instruction, while such things are unpalatable to important communities with sensitive prejudices ; we cannot yet afford to risk political obloquy in the dissemination of those principles. If the Mahomedan still prefers his own literature, our business is not to gainsay him disagreeably, but to let him take his own course for the present. I must explain that *primary* schools have never been Anglicized or made strictly secular, and that the complaints now heard are aimed entirely at the system which excludes Oriental classics from the curriculum of the Presidency Universities, thus barring the affiliation of the purely Mahomedan colleges ; and at the allotment of the funds of one particular Mahomedan college (at Hoogly) toward English instead of toward Oriental learning. All these thorough-going reforms, these abrupt innovations, were far too premature ; we cannot hurry an ancient people of some culture so rapidly through phases of social progress which with European nations have occupied long periods.

On the other hand, I must repeat my opinion that the direct consequences of our educational changes have been exaggerated ; and that though these things may have contributed something to the discontent and discouragement of Musalman students in Bengal, they have had little or nothing to do with the general feelings or position of the Musalmans of India. Moreover, though it is certain that the Government must offend Musalman prejudices and interests by openly pushing on English education all over the country, and must wound them by attempting this hastily ; yet, if we are to go forward at all, the movement must be in this direction, and all true intellect and real literary capacity among Musalmans must gradually follow, though the Hindus have been permitted to take the lead of them. Of course the Musalmans hang back, and are much dissatisfied with the supersession of their classics by modern literature ; but these are difficulties and thwart-

ing influences which were sure to cross our path; they were not created artificially or brought about by administrative blunders, though the blunders may have complicated the problem. Anyhow, we cannot now stand still, or shut out the rush of light and air which have followed our throwing open the windows of the West, because at first it chills and dazes the conservative Mahomedan. For we must recollect that he does not so much object to the influx of Western knowledge, as to the inevitable consequence that it has become a broad open channel toward official promotion and professional eminence under our régime; that the Hindus have taken this tide on its turn, while the Mahomedans persist in going out with the ebb. Now it is very hard to discover how we can help them here, since our civil government of India demands the best heads and the highest skilled training that the world can give, and by using inferior tools we should incur a peril far more serious than any that can grow out of the reactionary susceptibilities of Mahomedans. With military service, so dear to Mahomedans, the question of superior education has as yet no concern; but our *raison d'être* in India, and our motto for ruling it, must ever be *La carrière ouverte aux talens*; and for myself I would throw open to that career all but the highest posts in the regular civil services—indeed, every judicial office without reserve. With all respect for the very weighty authority of Mr. W. G. Palgrave, and for his intimate acquaintance with Musalman countries, I am afraid that his project* of establishing separate Musalman law-courts for judging all social and religious questions arising between Musalmans by one of themselves, would now hardly satisfy in India even themselves. The measure might succeed in great Mahomedan cities, as in Delhi or Patna, though even there I fancy that some might prefer courts which are quite incorruptible—at least for the appeal; while this separate jurisdiction might tend to increase the isolation of the Mahomedans amid the rising generations of India. But all over the vast provinces of India the Mahomedans are often very thinly scattered; and in many great districts we should be much puzzled to find them capable judges.

* See Fraser's Magazine for February, 1872.

If the Musalmans really desire, as the best of them do, to maintain in our Indian empire the high place which their remarkable qualities, their strong mental character and their great physical courage, naturally assign to them, they *must* in these days make up their minds to accept Western science and literature, and to join the society of nations which rule and lead the whole world. To those Mahomedans who cling to their own classics, and who adhere to the kind of training afforded by the study of Arabic theology or philosophy, every facility and even encouragement should be given. All natives, as Colonel Lees has proposed, might be free to graduate in the *litteris humanioribus* of the East or of the West, as they should please; there might be an Oriental faculty as well as an English faculty of Arts in our Indian Universities, so that every one might follow his own bent and take his choice. But although we may feel ourselves bound to throw open both lines of study to our Indian subjects, and precluded from closing the ancient road merely because *we* think that it leads astray, yet we cannot guarantee the same results to either branch of education and learning; we cannot promise to those who may choose Oriental scholarship, that they shall find themselves abreast, in all the various high-roads of life which lead to profit and distinction, with the men who shall have devoted themselves to acquiring the knowledge which in these days is power, the intellectual treasures which make fifty years of Europe better than a cycle in Cathay, which are the sinews of empire as surely as money is the sinew of war. It is impossible but that those who hold back in modern India will find themselves left behind; wherefore I doubt whether the Mahomedans will be much appeased by any concessions of encouragement to their special studies; because their real grievance is that these studies are no longer in fashion, that distinction and court favour can no longer be gained by proficiency in the literature and theology of Islam. This *is* a real and sensible grievance; but how are we to remedy it, except by patience and extreme consideration? Nor is it possible to comply with the demands of those liberal Mahomedans who have too much intelligence not to perceive the enormous advantage of European education, yet too much patriotism to abandon without reluctance the language of their country

and the traditions of their faith. These gentlemen, among whom Syud Ahmed Khan is prominent, argue that all the stores of Western knowledge should not be kept under the lock and key of the English language, but that our Government ought to provide for Indians access to this rich treasure-house through the media of their own vernaculars, so that a native need not labour for years at a foreign tongue before he can work his way up into the higher atmosphere of philosophic thought or scientific practice. No doubt this necessity of first mastering a strange language is a severe obstacle, but it is one which we should hardly attempt to remove; for we cannot undertake to translate European literature for the benefit of our Indian fellow-subjects, the best of whom would already laugh at paltry abridgments and imperfect renderings. Syud Ahmed Khan's son is at this moment, I believe, a promising student at Cambridge. I trust that he may rise to the first rank of any profession or service which he may choose after his return to India; but in intellectual competition what chance will there be against him for young men who have never learnt English, or who have worked at European literature through Hindustani translations? Possibly those pioneers from the East who have first explored and occupied this literary Eldorado of the West, may devote themselves to laying out the road, as translators and expounders in the vernacular, by which the mass of their less enterprising and less affluent countrymen may follow; but this is a task which we English are compelled to leave to their patriotic energy. The English Government has constructed for all natives a good system of primary education in their own dialects; and the official inspectors very properly heed not the strong probability (if not certainty) that some sort of religious instruction is given in the State schools, which are all quasi-denominational, that is, the Musalman and Hindu schools are ordinarily separate. There is no reason why Mahomedan boys should not receive an exclusively Mahomedan education; the State will still subsidize such elementary instruction, if only decent rudiments of secular knowledge are also given. But in the higher standards of education we cannot well refrain from shewing a decided bias in favour of English learning, because though it is unluckily the learning of foreign conquerors, yet it is so

incomparably the best. We may silence natural complaints and appease prejudice by an impartial and even-handed distribution of the educational grants to Eastern and Western learning; and we may attempt, as Dr. Hunter wisely recommends, to connect the two branches of study; but the ultimate result may be safely left to the shrewdness and literary taste of the cleverest races in Asia.

I have left myself no space to examine the other specific charges alleged against the British Government, which are taken to form reasonable and sufficient ground for our unpopularity among Mahomedans, by writers who trace it immediately to administrative shortcomings. The charges are very seriously worded. "Deliberate malversation of religious foundations," is, for instance, a tremendous accusation against a Christian Government of India; but all that can be proved is, I think, that we have scrutinized with injudicious rigour the title-deeds whereby endowments were held, and that in one instance we unwisely, though in good faith, attempted to divert toward European education the funds of an estate bequeathed for Mahomedan pious uses. Another count is for "abolishing the Mahomedan law officers who gave the sanction of religion to the marriage tie;" as if we had cut asunder the bonds of Mahomedan society and broken up families. Whereas all we have done is to cease to appoint Kâzis by order of State, leaving election or selection to the Mahomedan communities. This was a political blunder; but the truth is, that we were seeking to dissociate the State from its patronage of non-Christian religions, and we fancied that the severing of such connections would be rather agreeable than otherwise to Mahomedans and to Hindus, who might be jealous of our exercising these powers. Meanwhile, the Kâzis are still performing their ministry and holding their official allowances, which are ordinarily secured upon the land or on the land revenue; they are in no way abolished, though they are no longer officers of the Government. It is possible that all these changes may have produced some local irritation here and there, where they affected vested interests and strong prejudices; but I cannot allow that they have ever been sufficiently important or wide-spread in their effects to cause a general revulsion of feeling among Mahomedans all over India. The greater portion have pro-

ably never heard of these things; and I must again remark that the writers who enlarge upon them both draw their personal experience mainly from the same province of Lower Bengal. My contention is, that the feeling among Mahomedans of disinclination to our rule, and the occasional seditious stirs which move India from time to time in various quarters, are the natural incidents of alien dominion over a vast unsettled population; that all we see and hear is no more than might be expected and predicted; and that the Mahomedan element is necessarily and demonstrably an element of trouble and restlessness. Every now and then some skilful writer startles us by a vigorous picture of our situation, by grouping many striking facts, and by heaping up the errors and oversights which are inevitably scattered along the difficult path we have trod. But I believe that, to other nations who act as bystanders, the real wonder is that the blunders are not more, and that unpleasant premonitory symptoms of danger are on the whole so slight. I have attempted to sketch, though much too rapidly and imperfectly, the principal causes and conditions which have originated and still keep up among the Mahomedans a certain irksome dissatisfaction with our Government, and which must long postpone a complete reconciliation between us and that high-spirited but intolerant community, because it is no consolation to them to tell them that what they complain of is mostly inevitable. In so far as these grievances are part and parcel of the actual situation, we must depend on time and reason to allay them, and we must attempt to compensate the Mahomedans for what they have lost by other benefits which certainly accrue to them from living under the most just and the most enlightened Government that has ever been tried in their country. In so far as they can prove wrongs which have been accidental, and the consequence of mistakes which all foreign rulers must commit more or less, we are doing our best to apply remedy, and we see that the Musalmans do not lack fervent advocates among the best of our own English officers. But we must work upon our own broad notions of justice and expediency; we cannot continually twist and modify them so as to fit in with all the curves and angles of Oriental prejudices, any more than we can do this for our own insular peculiarities at home. We cannot guarantee to Musalmans

as a right what would be a wrong to other Indian fellow-subjects ; we will not deny civil status to any subject of the Queen, convert or pervert ; nor will we put back the hands of the dial by retarding the sowing and high cultivation of European education in so splendid and so fertile a land as India. We must continue to enlist the best men into our services, whoever they may be ; and we must govern the country, at any cost, on the principles of civil liberty and religious equality.

A. C. LYALL.

VI.—SAINT PAUL AND THE NERO LEGEND.

MONSIEUR RENAN has announced a new volume under the title of *Antichrist*. But for this, it might have been ill-advised to ask English readers to reconsider so well-worn a subject as the famous apocalyptic passage in the Second Epistle to the Thessalonians. Yet the interest of these old riddles rather rises than falls with the definitive abandonment of the old line of interpretation. When we have made up our minds that they do not contain the secret of the future, we can look in them with a milder but healthier interest for such traces as they may bear of the history of the past. Those, indeed, who in this country have most frankly taken up the newer point of view, are too much inclined, in the present as in some other cases, to water the whole question down into nothing at all. But the language of the Epistle is very definite, and something very definite must be meant by it ; and though no one can be readier than the present writer to acknowledge that it may very well mean something very definite, without our finding out what it means, yet the final explanation of the Beast in the Apocalypse is enough to shew that any such riddle may yield at last.

The language of the Epistle is more than definite. When, indeed, the Man of Sin, or, as the two best manuscripts have it, the Man of Lawlessness, is said to “withstand and

lift himself up against* every one called God and every object of worship (σέβασμα),” the words are obviously echoed from Daniel xi. 36, 37, and do not prove much. But what follows proves a good deal. Antiochus Epiphanes regarded no god, from Zeus the god of his fathers to Adonis the darling of women; but even he honoured some strange god of citadels, and at any rate did not set up for God himself. The new Antichrist does; he “seats himself in the temple of God and exhibits himself as God.” Now who in the first century claimed divinity, or had divinity claimed for him? One there is for whom it has been claimed in later generations—most men say in his own and by himself; but we are not seeking for Christ, but for Antichrist. The other, the only other, it would seem,† is the Roman Emperor. Of the strange attempt, at the very date with which we shall have to connect the Epistle, to make a sham Messiah out of a Roman emperor, it will be necessary to speak later; at present let us attend to the indications of something of the kind in the passage before us. Though the Lawless one is spoken of as existing, his “presence” (παρουσία), which is to be marked by “signs and wonders of deceit,”‡ is deferred for a while. “At his own time” he is to be “unveiled” (ἀποκαλυφθῆναι, ἀποκαλυφθήσεται); but meanwhile something or some one is in the way. Now these two words, *presence* and *unveiling*, are terms regularly applied elsewhere to the future advent of Christ himself, and the first of them is here applied both to Christ and to the Lawless one in

* Ἐπί is translated *above* in the Authorized Version. The phrase βασιλεύειν ἐπὶ τι would be something like; but τολμήσαι ἐπὶ τινας (2 Cor. x. 2), ἐπαναστήσονται τέκνα ἐπὶ γονῶς (Matt. x. 21, Mark xiii. 12), ἀνίστη ἐφ’ ἑαυτὸν (Mark iii. 26), are more to the purpose; and in βασιλεύειν ἐπὶ τι, the king is probably supposed as it were to take his seat *upon* the country or people, not *over* it.

† Apollonius of Tyana should be mentioned, for form’s sake at least. In the romance of which he is the subject, we are told that he was prosecuted at Rome for assuming divine honours; but we are also told that he disappeared from court by magic, and so escaped. Also that a great deal passed between him and Vespasian, in Egypt, both of the mystical kind and of the political, at the time of the miracles mentioned below—matters which must not be looked for in Tacitus or Suetonius.

‡ The modern reader ought to be reminded that σημεῖα καὶ τέρατα ψεύδους are not what he might understand from “lying wonders,” namely, sham miracles like the supernatural appetite of Bel and the Dragon; but real miracles serving to deceive, wrought, as we say in imitation of John viii. 44, by the “father of lies.”

marked antithesis (v. 8, 9). Therefore Antichrist, like Christ, has departed for a time, and we look for his *second coming*. This waiting for a second coming is not an unknown phenomenon in history. Frederick Barbarossa* still sits under a mountain near Salzburg, unless he thinks German unity has come at last; and it has been said that there are Portuguese to this day who look for the return of Don Sebastian. Do we know of any Roman emperor who was the object in the first century of any such popular belief? We do; the emperor Nero. Accordingly the First Beast (τὸ θηρίον τὸ πρῶτον) of the Apocalypse, whose "number" we now know is nothing else than the name *Nero Caesar*,—"it was," we are told, "and is not, and shall be present" (παρέσται, Apoc. xvii. 8); it is one of the "seven kings," in fact one of the "five" (v. 10—Nero is fifth from Augustus, and the *Sibylline Oracles* sometimes count from Augustus): on the other hand, it goes off into perdition, as we are twice told (v. 8, 11); that perdition apparently of which our Man of Lawlessness is the "son."

This would fix the time to some point after June 68, the time of Nero's death. We shall be able, if so much is granted, to go into far minuter detail; but we have already encountered the grand difficulty of the hypothesis, and we must stop to consider it. The difficulty, of course, is this, and all that is implied by this, that the hypothesis places the earliest but one, if not the earliest, of Saint Paul's Epistles some months at least after the date usually assigned to his martyrdom. If we cannot, with Chrysostom, take the prophecy as a miraculous prediction of a real Antichrist, with Nero for "type," must we conclude, with the late Dr. Baur† and others, that the Epistle is not genuine; or may we suppose that our external evidence is at fault by as much as fifteen years?

Neither the genuineness of the Epistle nor the value of our external evidence will be formally examined here. Each should be discussed in detail apart from the other

* However, if the story was originally told of Frederick the Second, as is now said, it was probably derived from this very Nero legend.

† See the article reprinted from the *Theologische Jahrbücher* (1855), in the appendix to the second edition of *Paulus der Apostel Jesu Christi*: to this edition are made the references below. The theory, however, is not quite original with Baur.

and apart from the present question. The present question concerns a particular explanation of "Antichrist," which it is the aim of this article to state experimentally, without adjusting it in relation to wider problems. Yet a word or two must be said on the general conditions of adjustment.

First as to the genuineness of the Epistle. Its aim, or one of its aims, is to correct an excessive tendency to look in the immediate present for the second coming of Christ. This dangerous and sometimes even "demoralizing" faith is plausibly supposed by Baur to have been stimulated by the appearance of a Pseudo-Nero about the time above indicated (Tacitus, *Hist.* ii. 8); and his theory of the composition of the Epistle is, that it was written in the first years of Vespasian's principate, and issued under the name of Saint Paul, to enforce with his authority its practical and tranquillizing counsels. But apart from all other difficulties, is this, on its own showing, a tenable hypothesis? Could a worse way be found of convincing men that the Day of the Lord was not just at hand in the year 70, than to shew that Saint Paul did not immediately expect it in the year 53 or 54? To be sure, the writer tells of other things which are to come first; but these, or what would be taken for these, might any day be revealed; and the mere production of an Epistle in the name of the apostle and martyr, directing men's attention in such pointed language to the signs of the times, would raise more agitation than could be allayed by all the counsel he has given or could give against being shaken in mind or troubled. Strongly, however, as this weighs with the present writer against Baur's hypothesis, it is a light thing compared with the evidence of genuineness which lies in the simple observation, that the Epistles to the Thessalonians are among those writings which it was beyond the resources of that age to counterfeit. There is nothing perhaps which Baur and his school have more completely established, than that no literary imposture could be too gross to impose upon the early Fathers. But the consequence, among other consequences, is, that subtle and refined imposture would never have been wasted on them. The art of attack only keeps pace with the art of defence. The skill required to produce such works as the forgery of one of Saint Paul's more characteristic letters (we need not here discuss the Pastoral

Epistles, or even the West-Asiatic Epistles, or insist upon every passage in any Epistle) is itself only to be gained in the elaboration of that criticism which would be required to detect it. The artist might have imposed on his contemporaries, but he could not have made the problem so difficult for us. It must be admitted that the vaticination itself is not what we should have expected of St. Paul. After this one speculation we hear no more of the subject, or of anything really like it, throughout the Epistles.* But this is not hard to explain. It is part of Saint Paul's greatness that *anything* should cure him of prophesying; and it is probable that nothing could have cured even him, short of some very signal event decisively falsifying his anticipations. It will be seen that on the proposed hypothesis his anticipations were falsified by what would be to a Jew the most stupendous event in the century.

Secondly, as to the value of the external evidence. The external evidence virtually reduces itself to the Acts of the Apostles: there is little else which anywhere but in Church history would seriously be produced in court on a point of chronology. Yet points of chronology are just what we cannot depend upon the Acts to determine for us. This does not indeed dispose of the difficulty: it is one thing to say that the historian's chronology is inaccurate, and another to say that he is so grossly at fault that it should seem as if much of his work was little better than a romance. Such a hypothesis is not, and ought not to be, an attractive one; but the Acts must be on any hypothesis a very puzzling book, and it is not easy to judge whether even this hypothesis is probable or not. This being the case, it ought to be admitted that the agreement which exists between Saint Paul's description of Antichrist and the known fact of the expectation of Nero's return, especially

* "Wie wenn es nichts auf sich gehabt hätte," says Baur (p. 362), who uses this to confirm the theory that the two Epistles are not genuine, - "eine dem christlichen Bewusstsein mit so grosser Wichtigkeit vorgehaltene Vorstellung mit einem Male wieder fallen zu lassen, und nachdem indess so Manches unerfüllt geblieben war, darüber hinwegsehend, die unmittelbare Nähe der Parusie Christi zu verkündigen (1 Cor. xv. 51)." That the *παρουσία* was to be in the course of that generation, is not what this verse asserts, but what it assumes. It was not necessary, nor was it likely, that Saint Paul should cut himself loose from that assumption, just because he had been obliged to abandon a specific prediction.

taken in connection with the analogous symbolism of the Apocalypse and the more pointed allegations of the *Sibylline Oracles* referred to later,—that this agreement is an important element of the criteria for deciding the question.

It has been observed above, that the adumbration of the Man of Lawlessness is taken from Daniel. This is notorious; in fact, it is generally supposed, as Saint Paul no doubt supposed himself, that Daniel's prediction related to the subject of his own. It would therefore be at least natural to suppose that the consummation of Antichrist's wickedness must at least include what constituted the profound enormity of Antiochus's, the outrage of the Holy City; but this is positively confirmed by what is said of his seating himself in the temple of God (*the* God, τοῦ Θεοῦ, not Jupiter or Apollo), and also by what sounds so strange from the author of the later Epistles (but, with this explanation, is not worth counting among the peculiarities of this one), the very Jewish epithet *Lawless* (ἄνομος) applied to the Son of Perdition as describing the essence of his abominableness.* Moreover, an expression in the First Epistle (ii. 16) shews that the ruin of the Jews seemed to be overtaking them at last. It is probable, therefore, that the "mystery of lawlessness" was the war for the complete and final suppression of Jewish resistance, which ended in the destruction of Jerusalem. The war lasted three years and a half (an odd coincidence with Daniel ix. 27); and our standard date, the death of Nero, comes a little before the middle of that period. But we see that the process, although in operation (ἐνεργεῖται, 2 Th. ii. 7), was nevertheless obstructed by something; if we can make out what, we shall have got to the bottom of the question of date. The obvious cause of hindrance to an invading army is the resistance of the invaded; but it is manifest that Saint

* It may seem a difficulty, however, affecting the explanation generally, that the point of view should be so Judaic, while there is already such strongly Antijudaic feeling. But this discord, which was resolved later, is quite natural at an early stage of Saint Paul's European mission; and those who compare Baur's remarks in *Paulus* itself with the essay reprinted from the *Theologische Jahrbücher*, will acknowledge that the indications of a Judaic point of view are among the difficulties of the theory that the two Epistles were written after Saint Paul's death, or even (if that was affirmed) late in his career. *Paulus*, Vol. II. pp. 99, 350.

Paul is not speaking of an obvious cause. "Do you not remember," he says, "that when I was with you I told you all this? and now you know what the restraining agency is." Now, as a fact, hostilities were suspended during the whole of the year 69; and, as a fact, the restraining cause was this, that the general in command, Vespasian, afterwards emperor, was obliged to watch the progress of the conflicts going on in the west between competitors for the empire. So our chronological range is limited to the year 69.

But the bare fact that men were fighting for the empire could never be called a "restraining agency" or "agent" (*κατέχον, κατέχων*). Such terms could apply to nothing less substantial than one of the contending factions; and it becomes necessary to glance at the course of events since the downfall of Nero. Nero killed himself in June, 68. Galba was emperor already, and he lasted out the year; then came Otho from January to April, 69; then Vitellius, till Vespasian's adherents killed him in December. Now our authorities nowhere say it, that I know of, in general terms, but it is clearly the case, that there is a certain unity during this period between the causes of alternate emperors—that, counting Nero as first or fifth, the odd numbers belong to a sort of Neronian party, the party of the legionaries, and the even ones to a Roman party in the stricter sense, the party of the city,* that is of the senate and people such as they were. Nero's trick—one can hardly say his policy—of insulting or ignoring the senate, is not the least of those outrages on received ideas which make the epithet "lawless" so appropriate to his reputation. And though it was not the senate that set up Galba, he was a candidate after their heart; and when he solemnly designated a successor at Rome, the event was considered a further triumph for the senatorial party. This designated successor had been an enemy of Nero's, and his rival Otho the most infamous of Nero's boon companions. The final conflict between Otho and Galba reduced itself to a fight

* That dealers in prophecy conceived the city as Nero's enemy, is betrayed by the prediction of a Pseudosibyl, that at his second coming he should destroy Rome (*Sibyll.* viii. 148–159). This idea would be a very natural product of the story of Nero's conflagration. Perhaps there is some confusion between the destructions of the two cities.

between the soldiers and the people (15 Jan. 69); and, when it was over, Otho seems to have taken or received Nero's name. On the other hand, again, though Vitellius was anything but a worthy heir to Galba, his success was celebrated in Rome by decorating Galba's statues. Lastly, Vespasian, so went the report, was invoked by a letter from Otho to avenge his death; and certainly among the first adhesions to Vespasian were the legions already devoted to Otho; besides, the very fact that he had been appointed under Nero to conduct the war against the Jews, would itself go far to make a Neronian of him in Oriental eyes.* This unity, then, among alternate emperors, is sufficiently made out; and it would probably strike an observer at a distance from Rome more strongly than those who were in the midst of the fighting. There seems to be no trace of it in the Apocalypse; and it may have been an original observation of Saint Paul's. However this may be, the "restraining agent" or "agency" was Vitellius† and the senatorial or Roman party; for we see that the time of its restraining efficacy must have been the latter part of the year 69.

Besides furnishing an easy and satisfactory interpretation of the Restrainer, this virtual identity between alternate

* We may add what Dr. Merivale says (qu. on what authority?), that Vitellius expelled from Italy the diviners, "the favourites and accomplices of Otho and Nero,"—great friends too, as we see, of Vespasian. *The Romans*, &c., VI. 435.

† The name Vitellius has already been attached to the *κατέχων* by Grotius; but he meant our Vitellius's father, who governed Syria under Caius (Grotius's Antichrist), and who, since his successor was sent out with orders to set up Caius's statue in the temple at Jerusalem, was or might be the restrainer of this *μυστήριον τῆς ἀνομιᾶς*. We still require something like the Nero legend to account for the application of the Apocalyptic imagery. But no doubt the affair of the statue would fix for the future the interpretation of the imperial claim to divinity.

It is wonderful that Baur should think it unnecessary to account more definitely than he does for *εἰς τὸν ναὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ καθίσαι*. From these words, he says (p. 358), "könnte man schliessen, er" (the Epistle) "müsse noch vor der Zerstörung Jerusalems geschrieben sein." (Certainly.) "Will man den Ausdruck nicht für einen dem Propheten Daniel nachgebildeten bildlichen halten" (improbable after Caius), "so kann man auch den *ναὸς Θεοῦ* für den *τόπος τοῦ ναοῦ* nehmen." This would be possible in itself, for a reason he gives; but it would be wonderful that a counterfeit vaticination after the fact should mention the temple, and yet shew no trace of the stupendous event which while impending was mixed up in men's minds with the end of the world.

pretenders is of service in another way. The greatest apparent difficulty (always excepting the question of date) in making Nero Antichrist, consists in the serious claims to that dignity which might be set up on behalf of Vespasian himself. The name Antichrist is usually understood to mean opponent of Christ; and this is no doubt the sense in which it is said in two of the Epistles of John that there are many antichrists, and that the sign of Antichrist is rejection of Jesus. But this does not at all come up to the ideas sketched in Daniel, the Apocalypse or the present passage,* and bears plain marks of being a rationalist explanation of the old predictions, adopted when it was found that definite fulfilment failed. Nor is this the most natural way of taking the Greek word. The Greek word suggests the idea of a counter-Christ, an opposition Christ, a reflection of Christ, an inverted Christ. In the experience of Greek "spiritualists," as also, we are told, in that of modern ones, it was observed that when a particular being was evoked, some officious demon would often present himself instead; in such cases, the *wrong dicinity* was called ἀντίθεος in relation to the right one.† Something like this is the idea (M. de Champagny's, adopted by Dr. Merivale) that it was positively attempted to set up Vespasian as a rival to Christ. At any rate, it clearly appears that Vespasian was represented as fulfilling the Messianic prophecies. Suetonius does as much himself. "An ancient and continuous tradition," he says in a famous passage (D. Vesp. 4), "had become very general throughout the East, that they were destined to come out of Judæa who should win supreme power. What the event has proved," he continues with simplicity recommendable to all interpreters of prophecy, "to have been meant of the Roman emperor, the Jews took to themselves." Suetonius is a great dealer in omens and predictions; and M. de Champagny's theory is, that to represent Vespasian in this providential character was a device of the historians. Dr.

* It is hardly necessary to say that the word ἀντίχριστος occurs nowhere in the New Testament, except in 1 John ii. 18, 22, iv. 3; 2 John 7. In Psalm ii. 2, *against his anointed* is κατὰ τοῦ χριστοῦ αὐτοῦ, 'at m'shîho. But we have ἀντικείμενος here, and ἐπὶ with the accusative, apparently in the sense of *against*.

† Lobeck, *Aglaophamus*, p. 58 (*Eleusinia*, § 7).

Merivale tacitly alters it into something less bookish and more probable, when he ascribes the idea to Vespasian's "flatterers in the East" (*The Romans*, &c., VII. 348). These flatterers are not a merely hypothetical class; though, indeed, they may often have been real admirers, not to say believers. The famous cures of the blind man and the lame man (the former with his saliva) make only two, according to Tacitus, out of many miracles which came during Vespasian's stay in Egypt this very year 69, to prove the divine favour. Entering the temple of Serapis to consult the god who had granted this success, he was met by a sort of double of one Basilides whom he knew to be some days' journey from the place (Tacitus, *Hist.* iv. 82). The name Basilides was to this lover of Greek equivoques a presage of empire (*Βασιλεία*); to us it is a reminiscence of what happened a few months before at Carmel, the name, says Tacitus (*Hist.* ii. 78), both of mountain and god,* where is "neither image nor temple—only an altar and worship." Here Vespasian sacrificed, and Basilides is the name of a priest who told his fortunes on the occasion. The prediction was vague enough in terms, and merely promised the highest success in whatever his aims might be;† nor does the repetition of the name strengthen one's faith in either story; but it looks like a sign that both are specimens out of a Vespasian legend current in the Levant. Otherwise, it would be ridiculous to dwell on such trifles; and probably Vespasian himself paid more attention to the encouragements of a more eminent impostor. Josephus, having surrendered Jotapata after a siege which in his history of the war he is supposed to have made the most of, determined, as Dr. Merivale says (VI. 555), to "recommend himself to the credulous Vespasian as a man favoured with visions and prophetic inspiration;" and his inspiration took the form of a prophecy that his conqueror should be the conqueror of the world. As Nero was alive at the time, this must have been about the luckiest hit of a singularly lucky schemer; but the probability is that Josephus was

* Apparently a foreigner's interpretation of the two syllables. If it had anything to do with *El*, the word would mean *God's Vine-hill*.

† This universality is artful. Political and military honours are significantly left out, and no doubt studiously; the object being to make it appear that the prophet did not know who he was speaking to.

an early promoter of ideas which became somewhat prevalent afterwards.

Vespasian's career, then, is marked by "signs and wonders of deceit," which set it in rivalry with the mission of the Messiah. To be sure, the triumph of a present leader of armies could hardly be predicted in the terms appropriated to Christ's second coming. But if Vespasian was conceived as the minister on earth of a power removed for a time, a sort of Antibaptist to prepare the way of Antichrist before his face, the signs and wonders would confirm the idea that Nero was to come himself and do or attempt greater works than these. Some such secondary part is played by the Other Beast or False Prophet of the Apocalypse; but we have positive evidence that, to the minds of at least some speculators on destiny, Vespasian's pretensions might be merged in Nero's to a degree far greater than this,—to a degree, in fact, hardly conceivable. There is a remarkable passage in the *Sibylline Oracles*,* which cannot be understood, without straining and evasion, but as alleging that it was Nero who destroyed the temple at Jerusalem. This must be actually after the fact; and Saint Paul, who writes before the fact, need not be supposed capable of ignoring history so grossly. What we must suppose is that, writing before the fact, and seeing, like any other wise man, that Zion's hour was come at last, Saint Paul, like any other Jew, was as yet unable to contemplate her ruin apart

* In the fifth book. After ten lines (137—146) fixing their subject's identity by such marks as the murder of his mother, the piercing of the Isthmus, and his mania for performing in public, it goes on thus :

ἤξει δ' εἰς Μήδους καὶ Περσῶν πρὸς βασιλῆας,
 πρώτους οὖς ἐπόθησε καὶ οἷς κλέος ἐγκατέθηκε,
 φωλεύων μετὰ τῶνδε κακῶν εἰς ἔθνος ἀηδές·
 150 δς ναὸν θεότευκτον ἔλεν καὶ ἔφλεξε πολίτας
 λαοὺς εἰσανιόντας ὅσους ὕμνησε δικαίως·
 τούτου γὰρ φανερωθέντος κτίσις ἐξετινάχθη,
 καὶ βασιλεῖς ὤλοντο, καὶ ἐν τοῖσιν μένεν ἀρχή
 † ἐς δ' ὤλεσαντ' μεγάλην τε πόλιν λαόν τε δίκαιον.

Here I have taken the liberty of writing *φανερωθέντος* for the impossible *φανέντος* ἢ, since *κτίσις* is used without ἢ soon after in the duplicate lines 230, 245; and of marking *ἐς δ' ὤλεσαν* as especially corrupt.

The passage is not well put together; but surely it will not justify the vagueness of Friedlieb's abstract (*Oracula Sibyllina*, Leipzig, 1852, Introduction, p. xliii). The innocent notion that the "righteous people" had been the subject of the "stage-stamping" destroyer's muse (*ὅσους ὕμνησε δικαίως*, 151, *θεατροκοπῶν*, 142), will shew, if necessary, that the Sibyl has not suddenly gone off to Vespasian.

from the collapse of the world. We must suppose him to have expected (no doubt exaggerating its importance) that a party in league with the invader, the party denounced in Daniel, and for us exemplified by Josephus, would declare itself sooner or later, and constitute the "defection" (*ἀποστασία*, 2 Th. ii. 3) which was to be the signal of the end;* that by its aid Vespasian would crush both his Roman and his Jewish antagonists, and the Holy City and the Holy of Holies would be violated by the actual "presence" of Nero, as they were to have been violated by the symbolical presence of his insane precursor: Nero would usurp the ancient seat of the glory of God,—thus finally unveiling the mystery of lawlessness,—to be consumed by the appearing of another Power. In a few months, sooner than Saint Paul expected, and no thanks to any "defection," the Roman antagonist was disposed of; and in a year the Holy City was destroyed—destroyed with a fearful destruction; but the world went on, and Anti-christ was not come. This was the fact: how was it to be dealt with? One way was to ignore it, and assume that things had turned out as they ought to have done; this seems to have been the way of the poor Pseudosibyl just referred to. Another way was to postpone the announced event, to postpone it and postpone it as the course of time falsified announcement after announcement; this has been the way of a series of fortune-tellers from that day to this. Saint Paul did neither of these things; he seems to have abandoned the pursuit of the ignis fatuus, and yet to have looked not less earnestly, but more earnestly, for the unveiling of Christ; thereby, it should seem, distinguishing himself from most of those who have ever been strongly attracted by the phantasmagoric element in religion.

If so, a touch is added to the portrait of the apostle. This would be the best result of our inquiry—better than the rectification of whole columns of dates.

C. J. MONRO.

* By the *ἀποστασία*, says Baur (p. 359), "nichts anderes verstanden werden kann, als dasselbe, was die Apocalypse (xiii. 4, 8, 12, 14 f) beschreibt, das abgöttische *προσκυρεῖν*, das dem auftretenden Antichrist von der ganzen ihm zufallenden und anhängenden unglaublichen Welt erwiesen wird." This defines, no doubt, the party to which defection was to be made. But *ἀποστασία* would necessarily be from the ranks of *Gläubige* of some sort.

VII.—CHRISTIANITY AND MODERN SCEPTICISM.

Christian Theology and Modern Scepticism. By the Duke of Somerset, K.G. London. 1872.

The Problem of the World and the Church reconsidered, in Three Letters to a Friend. By a Septuagenarian. London. 1871.

THE works named above are less remarkable in themselves, than as shewing the different modes in which the same problems present themselves to and are stated by different minds, and as indications of a spirit which is abroad within and without the churches,—a “questioning spirit,” which demands eagerly that its questions shall either be answered or admitted honestly to be as yet unanswerable. Partial or untrue replies this spirit will not tolerate. The two books give their *raison d’être* in very similar terms :

“For many years past religious questions have incessantly interfered with the social and educational improvement of the community.”*

“In reflecting on the condition of man in this life, it is impossible not to be struck with the large amount of privation and suffering which are the lot of the great mass of mankind. . . . I was naturally led to consider what had been the influence of the Church in this matter.”†

The conclusion is unfavourable to the influence of the Church in all its phases, and to that of “our National Church” in particular.

So with regard to the objection, which is sure to be brought against all such discussions as are thus introduced, that men’s minds will be disturbed, the Duke says : “Every Protestant may exercise his private judgment, and inquiry cannot easily make matters worse;”—the Septuagenarian, that “few persons would be likely to read the Letters whose minds were not unsettled already.”‡

Both books are hopeful, though not quite in equal degree, about the future. The last chapter in “Christian Theology” is headed, “A Glimpse of better Days,” which are mainly of better days to come by increased education.

* Christian Theology, p. v.

† World and the Church, p. vi.

‡ P. vi.

"A large portion of the people will, it is hoped, be better educated. Their opinions will then approximate to the views now prevalent amongst the cultivated classes of society."* This is, being interpreted, "Every cultivated person will surely come to think like me, the cultivated Duke of Somerset, K.G." Our other writer more modestly says: "To such persons I am not without hope that the views which I have suggested may have the effect in some degree of relieving their present perplexity, by shewing that if . . . they should be compelled to abandon a creed . . . no longer in harmony with the age, they may still find that all is not barren, and that there remains an ample field for the exercise of our highest faculties, our noblest virtues and our holiest affections."†

Each of the writers ranges freely over the whole of orthodox theology, examines it as he can, and finds it untrustworthy; each is especially dissatisfied with the doctrine of the plenary inspiration of the Scriptures, rejects summarily "the two great miracles" which "lie at the foundation of orthodox Christianity—the miraculous conception and the resurrection;" each is very angry with St. Paul, against whom the Duke of Somerset has an especial grudge. Both, we imagine, would on the whole agree with the tone of thought pursued by this Review, and write on what would be called the liberal side; neither do we differ from either widely in the general results of their thought, though we are not always in agreement in details: we have by no means always reached the same results in the same way, nor do we draw identical conclusions from the same premisses. And we notice the books far less for their merits, than because they afford us occasion to say something about various matters on which they touch, though it is fair to say that both are well worth reading. They are, however, so different, that each separately demands a few words.

The Duke of Somerset, feeling, as we feel, "that the theology of former ages cannot be permanently maintained," gives a "condensed" outline of reasoning on various matters, and the "points at issue are compressed into short chapters." They are indeed. "The only visible solution" of Scripture difficulties is contained in a chapter of just

* *Christian Theology*, p. 178.† *World and the Church*, p. vi.

twenty lines. The result is a collection of smart, telling paragraphs, in which all things which vex the earnest student are summed up and dismissed, as was the condition of the army and navy by the same epigrammatist in the House of Lords. The epigrams glitter like diamonds, but the danger is, that if any of them are found to be paste, the true jewels are discredited. Harm is done to the cause of progressive theology, if what is assailed is assailed on false grounds, or with insufficient scholarship. It is an obvious remark, and one scarce open to contradiction, that the Greek original, and not the English version, ought to be the source of all arguments founded on the New Testament; and it must surely be carelessness of no ordinary kind which can betray an educated writer into slips like the following.

"The beautiful prayer associated with his (Jesus) name, says in simple words, 'Lead us not into temptation,' thus leaving no place for the evil spirit."* A glance at the Greek ἀπὸ τοῦ πονηροῦ would surely have served to shew that the matter is not quite so simple as this, and that it is extremely probable, to say the least of it, that Jesus taught his disciples to pray, "deliver us from the evil one." And a similar glance at the celebrated words διὰ τῆς τεκνογονίας would have saved him from perpetuating a blunder of our translators, though it would have obliged him to sacrifice a flippant little epigram at St. Paul's expense. We are in doubt whether to attribute to a mere slap-dash way of writing or to ignorance, that Agbarus, the legendary king of Edessa, is here called Agbarus.

The word "person" and its derivatives appear to present some difficulties to the dual mind. "So long as Christians believed in the *personification* of evil."† Personality is, we imagine, what is here meant. Again: "The belief in the *impersonation* of evil" has "now passed away."‡ This also is apparently used as a synonym for personality. Again: "A still more astonishing revelation is made in the Apocrypha respecting the *impersonation* of wisdom. This mysterious *personification* is alluded to in other books, but," &c. Here both words are seemingly used as synonyms of each other, and perhaps again of personality, which cer-

* Christian Theology, p. 106.

† Ibid., p. 11.

‡ Ibid., p. 108.

tainly is a strange use of the former of the two. It would have been well that the writer had remembered his own words, "Precision of speech is essential to accurate reasoning."*

Precision of grammar is equally important with precision of terms. We do not know what to make of the following passage: "Faith is gradually losing her empire over the mind; whole provinces have been wrested from her dominion, and her authority is becoming daily less secure. There is, however, one unassailable fortress to which she may retire—faith in God."† Who is *she*? How is faith to retire to faith? What is meant is, that the mind may retire into faith in God, at least so we suppose; but the passage is hopeless in its confusion.

So much for the book itself, which if it were not so pretentious and sententious, and were more worked out in detail and less dogmatic, would be more valuable. It is of use now, but only as a straw flung up to shew which way the wind of thought is blowing.

There is less to say about the "World and the Church," of which a short and favourable notice has already appeared in our pages. The style is altogether smooth and pleasant; the book is attractive, whether we agree or disagree. The author is well up in all modern thought; and in a book which bristles with quotations shews age in perhaps only one particular. The only living poets quoted are Tennyson and Longfellow, the latter only once; while in prose writings the author is quite up with the newest lights. And he *does* quote Dryden, Southey and Barbauld, of whom few of this generation know more than the names. When we, Review or writer, have passed our 70th year, may we be as free from twaddle, and have grown as much with the growing intelligence of the times!

And now to turn to some of those many questions which, as these pages shew us, are agitating the minds of men, the shallow and the deep, the well-read and the ill-read, the serious and the flippant. Foremost among them would seem to be the authority of Scripture. Professional theologians, whether lay or clerical, such as are more or less all teachers and preachers of every denomination, all habitual

* Christian Theology, p. 112.

† Ibid., p. 147.

students, and the readers of this and kindred publications, are no longer greatly troubled about the inspiration of the Bible. The orthodox of all schools have decided once for all that it is, or is to be taken as, the word of God, and quote it as such, with little conscious discrimination of any different value in its different parts. They would seem to have entered on a tacit agreement to keep out of sight the objections to either theory of infallible inspiration in the letter or in the writer. But that from Scripture there is no appeal, is plainly the standpoint of orthodox teachers. To the professional theologian, again, who has once for all decided that he will not swear to the words of any master, his own standpoint is equally clear. He does not often use the word inspiration at all, but if he use it does not count it as denoting any quality of biblical writings or writers as such or alone. It is to him simply another term for religious genius; he allows it to some writers of the Bible and denies it to others, claims it also for many writers out of the Bible, and would not admit the existence of any absolute test of such a quality. Cultivation of the religious sense may do somewhat to bring men to an agreement, just as cultivation of the poetic faculty helps much towards a classification of great poets; but, when all is said and done, definitions will vary, and the places of those who possess such high qualities will be different according to different minds.

Both these classes of professional theologians write and speak as though they fully believed, and for the most part they honestly do believe, that all to whom they preach, for whom they write, with whom they come in contact, think with them. Each party knows there is another view, but has no doubt that if that be not taken, their own at once must be. That people can be long in perplexity, never occurs to them, because it is very difficult to realize that others have not always the same means of making up their minds as those whose attention has been, through choice or officially, specially directed to the matter. It is therefore extremely interesting and valuable to find these indications that there is really a vast mass of persons, as we suppose, represented by such different writers, who, shaken in the old opinions about inspiration, are only now feeling their way quite tentatively towards a bolder flight.

For instance, it is obvious that extremely few people now believe in Satanic possession or interposition; and so "this altered condition of belief constrains every thoughtful man to consider how far the Gospel narratives can be implicitly accepted as of divine authority, or even as historical truth."* Again of certain difficulties presented by the supposed fact that the old Law, if divinely given, required the Jews to put Jesus to death, it is said: "A deeper search, or a more enlarged view of religious truth, will furnish a solution, even if it should necessitate the rejection of statements supposed to be divinely inspired."† So also: "The conflict between the teaching of the Old and the New Testament has sorely perplexed divines; things being tolerated in the old Law which are positively forbidden in the New Testament. It has been attempted to get over this difficulty by supposing the revelation to have been gradual. . . . This is a simple and satisfactory explanation of the apparently contradictory views of the Deity in the earlier and later portions of the Hebrew Scriptures, if we suppose the Bible written by fallible men; but it is fatal to the notion of its being inspired throughout by divine intelligence."‡

Thus difficulties which are to the orthodox as good as non-existent because they will not see them, and really non-existent to those who frankly reject all notion of any difference in kind between the Biblical and other documents, are a great perplexity to minds which hold that there can be any middle view. And those, as we think, are responsible for this state of things who use language which is vague and misleading, who talk of the "human element in divine records," and "the Holy Spirit speaking with the tongues of men." Plain words are wanted on the part of teachers; for however true it is that the laity are, equally with the clergy of all denominations, a part of the church; however true that the former are just as capable of forming an opinion, provided they have the same data, it is none the less true that there is, and always will be, a class of men who give these matters their professional attention. It is for them to consider,—Had the lawgivers of the Old

* *Christian Theology*, p. 17.† *Ibid.*, p. 40.‡ *World and the Church*, p. 121.

Testament any divine aid which the English Parliament has not? Had the biographers of Jesus any divine aid which a modern biographer has not, waiving the discussion whether the writers had or had not personal knowledge of their subject? Had St. Paul any divine aid which now the writer of a theological treatise or pastoral letter has not? Were he or St. Stephen more assisted in their speeches than one now-a-days falsely accused of heresy, if such an one there be, before the Privy Council? It is quite fair that non-professional thinkers should ask us this question, and that we should give our opinion. However answered categorically, perplexity to a large extent is diminished or disappears; but there is *no* answer, as it seems to us, possible which involves *yes and no*. We are sincerely obliged to these writers for shewing us that plain speaking is needed on this matter of inspiration.

The want of plain speaking on this and many other subjects may be thought inevitable in a time of transition, and no doubt there is a real temptation to all preachers to use ambiguous language which may, it is thought, bridge over the gulf between discordant opinions. We could name more than one accomplished person whose utterances, e.g., on miracles and the marvellous in Bible history seem veiled in a studied ambiguity of language, in which the orthodox will scarce discover a tinge of liberalism, while the liberals will be able to read between the lines of orthodoxy.

An equally lame attempt is made to reconcile Science and Scripture, not indeed by the use of doubtful terms, but by glossing over the antagonisms, and by assuming that when both are more studied all seeming contradiction will disappear, because, God having spoken both in the Bible and in Nature, it is impossible He can contradict Himself. To say this is of course to assume that man's part is as little in the Bible as it is in Nature, and that what at least has passed through the mind of man is as purely divine as that which is wholly outside man.

From these facts have resulted two evils, both of which are evident in the works under consideration. The one is, that it is assumed that all who disagree with the current theology are in formal disagreement with the creed of the Church. "What can be more striking than the utter an-

tagonism between the views of creation and of the origin of life recorded in the first chapter of Genesis, *and forming part of the orthodox creed of the Church*, and those propounded and discussed by the leading men of science of the day?"* The other evil follows, that there is a growing distrust of the teachers of almost all sects, as being either ignorant or wilfully concealing their convictions. With the charge of ignorance brought against the orthodox, we are not greatly concerned, though we think that, as against their leaders, it is untrue. These have no doubt considered the whole series of questions at issue, and decided deliberately. It is for them, however, to meet the charge, if they care to do so. Neither should we greatly care to defend the existence of a clergy as such, because the very existence of men set apart for definite religious service tends to the keeping alive the notion of a magic sacredness in the priestly office, even in churches which would seem least in danger of any such superstition. But as till all men study the laws of health, and make themselves thoroughly and practically acquainted with anatomy, there will be need of medical men, so till they will for themselves study theology and a practical experience of the conduct of public devotion, ministers will be in demand. And it is and must be a misfortune if liberal men in any church must seem to be of necessity untrue either to the standards of their church or to their own convictions. The liberal clergy of the Church of England are of course those on whom falls the gravest suspicion of this alternative disloyalty; but it is not fair that they should bear the whole burthen. True, that they, and they only, of Protestant ministers, recite daily, or at least weekly, forms which are considered by a growing number of persons open to great exceptions, such as the Creed and the Doxology. But it should not be forgotten that the same Creed lies at the root of all systems of theology held in the great majority of Christian churches, whose standards form a body of doctrine more definite and rigid than the Articles themselves; that nearly all ministers of the orthodox sects have pledged themselves to those standards; that the Doxology itself in its rimerd form is held to be the fitting conclusion of

* *World and the Church*, p. 17.

almost every Nonconformist meeting. The difference is, that while in the case of the minister of other churches, these documents are just as binding, but may be thrust out of sight and forgotten, as no doubt are the Articles by the great majority of established clergy, the minister of the Church of England who may be devoted to liberal principles has constantly, and with increasing force, the question put before him, whether he can in any sense whatever use words into which he fully admits he would not himself cast his mature convictions.

That various views will continue to be held about the honesty of such persons, we do not doubt. But at least all may make it clear that in contradicting popular theological opinion, they do not necessarily contradict the standards by which they are bound; all liberals may endeavour to shew they do not hold the natural science which was formulated by early Jews. And all may make it honestly and clearly plain how and why they use words whose meaning is partially lost for them, and why they remain where they would not now have placed themselves. It is, no doubt, often a hopeless attempt to put new wine into old bottles; but it may seem to some equally wasteful and foolish to throw away those bottles while yet some wine remains in them, useful and wholesome, for the sustenance of those who as yet refuse to drink the new wine or use the new bottles. On this point the Septuagenarian has some kindly words, written with special regard to the clergy of the Establishment; though they are, as we have said, in part applicable to others also.

“They probably view the matter something in this way: The Church is there with its vast organization for good, if properly directed; wisely or unwisely they have become its ministers; and they are there to make the best of it. They may reasonably think that their chances of bringing about useful reforms are greater if they continue in the service of the Church than if they quit it. They may conscientiously believe that they serve the cause of religion and humanity better by retaining their position in the Church, shutting their eyes to its imperfections, and dwelling only on what is good in it. This good they wish to preserve along with the old and venerable associations which make the Church so powerful. They see very vividly the evils of any sudden and violent disruption of the Church system;

and they are willing to make some sacrifice of consistency, rather than incur the risk of encountering those evils. Many of them probably feel strongly that the old dogmatic system of the Church is no longer suited to the religious wants of the age, and desire nothing more than to let it fall quietly into disuse, if only their over-zealous and less discreet brethren in the Church would allow it to do so." *

We do not endorse the whole of this, but quote it as a specimen of what may be said on this matter by some who view the situation *ab extra*.

The dissatisfaction with dogmatic theology which finds so considerable expression in the feelings of our authors, is not with them confined, nor is it confined with society at large, to the words of modern writers and preachers. The position of Paul in Christianity would seem greater at the present moment than it has ever been before; and this is evidenced equally by the attacks made on him, such as that by M. Renan; by defences such as that of Mr. Arnold; by the position given to his theology, whether truly comprehended or not, in the Calvinistic churches, and the place he occupies in the "Calendrier Positiviste." To go into the question of his teaching and character would be to retrace the ground already occupied in a recent examination of Mr. Arnold's book. We will only say that the tendency to undervalue St. Paul, here exhibited and shared by so many, appears to arise from a complete misconception. Even those who most have shaken off the belief that the apostles were different to other men, who are ready to criticise their logic and cross-examine their testimony, yet judge them as they judge no other men, and insist on considering illustration as argument and metaphor as statement of fact. It is surely to deal with him as no other writer would be treated, to suppose that when he quotes a Jewish tradition he therefore endorses it. "In his First Epistle to the Corinthians, x. 4, he does not hesitate to state (on the authority probably of some Jewish tradition), that the Rock of Horeb, out of which Moses struck water, followed the Israelites in their wanderings, and supplied them with water." † We open at haphazard a little volume of sermons by a man of advanced liberal opinions,

* World and the Church, p. 29.

† Ibid., p. 166.

and find, "Just as the Israelites longed for the flesh-pots of Egypt, and were answered by a surfeit of quails, which fell in heaps till they bred a pestilence in the camp; so," &c. Are we bound to think this writer either dishonest, or ready to endorse all the legends of the wandering? Surely, too, the following passage is most unfair: "Thus while at one time he (St. Paul) describes the devil as the god of this world, he elsewhere asserts that the earth is the Lord's and the fulness thereof."* There need be no real contradiction in the English version, there is certainly none in the Greek, which in the former passage is τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου; but the Duke of Somerset has, according to his wont, looked only at the English version. We may fully admit that St. Paul was wanting in some of the characteristics of the modern mind; that his allegories did not always run smoothly; that his ratiocination was sometimes false, his science at fault; even while we claim for him the highest place, save one, among the founders of Christianity, and assert that he was indeed the channel through which that religion was conveyed from the Eastern to the Western intellect. He only of the early workers in the Christian society was able to see that not only must that religion act on the world, but the world on it: in applying the moving force of the life that was lived in Galilee to the lives of other men, there was need of extreme variety in the modes of its manifestation. That he saw the enormous change which must take place in all he had held dear, in the Christianity of the earlier apostles and in the religious views of men, and did not shrink from the change; did not fear that Christianity would break as it expanded, or that true faith would quit humanity if false ideas were discarded;—in this consisted the real greatness of Paul.

Since that earliest day in which Christianity began to expand, and prove its adaptability to a state of things in which it had not arisen, the same phenomena have often occurred. They have lost their strangeness; they do not need the same greatness of soul to meet them. When the Teutonic nations were absorbed, with their mythology, superstitions and manners, into the Church; when the Roman empire finally fell; when Western Christendom was ori-

* Christian Theology, p. 106.

ginally settled or further defined ; when in the Crusades it came into collision with Islam ; at the revival of letters, at the Reformation, at the dawn of physical science, and now in its broader morning,—the old questions were and are asked, Will Christianity bear the influx of new ideas, or will it break down under the weight ; will it shew itself as an underlying principle of religion, or is it a fixed and definite scheme, which, like all forms, becomes after a time outworn ?

“ I pretend not,” says Dean Milman,* “ to foretel the future of Christianity ; but whosoever believes in its perpetuity (and to disbelieve it were treason against its Divine Author, apostasy from his faith) must suppose that by some providential law it must adapt itself, as it has adapted itself with such wonderful versatility, but with a faithful conservation of its inner vital spirit, to all vicissitudes and phases of man’s social, moral, intellectual being.” But it is worth consideration that we deal with the problem in a manner very different to that of the great apostle. Dean Milman says again, and his words are quoted with cordial approval by the Septuagenarian : “ As it is my own confident belief that the words of Christ, and his words alone (the primal, indefeasible truths of Christianity), shall not pass away, so I cannot presume to say that men may not attain to a clearer, at the same time more full and comprehensive and balanced, sense of those words than has as yet been generally received in the Christian world.”† It is here assumed, and the same assumption is constantly made by others, that we have or can get at the *ipsissima verba* of Christ ; and that these and the facts of his life once ascertained, we have a religion sufficient for all needs underlying all superficial changes. And with the great majority of people, the search for truth, far more than joy at destruction, explains the interest taken in the many lives of Jesus which have of late years been given to the world.

But suppose we believe, with the great and increasing majority of those who have given their close attention to the subject, that the Jesus of the fourth Gospel, and, by consequence, the discourses of the fourth Gospel, are far less

* Latin Christianity, Vol. VI. p. 442.

† Ibid., p. 447.

historical than is the Jesus of the Synoptics; suppose, again, which is surely conceivable, that the draft of the Sermon on the Mount in St. Matthew, with its blessing on the poor in spirit and on those that hunger after righteousness, is less authentic than the version of St. Luke, which seems to reflect a something of that writer's strong socialistic class feeling,—need we therefore think that these represent less of the spirit of true Christianity, because they are less in accordance with the temporal facts out of which that Christianity grew? No. If the ascertained events of the life of Christ were far fewer than even now they seem to be; if the miraculous element fade utterly, and but faint echo of the words which were spoken as never man spake can fall upon our ear, still Christ will remain, and largely the Christ of the fourth Gospel, as a sacred figure of idealized manhood, in which the human is transfigured to divine, which the noblest and best men will strive to imitate. “Come what may of the possibility of critical verification, the divine image furnished by the life of Christ is now secured to the soul of Christendom, presides in secret over its moral estimates, directs its aspirations and inspires its worship.”*

This, as it seems to us, is what St. Paul meant in his memorable declaration, that though he had known Christ after the flesh, yet thenceforth he would know him no more. It was the ideal perfection which had attached itself to the real life of Jesus of Nazareth which henceforward he would contemplate, rather than the details of that earthly career, no doubt far better known to him than ever it can be to us or those who come after us. Of it, that earthly life, it has been truly said,

“What keeps a spirit wholly true
To that ideal which he bears?
What record? *Not the sinless years*
That breathed beneath the Syrian blue.”

But the pattern which found its truest realization in Jesus, the typical Christ, is independent in large measure of any human accidents, and aspiration towards that ideal is the union with Christ which makes a man a new creature. And believing that the way of St. Paul and Mr. Martineau is a truer escape from difficulty than that of Dean Milman

* Rev. J. Martineau, as quoted in the “World and the Church.”

and M. Renan, we are not greatly troubled by points which exercise the minds of many, and which are forcibly put in both the books before us. It need be no shock to us to find that we are deviating from the literal observance of the precepts of Jesus,—even supposing we have them correctly handed down,—in upholding the principles of political economy as against almsgiving ; there need be no inducement to favour Monachism, which, as Dr. Newman once shewed in a famous sermon, was in close accordance with many of the precepts of Jesus, if once we get clearly into our minds that Christianity is for us the fullest realization of the highest ideal of humanity known to each age, rather than an attempt to reproduce in later times a life which can be but imperfectly known, and to live in accordance with precepts which can be but imperfectly recorded. But certain noblest qualities, which can be exhibited in all ages and under all circumstances, will remain as the distinguishing “notes” of the church founded by Jesus and developed by St. Paul,—an eager desire to know and do the will of God, a bitter hatred of all falsehood, a passionate love for men, a self-sacrifice which knows no bounds, shrinks from no martyrdom, a trust in God which failure cannot crush, a hopefulness which refuses to believe that death is the end of all things, and an inward peace, though all without be dark and stormy.

The Duke of Somerset has a chapter, somewhat longer than is his wont, in which he recapitulates the main propositions of his little book, and with these propositions we on the whole agree. Then, in a further chapter, he observes: “Such notions, it will be said, lead to a vague, indefinite, colourless Christianity, and leave the Protestant without a creed.”* And no doubt it is asserted that such a religion as we have sketched is declared by many to be not Christianity at all, but Theism, and those who hold such views are urged by friends and foes alike to give up the older name for the newer, as though they were sailing now under false colours. And if indeed the name of Christian necessarily implied much which has sometimes been taught under the name, if we must use it, as do some Catholics, as synonymous with Romanist, or, as do the Plymouth Brethren, as involving the doctrines of election and reprobation,

* *Christian Theology*, p. 169.

we should do well to abandon it, in the spirit of the great Teacher who said, "Call no man your father upon the earth, for one is your Father which is in heaven." But since all Theists have arrived at their Theism through some agency and leading, other than the immediate intuitions of their own minds; since it was no shame to the Jew that he called himself the child of Abraham; since we have undoubtedly learned all that is most precious to us through the system which bears the name still so dear to us, and since in this name meet many phases of faith which without this name would trend far more widely asunder,—we may surely cling to the other half of the same passage, "One is your Master, even Christ, and all ye are brethren." To cast down the ladder by which we have reached all that is most precious to us, is at once an ungrateful and a useless proceeding. The same argument applies, with of course a somewhat diminished force, to such of us as are still within the confines of the dogmatic Churches; even the very forms which now may be an embarrassment were once an aid. And sometimes they have grown dear to us, if not absolutely necessary, as a strong man will, for very habit's sake, often choose to carry a stick on which long since he has ceased to lean.

How far, if at all, the Churches will aid religion in the future remains to be seen. They and the teachers in them are now on their trial. The books we have considered here serve to shew at least two things: that there is still a need of technical theologians, even with a laity cultivated up to the point reached by Dukes, though these technical teachers must expect and demand to be sharply criticised; and, secondly, this yet more, that if any man will be bold and true, will study and think and speak out, will strive to shew that in breaking with the superstitions of the past there is no need to break with the faith of the past, there will be ever an earnest and reverent few to encourage and help him, from among those who are obliged to reconsider the problems presented by the world and the church.

C. KEGAN PAUL.

VIII.—DRUNKENNESS AND LEGISLATION.

Five Speeches on the Liquor Traffic: delivered since the Session. By G. O. Trevelyan, M.P. London: Partridge and Co.

A REMARKABLE change has passed over what may be familiarly called the 'Teetotal' controversy. It has emerged from a social and entered a political phase. The warfare against drunkenness and its attendant evils was formerly waged in detail, from heart to heart, from will to will: the nation now, by the strong help of legislative enactment, is to be made sober in the mass. Men who were once looked upon as harmless fanatics, at worst a hindrance to good fellowship, and the fair mark for convivial sarcasm, are a thorn in the side of candidates, who anxiously ask whether they shall throw in their lot with the total abstainers or the publicans, or meditate whether it may not be possible to conciliate one party without hopelessly alienating the other. For the natural result of the political action of the United Kingdom Alliance has been the organization, under pressure of fear and self-interest, of the brewers and the publicans, and the formation of a powerful party whose programme is all comprised in the single word 'beer.' And though a Licensing Bill was actually brought forward in the last, and is promised for the present Session of Parliament, we cannot help thinking that the question will remain open for some time to come. The opposition to any decisive interference with the liquor trade is only just waking up to a consciousness of its own strength. There seems to be a general persuasion among politicians that the question is not one with which any government will care to deal, with the near prospect of a possible appeal to the country. And the first result which follows the transference of a question from the arena of social agitation to that of serious political conflict, is a sharp scrutiny of all the principles involved in its proposed settlement; a scrutiny which, though it seems to delay, in reality first makes possible the final issue. What the so-called 'Permissive Bill' really meant was a matter of comparatively little consequence, so long as it could be counted among the crotchets which well-meaning enthusiasts are always seeking to em-

body in legislation. But it assumes quite another aspect when it becomes, however remotely, a political possibility.

But before we proceed to discuss the question in its present shape, we have a word to say of the old Teetotalers and their methods of action. They have borne the brunt of some just, and far more unjust obloquy. They were men of one idea. They were in some degree obnoxious to the charge of summing up all virtue in the one negative merit of not drinking. They were singularly incapable of seeing any other side of the controversy than their own, and reluctant to admit that a true zeal for human welfare might exist outside of their own ranks. They pushed their theory to extremes, which repelled men of finer taste and less one-sided philanthropy: they endeavoured to pledge the Bible to a theory which it contradicts. But all these were the errors of a genuine and noble enthusiasm, the excesses of an ardour in itself infinitely to be preferred to the cool indifference to a terrible form of human weakness and misery against which it dashed itself. We have a lively recollection of one or two pioneers of total abstinence thirty years ago; and we must confess that while time and deeper reflection have softened down much that then appeared to us unlovely and even laughable, they have brought out in sharper relief the essential strength and purity of character that lay beneath. At that time, men had not meddled much with physiological theories about alcohol. They had not found out that the wine at the marriage-feast of Cana was the unfermented juice of the grape. What they knew and felt, with an intensity all the more remarkable for the unconsciousness of the fact which surrounded them, was that drunkenness was sapping the springs of manliness, ruining the happiness of homes, bringing young men to dishonoured graves, making the lives of noble and self-denying women one long-drawn torment. And to the heat of their Christian love it was a light thing if by their own voluntary and rigid abstinence from even innocent indulgence, they could strengthen the bias of any irresolute will towards self-control, or by the force of friendly example establish a wavering intention to good. Their argument—one not easy for the earnest Christian to withstand—was all shut up in Paul's words, "It is good neither to eat flesh, nor to drink wine, nor anything

whereby thy brother stumbleth, or is offended, or is made weak." Their method—which was Christian at its very heart—was self-denial, not for its own sake, but for the common good, and especially for the good of the weakest. They had a hard battle to fight against social ridicule and contempt: men not wholly coarse misconceived and laughed at them; and the usual result followed, that they drew back within themselves, pursuing their end with a more exclusive devotion, and going about their labour of sympathy in an ever narrowing spirit. But they were only a little before their age, and the revenges of time have soon manifested themselves on their side. They were the first to discern in its true light the evil which all their efforts have not availed to hinder from undermining the strength of the national character. And if the comparative fruitlessness of their efforts seems to shew that they had only in part divined the true plan of resistance, the force of public opinion which is now rising in stern resolution to abate the unbearable evil, is chiefly due to their perseverance in denouncing wrong, and their patience in enduring obloquy.

To those who have bestowed any attention upon the subject, it will seem unnecessary that we should attempt to demonstrate the magnitude of the evil, or to estimate its social and economical results. Perhaps there is another class of readers who would meet any effort of this kind on our part with a half-concealed contempt of teetotal statistics, as either based upon fundamental exaggerations, or capable of being manipulated to bring out any result. The truth is, that no array of figures, however plausible, will convince those who, from happy circumstance, or lack of imagination, or the subtle pleadings of self-interest, fail to realize the facts that life will supply. Men, after all, think most of what meets their own eyes. A Peer, a Chairman of Quarter Sessions, a Cabinet Minister, who when on a journey lives in an hotel, or has a public-house or two on his estate, not too near his park gates, bids us beware of interfering with the habits of Englishmen, who are not a set of sour and morose fanatics, and thinks that if the liquor trade is to be legislated for at all, it ought to be in the direction of setting it free from all excise restrictions. But a City Missionary, who lives in the perpetual sight of drunken women and neglected children, and families settling

down into depths of savagery; who finds all his efforts thwarted by this one vice, in the fruitless struggle with which he is spending his strength and giving his life for naught,—cannot look at the matter from such a philosophic eminence and in so calm a light: he will fight the foe with any weapon; and his temptation is to catch at any remedial scheme, no matter how wild and preposterous. This contrast, though actual, is extreme; but its principle is universally applicable. Men who live away from the great centres of population, or who are immersed in literature, or who have none but commercial interests, or who, it must be added, have theological passions too hot, or human sympathies too slow, for benevolence, estimate the evil lightly, and are little touched with the social shame and obligation. Even our great cities are no longer wholes, but collect round one centre incongruous populations: it is easy to live in a fashionable suburb of London or Liverpool, and know nothing of the mass of poverty and vice that seethes and festers eastward and northward. But to those who are compelled to come face to face with the facts, this matter of drunkenness is becoming more and more the great question of the day. It is possible to exaggerate its power of breeding crime, but not to state too largely its efficacy in producing poverty. It is easy to ascribe it to insufficient causes, or to seek to meet it by mistaken remedies, but difficult to over-estimate its success in fostering human wretchedness and degradation. There may be blacker sins, but none which stand so obstinately in the way of individual and social well-being. There may be deeper wrongs against the sanctities of domestic life, but none which bring after them so large a result of shame and misery. Of the whole host of social evils, this must be first attacked, if we are to entertain any hope of final victory. For habitual drunkenness means an enfeebled will, a dulled conscience, affections not strong enough to fight against a poor physical craving:—what chance has even the gospel with a weakened and embruted humanity?

It cannot be too clearly understood, that this question assumes a different aspect according to the chemical and physiological point of view from which we look at it. There are those who consider alcohol, in any quantity and under any disguise, as a poison, in the sense in which

prussic acid is a poison, and therefore, like prussic acid, to be taken only in carefully regulated doses, under medical advice. Such persons, if they carried out their principle to its logical consequence (as some of them do), would desire to restrain the sale of this among other poisons ; to put a stop to both the wholesale and retail trade, except so far as they were necessary for medical purposes ; to shut up not only the public-house, but the wine-merchant's cellar. In a word, they want to abolish drinking as well as drunkenness. Those, on the other hand, who think that "wine which maketh glad the heart of man" is a good gift of God and a lawful means of refreshment and exhilaration, will not only confine their efforts to the discouragement of drunkenness, without attempting to stop drinking, but even, so far as they go with the sterner ascetics, will be influenced by other motives and choose different methods. And this remark has a practical bearing upon the present state of the question. Outside the various associations which in one form or another are based upon the principle of total abstinence and prohibition, have grown up others, which aim, not at destroying, but at regulating the trade. Many excellent men, who may perhaps have given their adhesion to no formal programme, are anxious, for moral and social reasons, to throw their personal influence into the scale of sobriety. Cannot all these hosts be formed into a united army, and manœuvred towards a single end? We are constrained to answer, that so long as the fundamental difference of view, to which we have alluded, remains, this cannot be hoped for. The ultimate object is different, however eagerly all may strive towards the same near results. It is better and safer not to hide real divergence behind a cloud of friendly words, but to be satisfied with as much general concurrence as actually exists. The real danger is, lest advocates of entire prohibition should come to treat those whom they consider as half-hearted friends with less consideration than they are wont to shew to open foes. The partizans of the United Kingdom Alliance can hardly be expected to agree to a compromise with licensing reformers, which necessarily involves the abandonment of their characteristic principle ; but, on the other hand, they will be wise to accept as friendly, and to allow free expression and development to every form of protest against the trade as it is at present carried on.

So far as we are aware, no one except the brewers and the publicans is willing to leave matters in their present state. But when we come to ask what is to be done, the answer is threefold. Say some bold theorists, throw the trade entirely open, and treat it just as you would any other. On the contrary, reply the Permissive-Bill advocates, place the power of absolute prohibition in the hands of the majority of the ratepayers of a given district. And between these are a class of politicians, larger, perhaps, even though less eager, than either of the others, who believe that by modification of the licensing laws, and police supervision thoroughly carried out, the trade may be brought within legitimate limits, and the misery produced by drunkenness diminished to as great an extent as can be effected by legislation. And in what follows, we propose to give reasons which have satisfied our own mind that this middle course is the one which offers least practical difficulty, combined with the fairest prospect of good result.

Those, then, who wish to throw the trade entirely open, begin by denying the existence of a constant ratio between the number of places where drink is sold and the amount of drinking, and point to statistics which in their opinion support this view. Take, for instance, the following table, which compares the number of apprehensions for drunkenness in Liverpool during the last five years, with that of the public-houses and beer-houses actually doing business :

| | 1867 | 1868 | 1869 | 1870 | 1871 |
|-----------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Public-houses..... | 1881 | 1875 | 1888 | 1883 | 1903 |
| Beer-houses..... | 729 | 652 | 606 | 365 | 346 |
| Total | 2610 | 2527 | 2494 | 2248 | 2249 |
| Apprehensions for drunkenness ... | 11932 | 14451 | 18303 | 21113 | 19559 |

Thus, while the number of public-houses remains substantially the same, and the beer-houses have decreased one-half, the apprehensions for drunkenness are greater by 50 per cent. But to make these figures convincing, something more is necessary than merely to state them. We must know, first, that the number of persons arrested for drunkenness

in a particular town, may be accepted as a fair test of that town's want of sobriety. Surely it is a very familiar remark in regard to statistics of this kind, that an important factor in their production is afforded by the instructions given to the police, and that a little increase or relaxation of severity at head quarters will send the figures in this column of criminal returns up and down in a very remarkable way. And then, secondly, we should know whether any other causes were at work to increase or diminish drunkenness during the period to which reference is made. No one supposes that the multiplication of drinking-places is the sole cause of drinking, or that drinking would cease were they all shut up; still less would any reasonable person expect that habits which had been fostered through many generations, and which, notwithstanding the closing of these houses, can find the means of gratification at any street corner, should suddenly be transformed. It will be time enough to appeal to statistics when the policy of restricting licences has had as long a trial as the present plan; when its results can be estimated on an average of years; when a new generation, grown up under its influence, has replaced the old. Till then, it is more to the purpose to inquire whether, after all, there be not something in the nature of the trade itself which takes it out of the ordinary operation of the law of supply and demand.

But why not treat this trade like any other? At present it is a monopoly, and fastens upon the public all the characteristic evils of monopolies: its profits are unnaturally high; entrance into it is sought by every access of jobbery and intrigue; and the true interest of the customer—unadulterated liquor at a fair price—is the last thing thought of. Throw open the trade, and this state of things would cease, if not at once, yet before long; a healthy competition would set in; good beer would be the rule, not, as now, the exception; incompetent and dishonest publicans would have no chance; and the result would be less drunkenness, if not fewer drinking-places. But is, after all, even the boldest theorist quite prepared to put this business upon the same footing as any other? Because we must have no compromise here; no abandonment of the broad, clear ground of principle; no re-introduction of the idea of restriction by a side-wind. If licences are still to exist,

they must be mere devices to raise revenue, like licences to sell tea and tobacco; and their price must be determined only by the policy of the national exchequer. It will not do to say that any man who brings evidence of good character, and is in possession of suitable premises, shall be permitted to sell drink. Nobody inquires into the character of the village grocer, or inspects the front room of the cottage, when he puts a few jars into the window and fixes a deal counter by the door. We must face the possibility that it may turn out to be as profitable to sell a little home-brewed beer in every third or fourth cottage, as it seems to be now to vend sweetmeats and small wares in the intervals of domestic occupation. But not to insist upon the fact that the advocates of this view rarely go as far as this (desiring, we believe, for the most part, to preserve the magistrates' action, while laying down strict general rules for their guidance), they bring in the principle of restriction under another form in admitting the necessity of the severest supervision of the trade by the police. Is there, then, any great difference in principle between limiting a trade in its inception and surrounding it with regulations in its progress? We say nothing of the needless labour thus thrown upon the police; of their abstraction from other duties; of the danger of demoralization (with its consequent peril to the public) to which they will be needlessly exposed;—does not the very fact sufficiently prove that this trade cannot be treated like any other? It would be essential, to secure any supervision at all, to preserve to the police the power which they now have of unrestricted entrance to any house where drink is sold under licence;—is anybody prepared, or does anybody think it necessary, to extend that power to the case of the grocer who, equally under licence, sells coffee and snuff? Of course, under this new system, we are to have limitation of hours of sale: shall we have a parallel legislative enactment for the baker and the bookseller? Why should Acts of Parliament be necessary in the one case, while the other is left to public opinion? Or has any other trade like this a direct tendency to produce breaches of the public peace of which the law must take cognizance? The truth is, that even the so-called free-trader cannot frame his theory of the liquor trade without calling in the aid of 'regulation.' And regulation is

only restriction in another form and applied at a different stage.

What, then, precisely is it that differentiates this trade from every other which is engaged in supplying men's common wants? We cannot accept, we do not at this moment pause to state why we reject, the distinction which the total abstainer would draw sharply and without hesitation, that the trade, namely, is in its nature wholly unlawful, as the selling of poison is unlawful. Our argument is conducted upon the hypothesis that this trade, like any other, has a use; and we are quite ready to admit that every other trade has, like this, an abuse. But as we do not propose to shut up Fortnum and Mason's because reckless gourmands destroy their digestion, or Poole's because foolish boys run into debt for countless pairs of trousers, why should we interfere with the publican who intercepts an unreasonable proportion of the working man's wages? First, then, because this trade is one of which the abuse is very quickly and surely developed out of the use, and stands to it in quite a startling ratio; and, secondly, because it is a case in which legislation, imperial or municipal, may hope to interfere with some prospect of success. It is altogether beside the mark to make a practical comparison between any shop in which a legitimate trade is carried on—a tailor's, for example—and the corner gin-palace. In connection with the former, isolated instances of extravagance and folly will manifest themselves in the midst of a large and continuous supply of lawful needs; while in the latter, the abuses are the staple of the trade and the main source of the profit. What would become of the publicans of any large town if they were all at once confined to the purveying of 'the poor man's beer' for domestic consumption, and were cut off from feeding the growing passion for drink in children; from adding to the intoxication of men already bemused with beer; from selling the noggin of gin, which is in every conceivable case needless and shameful, to the self-indulgent wife; from serving out the fatal anodyne of forgetfulness to the prostitute? And these are precisely the things which regulation can touch. We have thoroughly learned in this century the utter futility of all sumptuary law: we cannot prevent men from giving and eating dinners which end in gout and gravel; or women

from running up milliners' bills which may half-ruin their husbands ; or working men, for that matter, from buying and consuming drink to excess—at home. But the simple reconversion of public-houses into what they once were, houses of entertainment, where drink was sold only or chiefly as the accompaniment of a meal, and the restriction within the narrowest limits of counters at which it is retailed simply for purposes of excitement or intoxication, would, we are convinced, have a most important effect upon sobriety, and all that sobriety will bring with it.

At the opposite pole of theory stand the advocates of what is called the Permissive Bill, which has more than once been introduced into the House of Commons by Sir Wilfrid Lawson, but has never yet succeeded in getting so far as the second reading. Its principle we understand to be this : The country is to be divided into districts, of size yet indeterminate ; and within each district the control of the liquor traffic is to be committed to the ratepayers, who, by a majority of two-thirds, may absolutely prohibit it. The details of the scheme are to be left for future consideration, so that these fundamental provisions be not touched. And its chief defences, as reiterated, almost *usque ad nauseam*, in the speeches of its advocates, are twofold : first, that the majority of the inhabitants have a right to put away this traffic from the midst of them, if they will ; and, secondly, that as many landowners have already exercised, with good social result, the autocratic power of this kind which the law gives them, it cannot be unreasonable or undesirable that the same power should be entrusted to communities.

We believe that the scheme only needs to be stated in a plain, straightforward way, to be rejected as inadmissible by all sober political thinkers. As a matter of fact, it very rarely is so stated ; the form in which it is invariably put by its advocates being, Have not the people a right to put away this intolerable nuisance from among *themselves* ? Ought they not to have the power of regulating *their own* life ? But to what extent this is a mere declamatory and *ad captandum* statement of the case, appears the moment we discern clearly that this Bill proposes to give two-thirds of the population of a given district the right of regulating in an important matter the life of the remaining third. In one word, the political principle upon which this legisla-

tion proceeds must be taken to be, that the rights of the majority over the minority are practically unlimited. If this Bill become law, it is difficult to see at what point any further resistance can be successfully made to the tyrannous will of the greater number. Of course it will be pleaded on the other side, that the sickness is one which requires this drastic remedy ; that for the removal of so great an evil, the partial surrender of liberty is not too large a price to pay. We do not yield to any advocate of this Bill in sorrow and indignation at the present drinking habits of the people, and the misery which they produce ; but we cannot believe that the way to a better state of things is through a violation of the fundamental principles upon which civilized society is built up. To one who believes that all noble ethics are founded on the freedom of the will, it seems the strangest dream to restore morality by sinning against liberty.

But it is alleged that many landowners already exercise this prohibitory power with excellent results, and it is asked, Why should not a majority of any community be entrusted with the same power? Would it not be more logical to inquire whether this power is one which ought to reside in owners of great estates, before taking for granted that it is desirable, and proposing to extend it? Surely all political thinkers who have any faculty of disentangling their minds from the actual prejudices of society, and of gaining some imaginative glimpse of the future, are convinced that the rights of property, and especially of landed property, are in England stretched to the hurt of the general good, and that nothing is more certain than the gradual recognition of the principle, that all land, in a country where every foot of soil has an owner, must be held under restrictions imposed by the State with reference to the common interest. We know a Welsh county where one nobleman perpetually adds estate to estate, building everywhere great walls to shut out, as far as he can, even the sight of the everlasting hills from the passer-by ; putting a gate, only to be opened by a sixpenny fee, at every water-fall ; fencing off the very heather, which is almost as guiltless of grouse as it is of pineapples, from the traveller's foot ; and throughout the whole of his vast and increasing domain ruling like an absolute monarch in the matter of

sites for churches and chapels and school-houses. We know a Nonconformist congregation in a midland county village, which dates back to the Revolution, and comprises in its members industrious, thoughtful, frugal, devout men which any community might be proud to count as citizens, which is being slowly, and without visible persecution, crushed out of life, because the neighbouring landowners have entered into a tacit combination to let no farms that fall vacant except to Churchmen. There is perhaps not a county, from Sutherlandshire to Cornwall, in which instances of this kind may not be found; instances of arbitrary and oppressive power exercised within the limits of the law, and from the circumstances of the case unrebuked, or ineffectually rebuked, by public opinion. And the question which we would ask those who so constantly adduce this analogy is: If this conduct is right, and ought to be imitated in regard to public-houses, can it be wrong in the case of Dissenting chapels? If the squire is to be praised for shutting up the Red Lion, can he be blamed for refusing a site for the Methodist meeting-house? The clergy of the province of Canterbury, whose evidence upon this subject is so often quoted, have probably an equal objection to both.

At what point is the power of the two-thirds over the life of the remaining third to be restrained? We think that, on the principles of the Permissive Bill, and in the spirit of the arguments by which it is defended, we could make out a good case for the suppression of Unitarian chapels; a case which, if it did not approve itself to the majority of the ratepayers of Birmingham or Manchester, might yet be convincing to two-thirds of those of an English, and much more a Scotch country-town, where the dead-level of Evangelicism had been for the first time disturbed by some adventurous missionary who had lectured in the town-hall and was meditating a permanent settlement. For what can be of more importance than the eternal welfare of the townsmen and their children? Surely fatal heresy must be as much worse than drunkenness, as eternity is longer than time. And if, even in this extreme case, it is dangerous for the public authorities to meddle with opinions—look at the moral consequences which must result from the toleration of Unitarianism! Morality is

founded upon dogma : to live well, men must believe truly ; and Pope's famous line must be read the other way, " He can't be right whose faith is in the wrong." There may indeed be produced, in connection with this heresy, a specious imitation of Christian morals ; but it is only the electro-plate which simulates the silver, and is the more dangerous the more perfect the delusion. Lord Blank, who holds all the land hereabouts, will grant no site at all to any Nonconformist society : why should he have a right which is not possessed by an ancient and respectable municipality ? It would be easy to find as many clergymen as have testified to the moral benefit of having no public-house in their villages, to bear witness to the equal advantage resulting from the absence of dissent ; and this, it must be remembered, is no common dissent, but precisely the most noxious and intolerable form of all. On the whole, we are afraid that if a general Permissive Bill were passed, empowering two-thirds of any community to prohibit anything they disliked in the life of the other third, it would go hard with Unitarian chapels in some towns, and all kinds of Dissenters in many villages, and everywhere with the little knot of men who think for themselves and lead public opinion, and represent the common belief of the next generation but one. Who knows whether in the universal crusade against crotchets in which the British Philistine with such encouragement might engage, the great principle of the infallibility of two-thirds might not be used to put down teetotal meetings ?

Some of the more obvious practical objections to this legislation have been so often urged, that we shall not enlarge upon them in these pages. There is the difficulty of what we may call geographical sobriety ; neither public-house, beer-shop or wine-merchant, on this side of an impalpable line ; and on that, the whole system flourishing with double vigour. There is the certainty that the most drunken places would be precisely the last to adopt a voluntary remedy. There is the impossibility of coercing the recalcitrant minority of a great city : one-third of the population of Liverpool or Glasgow is 200,000 souls—a city in itself. There is the fact, that if in such a city the requisite majority could by any means be attained, the stoppage of all public sale of liquor would leave behind it

an enormous mass of appetite for drink, demanding the gratification which an illicit trade would find it most gainful to supply, and which would add to drunkenness the new pleasure and the keener excitement of breaking the law. But a more general and even more cogent objection to legislation of this kind is, that it confounds the removal of temptation with the extirpation of vice. We do not dispute that the presence of temptation is one element, and often a very important element, in the committal of a sinful act; and that in so far as it can be lessened or taken away, the probability of the sin is diminished; though even here we might be inclined to maintain that the entire abolition of any lawful means of gratifying a natural desire, will put the passion very eagerly on the scent for unlawful ones. We admit that the liquor trade, as at present carried on, surrounds the average working man with a persistency and seductiveness of temptation which he finds it almost impossible to resist; and we allow that in some cases even an enforced sobriety, inasmuch as it may lay the foundation of habits of abstinence, is better than a freedom which is only liberty to fall. But what is the moralist to think of a virtue which is at the mercy of temptation? We have been told stories of the paradisiacal peace and virtue of certain villages which fell into swift demoralization as soon as a public-house was opened; but it did not seem to strike the tellers of them how little nerve and strength there must have been in the goodness that was so soon and so easily debauched. If to take away temptation can be said very indirectly to add to a man's moral force, inasmuch as it may save him from the weakness which is part of the punishment of sin; on the other hand, it is only in conflict with temptation that any manly vigour can be won. An untried virtue is no virtue at all. It is an old story, that those who have been brought up out of sight and hearing of evil are the surest to go down in the first real conflict with it. Presently we may find that no voters are so open to intimidation as those who have most sheltered themselves behind the protection of the ballot-box; and that drunkenness may rage most fiercely among populations which have grown up in the enervating air of prohibition.

If, then, it is equally inexpedient to throw the liquor trade entirely open and to prohibit it, we are shut up to

the policy of restriction or regulation. The rationale of this policy we take to be, that the trade has within certain limits a public use, and therefore a right to existence; but that, as it is very apt to overpass these limits, and in so doing to become a nuisance, every precaution must be taken to keep it within them. The objections to the present method of securing this end are many and weighty. The magistrates who grant the licences rarely act upon any fixed principle, and the assumed standard of the requirements of the population varies from district to district. The exercise of their authority is peculiarly liable to be suspected of yielding to influence and intrigue, and in some cases at least is actually determined by these ignoble forces. But the great evil—that which lies at the foundation of the present difficulty in dealing with the subject—is the practical perpetuity of the licence. It is of no use to point out that in form it is only granted for one year, and that it is given to the person and not to the house. A system of transfer has grown up, converting a licence into a valuable property which, under the transparent veil of ‘good-will,’ is openly bought and sold. This transfer is so much a matter of course—it is so perfectly understood that a licence will not be forfeited except under very exceptional circumstances of offence—that one man of straw is boldly put up to succeed another in the management of a productive but disreputable business; and the personal responsibility to the law, which it is the very object of the licence to secure, is systematically evaded. But, in truth, a very large part of the present legislation, in regard to the regulation of the drink traffic, is a mere dead letter. Whether, as it stands, it needs to be more rigidly administered, or requires amendment in the direction of severity, is a question which we leave to those who are better acquainted with the state of the law than ourselves. But, to take only one fact, out of many that might be adduced, it is a disgrace to our civilization that in all our large towns public-houses which are the known haunts of thieves and prostitutes, and which are reported as such in municipal police statistics, should be permitted to exist, and to carry on their gainful and disgraceful traffic with almost complete impunity.

But, in truth, the system of licences is surrounded with immense practical difficulties. For its effect is to

create a lucrative monopoly. It is well understood in London and Liverpool and Manchester, that no trade is so profitable as this. It requires little or no capital beyond what is requisite for the purchase of the good-will; the brewer and the wine-merchant are accustomed—to taking, of course, their own precautions—to give ample credit. A publican needs no education, not even any manual skill; but only a somewhat callous conscience, a not very tender heart, and a power of abstaining from his own drink: with these qualifications, pecuniary success is rapid and certain. But this is not all, nor the worst. Behind the keeper of the beer-house or the gin-palace, who is often a mere agent, stands a capitalist who has discovered that this trade can be profitably worked on the large scale; who pulls indeed all the strings, but whom the law never sees and never touches; who has large investments in house property, in plant, in breweries, in importation of spirits, and contrives to make them all co-operate in the production of an enormous revenue. Does one of his managers—the landlord of the house, in the eye of the law and of the public—draw down upon himself the animadversion of the police? He is replaced by another, to whom the licence is transferred, and all goes on merrily as before. The real publican may sit on the bench of magistrates, to administer ‘40s. and costs’ to the poor wretches on whose drunkenness he has grown rich; and when the licensing day comes round, retire gracefully in favour of friends and associates in whose hands his interests are safe. Beer is so potent a persuasive at municipal elections, that he finds the access to town councils, with its result of direct power and indirect influence, not difficult. There is a well-known brewing interest in the House of Commons itself, which commands votes and has the ear of Ministries; much more is there in every constituency a large phalanx of publicans, able to put strong pressure on the lowest stratum of voters, resolute in the defence of their own interests, and now led, more or less openly, by men of a larger knowledge of the world and a subtler policy than themselves. And the sum of the whole is, that here is an enormous vested interest in the immorality and degradation of the people, which withstands eager reformers and timid statesmen alike in their efforts to remove this great evil, and declares that not a step shall be taken in the direc-

tion of better things without an enormous compensation to itself.

This, then, is the great difficulty in the way of restriction, that by diminishing the number of licences you make each one of them more valuable, and concentrate, if you do not absolutely increase, the force of the vested interest which is arrayed against reform. And it lies with those who would take this step to propose some concurrent measure which shall prevent the monopoly (if monopoly there must be) from remaining in one hand, and shall divert a part of its profits to the public exchequer.

This is not the place to sketch the outline of a Licensing Bill, nor are we disposed to accept the responsibility of so doing. It will be sufficient if we have indicated some of the difficulties which attend upon any of 'the short and easy methods' of dealing with this problem. But at least we may state our opinion that a new licensing authority, commanding greater public confidence and proceeding upon more definite principles than the present, is urgently needed, and that the ratepayers are entitled to a voice either in its election or in the revision of its action; and in the next place, that all licences should be strictly personal, issued for only one year, and not capable of transfer. Whether it would be possible to lay such a tax upon this trade, as at once to make it less attractive to capital and a large contributory to the public revenue, we leave to abler politicians to decide; it is enough to notice here that at Gothenburg this has been accomplished. Shorter hours of business, and on Sundays an almost entire closing, with the prohibition of any drinking upon the premises, are matters upon which all reformers are agreed. And in order that legislation should not end in good intentions, a much more efficient inspection than any which now exists must be made of all licensed houses, and the law put in force with impartial strictness.

But will restriction in any shape diminish drunkenness? That it will to a certain extent, is admitted, we think, by that very large class of persons who are in favour of shorter hours. It cannot be necessary, they say, that public-houses should be open before a reasonable hour in the morning; and it is proved that a large percentage of drunkenness occurs in the last hour or two of trade at night. But what

is the difference in principle between compelling the existing houses to trade for a shorter time and lessening their number? If one plan is efficient in diminishing drunkenness, why not the other? It is unreasonable to talk as if all drunkards belonged to the incorrigible class, as if no man ever got drunk who was not also a dipsomaniac. Many a poor fellow, very ready to fall and yet very willing to stand if he could, finds himself overpowered by the ubiquity of the temptation: he cannot get out of sight or hearing of it; occasion is always ready to inflame and gratify desire; no part of his daily path but offers this stumbling-block to his feet. This multiplication of more drinking-houses in our great cities is certainly the product of moral corruption, but not less certainly a perpetually corrupting agency: drinking habits make drinking-houses, and in return drinking-houses make drinking habits. No one can be more profoundly convinced than we are that legislation cannot do everything for the repression of this national vice; but it is an extreme of opinion, in our view even more pernicious, to believe that it can do nothing.

At the same time we must confess that we have watched with regret so large a part of the zeal and strength of the old Temperance movement diverted from the work of reforming drunkards one by one, of spreading sobriety little by little, towards the production of a change in legislation which we believe to be unattainable, and which, if attained, would not produce the result desired. There are no royal or legislative roads to moral reform; nothing is so deceptive, because so full of apparent promise, as a 'short cut' to great changes in the habits of a nation. All that the collective wisdom of a people, as expressed in law, can do in regard to vices which cannot be treated as crimes, is to take away any unnecessary and overpowering temptation to their commission; so to modify circumstance as to make it clear that the responsibility for them rests upon the individual conscience; to give a fair chance of virtue to a coming generation. But at the same time it must be remembered that any attempt to protect men from sin by surrounding them with a hedge of prohibitions,—to take private morals, as it were, into the keeping of the State,—necessarily recoils upon itself. It is no triumph of legislation to have converted vice into crime. External pro-

tection is not the same thing as inward strength, and very often does not even tend to produce it. And therefore when legislation has done all that it can, we shall still have to fall back, for the result which we desire, upon the operation of indirect causes which are slowly raising the level of popular life, and upon that gradual progress of good from heart to heart which is the sure, though slowly working, method of Christianity. The old Teetotallers were, after all, more upon the right track than their successors of the United Kingdom Alliance; and even if the latter were to succeed in the attainment of their end (which we do not believe), the characteristic work of the former will still have to be done.

In a very singular passage of those "Speeches on the Liquor Traffic,"* the title of which we have placed at the head of this article—a passage which betrays a complete ignorance of the fundamental moral relations of this question,—Mr. Trevelyan tells his hearers that education will not remove the evil of drunkenness, that emigration will not remove it, that religion will not remove it; but that the victory which these and all other indirect agencies are powerless to win, will be gained by legislative prohibition. Could any one have uttered so strange a statement, unless, in the concentration of his attention upon the sale of drink, he had altogether missed the deeper and more practical question—why men drink? The physical propensity to drinking inherited through many generations; the drinking habits of the people, fastened upon working men both by the usages and the corruptions of their trade; the absence of any counteracting force in the public opinion of their class; the unhealthy conditions of their life; homes dull, squalid, comfortless; the restrictions put upon rational amusement by Sabbatarian prejudice; the incapability of higher recreation after monotonous toil, of empty minds and untrained intellectual powers;—all these forces, subtly combined in various proportions, drive men to the public-house. If the public-houses were all shut up, the predisposing causes to drunkenness would hardly be lessened, and would certainly, in some way or other, continue to produce their effect. And therefore it is that we can only have recourse to those slowly-working remedial agencies which

* P. 21.

Mr. Trevelyan dismisses with such easy scorn—education and religion. It is perfectly true that a full and active mind is not an absolute specific against this particular form of base self-indulgence, and that the annals of literature need not be very deeply searched to find drunken scholars and jovial poets. But no one can deny that in proportion as the working classes have their minds widened from the inevitable narrowness of their daily work and their domestic lot, to a more just conception of the possibilities of life, they will cease to acquiesce contentedly in much that now weighs them down ; and that with better dwellings, shorter hours of labour, larger knowledge, freer access to nature and to books, the gaudy splendour of the bar-parlour and the crude satisfaction of a physical craving, will no longer furnish their sole ideal of enjoyment. The only way of effectually weaning men from coarse pleasures is to implant in them the possibility of finer ones. No mind is so open to the access of brutal physical temptation as one that in its narrowness and emptiness is little raised above the brutes.

And when education has in part accomplished its work, there will be better hope for religion. But it will have to be a religion, not of outworn dogmas, but of living truths ; making its direct appeal to mind and conscience ; not at war with the intellectual tendencies of the age, but ready to shew how they and it converge towards the one final goal of the reality of things ;—a religion which goes upon the supposition that self-control is strength, and goodness the secret of happiness, and manliness essentially natural to man, and salvation a matter of to-day, and the kingdom of God, the reign of love and justice, here, no less than hereafter. Such forces as these rarely win rapid and conspicuous victories, except in those seasons of moral and spiritual excitement which recur but once in a thousand years ; they are but the leaven hidden in the meal ; they move slowly from heart to heart—here making a rough life a little sweeter, and there winning a strong will to the side of purity. But we cannot change or hasten God's methods ; and only disappointment and shame can be the result of setting up for ourselves a new law of social progress. Even yet we are but slowly shaking off our barbarism : let us be content if, as the ages pass, the brute is gradually fading out of the man.

CHARLES BEARD.

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I.—RECENT PUBLICATIONS ON BUDDHISM.

A Catena of Buddhist Scriptures from the Chinese. By Samuel Beal, a Chaplain in Her Majesty's Fleet; Author of "Buddhist Pilgrims," &c. London: Trübner and Co. 1871.

The Wheel of the Law. Buddhism illustrated from Siamese Sources, by the Modern Buddhist; a Life of Buddha; and an Account of the Phrabat. By Henry Alabaster, Esq., Interpreter of Her Majesty's Consulate-General in Siam; Member of the Royal Asiatic Society. London: Trübner and Co. 1871.

PERHAPS there is no religion the study of which is likely to be so useful to Europeans as Buddhism. Discarding, as it does, those primary beliefs which we are tempted to regard as the essential ideas of religion generally, Buddhism forces us to reconsider the question to what extent these beliefs can be pronounced universal or necessary ingredients of the religious consciousness of mankind. Its right to be called a religion cannot be disputed. Whether we look to the thoroughness of its ecclesiastical organization, to its elaborate dogmatic system, to the profound influence it exerts on the life of its adherents, or to the mass of its canonical Scriptures, its title to that name is complete. Yet it fails, at least in its earlier and purer forms, to recognize a creative deity, to admit a providential government of the world, or to assert the eternity of the human soul. Based on the singular principle that all existence whatsoever is a source of pain, its grand practical object is to get rid of existence. We have been instructed to look on life as the highest of blessings, for

which it is our duty to render thanks to the Creator. If there are too many among us to whom it bears in fact the semblance of a curse, we nevertheless look forward, not to its entire extinction, but to its revival in a happier form. We speak of the miseries of life. The Buddhist speaks of life itself as misery. Our aim is deliverance from these miseries. His aim is deliverance from that which he regards as their producing cause—the conscious existence which renders pain possible.

Buddhism taught its followers how they might cast off this intolerable burden. By knowledge, or, as we should express it, by faith, they might attain the longed-for goal of absolute and final death. These are the terms, preserved to us as a standing formula in some of its most ancient Scriptures, in which it called upon the suffering millions to accept the proffered consolation: “Begin, come out [of the house]; apply yourselves to the law of the Buddha; annihilate the army of death, as an elephant breaks down a reed-hut. He who shall walk without distraction under the discipline of this law, escaping from birth and the revolution of the world, shall put a stop to pain.”* Nirvâna, the name given to the goal which puts a stop to pain, conveyed the notion either of complete extinction, or of a repose so perfect as hardly to fall within the definition of conscious life. The foundation of this faith was a deep despair. Life was evil, and could not be improved. All that a wise man could do was to endeavour to be quit of it once for all, and thus to escape from that endless repetition of births and deaths which, according to the established theory of transmigration, was the unhappy doom of all mankind.

Surely there is something well deserving to be pondered in the spectacle of a religion holding out such hopes as these to those whom it was seeking to attract. Nor were they held out in vain. Converts flocked to its standards. In a few centuries it was able to dispute the mastery of India with the Brahmans, and to make its influence felt throughout the gigantic empire of China. It throws an interesting light upon the state of the Indian mind in the fifth or sixth century before Christ, to learn that such a doctrine was preached, and preached with pre-eminent success.

* Burnouf, *Introduction à l'Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien*, p. 184.

What an intense consciousness of suffering the populations who listened to the Buddha must have had! What a longing to leave life behind them once for all! For observe, that this sense of pain, this desire to put an end to existence, belongs peculiarly to India, and not only to India, but to the India of an epoch long subsequent to the composition of the Vedic hymns. In these ancient poems there breathes a spirit widely different from the sense of oppression and weariness that appears in later ages. Nor is there, if we may accept Dr. Muir's account of the Vedic doctrine of a future life,* any such feeling expressed in the Vedas as the desire to escape from existence altogether. But in the philosophies of later ages, which took their rise at epochs not very distant from the origin of Buddhism, something of this nature appears. Thus the Sâṅkhya speaks of "abstruse knowledge" as effecting "the liberation of soul;" and explains that when "separation of the informed soul from its corporeal frame takes place . . . then is absolute and final deliverance accomplished."† And the Nyâya philosophy, according to its learned expositor, Dr. Roer, teaches that "it is possible for the individual soul to emerge from the vicissitudes of worldly existence by the attainment of true knowledge."‡ The Bhagavad-Gita, an interpolated portion of the Mahâbhârata, though its philosophy is theistic, and though it teaches the eternity of spirit, yet insists, in language quite akin to that of Buddhism, on the importance of discarding the "bonds of action" which produce regeneration. But these theories are Indian, and Indian alone. Hence they were not in existence among those nations to which Buddhism spread, and where it has continued to flourish since its banishment from its native land. Neither the Chinese Scriptures emanating from the teaching of Confucius, nor the Canonical book attributed to Laò-tsè, know anything of the universal painfulness of life. Still less can it be supposed that the wild Mongolians and Tartars who ultimately fell under the influence of Buddhism, had the smallest notion that their existence was nothing but misery. Hence it is not surprising that Budd-

* Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. I. Part ii.

† Wilson's Sâṅkhya Kârîkâ, pp. 186, 187.

‡ Bibliotheca Indica, Vol. IX. No. 32, p. xiii.

hism, importing as it did into the countries penetrated by the zeal of its missionaries a set of ideas which were altogether foreign to their inhabitants, should there have assumed a widely different aspect from that which it originally possessed. More general causes, which cannot fail to affect a faith believed in by some 340 millions of men, have also been at work in the production of this result.

No great religion, existing for many centuries and received by many different families and even races of men, can possibly remain unmodified by the course of its history and the character of its disciples. None has suffered more profound and radical alteration from these causes than Buddhism. Even before its expulsion from India, contending schools had sprung up within its bosom, which had completely perverted its original features. Hence Buddhism in the North of Asia is now widely different from Buddhism in the South; while in addition to this broad distinction there are minor, but still important, differences between the several nations in each. Thus the variety current in Nepaul is completely unlike the variety in Thibet, and the variety found in China differs from either. No doubt Mongolia, Tartary, Japan, Burmah, Siam and Ceylon, have also effected their special modifications. The religion of these various countries has been described to us by scholars of whom each has been especially familiar with a particular branch of this gigantic trunk. To the labours of these predecessors, Mr. Beal—already favourably known to us by his translation of the travels of two Chinese pilgrims—adds a work, the sources of which he has found in China; while Mr. Alabaster imparts the information obtained during his residence in Siam.

The “Catena of Buddhist Scriptures from the Chinese,” published by the first of these gentlemen, is an important contribution to our knowledge of the subject. For the writer, instead of putting forward his own views or constructing a system himself, takes us straight to the original sources of Buddhist doctrine—the holy Scriptures. Confining himself mainly to the laborious task of translating or summarising Chinese books (themselves translations from the Sanscrit), he has rendered a far greater service than if he had endeavoured to present the same facts in a more agreeable form to the European public. Especial gratitude

is due to those who undertake the laborious and rather thankless task of translating the sacred books of Oriental nations. These books are anything but attractive, and are likely to find few readers; but they are essential to the proper comprehension of the religious systems to which they belong. So useful a work required no apology on the part of the translator. It is the more to be regretted that among various other advantages which, as he rightly argues, may be derived from a study of the Buddhist Scriptures in Chinese, Mr. Beal has included one of a highly speculative and unscientific kind. After the just remark, that "the widest and most interesting result" of such studies "is the means they afford us for arriving at a correct judgment in the comparative science of religion," he thus proceeds: "There is a divine strategy employed in the education of the world, and its method may be traced in the less apparent affinities of religious systems, which, though generally unobserved, are tending to lead men towards the same central truth. We may sometimes venture to interpret the Divine method. And if in any case we may do so, certainly we may in the present subject of inquiry." At the time of the Christian era, Mr. Beal thinks, the millions of China and India had "through a long lapse of ages" been prepared "for the reception of higher truth." St. Paul was preaching, Kanishka and his Scyths were preparing ways for the missionary, and the Chinese were awaiting the return of an embassy sent to inquire in India concerning Buddhism. "These events happening on such a world-wide scale, indicate the culmination of a Divine plan, the arrival of the full time for which men had been looking, and in preparation for which the religious systems of the peoples had been secretly working. It is not within the province of this work, even if it were in the competence of its author, to account for the apparent failure of the plan we have ventured to indicate; nor to suggest how the same plan may be otherwise carried out, or in what period of time;" but, he adds, one great cause of failure is the neglect of the first principles of religion. Mr. Beal's disclaimer is superfluous. No reader could possibly expect him to account for the apparent failure of a divine plan, still less to suggest (apparently to Providence) how it may be carried out. But he might with advantage push his reserve yet a step

further. Instead of assuming the existence of a divine plan, and then setting to work to find a reason for its admitted ill success, would it not be more reverential, as well as more rational, to drop this assumption altogether? There is not a shred of evidence that the Asiatic nations ever were prepared for the adoption of Christianity, or are prepared for it now; and when we try to "interpret the divine method" on such imperfect and scattered data as these, our conjectures are likely to be not less fanciful and wild than the cosmogonical speculations of the Buddhists themselves.

Mr. Alabaster's "Wheel of the Law," though by no means equally valuable to the scientific student of Buddhism, will undoubtedly be far more popular with the general reader. Mr. Alabaster, in addition to his other qualifications, is a pleasant writer, and his excellent Preface is perhaps the most interesting portion of the whole book. The work includes, in addition, the views of a Siamese Cabinet Minister, who is termed "the Modern Buddhist," both on his own religion and on the efforts of Christian missionaries to convert him; a translation of the Siamese Life of Buddha; and a description of a curious sanctuary visited by the author, the "Phrabat," or Holy Footprint of Buddha, an object of extraordinary reverence to the Siamese population. There would be nothing to object to in the mode in which Mr. Alabaster has done his work, were it not for the circumstance that he has been somewhat more anxious to produce a readable book than is altogether desirable in the interests of science. In saying this, I have no intention of endorsing the views of those critics who wished him to give a literal translation of the Siamese Minister's work. Curious as the speculations of "the Modern Buddhist" are, they can have no authority beyond that belonging to the opinions of a clever and thoughtful individual. Hence it would have been a grave literary error to bury those parts of them which are really of interest to the European reader under a mass of astronomical or cosmographical theories which can only be wearisome. Mr. Alabaster has exercised a sound discretion in expunging much of the Siamese original, and in reproducing much of it in his own language. But the case is different where he deals with the Life of Buddha. Here we are on classical ground. This Life has been consecrated by tradition reaching to the ear-

liest ages of Buddhism, and is accepted in every land where that religion is professed. An English translator is not at liberty to deal with a biography founded on these venerable materials according to his fancy. Mr. Alabaster therefore exceeds the just limits of a translator's discretion in treating it thus: "My translation is free or literal, according to my judgment. In many passages I have cut out tedious descriptive passages; in one or two places, duly referred to in the notes, I have corrected presumed errors in my Siamese manuscript; and in Chapter x. I have substituted a simple for a confused arrangement." The only one of these operations which Mr. Alabaster was strictly entitled to perform, was that of correcting errors in the text. But the remaining licences which he has assumed must destroy all confidence in his guidance on the part of those who wish to know what the Siamese text actually says, not what its translator thinks it ought to have said. Mr. Alabaster calls this "a Buddhist Gospel," and such it is. What should we think if some "modern Buddhist" were to translate into his native tongue a corresponding book—say the Gospel of St. John—and were to reproduce it "freely or literally, according to his judgment;" were here to omit what he might consider "tedious" to his countrymen, and there to "substitute a simple for a confused arrangement"? Mr. Alabaster seems to have constantly before his eyes the melancholy fate which has befallen Burnouf, whose works, as he tells us twice over, are still "procurable uncut" from their publishers. Yet Burnouf's writings are consulted and re-consulted by every careful student of the history and doctrines of Buddhism; and their limited sale in no way detracts from their enduring value. A similar spirit prompts Mr. Alabaster's remark on Foucaux's translation of the *Rgya Tsh'er Rol Pa*, or Thibetan Life of Buddha, which he says "not even the skill of M. Foucaux can render pleasant reading." Undoubtedly not; but then Foucaux's object was probably not to entertain his readers with an amusing story, but to make them acquainted with a very important Buddhist classic. And I think Foucaux was right. If an author's object be entertainment, he had better leave the translation of Oriental Scriptures alone. If he gratuitously undertakes translation, he should do it accurately.

Nor is Mr. Alabaster's procedure without its drawbacks.

He is too conscientious a writer to leave his readers altogether in the dark as to the alterations he has made. Hence they are occasionally taken over the same ground a second time in the notes. Thus, in the last chapter, a very important one for the intelligence of Buddhist dogma, he gives in the text "a carefully arranged abstract with my own explanations," and in a note at the end, "a free translation." Surely every sound principle of literary taste should have led him to reverse this arrangement. The translation should have been in the text, and the abstract, intended to elucidate the text, in the note. Any other method of proceeding can hardly fail to cause inconvenience, and perhaps confusion, to the reader.

As has been already stated, the "Life" with which Mr. Alabaster deals in this free and easy manner is one of the most sacred and authentic traditions of the Buddhist Church. Be it understood that the word authentic is employed with exclusive reference to Buddhist standards. This tradition is authentic, not in the sense that it rests on contemporary evidence, but in the sense that it is accepted by the whole Church with entire unanimity. It will be better, however, not to prejudge the question as to the degree of credence it may deserve, until we have very briefly enumerated the cardinal incidents which the biographers relate. Critically examined, the traditional Life falls into a certain number of well-defined periods, or moments, each of which is essential to the character of the "Tathâgata," or teacher who follows in the footsteps of his predecessors. These periods may be thus stated:—I. His Incarnation. II. His Birth. III. His Infancy and Youth before he had determined to forsake his secular life and become a Buddha. IV. His resolve to become a Buddha. V. His ascetic life while in search of "Bôdhi," and his temptation. VI. His victorious attainment of "Bôdhi." VII. His turning the Wheel of the Law. VIII. His entry into Nirvâna.*

* Without pretending that this is the very best division of Gautama's life, I offer it as on the whole a convenient one, because it marks his entry on each successive stage of his existence, each number on my list indicating the attainment of a new physical or (after his youth) of a new spiritual condition. Csoma Körösi, in his "Notices on the Life of Shakya" (*Asiat. Researches*, Vol. XX. p. 286), has given a somewhat different classification of the periods of his career, following Thibetan authorities, who make them twelve in number. His is in accordance with the ideas of Buddhists; but the above appear to me to mark off the real divisions in the legend more sharply, and therefore more usefully for our purposes.

I. His Incarnation. In the Buddhist system there are many different heavens, corresponding to the degrees of blessedness of their inmates. Those who are in them do not, however, escape re-birth in this world at some time, though it may be long deferred. The future Buddha—or Bôdhisattva, as he is officially styled—was residing in one of these regions, called the Tushita heavens. The time had arrived for him to enter on his final earthly existence. As his father he selected Suddhâdana, king of Kapilavastu ; and as his mother, Mâyâ, the wife of this monarch. Mâyâ dreamed that he entered her body in the shape of a white elephant. “By the constraining power of his great love, he was led to assume a human form, and to be born in the world.” So speaks the Chinese legend, quoted by Mr. Beal ; but these words form no part of the ancient story.

II. His Birth was totally unlike that of other infants. We learn with satisfaction that Mâyâ had passed the ten months* of gestation, “enjoying the most perfect health, and free from fainting fits.” At length the time of her delivery arrived, as she was walking in a garden or forest with her attendants. A tree, under which she happened to be, courteously bent down one of its branches towards her, that she might obtain support by grasping it ; standing in this posture, she gave birth to the child. No sooner had he reached the ground, than he took seven steps, and proclaimed himself the most exalted being in the universe, adding the fact that this was his last existence. All sorts of signs and wonders occurred ; the heavenly hosts being in attendance in great force, as is the custom of the heavenly hosts on such occasions.

III. The secular life of this wonderful being lasted for twenty-nine years, though this period, especially his infancy, was not wanting in indications of his future greatness. Scarcely had he been born before the Rishi Kaladewila (called in the Lalitavistâra, Asita), a hermit of pre-eminent piety and wisdom, foretold his future career, and deeply lamented that he himself was not destined to live long enough on earth to benefit by his instruction in the law. The royal Brahmans, too, being consulted, predicted that he

* In ordinary cases the Buddhist Scriptures speak of pregnancy as lasting “eight or nine months ;” a Buddha always takes ten.

would be either a universal monarch or a Buddha. His mother Mâyâ died exactly seven days after her confinement, not because she had suffered any kind of injury, but because it was the rule that the mother of a Buddha should die at that distance of time after his birth. The infant, who was named Siddhârtha,* was placed in the hands of his aunt Prajâpati, who brought him up with every attention. When he had arrived at a marriageable age, his father proposed to the princes of his race that they should give their daughters in marriage to the young Siddhârtha.† The S'âkya princes, however, objected to the proposed alliance on the ground that his education had been grossly neglected. Suddhâdana having reported this objection to his son, the latter determined to exhibit his accomplishments. On a fixed day the whole of the S'âkya family was assembled, and in their presence Siddhârtha proved his skill by stringing a bow which no other human being could handle, and performing with it some superhuman feats of archery. The scruples of the princes were overcome; they gladly gave their daughters, and the young bridegroom conducted to his harem a large number of the loveliest princesses whom his country could produce. Apparently he lived for some years contented with the enjoyment of every luxury. At last his attention was roused by the four fatal signs which, according to prediction, were to induce him to forsake the world. These were, an old man, a sick man, a corpse, and a monk. The three first led him to meditate on the miseries of existence; the last impressed him by his calm and peaceable demeanour. Henceforth earthly pleasures had no charm for him. His father, who would greatly have preferred his attaining universal monarchy to his becoming a Buddha, barred the gates and surrounded him with beautiful women, who endeavoured to attract his attention by the most exquisite dances. All was unavailing. The object of their fascinations fell asleep. In time the damsels, tired out with dancing, fell asleep too; but Siddhârtha, waking up, beheld them in every sort of unseemly and ugly attitude, and was disgusted by their appearance.

* He has many other designations. The "Buddha," or the Enlightened, is his official title; he is known also as S'âkyamuni, Gâutama Buddha, Sugata, Bhagavat, or Tathâgata.

† According to some accounts, it was only one lady who was thus demanded.

IV. His resolution to leave the world was now unalterably fixed. Secular life was ended for him. It is added, however, in some of the Lives, that before his departure from the palace he took a last look at his beloved wife Yasôdharâ, who was sleeping with an infant son, Râhula, to whom she had recently given birth. The prince would fain have kissed his child; but fearing that if he did he would disturb the mother, who with her child would have constituted a bond of attachment to the world, he forbore to approach the couch. With a single friend, and borne by a favourite horse, he left his father's capital, never to return till after his assumption of a religious character. On arriving at a solitary place, he changed his royal clothes for a humbler garb, and sent back his costly ornaments to the city by his friend. The lamentation of his wife and family on learning of his departure need not be described. "Any one can conceive what women would say under the circumstances," Mr. Alabaster curtly remarks, and leaves this part of his text untranslated.

V. Sâkyamuni, however, was still far from having attained his aim—"Bôdhi," or the complete enlightenment which constitutes a supreme Buddha. For six years he subjected himself to the severest austerities, denying himself food so resolutely that at the end of them he was reduced almost to a skeleton. He was followed during this time of penance by five disciples. At length he became convinced that "Bôdhi" was not to be reached by mortification carried to this excess. No human being was likely to be saved by his preaching if he thus destroyed his vital powers. He accordingly partook freely of the nourishment that was offered him as alms; whereupon the five disciples forsook him. To them he seemed no better than a glutton and a wine-bibber.

VI. Complete "Bôdhi" was at length, after a severe struggle, attained under the shadow of the famous Bôdhi tree, at the foot of which he seated himself during this supreme crisis of his efforts. Mâra, a personage corresponding to the devil, attacked him both by violence and by guile; in the latter case employing the seductive fascinations of his three daughters, who were instructed to display their charms before him. But Gâutama beheld them with frigid indifference. The Bôdhisattva became Buddha; or,

in other words, arrived at that height of spiritual perfection which enabled him to preach the law for the salvation of other mortals.

VII. Turning the Wheel of the Law, or, as we should say, preaching the gospel, formed his occupation during the remainder of his life. The five disciples who had left him on his abandonment of extreme ascetism were re-converted. Vast numbers of beings were saved by his preaching. He was supported during the whole of this period by the offerings of his admirers.

VIII. Nirvâna, the last reward of this life of self-denial, was obtained after forty-five years had been spent by the Buddha in turning the Wheel of the Law. The narratives concur in stating that he died at Kus'inagara, and that his body was burned. Such relics as remained were carefully preserved by the princes of India who had embraced his doctrine. His death is usually—though on what appear to me inadequate data—placed in the year 543 B.C. Köppen, however, assigns to it a much later date, about 460; and Westergaard brings it down to about 370.

This legend—which in the bald and abbreviated form into which want of space has compelled me to throw it loses much of its interest—acquires a high importance from the fact that, amid the wide divergences of the numerous schools of Buddhism, it constitutes a common ground upon which they are all agreed. For the incidents in the above narrative are reproduced, with a limitation to be noticed immediately, in the Pali Annals (communicated from Singhalese sources by Turnour), in the Thibetan works (analysed by Csoma), in the Burmese life, in the Siamese life, in the Chinese legend, and in the Sanskrit Lalitavistara (translated from the Thibetan version by Foucaux). And since at a very early period in the history of the Buddhist Church there occurred a complete separation between northern and southern Buddhism, since which the two streams have pursued an independent course, it is obvious that this harmony affords a sufficient guarantee for the antiquity of the legend. The variations in the several lives are not important, being due to difference of locality, and affecting, so to speak, merely the accompaniment which pious fancy has added, while the essential notes of the strain are constantly the same. The Lalitavistâra, it is

true, does not include the Nirvâna, or the funeral of the Buddha, because, by a favourite Buddhist fiction, he is represented in it as the narrator of his own life. Neither does the Siamese life continue beyond the attainment of the Buddhahood under the Bôdhi tree. But the remainder is guaranteed to us by ample authority, so far as any authority in the annals of Buddhism can be spoken of as ample.

We must not, however, permit our judgment to be so imposed upon by this array of witnesses as to attribute to it more than its due weight. Mr. Beal, who has treated the Life of Sâkyamuni on the rationalistic system, has certainly suffered himself to be misled by it in the following passage: "The singular agreement, however, of the various records, as far as we know them, tends to the conclusion that they were originally founded on fact. And by removing the evident inventions of subsequent years, we may arrive at an approximate estimate of what those original facts were."* It can scarcely be needful to point out to a scholar so well-informed as Mr. Beal, that "the agreement of the records," far from proving that they are all "founded on fact," proves simply that they are derived from a common source. If, indeed, the various lives, while concurring in the natural incidents, differed in the supernatural incidents, there would be some colour for Mr. Beal's conclusion. As it is, there is none whatever. For the "evident inventions" are as much agreed upon by all the records as the possible realities. And the presence of such inventions, not as a mere by-the-way, but as cardinal elements in the narrative, obviously discredits the whole. Strip off these inventions, and you have a skeleton (if even you have that) which no Buddhist would regard as the life of Gâutama, and no European could with any confidence accept as historical. And the results of Mr. Beal's rationalism amply justify this assertion. Such is the poverty of the non-mythical materials left to him after he has distilled away the whole remainder of the life, that he is himself compelled to supplement them by unwarranted hypotheses of his own. Thus the Sâkyas, whom Mr. Beal considers to have been "a refugee family," are represented as "famous

* P. 126.

archers," solely on the faith of the legend which attributes to S'âkyamuni the successful stringing of a bow "which required a thousand persons to string and unstring it." But history cannot be constructed out of statements so plainly mythical. Again, the method of the Buddha's cremation and the erection of a mound over his ashes, "according to the old system of the Wheel Kings," or Universal Monarchs, is taken to indicate a probability that his family were Scythians, both because the Scythian kings assumed a similar title, and were buried in a similar manner. But inasmuch as the mode of S'âkyamuni's birth is vouched for by precisely the same authorities as his cremation and interment, the utmost we can say, that while it is possible his relics may have been so buried, it is equally possible that the whole story is fictitious. Both the birth-scene and the cremation-scene are adorned with marvels; both are intended to add to the glory of this exalted being. Even his royal parentage itself may have been, as Wassiljew supposes, the creation of the same desire to do him honour. His biographers could as easily endow him with royal blood as with the thirty-two characteristic marks of a great Being, and the eighty minor signs which are said to have been apparent on his person.

Every attempt, in short, to deal with this legend on the rationalistic plan must fail. It is certainly not Mr. Beal's competence for the task that has led to his failure, but his adoption of an erroneous method. The whole character of the legend, from beginning to end, shews that it is almost entirely fabulous. Not indeed that we need doubt the existence of such a person as S'âkyamuni altogether. Buddhism did not originate without a cause, and it would be unreasonable to doubt that he was that cause. But no single incident of his life, though probably some of them are true, is guaranteed by any trustworthy authority. Moreover, that life is constructed on an evident design. Each incident has a definite dogmatic value, and stands in well-marked dogmatic relations to the rest. There is nothing natural or spontaneous about them. Everything has its proper place and its distinct purpose. And this applies to the physically-possible, no less than to the physically-impossible events. For instance, it was perfectly possible that the queen, his mother, might die seven days after the

birth of her son. But we are told, as the reason of her death, that "a womb in which a Buddho-elect has reposed is as the sanctuary (in which the relic is enshrined) in a chetiyo.* No human being can again occupy it, or use it."† After this our confidence in the fact is naturally shaken. It is obvious that we are dealing with a myth, and not with a history.

So regarded, the Life of Gâutama Buddha is deeply interesting, both because it throws so much light on the early creed of Buddhism, and because it affords materials for a comparison between the earlier and later views taken by Buddhists of their founder and of his doctrines. The extraordinary travesty of primitive Buddhism presented by the subsequent systems of the northern schools would be almost incredible, were it not that other churches have departed scarcely less conspicuously from their early simplicity. In Mr. Beal's work this progress of Buddhism to greater and greater complexity, irrationality and mysticism, is traced in a very instructive and interesting manner. In no part of the system is there a more remarkable development than in regard to the person of the Buddha himself. There can scarcely be a doubt that the generations of believers contemporary with and immediately succeeding S'âkyamuni, regarded him as simply a man, though an enlightened and venerable man. But, as his actual form was forgotten, an ideal form was given to him. Not that he was ever spoken of precisely as a god, but he was certainly no longer a man, in the full sense of the word. His natural, human life was obscured by a mythical life; for human disciples were substituted superhuman beings; for the ordinary, earthly scene of his teachings were substituted countless worlds and universes crowded with adoring listeners. Moreover, the theory of the Buddhahood itself underwent a remarkable development. Can it be believed, for instance, that the Bôdhisattva theory was in existence during the lifetime of Gâutama? A Bôdhisattva is a being who makes a resolution to become a Buddha; who perseveres during

* A Tchâitya, or building constructed over a relic.

† Turnour's Pali Annals, No. III. p. 27. The Lalitavistara assigns a different, but equally supernatural reason; namely, that when he went to wander as a monk, his mother's heart would break. Foucaux, Rgya Tsh'er Bol Pa, Vol. II. p. 100.

ages and ages of recurrent births in that resolution ; who receives a promise from an actual Buddha that he shall arrive at that dignity ; and who, having fulfilled all the hard trials imposed upon him to bring his virtue to perfection, is at length re-born in the Tushita heavens, preparatory to his final appearance on earth. At the time when the current lives of Gâutama were written, this doctrine was certainly in existence. But, if it be not too bold a conjecture, I should suggest that even in them we have still the traces of an earlier and simpler story. The Bôdhisattva certainly selects his mother with the full consciousness of his impending mission ; moreover, that consciousness has not been lost when, at the very moment of his birth, he loudly proclaims his exalted dignity. But this state of mind does not continue. During his youth the prince appears entirely oblivious of his intentions in having left the Tushita heavens. He exhibits his martial accomplishments in order to win his bride or brides. He lives in magnificent palaces, surrounded with luxury. Concubines and dancing-girls minister to his enjoyment. "I had an establishment of forty thousand accomplished women," he says of himself ; and it does not appear that he was in any way overburdened by the cares of this extensive household. So completely had he forgotten his original purpose, that it was not till after he had witnessed the four sights, that secular life began to fill him with disgust. Then only, at the age of twenty-nine, he resolved to forsake this unsatisfying pomp. Yet he, who for ages had meant to be a Buddha, who had been born with no other object, was even now in ignorance of the right road to complete enlightenment. He first resorted to two Brahminical teachers, who failed to satisfy him. He then practised all but entire abstinence from food, until this, too, proved to be a mistaken way. Then, at last, he discovered the long-sought treasure. "Bôdhi" was acquired ; but was there even then absolute certainty as to his duty ? No. Strange to say, there was still a moment of hesitation. The Buddha, according to the legend, doubted whether it was worth while to preach the law to beings who probably would not understand him, and who would be unable to profit by his exertions. The supplications of a god, entreating him to have pity on mankind, were required to animate his wavering resolution.

Yet, according to the strict theory of the faith, he could not be a Buddha at all—which at this time he was—and fail to save mankind from their delusions. He who is himself enlightened, but cannot teach others, is a Pratyêka Buddha, but not a supreme Buddha.

Striking as these inconsistencies are, they are easily understood if we suppose two different and not contemporaneous legends to have become fused together in that version which is now accepted as canonical by the whole Church. We might then suppose that the earlier and more genuine story spoke of S'âkyamuni as a young prince who, though endowed with superior natural gifts, was not awakened to the vanity of worldly things until the sight of disease, decrepitude and death, in some conspicuous and startling form, had brought it vividly before his mind. The primitive Gospel would represent him, first, as aroused by these sights to serious reflection on the contrast between his thoughtless and indolent life and the misery of others; next, as revolted by the sensual pleasures of the harem; lastly, as leaving them in disgust for a religious career. If, then, on this natural, and possibly more or less historical account, the Bôdhisattva theory came to be foisted by a subsequent generation of believers, we should anticipate precisely the kind of result which we actually have. The original stock, if it already formed a part of the general belief, would be too firmly rooted to be effaced by the new elements grafted upon it. Both would grow together; and we should have S'âkyamuni at one period of his life a conscious Bôdhisattva; at another, an accomplished prince, entirely oblivious of his divine mission. In such a case, the popular legend might easily preserve the incident of the Buddha's hesitation, as the Mussulman legend has preserved the incident of Mahomet's temporary weakness in seeking by an unworthy compromise to conciliate the heathen Koreish.

Moreover, the conception of Gâutama as a Bôdhisattva is connected with an elaborate and highly artificial theory of the periodical appearance of a Buddha in the world—a theory which implies that the actual form of the genuine Buddha had already been obliterated by the semi-divine character which he had gradually acquired. Could any one, soon after the decease of a great teacher, by any

possibility have conceived the singular thought that he had only been one of a long and still continuing line of similar teachers? Mr. Beal, indeed, in his very candid and just remarks on primitive Buddhism, speaks of "traditions among the people of the doctrines of other Buddhas;" and observes that these traditions "contain truth." Though no doubt Mr. Beal did not intend it, yet practically this remark would be misleading to an uninstructed reader. For these "traditions of other Buddhas" are only found in Buddhist books; that is, they cannot be proved to have existed before the epoch of S'âkyamuni; nor even then among any but Buddhists. And, even if this were not enough to prove the purely fabulous character of these previous Buddhas, it would be abundantly demonstrated by the fact, that every one of them leads exactly the same life, the sole variations being found in such trifling details as the caste in which they are born, and the tree under which they obtain the Buddhahood. Hence one of the titles of honour of the Buddha, "the Tathâgata," or he who walks in the footsteps of his predecessors. But this title asserts a dogma, and not a fact; and it is surprising that any scholar can still be in doubt as to the unhistorical character of these Buddhas, or can fail to perceive that in the long line of Tathâgatas, those who are yet to come are quite as essential as those who are already gone.

The idealizing process did not stop here. Among northern Buddhists, at least, the human element in the Buddha has been more and more overshadowed by mystic attributes completely foreign to the original notion. At last we have the purely abstract doctrine of the "Trikâya," a kind of Trinity, in which there are either three Tathâgatas, or in which a threefold form is ascribed to one Tathâgata. I quote from Mr. Beal: "Now these three Tathâgatas are all included in one substantial essence. The three are the same as one. Not one, and yet not different." After this, we should not be surprised to hear: "This is the Catholic faith, which except a man believe faithfully he cannot be saved." But the Buddhist would make no such addition; nor has the Buddhist Trinity more than an outward resemblance to that of the Christian.

When, from the life of the teacher, we turn to the character of the doctrines taught, we enter upon ground that

is comparatively firm. For, while we may be unable to say with any confidence whether a particular doctrine is or is not due to the Buddha himself, the general characteristics of the faith taught by himself and his earlier disciples are clear; and there is at least a strong probability that he himself was the author of the salient features in its discipline and its ethics. S'âkyamuni, in fact, appears before us as a being who made it his business to offer salvation to his hearers; and who pointed out to them, as the means of salvation, three things: 1, Acceptance of certain abstract beliefs; 2, Adoption of an ascetic life; 3, Practice of moral virtues.

I. It is probable, and indeed almost certain, that in the earliest times the abstract dogmas of Buddhism were few and simple. The enormous development of metaphysics which is found in that section of the Canon known as "Abhidharma" was completely foreign to the primitive faith, which found its *raison d'être* in the existence of pain, and its goal in the annihilation of pain. We may be sure that the historical Buddha never dreamed of those extraordinary speculations, ending in the assertion of the absolute nothingness of all things, in which the ecclesiastical Buddha so greatly delights. If there is any single dogma which may with confidence be fathered upon him, it is that of the four Truths,—the fundamental principle of Buddhism in all its forms, however it may be overshadowed by later growths of doctrine. The four Truths are: 1, The existence of Pain; 2, The production of Pain; 3, The annihilation of Pain; 4, The way to the annihilation of Pain. Their meaning is this: That all living beings are subject to suffering; that its source is existence; that it may be put an end to; and that the way to put an end to it is to enter on the path of life opened to mankind by Gâutama Buddha, which finally terminates in emancipation from existence and its concomitant misery. Closely connected with these fundamental verities is the theory of the twelve Nidânas, or causes of existence. If existence was the source of pain, it was important to discover the source of existence. This the theory of the Nidânas professes to do. Without entering into it at length, it may suffice to remark that it traces up existence in the last resort to Ignorance, i.e. a mistaken opinion; and that Desire and Attachment

are intermediate causes. If every one of the causes is destroyed within us in ascending order, we shall end at last with destroying our existence, the great end of Buddhist piety. An ancient formula discovered on images and in books declares, that "Of all things proceeding from cause, the cause of their procession hath the Tathâgata explained. The great Sramana has likewise declared the cause of the extinction of all things." Whether this formula refers to the Nidânas, or only to the four Truths, it is evident that the one doctrine grew out of the other, and was a kind of attempt to account for the origin of human life and its continuance through birth after birth. Probably the original germ of the Nidâna doctrine may have been the accepted belief of Buddhists, that attachment to worldly things—"cleaving to existence"—hinders emancipation from life. The causes of this attachment might then be sought, and their ultimate cause be found in Ignorance. But Ignorance of what? The Buddhist replies, In Ignorance of the unreality and impermanence of all earthly things; in the false belief that these things are real and enduring. But here we are touching on a subject that would lead us far beyond our limits—that of the metaphysics of Buddhism. The key-note of its metaphysical teaching is this very doctrine of the unreality of all things. But in addition to this Nihilism, Mr. Beal's book has the especial merit of bringing out the important place which northern Buddhists assign to the "true self," the permanent reality which forms the essential ontological basis of this impermanent unreality. We must resist the temptation of following Mr. Beal any deeper into this interesting topic. After the exposition in a metaphysical treatise of certain abstruse doctrines by the Buddha, we are told that the eminent disciple "Ananda, with all the great congregation, looked at Buddha in blank perplexity." Such, we fear, would be the feeling of readers if we were to enter on this part of the teachings of Buddhism, which has formed a field for the untrammelled revels of monastic imagination.

The early Buddhist did not trouble his mind with these over-subtle speculations. It was enough for him to get rid of his "cleaving to existence," his attachment to the vanities of life, and to look forward to the Nirvâna which his Master's teaching opened to him. Whether that Nirvâna

signified complete extinction, or a mere state of absolute repose, has been debated among scholars, and cannot yet be considered a settled question; but it is more than probable that on this point too the Buddhist, in the plenitude of faith, was content with a vagueness which would be repugnant to the more critical dispositions of European inquirers. According to Mr. Beal, Nirvâna is "a condition of Rest and of Peace;" and this is, on the whole, the opinion that has the greatest likelihood in its favour. The views of a philosopher like Nâgasêna, though important as evidence of the conceptions entertained on this point by theologians, can scarcely be accepted as any indication of popular notions. Indeed, it is worthy of inquiry whether the mass of unlearned Buddhists *do* look forward to Nirvâna at all as the goal of their efforts. With respect to some countries, at least, we have the positive testimony of competent observers that they do nothing of the kind; that their hopes are of heaven, not of Nirvâna. "The ordinary Siamese," says Mr. Alabaster, "never troubles himself about Nirvâna; he does not even mention it. He believes virtue will be rewarded by going to heaven." "Reception into Sukhavati," the Paradise of a being called Amitâbha, is, according to Schlagintweit, the "highest ideal" of the modern Thibetans. "The Paradise of Amitâbha," says Mr. Beal, "is the desire of the great body of Buddhists in China and Japan." Nirvâna, in short, is the abstraction of theologians; the bliss of heaven is the hope of the masses.

II. More characteristic than his abstract doctrines, and probably far more important in its influence on the propagation of Buddhism, was S'âkyamuni's institution of a religious brotherhood. It was in this that he shewed the highest independence, disregarding alike the trammels of caste and those of sex. Every believer who, renouncing the world, became a Bhikshu, or mendicant friar, was equal in the eyes of the Church, saving such distinctions of hierarchical grade as were open to all. Every believing woman who became a Bhikshunî, or mendicant nun, was admitted to precisely the same religious privileges as the Bhikshus, and was subjected to the same rules. The legend relates that Prajâpati, the aunt and foster-mother of S'âkyamuni, was the first nun; and whether or not this story be founded on fact, there can be no doubt that women

were from the very earliest times admitted to the privileges of the order. This, indeed, was one of the distinguishing features of Buddhism ; and it is astonishing to find a writer so learned as Mr. Cox asserting that "the idea of monachism or asceticism for woman probably never entered the head of Hindu or Buddhist theologians and philosophers."* "Monachism or asceticism for woman" is one of the original ideas of Buddhism ; and in the most ancient Sûtras, monks and nuns are mentioned together among the auditors of the Buddha. The rules for both are the same, and include of course the observance of strict chastity. The vows, however, are not of perpetual obligation ; and Mr. Alabaster states that it is the custom in Siam for every male inhabitant to become a monk during a short period of his life. But in the times of fervid faith in which Buddhism was established, this was not so. The legends clearly shew that those who embraced the ascetic life had no intention or thought of ever forsaking it.

In addition to the five commandments binding upon clergy and laity alike, namely, 1, not to kill anything that has life ; 2, not to steal ; 3, not to be unchaste ; 4, not to lie ; 5, not to drink intoxicating liquors,—those who took orders were subject to five special regulations, namely, 6, not to eat after midday ; 7, not to attend public spectacles, such as dancing, singing and music ; 8, not to use perfumes and unguents ; 9, not to have a large or high bed ; 10, not to possess gold and silver. Besides these ten commandments, the object of the last five of which is to discourage luxury and the indulgence of the senses, the Bhikshus are subject to numerous special regulations. The Pratimôksha Sutra, a work of undoubted antiquity, enumerates at full length the various offences which may be committed by monks, and appoints the appropriate penalties for each class of transgression. This work they are required to read twice a month in their monasteries, and, according to the rule, any monk who has committed one of the forbidden acts is bound to confess it, though it appears that the latter practice has fallen into disuse. The introductory passages of the Pratimôksha (as translated by Mr. Beal) are of considerable interest :

* *Mythology of the Aryan Nations*, Vol. II. p. 118, note.

“Commencement.

“Brethren, I desire to go through the Pratimôksha. Bikshus, assembled thus, let all consider and devoutly reflect on these Precepts. If any have transgressed, let them repent! If none have transgressed, then stand silent! silent!”

The next paragraph enjoins confession of any wrong done, because “if we decline to acknowledge it, we are guilty of prevarication. But Buddha has declared that prevarication effectually prevents our religious advancement.” The brother who declares his fault “after proper penance shall have rest and peace.” The introduction continues:

“Brethren! having repeated this preface, I demand of you all—Is this assembly pure or not? (Repeat this three times.) Brethren! this assembly is pure; silent! silent! ye stand. So let it be!”

The 250 rules, some of them founded on grounds of general morality, some trivial, are then recited, the question as to the purity of the assembly being repeated before each separate section.

Even more curious than the Pratimôksha Sutra are the specimens of ritual translated by Mr. Beal, namely, the “Daily Manual of the Shamans” (or monks) and the “Liturgical Services of the great compassionate Kwan-yin.” The latter contains some striking passages; for instance, the confession of sins (at pp. 407, 408) and the following short prayer:

“I pray for all men, that they may attain perfection of wisdom.

“I pray that all men may be deeply versed in the wisdom of the sacred books, and acquire perfect knowledge.

“I pray that all men may agree in the great principles of truth, and maintain peace, and reverence the Church.”

“Prayer,” according to Mr. Alabaster, “is not a Buddhist practice, for the simple reason that Buddhists have no divine being to pray to.” Limited to the Church in its original state of purity, and to that form of modern Buddhism which is best known to the writer, this statement is correct. Possibly Mr. Alabaster intended so to limit it; but the too absolute form of his assertion would convey an erroneous notion to a reader unacquainted with the practices of China and Thibet. How ancient the custom of praying, in the Christian sense of offering an actual petition, is in China,

is proved by the example of Fah-Hian. That pious pilgrim, who travelled about A.D. 400, being overtaken by a storm on his homeward voyage, and threatened with destruction by a leak in the vessel, tells us that he prayed to Avâlokitêswara and the saints to "turn back the flowing of the waters."*

III. Buddhism, however, while exalting the value of the ascetic life, and (in the North at least) sanctioning certain forms of worship, has the credit of placing morality far above everything else as a means of obtaining the blessings promised to believers. Its sacred books are full of instructive legends shewing how a given person has been punished in his present life for some bad action, and rewarded for some good one committed in a former birth. Whatever objections may be made to the doctrine of "Karma," there can hardly be a question that it is strictly in accordance with the highest conceptions of morality. "Karma" is a very difficult word to explain. Perhaps it may be defined as the sum-total of our moral actions, good and bad, conceived as a kind of entity endowed with the force of destiny. It is our Karma that determines the character of our successive existences. It is our Karma that determines whether our next birth shall be in heaven or in hell, in a happy or a miserable condition of life on earth. Reward and punishment being in this system exactly apportioned to merit and demerit, and every action producing its appropriate fruit, our ideas of justice are never violated. The balance, either on the credit or debit side of our account, must always be paid—to us or by us, as the case may be. Hence the "Modern Buddhist" is not unnaturally shocked at the notion of eternal punishment. He holds that "there is no being who has not done something good, and that to recognize the liability of any one to suffer eternally in hell, would be to deny to good works the same power of producing fruit that is ascribed to evil works." Unbelief, though it may prevent the attainment of eternal rest, does not hinder the operation of this universal law. The "Modern Buddhist," who enters at length into the whole subject of Karma, is careful to insist on this. "Even those," he remarks, "who do not believe in the religion of Buddha, by good actions acquire merit, and will on their

* Beal's *Buddhist Pilgrims*, pp. 166, 167.

death attain heaven, and by evil actions acquire demerit, and on death will pass to hell. Buddhism does not teach the necessary damnation of those who do not believe in Buddha, and in this respect I think it is more excellent than all the other religions which teach that all but their own followers will surely go to hell."

The practical ethics of Buddhism are not inferior in excellence to its theory of justice. This will be admitted by all who are familiar with them, and needs no proof. Who can read the Sutra of 42 sections and fail to appreciate the spirit in which the Teacher inculcates the forgiveness of injuries, the repression of lust, and the exercise of charity? Here are a few extracts from this ancient Sermon, which is known to have been taken to China in A.D. 70, and was therefore canonical in India long before that date.*

"Buddhasaid : A man who foolishly does me wrong (or regards me as being, or doing, wrong), I will return to him the protection of my ungrudging love; the more evil comes from him, the more good shall go from me; the fragrance of these good actions always redounding to me, the harm of the slanderer's words returning to him. There was a foolish man once heard Buddha, whilst preaching, defend this great principle of returning good for evil, and therefore he came and abused Buddha. Buddha was silent, and would not answer him, pitying his mad folly. The man having finished his abuse, Buddha asked him, saying : 'Son, when a man forgets the rules of politeness in making a present to another, the custom is to say, 'Keep your present.' Son! you have now railed at me! I decline to entertain your abuse! and request you to keep it; a source of misery to yourself. For as sound belongs to the drum, and shadow to the substance, so in the end misery will certainly overtake the evil doer.'"

Buddhism is not less careful than Christianity to exclude the first suggestions of lust.

"Buddha addressed all the Shamans—"Guard against looking on a woman. If you see one, let it be as though you saw her not, and be sure to have no conversation with her. But if you must needs speak to her, let it be with a pure heart and upright conduct."

"Buddha said : A man once had grief because his lusts could not be appeased, and so he seated himself on some sharp knives, in order to free himself from the cause of his sin. Buddha addressed him and said : 'If you succeed in getting rid of the

* I quote from Mr. Beal's translation. Mr. Beal arrives at the conclusion, which will no doubt be that of every dispassionate student, that the morality of Buddhism was entirely independent of Christian influence.

external cause, this is not to be compared to getting rid of the lustful inclination. The heart is the busy contriver of these lusts; compose the heart, and these evil thoughts will all be still. But if the wicked heart be not set at rest, what benefit will self-mutilation bring?"

Buddhism enjoins the most boundless charity, a duty exemplified in various legends which exhibit the Buddha in previous existences as giving away everything he has, even himself, his wife and his children.* This is no doubt exaggerated, but the moral is obvious. St. Paul in like hyperbolical language, speaks of giving "my body to be burned." Not much is said in our Sutra on this cardinal virtue, but the following is noteworthy:

"Buddha said: A man in the practice of religion who exercises charity from a feeling of necessary obligation, or from a feeling of partiality, does not obtain much merit. But he who is charitable, and at the same time guards his motive in respectful deference to the principles of religion, this man's merit will be very great."

It is the presence in Buddhism of such teaching as this that makes it so difficult for missionaries to appeal with success to enlightened men like the "Modern Buddhist." We hear without surprise that "he listens to and admires the morality of the Christian religion, until they believe him almost a Christian, and then he tells them that Buddha too taught a morality as beautiful as theirs, and a charity that extends to everything that has breath." No doubt it is the best side of his religion on which the Siamese minister here relies. No doubt that religion has its deficiencies, its weaknesses, its errors, of which he is not aware, but in which even he is hopelessly entangled. On these, however, I do not care to insist. They will probably be patent to all. Even were they not, it is an ungracious task to attack a system in publications which can never reach its legitimate defenders, and to which they are unable to reply. The most candid Europeans may fail to comprehend the subtleties of the Asiatic mind, and may thus completely misrepresent Asiatic creeds. We may therefore justly hesitate to criticise or to condemn, until we are well assured that we understand them.

AMBERLEY.

* There is an interesting collection of such legends in I. J. Schmidt, "Der Weise und der Thor," St. Petersburg, 1843.

II.—THE INTUITIONAL PHILOSOPHY IN A NEW FORM.

Hereditary Genius. By Francis Galton, F.R.S. London : Macmillan and Co. 1869.

Variation of Animals under Domestication. By Charles Darwin.

Principles of Psychology. By Herbert Spencer. London : Longmans. 1855.

Descent of Man. By Charles Darwin. 1871.

No phenomenon is more common in the history of religious or philosophical systems than the revivification of modes of thought once believed to be extinct. This is indeed nothing else than the inevitable result of the circumscription of the human intellect by its own limits ; in other words, by the ultimate conclusions which surround it on every side. The dove, according to Kant's well-known simile, cannot transcend the atmosphere in which it floats ; and therefore whatever be the direction in which it wings its flight, and however much it may attempt from time to time to vary its course, yet the recurrence of older and once forsaken directions is an absolute necessity. Hence it may well be doubted whether the history of philosophy proceeds so invariably as is sometimes thought, in a straight line ; whether its course is not rather a zig-zag or tortuous one ; or, as has been suggested, whether it does not move in cycles. Possibly the general prevalence of the notion that human thought keeps moving in one continuously forward direction, which has been the basis of so many philosophies of history and histories of philosophy, may account for the incredulity with which, notwithstanding well-known examples to the contrary, many people regard the resuscitation of modes of thought which they have once accustomed themselves to consider exploded.

Nor is this truth of the resurrection of inanimate beliefs at all affected by the fact, that in their new life they frequently assume a new form, a "resurrection body," so to speak. This may indeed delude the eyes of the superficial gazer ; but the practised thinker, who is not satisfied with the mere external aspect of a system, but who must needs

penetrate to its very essence, soon perceives that what at first seemed a new method of thought is in reality an old one, only veiled by a different mode of presentation. As a speculation, therefore, and one not unwarranted by the aggregate results of human thought, it may be doubted whether the mind of man has not by this time well-nigh reached the end of its tether; whether it has not sounded the profoundest depths both of philosophy and of religion; and therefore whether a bran-new philosophy is not now just as impossible as a bran-new heresy is said to be. If this be so, the task of acquiring a knowledge of the history of philosophy will become greatly simplified for our descendants. Philosophers, having exhausted all conceivable or possible modes of thought, will be rangeable into genera and species, so that the whole realm of human speculation may be compressed into a single page, not unlike a leaf extracted from a school botany.

Perhaps the latest example of this resuscitation under a new form of a philosophical doctrine once deemed extinct, is that to which we are about to call our readers' attention, and is now in progress before our eyes. It has become an accepted truth among philosophical inquirers both in this country and on the continent, that what is known by the name of the Intuitional Philosophy is, as a school of thought, now no more; and that the Experimental Philosophy reigns in its stead. Sir William Hamilton was among ourselves the last great representative of the former school, and the names which represent our highest philosophical culture at present are enthusiastic adherents of the latter. Hence, so far as the formal expression of philosophical belief is concerned, no one now claims to hold the doctrine of Innate Ideas; no one believes that from the moment of a man's birth he has a Minerva fully formed and equipped springing forth from his head. No one now maintains, to quote the words of Descartes, that we possess a "*lumière naturelle*"* in our reason; or that there are "*certaines semences de vérité qui sont naturellement en nos âmes*."† Thanks to Locke and Hobbes, and their successors of the same school, we have not only been led to see the unfounded nature of these assumptions, but we have also

* (Œuvres de Descartes, ed. Cousin, I. 132.

† Ibid. I. 195.

been taught how to account for our possession of them. It would appear, then, according to our more recent instructors, that all those rudimentary notions which mankind had for so many centuries fondly conceived to be a kind of divine and inalienable birthright, are in reality nothing more or less than the gradual, unconscious accumulation of their own experiences. Man, we are assured by these philosophers, is born into the world, not with certain elementary truths or tendencies inscribed by a Divine Finger on the tablets of his mind, but with a *tabula rasa*, on which he himself writes, first timidly and tentatively, but afterwards firmly and distinctly, all those truths on which he is accustomed to lay such stress. Moreover, the *elementary* character men commonly assign to such truths is merely a wrong inference, due to the power of the constant accumulation of experiences which we possess by memory and association. It is the concentration of numberless abstracts into a natural but spurious concrete. It is not our purpose to decide between these conflicting schools of philosophy. Indeed, so far as the prevailing tone of thought of our time may be accepted as evidence, the decision is already made. The Intuitional philosophy, belief in innate ideas, has been weighed in the balance and found wanting. Accordingly it must give place to another philosophical dynasty. Its overthrow, commenced by Locke in the Introduction to his Essay, has been recently consummated by Mr. Mill's Examination of Sir William Hamilton. It has joined its brethren in the limbo of effete and untrue speculations; and if we are to believe its enemies, we need never give its existence, otherwise than as an interesting monument of the blindness of the human intellect, a single thought.

Very recently, however, we have had sundry warnings that the usual resuscitation is about taking place; perhaps, indeed, there are reasons for doubting whether the older form of thought was so thoroughly extinct as its enemies thought. Setting aside the fact that the Intuitional philosophy has never ceased to be the creed of the unthinking many, and that its use to the theologian is too manifest to enable him to dispense with it, we have now symptoms of a return of philosophers themselves to the system they had so willingly abandoned. True, the doctrine has appeared in a new dress; it presents itself before us under new cir-

cumstances; and the struggle for bare existence which it has apparently undergone since we last met with it as a philosophical belief, has not unnaturally tended to curtail considerably its former dimensions, and to abate still more largely its claims to a supernatural character and origin. Still, a little close examination will suffice to assure us of its identity. Locke's main proposition may be summed up in his well-known assertion, that, antecedently to experience and reflection, the human mind is a *tabula rasa*, perfectly free from all principles or prejudices whatsoever. We are now, however, assured that this view is most inadequate, and therefore very erroneous; that it is opposed to various natural laws, the operation of which we cannot deny; that it solves the problem by leaving some of the main data out of consideration, &c.; and this we are taught by men who have themselves started from the premisses of the Experience philosophy. Mr. Herbert Spencer, e.g., in his profound and suggestive work on Psychology, tells us, that "to rest with the unqualified assertion that antecedent to experience the mind is a blank, is to ignore the all-essential questions: Whence comes the power of organizing experiences? Whence arise the different degrees of power possessed by different races of organisms, and different individuals of the same race?" * "The defenders of the hypothesis that knowledge wholly results from the experiences of the individual, ignoring as they do that mental evolution which is due to the autogenous development of the nervous system, fall into an error as great as if they were to ascribe all bodily growth to exercise, and none to the innate tendency to assume the adult form." † Here, therefore, we seem to recognize the re-appearance of the older philosophy, not indeed in its old form, but possessing much the same characteristics. No doubt the older advocates of the Intuitionist philosophy supposed the possession of innate knowledge to pertain to the soul of the individual; but in assigning its origin to the "accumulated experiences of the race," it cannot surely be pretended that a directly opposite opinion is asserted. The question at issue, put in its simplest terms, is: Have we any knowledge which transcends experience? Have we any predilections, principles

* Psych. p. 580.

† Ibid. p. 582.

or prejudices, in the literal meaning of the word, which we inherit by our birth? To these questions Locke answered in a decided negative. Mr. Herbert Spencer, however, answers the same questions in the affirmative; he says: "It is manifest that reflex and instinctive sequences are not determined by the experiences of the individual organism manifesting them; yet there still remains the hypothesis that they are determined by the experiences of the race of organisms forming its ancestry, which by infinite repetition in countless successive generations have established these sequences as organic relations."* So that it would appear the individual has innate knowledge, but he owes it to the experience of his ancestors, and not to any divine faculty with which he is individually endowed.

But it will perhaps be objected to this, that the innate ideas, the existence of which Locke denied, were definite notions or maxims supposed to be imprinted in the soul, and distinctly perceptible to their possessors. As he himself puts it, "to imprint anything on the mind without the mind's perceiving it, seems to me hardly intelligible;"† and that in this fuller and more definite sense no modern philosopher, probably not even Mr. Herbert Spencer himself, would scruple to deny the doctrine. But the answer to this objection is not far to seek. It is quite true, and must be allowed, that the particular form of the doctrine of innate ideas against which Locke mainly contended, was the crude and utterly untenable one in which it was maintained by Lord Herbert of Cherbury; but it is equally true that his argument strikes at the root of *every conceivable form* of the doctrine. He is not satisfied with demolishing a superstructure perhaps not well put together, but he must needs attempt to raze foundations which the past history and present experience of philosophy proves to be of the most solid and durable kind. If, instead of confining his attention to certain maxims, propositions supposed to be impressed *in their logical form* on the human mind, he could so far have extended his point of view as to inquire into the existence of mere rudimentary convictions and semi-instinctive principles, his Essay would have had a greater philosophical value than it can be said to possess.

* Psych. p. 526; 2nd edition, p. 422.

† Essay, ch. ii. § 5.

He was perhaps prevented from taking this larger view of the subject by the small advance which psychology had accomplished in his day, as well as by the insuperable barrier which was then thought to exist between instinct and reason. Hence it never occurred to him that the defenders of innate knowledge might, as Leibnitz actually did, take up a medium position between mere "*capacity*" on the one hand, and distinct "*perceptible impression*" on the other, affirming more than could well be understood by the former term, and somewhat less than would generally be implied by the latter. It is possible that the implications contained in the word *knowledge** may have conduced to this result. It is a word which, for more than one reason, seems unfitted to be joined with *innate*; for, first, it implies definite individual attainment, the acquiring of something *once unknown*; and, secondly, it implies consciousness or recognition of the fact by the person knowing. To speak of innate knowledge in the first sense is an obvious contradiction in terms; and in the second sense, although insisted on by Locke for controversial purposes, few among recent intuitionist philosophers, probably none in our own time, would care to defend it, for the *degree of consciousness* which it implies is necessarily *post-nate*. The sense in which the affirmation of innate knowledge would now be generally understood, would be a distinct pre-determination†—a decided aptitude for acquiring particular kinds of knowledge. It is more than mere *faculty*, and, so

* It is an unavoidable consequence of the mode in which metaphysical language is formed, the natural but improvident "hand-to-mouth" kind of manner in which new terms are devised only when their necessity has become obtrusively manifested, that names expressive of *minor* stages of growth are rare in mental science; e.g. all the names which denote mental apprehension of any idea or notion are terms employed of the fullest and most perfect apprehension. An *idea* denotes a definite, distinct notion. *Knowledge* implies some actual fact or thought which is known. *Acquirement* and *attainment* both imply an additional possession. We have no other names than these to mark the highest possible degree of knowledge. The mature conception of the philosopher and the tentative, partial notion of the child are expressed by the same names. It is obvious that we have here a fruitful source of misunderstanding in philosophical discussions. On the subject of consciousness, e.g., how many misconceptions might be avoided if philosophical writers would be careful to discriminate the *degree* or *amount* which they wish to assign to that too comprehensive term!

† What Leibnitz calls "*des inclinations, des dispositions, des habitudes, ou des virtualités naturelles.*" *Nouveaux Essais*, Erdmann, p. 196; cf. p. 210.

far as the individual is concerned, is less than *attainment*; or, employing the terms used by Locke, it is more than *capacity* and somewhat less than *perceptible impression*: e.g. the innate tendency towards mathematical or astronomical science which we have authority for supposing to characterize a new-born Herschel, would mean much more than a capacity for acquiring mathematical knowledge which might be predicated of 60 people out of 100; and doubtless less than the actual inscription of mathematical tables and star-maps on the tablets of his mind.

We ought, however, not to lay too much stress on the fact that Locke took an unfair advantage of the connotations of the word knowledge; for even if it had occurred to him that the word was capable of the modified sense just pointed out, he would have rejected the theory of *innate knowledge* as decisively as he did in the sense actually adopted by him. He would neither have conceded to Mr. Herbert Spencer that "instinctive sequences are determined by the experiences of the race;" nor to Leibnitz,* that truths exist in the mind as the veins in a piece of marble, which would mark out a given figure, e.g. that of Hercules, in preference to other figures; for either theory is in direct antagonism to his main principle of the mind being a *tabula rasa*. The *razed* quality of the tablet is directly impeached as soon as an impression, however faint, and whencesoever derived, is affirmed to belong to it.

In connection with the undue advantage which Locke obtained in reasoning from inadequate terminology, must be placed the corresponding advantage accruing to him, so far as an easy controversial victory is concerned, from his imperfect knowledge and appreciation of the elementary principles of psychology. He allows, or rather indeed he insists, that there are certain principles of knowledge which exist long before the acquisition of logical maxims, and he rightly employs this fact in arguing against his adversaries; but the full significance of this truth seems to have altogether escaped him. He fails to perceive that these principles, or rudimentary forms of knowledge, represent the ordinary mode in which our ideas exist;† in other words, they do

* Leibnitz, *Nouveaux Essais*. Ed. Erdmann Avant-Propos. p. 196.

† It is to be noted that the main discoveries which Psychology has made from the time of Locke to our own, have been in the direction of indistinct and
VOL. IX. Z

not exist as formulas, but as principles of conviction and practice. Take, e.g., the formula, "Whatever is, is:" we would willingly concede to Locke that to suppose a child born with that particular phrase stamped on its consciousness is plainly absurd. We would go further, and contend that the majority of even thoughtful men pass through life without ever knowing such a phrase; but both in the case of the child and of the man we find the principle, of which the phrase is but an imperfect tautological expression, continually acted upon, just as much as if it were a thousand times stamped upon the tablets of his mind. In a word, the beginnings of knowledge are not of logical phrases and formulas, but of principles, often too immature, often too subtle, for language to grasp. Moreover, on such principles, and therefore when logical maxims stated in language are out of the question, we find not only children, but even inferior animals, continually act.

But an objection may be offered to this argument. It may be said of Mr. Herbert Spencer's hypothesis, that it has nothing to do with the Intuitional philosophy, in the true sense of the term; that, on the contrary, it is, what he himself proclaims it, a mere indefinite extension of the Experimental philosophy itself. But setting aside the general answer to this objection, that Mr. Spencer's additions to the Experimental philosophy are regarded with considerable suspicion by the one best qualified to judge of them, it is sufficient for us here to remark that, so far as the individual is concerned, *the result is precisely the same*. He is allowed in either case to be endued with certain innate qualities; and, except as an interesting object of speculation, it does not in the least matter whether we conceive such qualities to pertain to him in virtue of his possession of a divine intuitional faculty, or whether they come by inheritance from his forefathers; and it is quite inconceivable that he himself should be able in the least degree to determine the question. There is, it is true, a specious appearance of simplicity about the latter hypothesis. We seem to be nearer the real origin of those wonderful faculties about which men

semi-conscious modes of knowledge. Further progress in the same direction may be confidently expected. It is curiously illustrative of this tendency in current thought, that the latest form of philosophical speculation in Germany is "the Philosophy of the Unconscious."

have puzzled themselves ever since they began to think. Moreover, it will by many be deemed an advantage that the immediate agency is human rather than divine. For our parts, we cannot see that much is really gained by either of these considerations. For in referring our innate faculties to our forefathers, we are putting back their first possession indefinitely—we might almost say, speaking relatively, eternally. Geology proves the existence of man upon the earth for an almost unlimited period. In which link of this endless chain, may we ask, did this mind-transmitting power come into being? Did it begin with the “man-like ape” of Darwin, or have we inherited it from animals still lower in the scale of creation? Assuming, as we must, a starting-point for this wondrous power, the question still recurs, Whence came it thither? In degree therefore, and, pushed to its ultimate issues, even in kind, the theory of the transmission of intellect through countless successive ages, partakes of the same combination of certainty of present fact with uncertainty of past origin, which characterizes the argument of the Great First Cause of the universe; and hence the real origin of the human mind is, even under this hypothesis, just as inscrutable as the origin of the Divine Being.

It would therefore seem that philosophic thought has arrived, by a circuitous and unexpected route, nearly to the position in which it stood prior to Locke. The starting-point is indeed different, but the result is pretty much the same. We cannot now adopt in its entirety the celebrated formula of the Experience philosophy, “*Nihil est in intellectu, quod non prius in sensu.*” Large deductions must be made from the “*nihil*,” even if we are not compelled to accept in all its force the “*præter intellectum ipsum*” by which Leibnitz endeavoured to preserve the old Intuitionism from the grasp of the giant Experience. This return, however, of contemporary thought to an older and long-abandoned phase is instructive, and affords one more illustration of the peculiar Nemesis which seems to pursue systems of thought, that, Saturn-like, they are liable to be devoured by their own offspring. The Experience philosophy of Locke obtained, almost on its first announcement, a consideration and even popularity which perhaps has been the lot of no other modern system. This philosophy soon

found its explanation, and even its *raison d'être*, in the Association theory of Hartley. The latter theory, again, was based on a firm physiological basis by subsequent adherents of the same school, e.g. by Professor Bain; while the two Mills have pointed out how it sufficiently accounted for certain psychical and metaphysical phenomena, to explain which Intuitionalism had once been thought absolutely necessary. So far all was well. The philosophy of Locke was found to be in harmony with the latest results both of physical and metaphysical science. Especial stress was, however, laid on the former of these agreements. The structure and properties of the nervous system were a standing witness to the truth of the Experience-Association philosophy. But the very advance of physiological science which made this triumphant result possible, contained also the principle which seems destined, so far as we can see, to prove fatal to it as a philosophical system. By the researches of Darwin and others, the transmission of mental as well as physical qualities from parent to child is now proclaimed to be well established. Why indeed, it is asked, should not the demonstrable results of physical science be applicable to mental science as well? It is needless to point out how the line of thought laid down in the celebrated "Origin of Species," and further developed in the "Variation of Animals under Domestication" and the "Descent of Man," has been applied by Mr. Galton to mental qualities. The application was not only legitimate, it was inevitable; but it renders necessary a still further deduction, viz. that principles, ideas and aptitudes, are once more awarded their ancient prerogative of being innate or hereditary. And the Experimental philosophy, having invoked the aid of physiology, seems destined, at least in the form in which it is usually maintained, to receive its *coup de grace* at the hands of its treacherous ally.

One great difference between the older and newer forms of the Intuitional philosophy must, however, be allowed to exist. The older metaphysicians, of whom Descartes may be cited as an example, considered innate ideas as the birth-right of the race. They were therefore regarded as universal, and as being, with unimportant exceptions, the same in kind. Now it is an essential part of what we may term the physiological theory of innate ideas, that this similar-

ity no longer exists ; for they differ according to race, family and kindred, and hence they possess as wide a range as the numberless diversities of human faculties and aptitudes themselves. The theory does not indeed seem sufficiently advanced to be able to tell us how many generations it would take, by careful breeding, to ingrain an intellectual power or moral disposition in given individuals.* Possibly a future Darwin may in the course of a few centuries enlighten our descendants on this interesting subject. It is the only achievement now needful to assimilate our knowledge of hereditary transmission in the case of mental qualities with the definite results already obtained of the same transmission of physical qualities.

In one respect this theory seems well calculated to achieve present popularity, and for this reason to receive some further development (though we are inclined to think that such advance will be more apparent than real), for it is quite in harmony with current materialistic thought. Hence in times like ours, when the human mind is resolved into cortical brain-matter ; when, to use the words of Clough,

The fame of Shakespeare, Milton,
Of Wordsworth, Byron, Shelley,
Is in reason's grave precision
Nothing more, nothing less,
Than a peculiar conformation,
Constitution and condition,
Of the brain and of the belly,

it can involve no great additional strain on our credulity when it is affirmed that a man's mind is inherited from his progenitors. For certainly the aforesaid grey matter is so inherited, just as every other part of a man's physical frame ;† nor is it a great step to the further inference, that if this

* The effect of the laws of breeding and selection upon men has been already set forth by M. Comte, who indeed seems to have looked forward to such an improved state. He tells us, "The valuable results attained in the principal races of domestic animals convey but a faint idea of the improvements which are reserved for the most eminent species under the systematic guidance of its own providence." (Catechism, Eng. ed., p. 22.) At present there seems scant probability of the fulfilment of this sanguine prediction ; the only attempt made in this direction in recent times is one sufficiently characteristic of modern civilization and some of its tendencies—the production of tall grenadiers !

† "Hereditary transmission applies to psychical peculiarities as well as to physical peculiarities."—H. Spencer, *Psych.*, 2nd ed., I. 422.

"matter of mind," together with its qualities, are transmitted in this way, ideas, predispositions, principles, may owe their origin to the same cause. The inference is indeed so easy, and is supported by such an amount of analogical proof, that we can only express our wonder that it has not been oftener insisted on.

It will be readily seen how large and important are the results which such a theory, once received, carries in its train. To a greater or less extent it must exercise a modifying influence on every department of speculative thought. So the philosopher will recognize in it the re-appearance, under a different mode of presentation, of some of the oldest notions of Greek philosophy. The doctrine of the transmigration of souls, devised by the eccentric genius of Pythagoras and maintained by the splendid eloquence of Plato, is hereby shewn not to be so utterly destitute of foundation as most subsequent philosophers have assumed. We have here physical facts serving to prove that most of the mental attributes which we commonly assign to the soul are capable of being inherited from our forefathers. It surely is not an utterly unwarrantable mode of describing this fact to say that a man's soul has migrated into his son or his grandson. It is true, our modern theory only warrants the general inference that a man is probably "a *chip* of the old block;" but we have many instances, the younger Pitt being a conspicuous one, in which the chip is a very large one, even if it be not the entire old block itself "newly faced." And this admitted possibility is immensely confirmed by the analogy of physical likenesses, numbers of which will occur to each of us, where the resemblance of child to parent is of such a striking character that the parent may be said to live again in the lineaments and form of his offspring.

Nor, again, can we assert since the promulgation of Mr. Darwin's views, that the transmigration of human souls through beasts forms in no sense a part of the modern theory. Indeed, it is probable that inferior animals play a more important part in this theory than they did in that of Pythagoras himself; for they are no longer the temporary resting-places of individuals, but the undoubted cradle of the human race. Hence we are assured that the mind of a modern philosopher *must* a few centuries ago have

"gone a progress" through the brain convolutions of a "man-ape" or gorilla. In a word, the old Pythagorean doctrine is, in its most essential aspects, once more reinstated into the position which it occupied centuries before the Christian era, with moreover the inestimable advantage, from the modern point of view, that the transmigration of souls and constituent parts of souls is now maintained to be in harmony with the latest results of physical science.

Similarly, the Platonic doctrine of *ἀνάμνησις*, or the opinion that human learning consists in a great measure of reminiscences of acquirements made in prior stages of existence, must now be held to be more or less completely justified. That the instincts and aptitudes of certain portions of the brute creation are acquired by this transmission of co-ordinated remembrances through, probably, a long line of ancestors, has long been a received truth. On no other hypothesis can we explain the undoubted fact, that faculties and acquirements which have no relation to the primordial needs of the animal, e.g. the purely artificial acquirements of the pointer or setter, are transmitted with almost as great regularity as its most natural and necessary instincts. To this general confirmation of the theory on the side of natural history and experience, is to be added the specific proof arising, as we are told, from physiology. So Mr. Maudsley tells us that "memory is an organized product," and "it is an organization extending widely through the cortical layers of the cerebral hemispheres."* Now no one will deny that such cortical layers of the cerebral hemispheres are, like every other part of the body, inherited organizations, and a small amount of analogical reasoning warrants the conclusion that such organizations may, and probably will, have in each individual case specific qualities of its own.

The same truth is exemplified in the admitted connection which exists between memory and instinct; for "while," says Mr. Herbert Spencer, "instinct may be regarded as a kind of organized memory, on the other hand memory may be regarded as a kind of incipient instinct."† And if it is a long acknowledged truth that instincts are inherited, it seems necessarily to follow that co-ordinations of memory,

* Physiology and Pathology of the Human Mind, 1st ed., p. 190.

† Psych. I. 445.

sometimes strengthened by repetition as to approach the automatic character of instincts, are, in proportion to the degree of cohesion they have attained, capable of transmission by inheritance as well.

No doubt, minds of a Platonic type will not readily acquiesce in a theory which makes the mysterious link which joins our present life with past existence—

The isthmus which our spirits cross
In progress from their native continent
To earth and human life—

of such a grossly material character. That those flashes of intellect or feeling which men of an introspective or devotional turn of mind have been wont to regard as proofs of the divine and spiritual character of the soul, are nothing more than temporary disturbances of cerebral centres; that the fresh impulses of the child's religious imagination which Schleiermacher thought it almost sacrilegious to repress; those "Intimations of immortality,"

Those first affections,
Those shadowy recollections,

which Wordsworth sang in his exquisite ode,—are nothing more than waves of nerve-motion, measurable by mere terrestrial rules and instruments, will indeed seem hardly credible to many. They may, however, derive some consolation from the fact, that this is not only a modern rendering, but a scientific proof of the truth, of that belief in pre-existence and immortality which, explain as we may, is one of the oldest and most widely diffused of the speculative beliefs of mankind. We cannot perhaps say from the modern scientific point of view, with Wordsworth—

"Not in entire forgetfulness,
And not in utter nakedness,
But trailing clouds of glory do we come
From God who is our home;"

for in this, as in so many other cases where modern science has undertaken the revision of theological terminology, we are requested to correct the old erratum, and "for God" to read "man." Still, indirectly and in a remote sense, the language of Plato and Wordsworth must be held to have received substantial confirmation from the researches of

modern science. And although some may disdain a confirmation so avowedly materialistic, others, looking further into the matter, will probably perceive that the materialism imported into it is only *the inevitable disguise of what is actually ideal*. They will feel that we are dealing here only with secondary causes,—the first cause of the mind traceable in the evolution of the human race being under this or any other hypothesis just as inscrutable, or, as we would rather put it, just as divine, as ever.

Nor is this virtual resuscitation of the older theory of innate ideas without interest, considered in relation to philosophical schools and opinions of our own time. It is perhaps needless to do more than suggest the support which inborn qualities and mental predispositions must necessarily receive from Mr. Darwin's theory of Pangenesis. Mr. Galton says (what is of itself sufficiently obvious) that this theory "is of enormous service to those who inquire into heredity. It gives a key that unlocks every one of the hitherto unopened barriers to our comprehension of its nature."* And though it may be said that Mr. Darwin's ingenious speculation is only an hypothesis, and therefore provisional, it must be remembered that the facts for which it satisfactorily accounts are so numerous, and the analogies on which it is based are so strong, that either that or some kindred theory, such as, e.g., the one propounded by Mr. Herbert Spencer in the first volume of his *Biology*, must almost of necessity be conceded as the only satisfactory method of accounting for existing phenomena. And, whatever theory be employed, it must cover the ground not only of physical, but also of psychical heredity; for modern science has definitively proclaimed that the phenomena in each case are the results of a common law.

It is important to note, in passing, how the modification of philosophic thought now taking place before our eyes bears witness to the truth, that the whole history of philosophy is a struggle of the material with the spiritual, and that the undue assertion of either element will inevitably provoke a reaction in favour of its opposite. In other words, we have here another proof that Hegel's law of Progress by antagonism, whatever be its value when regarded as

* P. 364.

the *sole law* of material and spiritual evolution, is not without evidence of its action in certain particular cases. We here discern contemporary thought in its most forward and materialistic aspect, making a direct and unquestionable approach to an earlier and more spiritual phase. After man has long been denied any spiritual birthright whatever,—after he has been expressly declared to owe even his most elementary truths either to an instinct purely automatic, or to the slow accumulations of his own individual experience,—it is at least some relief to be assured that these extreme statements can no longer be maintained, that a man actually has inborn faculties and powers, both moral and intellectual. This, at all events, serves to shew that under the most materialistic hypothesis there is still *a spiritual residuum to be accounted for*; and that any theory of the origin of human knowledge which refuses to take this important element into consideration is confessedly imperfect. This fact seems to us of the profoundest significance, especially when taken in connection with the further truth, that this is by no means a rare or unexampled phenomenon in the history of philosophy. For the instances are not few in which men and schools, starting from a materialistic basis, have found themselves to have drifted, involuntarily and almost unconsciously, into some form of spiritualism.

One conclusion of infinite moment which may be deduced from this, is the power of self-assertion which seems to be inherent in what may be called, speaking comprehensively, the *spiritual force* of the universe. Just as materialism cannot interpret a physical universe without the admission of laws which bear upon them the strongest impress of mind, purpose and volition, so neither can it account for the phenomena of the human mind without attributing to it an origin transcending both its own powers and its own existence. Those who think that materialism pure and simple is likely to be the creed of the future, will do well to lay this significant fact to heart. They may rest assured that so long as men remain what they are now, so long as their religious needs and intellectual faculties form so large a portion of their mental constitution (and on the hypothesis of evolution these characteristics must in a civilized and religious community *increase* rather than diminish), so long

will a thorough-going and reasoned system of materialism be an utter impossibility.

We would therefore advocate the recognition and free acceptance of this instalment of intuitionalism which contemporary philosophy seems compelled to extend to us. But it is possible some of our readers may object to this. They will decline to accept an enforced and niggardly tribute to spiritualism from the hands of partial materialists. They will refuse to concede that faculties which are heaven-born can be transmitted by physical processes. All we can say is, such conduct seems to us short-sighted. Except on the assumption that every intuition is an immediate and supernatural influx of the highest mind, we can see nothing which we could ask from intuitionalism proper which the new form of the doctrine would not implicitly allow us. It is enough that we are permitted to share faculties confessedly inborn in us (the question of their real origin being left in abeyance), to share some portion of the mind which is expressed in the laws of the universe, even though it come to us immediately by the humble instrumentality of human generation. And, in truth, it is the *mode* by which we have attained spiritual faculties, rather than the fact of our having done so, that is here the chief matter for dispute. It is agreed by intuitionalism proper, and by the current phase of thought which we have ventured to characterize as its newer form, that we actually possess innate powers and predispositions. The sole question remaining is, How did we come by them? We venture to submit that the theory of their transmission by parents is just as likely to be true as that they are the immediate production of God Himself. We might indeed go further and claim a superior degree of probability for the former theory; for it is certain that in adopting it we are merely enlarging our scope of the Divine government of the world, and substituting for isolated and occasional instances of Divine interposition continuous and comprehensive laws. We are but asserting in the region of spiritual force what has become an axiom in the physical forces of the universe, the superiority of Natural Law as a divine agency to special supernatural Providences.

Before leaving the more distinctly philosophical aspect of our subject, we may observe in passing, that the change now

in progress in the current of English thought with regard to the origin of knowledge, is of especial interest to those who delight to watch such changes from their almost imperceptible commencement to the strong full tide of reactionary movement. It is certain, so far as we can trust present appearances, that the newer philosophy of Evolution is likely to make considerable havoc of the Experience-Association philosophy of Hartley, Bain and Mill. It would perhaps be premature at present to attempt to foretell the probable extent of such reaction. It is conceivable that the two schools, which between them number some of the most eminent thinkers in England, may finally determine upon some kind of compromise, for they have many interests and not a few principles in common. But it is equally conceivable that the new reaction against the older school may go further than the most prescient among us are now able to foresee. The study of the laws of physical science, of which the philosophy of Evolution is the outcome, has already produced a younger branch of the same school of thought, to whose extreme and aggressive tendencies not only the conclusions, but some of the first principles, of the Association philosophy are exceedingly distasteful. Certain physicists, of whom Mr. Maudsley may be cited as a type, are entering vehement protests against the employment of any introspective method whatever, and insisting that even consciousness is "an unreliable witness of that which takes place in the mind."* That a mode of thought so destitute of all principles of true philosophy is destined to attain a large measure of recognition, we cannot bring ourselves to believe. Conceding, for argument's sake, the possibility of such an event, we are confident that this excess of the physical-science method in its narrowest form would in turn provoke a reaction of pure metaphysics, almost as great as any recorded in the history of philosophy.

We proceed to discuss briefly the bearings of our subject on theology, ethics and legislation.

That man inherits faculties, predispositions and ideas, from his forefathers, is a proposition which has obvious and close relations with several topics of theological inte-

* *Physiology and Pathology of the Human Mind*, 1st ed., p. 10.

rest. First and foremost is a question which has been the theme of much discussion in Greek, Patristic and Scholastic philosophy, but which we in recent times have, with commendable discretion, been content to shelve—we refer to the origin of human souls. Into the controversies connected with this subject we have no desire, even if we had space, to enter. The change from the older notion of the pre-existence of souls, and their transmission by generation into the special creation theory respecting them, which provoked the sneer of Gibbon, that “our spiritual history is grown less sublime without becoming more intelligible,” is probably a fact well known to our readers. We will only remark that while the newer theory, which, derived from Aristotle and supported by the schoolmen and mediæval writers,* has become the orthodox doctrine of Roman Catholic and (for the most part) Protestant theology, is well suited to the exclusive individualism of the Experience philosophy, the researches of Darwin, &c., tend to bring back the older Traducian theory (the derivation of all souls from our forefathers, as, e.g., Adam) which has been adopted by certain of the fathers,† and in a more or less modified form by some of the Reformation divines. If a theory on such a mysterious subject be at all permissible—and it

* Perhaps best described by Dante, *Purg. cant. xxv.*

Apri alla verità, che viene, il petto,
E sappi, che sì tosto, come al feto,
L'articular del cerebro è perfetto,
Lo Motor primo a lui si volge lieto
Sovra tanta arte di natura, e spira
Spirito nuovo di virtù repleto,
Che ciò, che truova attivo quivi tira
In sua sustanzia, e fassi un'alma sola,
Che vive, e sente, e sè in sè rigira.

† Compare, e.g., Tertullian, de Resurrect. Carn., ch. xlv. op. om. Migne, ii. 858.

“Caro atque anima simul fiunt, sine calculo temporis, contemporant fœtu, cœtant natu.” So also De Anima, cap. xxvii. op. om. Migne, ii. 694: “Simul ambas (substantiæ corporis animæque) et concipi, et confici, et perfici dicimus.”

On the subject of the inheritance of intellectual as well as of physical faculties, Tertullian is quite of Mr. Darwin's opinion, and passages from the De Anima might be adduced strikingly parallel with others from the “Descent of Man.” The reason why the Traducian theory has been unpopular with most theologians is pithily expressed in the epigram:

Cœlitus orta mihi mens, non ex traduce; nam si
Corpore cum reliquo mens oritur, moritur.

Joannis Audoeni, Epig. iii. 178.

seems difficult to prevent human reason from sometimes speculating on a topic so intimately connected with its origin in the past and with its hopes in the future—it seems to us that the transmission of a certain portion of spiritual force through the race by natural process, is the one which best commends itself to religious thinkers of our own day, as being most in harmony with the ordinary methods of divine agency at work in the universe. It is, however, a subject on which we have not the slightest wish to dogmatize. The choice of a theory on this and other inherently obscure questions, is not the choice of one entirely free from difficulties, but of one somewhat less encumbered by them than the rest.

If, however, the transmission of divine reason or spiritual force from parent to child be held as a moot point among theologians, they are well-nigh unanimous in assigning a precisely similar mode of propagation for undivine or diabolical forces. It would therefore seem that whatever difficulties beset the transmission of good in the world, the progress of its opposite enjoys an enviable immunity from them. Accordingly, the congenital nature of moral defect and its propagation by physical generation, which are the truths underlying the dogma of original sin, have long been allowed a large place in popular theology; and wherever that dogma has been strongly held, its origin and descent are explicitly attributed to physical generation. Augustine, who by a detailed elaboration of the theory succeeded in intensifying its worse features to an unfortunate extent, expressly says,* “*quia generante carne illud tantummodo trahitur, quod est originale peccatum;*” and the ninth Article of the English Church maintains the same thing when it calls original sin “the fault and corruption of the nature of every man that *naturally is engendered* of the offspring of Adam.” The confirmation, therefore, which original sin may be said to receive from the doctrine of hereditary transmission of mental as well as physical qualities is sufficiently obvious. We need not, however, point out that this confirmation by no means reaches so far as, and therefore cannot warrant the extreme statement of, that

* Augustine, op. om. Tom. x. 12 c. Benedictine ed. De Peccat. meritis et remissione, lib. i. ch. xv.

doctrine as it has been laid down by dogmatic theologians. All that we can legitimately deduce from the conclusions of Darwin would be evil inheritance in special cases, not a corruption of the whole race; a *weakening* of spiritual force in particular individuals, not its entire abrogation for the whole of humanity. It is probable that the latent conviction, induced by a long array of experiences, that moral defect may, like physical defect, be inherited, has been the main cause why original sin, even in its worst and most repugnant forms, has taken such deep root in popular theology. Extreme statements are easily accepted when moderate ones are seen to be true,—a principle to the operation of which we may safely attribute the larger half of the development of doctrine in current theological systems.

One main tendency of the speculations we have been considering is to merge the individual in the race of humanity, to regard him as a mere unit of a great whole, a single link in the long chain of existence. He is therefore indissolubly joined, not only with the future through his descendants, but also with the past through his ancestors. Indeed, the pre-existence of the individual in his ancestors may be said to be a necessary correlative to his re-existence in his descendants. That speculations to the same effect have at different times engaged the human intellect, will not seem wonderful to one who remembers how many phenomena seem naturally to give rise to, even if they cannot be said to demand, them. The phenomenon, e.g., to which the name Atavism has been applied, is nothing else but a recognition, in greater or less degree, of pre-existence—the prior occurrence of the actual type in some member of its ancestors. As an explanation, though a provisional one, of this wonderful fact, Mr. Darwin's theory of Pangenesis must be said to possess some merit. Philosophers, therefore, who maintain that immortality consists in our living again in our descendants, must likewise assume a pre-existence in harmony with it. Our readers will remember the curious argument of the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews, which is based upon the presumed pre-existence of the individual in his forefathers, viz. that "Levi paid tithes in Abraham, for he was yet in the loins of his father when Melchizedec met him,"—a passage, we may remark in passing, which has not only served St. Augustine for a proof that the race

was virtually condemned in the condemnation of Adam, and certain political theorists as an argument for limiting the property of the individual to the amount possessed by his forefathers ! but which might also, supposing that the science of the present day was required, like the science of two centuries ago, to be based upon Scripture, serve Mr. Darwin for an authoritative proof of his theory of Pangenesis. The correlative idea of immortality, as being dependent on and consisting of the continuity of humanity, has been in modern times insisted on by M. Comte, but cannot be said to be a widely extended belief. The feeling, however, that a man's existence (nay, often his volition and energies) is continued in that of his children, is a natural and not unpleasing one. Dr. Arnold used to say that the pleasure of possessing children lay in the fact that the man who did not possess them was, in case of death, "wiped so completely out of existence."

A further relation which our subject may be said to bear to theology, in the largest sense of the term, is the different and assuredly higher point of view from which it teaches us to regard inferior animals, both as to present powers and as to future destiny. The Cartesian conception of dumb animals as automatic machines, and their instincts as blind impulsions, having no relation to the reasoning powers of man, may be said, for every impartial inquirer into the subject, to have been fully and finally disproved. The instinctive nature of many rudimentary human actions ; the faculty, by continued repetition, of so forming a given habit that it becomes quite indistinguishable from instinct ; the undoubted power of transmitting such habits, even when of the most artificial and ludicrous kind, from parent to child, on the one hand ; and, on the other, the evident powers of reasoning, forethought and reflection, which we find inferior animals display,—are arguments the united force of which can no longer be ignored. Hence the difference between man and the higher mammals becomes, for the most part, a difference of degree, although this is occasionally so great as almost to amount to a difference in kind. The bearing of this truth on the important question of the title of the lower animals to immortality is manifest, though this is a point which we cannot here discuss. We, however, hail with pleasure the advance of more generous and enlightened

opinions on a subject which must naturally interest every thinking man, and the extension of which will, we may well hope, add to the due appreciation of and consideration for creatures to which we are indebted for so many of the innocent pleasures of life, and which, moreover, are only a little beneath us in the scale of creation.

On the ethical part of our subject we need not dwell long. It is obvious that the recurrence to a kind of semi-intuitionism which characterizes contemporary philosophy on its intellectual side, will also obtain in its ethical aspect. Hence, instead of the doctrine that a man's moral principles and religious sentiments are the mere effects of his own personal experience and training, we are now informed that "the experiences of utility, organized and consolidated through all past generations of the human race, have been producing corresponding nervous modifications, which by continued transmission and accumulation have become in us certain faculties of moral intuition, certain emotions responding to right and wrong conduct, which have no apparent basis in the individual experiences of utility."* The theory thus laid down appears to us, indeed, to labour under serious deficiencies when considered as entirely accounting for the higher moral and religious faculties of mankind; but on these we need not dwell, as they have been already pointed out in the pages of this Review. We would remark that the weak part of the theory seems to us to lie rather in the assumed starting-point than in the subsequent mode of growth; for it is manifest that the hereditary transmission of moral faculties and religious tendencies is a fact quite independent of their supposed origin in the experiences of utility. In this case, as in that of intellectual ideas, the main point for consideration is not so much how the individual became possessed of them, as how they originated in the race; and we may accept the facts of growth and hereditary transmission without binding ourselves to a merely human starting-point. It is surely not inconceivable that a germ of spiritual force might have been implanted in the race of reasoning beings, and that such germ is transmissible and capable of growth by purely natural methods. Such a divine starting point seems to us

* Herbert Spencer, quoted by Bain, *Mental and Moral Science*, p. 722.

at least more in harmony with the existence of high moral and intellectual faculties than any mere experiences of utility. And it is only by assuming some such origin for the ethical instincts of humanity that we are able to maintain our hold on absolute morality, a fixed law of right and wrong infinitely superior to, and therefore unaffected by, such a fluctuating standard as "experiences of utility." At the same time we have no wish to impugn the mode in which these first ethical principles are alleged to have attained their present high development. Gradual growth, and transmission by natural methods, seem to us more in harmony with the general working of Divine Providence than special individual enlightenment or irregular flashes of divine inspiration. And while this method of development of the moral sentiments is analogous to all the laws of growth which we discern in the physical or moral universe, it appears to us to carry with it a practical power quite peculiar to itself; for it is obvious what a forcible incentive to the cultivation of good and moral habits is afforded by the fact, that our descendants will reap by *direct* inheritance the fruits of such ethical training and exercise on our own parts. Instead of the isolation in which the Experience philosophy necessarily places every man—imparting to the most moral and best-regulated life a mere individual character, or at all events confining the influence exercised upon others to the comparatively indirect effect of example—we have in the theory of hereditary transmission of moral habits one of the strongest possible motives for leading a well-conducted and virtuous life. It is hence seen that a man's moral character is no longer to be regarded as entirely his own property; a man's formed habits and modes of action must, like his intellectual powers, be looked upon as an entailed estate or ethical heirloom, which he must transmit, together with the usury of his own individual improvements, or with the deterioration caused by his neglect, to his children. Such a consideration, once generally accepted, would impart great additional weight to the best moral law that has ever been propounded. The Golden Rule of the New Testament, the Ethical standard for humanity of Kant, the Greatest Happiness principle of Bentham, and the Altruism of M. Comte, would each and all benefit by the reflection that disinterested and noble acts, consolidated into

definite habits, become moral tendencies inherited by posterity.

Our readers will easily perceive the further bearings of our subject on various questions of social science and legislation. It seems probable, e.g., that more enlarged considerations on this point may have the effect of greatly tempering our indignation at many forms of vice with compassion for the vicious. The apology of *Œdipus*,

. ἐπεὶ τὰ γ' ἔργα μου
πεπονθότ' ἐστὶ μάλλον ἢ δεδρακότα,

will be seen to have a much wider application than we are now apt to suppose. The legislation as well as the theology of the past went on the easy assumption that all men are born equal in respect of moral perceptions. It may perhaps exercise a humanizing influence upon sermons as upon laws if more attention be paid to possible congenital disabilities of the moral sense. A somewhat less harsh tone is indeed perceptible in popular discourses, and a corresponding readiness on the part of legislators to admit the possibility of inherited vice is equally apparent. The increase of such terms as *kleptomania* and *dipsomania*, and attempts at special legislation in order to counteract them, are sufficient indications of the change in public sentiment on the subject. That the growth of this feeling is likely to proceed much further, we have not the least doubt. English judges and jurymen will probably continue to evince impatience at the introduction of evidence of such a subtle kind; but we may fairly hope that the *bonâ-fide* progress of mental science is not likely to be long impeded by the inability of the average jurymen to weigh its evidence. Among the increasing complications of our civil and political systems, some room must certainly be found in our criminal administration for a maturely devised system of medical jurisprudence; in which event, we may expect that a hospital for incurables will, in the case of our worst criminals, befittingly supersede penal servitude for life.

The further bearings of our subject, such as, e.g., the infinite importance, not only for the present, but for *all future ages*, of proper training and culture for all classes, we will leave to the reflection of our readers.

In bringing our remarks to a close, we may observe that

our main purpose in entering upon them was to draw attention to the changing phase of contemporary philosophy, and at the same time to point out the religious, philosophical and ethical bearings of such a change. It is premature as yet to assume that the conclusions ostensibly put forth as merely tentative and hypothetical, will ever have a higher warrant for their acceptance. Demonstration, in the ordinary sense of the term, is no doubt impossible. But a high measure of probability, closely approaching that on which the transmission of physical qualities is based, may perhaps be some time attained. Meanwhile, no small warrant for the conclusion may be found for those who delight in unifying their various conceptions, and who regard the possibility of such unification as a test of truth, in the assimilation which the theory affords us of a man's ethical with his physical and intellectual laws. It is certain that a man's bodily, and almost certain that his mental, faculties are capable of inheritance and transmission. It seems hard to say why the same law should not hold good of his moral faculties, or to point out in what consists the essential difference between, e.g., a congenital inability to apprehend an intellectual conception and a well-grounded ethical or social law. At all events, we may content ourselves with the fact that Philosophy has felt bound for the time being to retrace her steps so far as to take in a mental and moral birthright for humanity. The significance of this step we have already pointed out; we need only add the protest that it is not fair, with the theories of Spencer, Darwin and Galton, before us, to pooh-poo the doctrine of innate ideas, or to assume that the philosophy of Experience is the ultimate form of all philosophical speculation.

JOHN OWEN.

III.—FREDERICK DENISON MAURICE.

FOR those who feel that our life here is from beginning to end an education which pre-supposes and points to the higher condition to which it leads, few things perhaps will appear more wonderful than the history of the purely spiritual relations which one man may bear to another. They may have started very far apart; they may have come into the closest possible contact; and they may even after this seem to diverge indefinitely, perhaps irreconcilably. It is perfectly clear that each of these men is bound to be true to his own convictions, and that if the one allows his sense of obligation to the other to soften down or to gloss over difficulties which but for that sense of obligation he would have scrutinized to the utmost, he is really losing his hold of truth, and lapsing into a state which in the eyes of sacerdotalists would appear highly promising. This state both, it is supposed, would regard with equal horror; but it is also possible that if the man on whom the sense of divergence is consciously and keenly forced, should continue to work for years in independence of the teacher to whom he willingly owns his debt of gratitude, yet never losing the affection and sympathy which at any time he may have felt for him, he may, when the other has finished his journey and entered into his rest, be a better judge of the general work of that friend and its results, than they who have never had their confidence in his judgments shaken.

This, I confess, is my position with regard to the great teacher whose influence on English Churchmen in his own age has probably been wider and deeper than that of the most distinguished of the leaders of the revolution known as the Oxford movement. Whether his influence will be as great on subsequent generations, is a question which can be answered only when the value of the methods which he followed in the ascertainment of truth have been determined; nor do I hesitate to say that, if this method is not in precise accordance with facts, and if it may not be tested as we test all methods applied to the discovery of fact, his influence must hereafter be lessened, no matter what amount of vigour and beauty and

spiritual appreciation may be exhibited in his writings generally. But the point on which I feel bound to lay stress now is, that having been brought into this close mental contact with the man whose greatness and excellence men of all schools are ready and glad to acknowledge, and having afterwards felt myself driven to walk in a road which, if he could, he would have barred against me, I am probably a better judge of his work generally than they can be who have followed him to the end of his career with a sympathy and a conscious agreement which has undergone no changes. Such men may possibly be so far dazzled by the beauty of his character and his teaching, as to make an unconscious compromise with that truth to which it was at the least his wish to pay absolute homage. In using this phrase, I am very far from seeking to insinuate that his love of truth began and ended in wishing. Such an imputation would be a gross injustice to the man who more than any other in his own generation fought against every superstition that may come between the soul and God, and who by the marvellous power of thorough simplicity interposed a formidable, perhaps an insuperable, barrier in the way of the strongest sacerdotal reaction of modern times. There can be no doubt that in him the theological reformers known as the Oxford School found their most powerful antagonist; that, while they exalted a visible society as the indispensable medium of communication between man and God, Mr. Maurice insisted that each man lives in God; that at all times and in all places, God is educating and training, not this or that man, or this or that nation and tribe only, but all mankind; that they who are being thus trained and educated move in the right path and act rightly only in proportion to the measure of their obedience and their trust; that in the proportion in which they may rely on themselves, their thoughts, their words and their acts, will be faulty or sinful, and that the character of thought and act can never be changed, no matter who may be the thinker or the agent; that falsehood, treachery, cruelty, oppression, are as wicked in one man as in another, and that we can no more excuse them or call them by other than their right name in the greatest of saints than we can in the greatest of sinners; and that hence acts of lust or of lying, of cruelty or of treachery, when found

in the lives of Abraham or Jacob or David, must receive as stern a condemnation as when they are found in the life of a Nebuchadnezzar, of an Elagabalus or a Nero.

I am in no sense pretending to write a biography of Mr. Maurice, or even to enter into any minute analysis of his character. The former is a task which probably none will undertake while his career must be viewed from so near a standpoint; and the latter work is rendered unnecessary by what has been already said by those who knew him best and loved him most. I should be sorry indeed to weaken in any degree the force of their words. I believe that he had that absorbing love of truth, that intense earnestness of devotion and self-sacrifice, which they all ascribe to him; and in the convictions which I have already noted as underlying his teaching generally, we may, I think, discern the lever which has imparted the most momentous impulse which Teutonic Christendom at least has received since it first asserted its rights at the Reformation. For, at a time when all existing schools were engaged in upholding dogmatic systems which more or less shocked the moral sense,—while High-churchmen and Low-churchmen were alike maintaining an external infallible authority, the one of a church, the other of a book, and by virtue of this authority trying to convince men that a lie in Abraham was something different from a lie in Judas or Pontius Pilate, or that a command to murder or massacre ceased to be evil because it was alleged to come from God,—Mr. Maurice alone insisted that, come what might, we must hold to those perceptions of right and wrong, of truth and falsehood, which God has implanted in us as the very sheet-anchor of our spiritual life; that if for an instant we ascribe to God that which would be vile or disgraceful in man, faith, trust and love, as applied to God, become a miserable mockery; and that if, for instance, we feel horrified at the thought of any creature being kept alive through interminable ages solely that he may be tortured with the most excruciating pains, it is at the peril of tampering with and deadening their honesty and truth if they suppress that horror, or disguise it by an hypocritical profession of belief in the dogma which thus horrifies them.

It is probably not too much to say that by taking this ground, and maintaining it through evil report and good

report, Mr. Maurice did more, within the limits of the Church of England, to check the flood of sacerdotalism, and of the hard Protestant dogmatism which is its necessary complement, than any other one man, or perhaps than all other thinkers, of our own day. His earlier works appeared at a time when the Oxford leaders on the one hand, and their opponents on the other, were alike seeking to enforce on their countrymen a morality and a religion which had its sanction in never-dying fires, and to repress as deliberate rebellion and blasphemy the expression of natural abhorrence for that which utterly contradicts our sense not only of mercy, but of the barest justice. Many certainly, whether within or without the borders of that Church which Mr. Maurice joined in his early years, and to which he yielded the devotion of his life, will remember, and remember with an intense gratitude, how on such subjects as these Mr. Maurice's words in his Sermons on the Old Testament came as a breathing of life when all hope of life seemed passed; how they felt as if freed from an intolerable bondage when they heard the emphatic verdict that words which horrify us in Augustine or Fulgentius are to be judged precisely as we would judge the same or like words in any one else. But when they once summoned courage to say that many words of Augustine and Fulgentius were as horrifying as any utterances of Baxter or Jonathan Edwards, it is obvious that the great work which it was the special object of Mr. Maurice's life to achieve was practically accomplished. If they could say that it was monstrous in Augustine to speak of an infant as tormented for ever in the fires of hell because the priest who was summoned to baptize it was drunk or absent, and that his absence or his drunkenness was expressly ordained by God to insure that infant's damnation, it was clear that sacerdotalism in any form had lost its hold upon them. Henceforth they knew and felt that they could converse with their Maker as a man talks with his friend, and that they had a sense of justice, faithfulness, mercy and love, because, and only because, these qualities, understood as we understand them, and not in any other sense, constitute, if we may use the term where all terms must be inadequate, the essence of the Divine Nature. But if it be thus, not only this dogma

of endless torturings, but every other, was brought before a final tribunal which was neither an infallible book nor an infallible church, nor the opinion of the majority of mankind or of the majority of Christians, nor necessarily even the belief of the best among them. In short, the whole fabric of traditional theology, as such, ceased to be an object which was to be regarded only with awe. Henceforth each stone in it was to be examined with minute care, to ascertain not merely whether it harmonized with the whole structure (for this to a certain extent might be pre-supposed, and told little either for it or against it), but whether it was in itself sound and capable of enduring hard blows without fracture. Thus the doctrine of mediation or atonement might be taken after that of final reprobation, and the result would be that under these terms two notions would be found to exist, the one making these terms synonymous with substitution, or the infliction on the innocent of the punishment due to the crimes of the guilty; the other interpreting them as expressions of that absolute submission and harmony of the will of Christ with the Divine Will which constituted his perfect sacrifice, we offering in imperfect measure the same sacrifice in proportion to the degree in which our wills are brought into conformity with the will of God. Of these two notions, Mr. Maurice rejected the former with horror, as cutting away the very foundations of all true faith and trust, and asserted that the latter, as commending itself absolutely to our sense of righteousness, was also the genuine teaching of the Scriptures. But it was obvious that though the notion or belief accepted might have the sanction, and, as he maintained, the exclusive sanction, of the Bible, it was not received because it had this sanction. Rather, it was the truth of the belief which imparted to this sanction whatever of value it might possess; and the real tribunal was not the Scripture, nor any society of men professing to interpret that Scripture, but, in Butler's words, God himself speaking in the heart of man.

I do not hesitate to say that in this position lay Mr. Maurice's strength and his weakness. As against those who, like Dean Mansel, would assert or imply that we can in no sort comprehend the Divine Nature, and therefore cannot be justified in saying that justice and truth and love in God

must be what these same qualities are in man, it placed him in an impregnable fortress ; but it laid him open to serious dangers and serious temptations from another quarter, because it necessarily determined and modified his estimate of facts. It is of course quite possible that a man, fully conscious of the conviction that he must, like Job, hold fast to his own righteousness as founded in the righteousness of God, and that he must never let it go, might yet be under the impression that a particular book or set of books contained nothing which could be really antagonistic to or subversive of this belief. The very strength of his assurance that the Divine Spirit which spoke in his own heart spoke also in Abraham or Moses, Isaiah or Paul, might also assure him that the books which tell us of these and of other servants of God cannot offend against the moral sense in the way in which the decrees or dogmas of churches have sometimes offended against it. He might therefore go through these books with extreme minuteness, and by bringing forward all that really harmonized with his belief, and leaving out all that might be placed on the other side, rise from his task with the certitude that we have in our hands a volume which, although not infallible and in no sense a tribunal of ultimate appeal, yet is essentially and completely in harmony with the voice of the final Judge who speaks within us. Feeling this, he could not help feeling further that these books are a precious inheritance, illustrating the working of the Divine government in the education of the Jewish people and in the growth of the great society of Christendom, and that each incident in that long history has its own special lesson for us. It would only remain to add to this the notion that, without these incidents, we could not learn these lessons as clearly and forcibly as we may now, or possibly that we could not learn them at all ; and we should have a state of mind which must be essentially opposed to the method of a genuine historical criticism.

This is, in fact, what Mr. Maurice did, and the result was a state of mind which certainly deprives him of all claim to the title of a dispassionate historian. It will probably be admitted by all, that the conclusions of any science demand our acceptance only as being inferences from data which have been ascertained, and which lie open at any time for the scrutiny of all who may choose to examine them. All

these sciences, as being concerned with the phenomena of the universe, may indeed and do take root in God ; but so far as they register these phenomena as foundations for future inferences, they register historical facts ; and we are not only justified in asking with reference to any one of them, Did this really take place, or did it not ? but the question would be eagerly welcomed and answered by any one who felt that truth was of infinitely more importance than any conclusions or scientific systems whatsoever. If the same question cannot be put with the same freedom about any facts in the history of mankind, this circumstance may be regarded as indisputable evidence that violence has been done to the historical sense, and that, so long as this state of things lasts, it is useless to hope that the truth of facts can be ascertained. In any case, I should have felt it my duty to insist that, with all his purity and humility of mind, with all his self-sacrifice, with all his intense eagerness to promote the highest good of his fellows, Mr. Maurice was not more strictly an historian than those who find in the records of Latin Christianity incontestable proof that the dogma of Papal Infallibility has been held from the beginning by all good Catholics ; but it becomes more immediately my duty when it has been emphatically maintained that “no positivist, no geologist nor ethnologist, respected and valued facts more than Mr. Maurice did ; in the whole range of human investigation there was nothing alien or uninteresting to him—nothing, even in those departments of physical science of which he knew least, to which his quick intellect did not respond with a prompt alacrity and sympathy.”* The things said or done by human beings in all ages and countries come strictly within the range of human investigation ; but to the investigation of some of these things Mr. Maurice did not respond at all, except to protest against those who, after examining the evidence, were driven to assert that that evidence was inadequate or even worthless. The case is even more serious ; for the protest was made, not on the score of ignorant or illogical procedure, but distinctly on moral grounds ; in other words, on grounds on which the Mahometan, the Buddhist or the Brahman, might equally protest against those who ventured

* *Spectator*, May 18, 1872, p. 628.

to meddle with their traditional records. In broad speech, the genuine historian will have no greater attachment to one set of facts than to another; and if he felt conscious of the least reluctance to submit all of them to the same stringent tests, he would immediately suspect himself of being actuated by some secondary and illegitimate considerations. Such a man could never dream of saying—"I cannot afford to part with the facts narrated in the history of Thucydides. Each fact teaches me its own lesson, and all of them taken together form an invaluable storehouse of political knowledge and moral truth. Take away these facts, and you weaken or even destroy my conviction of these truths. I cannot, therefore, allow any to examine these facts except on the proviso that he shall shew them to be true facts." Rather he would say—"Perish the history from beginning to end, rather than that I should seek to exempt the most insignificant fact recorded in it from the most minute scrutiny, utterly regardless whether the result of that scrutiny be its acceptance or its rejection. The history does certainly teach me invaluable lessons; but if it be proved to be throughout untrue, my conviction of the truth of those lessons is neither weakened nor shaken. All history teaches me these lessons; and if the history of Thucydides be shewn to be a fiction, I shall only say that it has been put together with wonderful plausibility, so as to suit a political and ethical code which commends itself to me as profoundly wise, and that thus his work at the least proves to me that he shared my convictions; in other words, that the truth of these lessons in no degree depends on the truth of his history, although the history, if true, furnishes a most striking illustration of their truth." In the judgment of such a man, it would be really ludicrous to say, "The stories of the Decemviral legislation, or of the establishment of the republic at Rome, impart to me lessons which I cannot do without; therefore these stories are true, and any one who attempts to take them away from me, not only does me a mischief, but makes it henceforth impossible for me to teach these lessons to others."

Yet this is, virtually, the language which Mr. Maurice applied to those who felt themselves bound to examine the history of the Pentateuch. The Mosaic legislation and history, and the legislation of Servius Tullius, with the Veien-

tine or Samnite wars, are all alleged facts ; of every one of them we are bound to ask indifferently, "Did these alleged facts take place as they are represented to have taken place, or did they not ? and if they did not, then, further, did they take place at all ?" But this process with regard to some of these facts was estopped at the outset by Mr. Maurice, when, speaking of the Bishop of Natal's examination of the history of the Exodus, he said :

"He seemed to me to be taking from us the very message which we had been suppressing and mutilating, . . . to be driving us to the old platitudes and abstractions about the necessity of order to freedom, and freedom to order, which have no power over any human spirit, when we might, if we believe the Exodus, speak of an everlasting God of Freedom, who is also, and for that reason, the God of Order."*

In other words, we cannot speak of an everlasting God of Freedom and of Order unless we accept the whole narrative of the Exodus as a narrative of actual fact. I deny it absolutely. If we had never heard of the Exodus, we might have learnt the same lesson from the narrative of the Persian war and of the overthrowing of Xerxes, which answers to the overthrowing of Pharaoh ; and if both these histories had perished utterly, we might draw the same truth from all that is passing round us, or has passed in any age or land. Yet Mr. Maurice could actually go on to say that, apart from these Mosaic traditions, England could never have done what she has, and that the English people could never have thrown off the oppression of feudalism.

"If there was a Lord God who had proclaimed His commands out of heaven amidst thunders and lightnings ; if He was really what He said that He was, a Lord God who brought His people out of bondage ; if He had indeed redeemed slaves in Egypt out of the hands of a tyrant ; . . . if He was the same from generation to generation ; . . . then England might live, then Englishmen might hold up their heads against their foe, and rise up when they were ever so sunken, in the might of Him who had promised not to forsake them or to forget them."†

I am speaking simply as an historian ; and I again deny absolutely that we can have no message for the oppressed.

* *Claims of the Bible and of Science*, p. 7.

† *Ibid.* p. 70.

if the story of Jewish deliverance from Egyptian tyranny be either wholly or in part untrue. The truth is, that in these propositions Mr. Maurice has mixed up premisses of two different kinds, those relating to certain alleged events being placed on the same level with the premiss, "if God was the same from generation to generation;" so that, after all, the appeal lies not to the truth of the history, but to the reality of our conviction and trust in a living God. Apart from this, I deny altogether that the narrative of the Exodus had anything to do, as Mr. Maurice declared that it had, with raising the English middle classes into moral and political existence, or with the great oath of the Swiss peasants at Rütli, with the witness of Savonarola against Alexander VI., or with the energy of the Russian Czar in driving back the invader who had profaned the holy shrines of Moscow.* There is no evidence whatever to prove the proposition.

In short, the ground thus taken is that of a mind whose spiritual convictions are as sound as they are strong, but in which the historical sense is very feeble, and facts are regarded from a point of view which makes it impossible to determine whether they are facts or not. Thus the demand for the translation of the Bible into the vernacular is said to have been prompted by a craving "more particularly in this sense (that, namely, of edification), for the portion of the Bible which Bishop Colenso now declares to be not historical," although there is nothing to shew that they desired the Pentateuch more than other parts of the Old Testament.

It is unnecessary to say more than that this attitude of mind must lead sooner or later to intolerance, and that it did lead Mr. Maurice into an intolerant and unjust treatment of one of his oldest and dearest friends, which all indifferent and impartial historians must regard with grave regret. It is imperative on those who care more for the truth of facts than for any moral lessons which may be drawn from them until the alleged events have been proved to be real events, to speak with all plainness even of the greatest and the best of men when these place obstacles in the way of genuine and unbiassed historical research. Mr. Maurice

* *Claims of the Bible and of Science*, p. 71.

did this by building an elaborate fabric upon very scanty and frail foundations, by representing the Israelites as entering Canaan strong in the firmness of their monotheistic convictions, and possessed of an elaborate sacerdotal legislation which insisted on a three-fold yearly gathering of all the males, and on a multitude of rules on the most momentous subjects, which, so far as we can see, were either unknown or never carried out until after the Babylonish captivity or in times not long preceding it. When this is done on the ground that the facts are needed to enforce a particular lesson, and that they must be true because they enforce it, it becomes the duty of the historian to say that sooner or later every fabric so raised must fall; that, when it has fallen, the truth which was supposed to rest on it, or the lesson which was thought to be derived from it, will remain wholly unaffected by the catastrophe; and that however great and fruitful may have been the work of Mr. Maurice as an unflinching opponent of sacerdotalism, and the fearless preacher of a law which knows no exceptions and can never fail, he has done little to promote the interests of historical science. He may indeed, and he must, express his gratitude for all that Mr. Maurice did to raise the religious life and thought of the people, but he dares not to withhold the expression of his convictions when higher interests are at stake than the good name of one of the most single-hearted, most loving and most fearless of men.

ἀμφοῖν ὄντοιν φίλουν, ὅσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

I will not say that the ill effects of Mr. Maurice's attitude towards the historical criticism of the Bible would be inappreciable in his life and character. It would be rash to assert this of any man; and in the case of Mr. Maurice it may perhaps be fairly maintained, that had it not been for the special form which certain alleged historical facts assumed in his eyes, he probably would not have deserted the religious society in which he was born and educated. The tone of mind which shaped his critical method ran, therefore, as it probably does with most men, through all his life and work; but of the purity and nobleness of Mr. Maurice's life and work I have an assurance, which in its strength will not, I trust, yield to that of any

who feel bound to him by ties of the deepest gratitude. He would have desired for himself no better reward than that he should be remembered as one who taught his countrymen that the will of God is to bring men to their highest good, and that His power is commensurate with His will. This reward is his already, and it will be his in more abundant measure as time goes on. To teach men thus, and to live in the spirit of this faith, is the truest work of the servants of God; and this work Mr. Maurice did with a single-minded and unswerving zeal and love, the memory of which will be treasured by thousands with life-long thankfulness.

PRESBYTER ANGLICANUS.

IV.—THE NONCONFORMIST PROGRAMME AND POLICY.

Authorized Report of the Proceedings of the General Conference of Nonconformists held in Manchester, January, 1872.
London : Simpkin, Marshall and Co.

A DEEP and wide-spread agitation undoubtedly prevails among the Nonconformist bodies of England, which, on the one hand, is condemned as an outbreak of sectarian jealousy and bitterness; and, on the other hand, welcomed as indicating one of those great movements of thought and feeling which determine the course of religious history and deliver the life of the soul from unhealthy and unjust restraints. The controversies which have fastened themselves upon certain clauses of the Elementary Education Act, while possessing to some minds no nobler importance than attaches to ecclesiastical efforts to win political power, are actually fought out in the parishes and boroughs of the land by combatants who, upon whichever side they may be marshalled, manifest an equally intense conviction that principles are involved which have too large a meaning and too wide a range to be treated as the passionate incidents of a passing quarrel with the Government of a day.

The formation of a Nonconformist party in the State, although dreaded by many, whose love of religious liberty is beyond dispute, as a disastrous catastrophe endangering the gradual unfolding of a liberal political and theological policy, and resented by its ecclesiastical opponents as another proof of "Dissenting" dogmatism,—has been undertaken by men whose chief interest in life is the Christianity they believe and teach, and is proceeding with steady and determined steps. An organization bearing the distinct name of "Nonconformist" is extending itself with significant rapidity. From town to town, and from village to village, the conviction is spreading that the grave responsibility of securing for the people of England a perfect religious equality rests emphatically with Nonconformists. Those most familiar with the history of the Manchester Conference were the most surprised at its unanimity and its enthusiasm. The delegates, who attended to the number of 1885, had been subjected to no preliminary test, expressed or understood, and had been publicly appointed by more than 800 district associations. Accredited representatives were present from the Congregational and Baptist Unions, and from various organizations connected with the New-Connexion, United and Primitive Methodists, Unitarian, Presbyterian and other bodies. At the very eve of the Conference itself, those upon whom the conduct of its business fell, anxiously questioned whether elements so diverse could ever be harmonized, and prepared themselves to defend the principles they personally held, in the spirit in which men go upon forlorn hopes, rather than in the easy confidence of assured victory. Had anything less than a principle been submitted to the Conference, it would have broken up in confusion. In no ecclesiastical assembly that Europe has ever witnessed (we venture to assert) was the power of a principle more wonderfully manifested. Religious equality achieved its triumph, because it was stated in its simplicity, carried to its logical results, and fearlessly applied to every department of modern life.

The interpretation of the thirteen resolutions unanimously passed (with the exception of one, from which there was one dissentient) may be briefly given:—Let the soul have free life; whatever orthodoxy or whatever heresy may

result, God must judge, not Parliaments and Ministers of State; Christianity must be trusted to accomplish its civilizing and redeeming work through the instrumentality of those who are consecrated by its spirit.

The Nonconformist programme demands that Christian churches should be left to develop their own natural life according to the grace given to them, no exclusive privileges being accorded to any section of the community; that fellowships and headships of colleges, and other offices and endowments connected with the national Universities, should not be confined to members of one sect; that endowments intended for the higher education of the people should not be devoted to partizan purposes; that public funds should not be entrusted to denominational management; and that the School Board and the State should make provision solely for the secular instruction which all children may receive in common;—the responsibility of the religious education of each district being thrown upon those voluntary efforts which it is at once the privilege and the duty of religious men to make, and by which (it is contended) the religious life of the community can be most nobly sustained.

The charges of narrowness and bigotry brought in some quarters against this programme, appear to us singularly inappropriate. Nothing whatever is sought for Nonconformists as Nonconformists. If it were asked that in virtue of Nonconformity certain positions should be held in the State, the University and the School Board, there would be reason in the charge; but a plea for equality cannot be fairly dismissed as a sectarian claim.

The proposition made is, that restraints are placed upon the free religious life of England by conferring special favours upon any section whatever of the Christian Church; and the strange reply is, that it is "narrow" and "bigoted" to oppose those who conscientiously wish for their Church to receive such favours. Have not (it is asked) those who desire to administer State funds through their own denominational agencies, consciences as tender as those who object to confer on them such administrative powers? The argument will justify the fiercest persecution. Had not, it may be urged, the persecutors who lighted the fires of

Smithfield consciences they were bound to obey, as well as those who suffered at their hands? If some men "conscientiously" objected to profess a certain creed, others "conscientiously" objected to their continued existence upon earth, as corrupters of the truth of God, more dangerous than murderers, who can kill only the body and not the soul.

General human rights surely limit the range of individual actions. The difference between the plea of conscience urged by the Nonconformist, and the plea of conscience retorted by the denominationalist who employs the resources of the State for the purposes of his party, is the difference between a conscience which, acting within the sphere of a personal relationship to God, takes away from no man the power of following his own convictions at the expense of his own energy and substance, and the conscience which appropriates the property of those who reject its dictates.

A new definition of "bigotry" seems coming into vogue, when resistance to ecclesiastical pretensions is condemned as an undue interference with the rights of believers in the authority of a priesthood; and a new definition of "narrowness" is found, when those who would give all forms of faith equal scope are rebuked because they will not make public provision for the restraint of thought.

The Catholic hierarchy has formally declared* its unalterable conviction that Catholic education is indispensably necessary for the preservation of the faith and morals of Catholic people, and condemned "mixed education" as intrinsically and grievously dangerous. It has claimed as an inalienable right, that provision shall be made by Government for the Catholic education of Catholic people. "One great evil of mixed schools" (the Hon. Francis Kerr acutely remarks†), "especially with respect to Catholics in the country, where their children will almost always be in a minority, will be the effect—silent, but not less deadly on that account—produced on them by *daily contact with children of other religious beliefs*; for it is not so much the

* Manifesto of Roman Catholic Archbishops and Bishops, 1871.

† Speech delivered in Glasgow, 1872.

lessons as the influences of the majority of his school-fellows that affect the child's mind."

Religious equality, as understood by Nonconformists, is broadly distinguishable from the religious equality pleaded as the ground for employing the resources of the State to prevent the daily contact of Catholic children with children of other religious beliefs. In the one case, the Catholic doctrine is neither affirmed or denied by any act of national policy; in the other, the Catholic doctrine is affirmed by agents of the State. In the one case, the Catholic is left perfectly free to carry out such plans as he may choose on his own responsibility; in the other, the Nonconformist is compelled to support a system directed by a priesthood. Religious liberality does not consist in keeping terms with an illiberal exclusiveness, but in securing an open field in which, by wager of fair battle, the great controversies of the world may work out their own solutions.

Among those who sympathize with the newer researches of modern theology, and are more anxious for the development of free thought on religious subjects than interested in the issue of any purely ecclesiastical struggle, considerable distrust of the Nonconformist programme exists, because of the dogmatic character of many Nonconformist sects. A church embracing as many heretics as can possibly be gathered within its fold by subtle and dexterous interpretations of its legal position and creed, is preferred to any church marking its boundaries with sharp and definite lines; and when the demand for "equality" is raised by the upholders of the strictest orthodoxy as a condition of church membership, it is regarded with suspicion, if not actually condemned, as a method of concealing the reality of intellectual bondage beneath the forms of popular government. How can Nonconformists defend religious equality when they treat heretics with scant mercy, and very diligently separate the tainted sheep from the lambs of God without spot or blemish on their creed? Are there any orthodox Nonconformist churches in which Christians differing as widely as Rationalists, Evangelical believers and Ritualists, can be received as members of one body?

The whole question at issue appears to us to be mistaken

when opposition to the Nonconformist programme is animated by any such feeling as these questions indicate. If those who personally believe in a dogmatic basis for a Christian Church, and because they so believe develop their Christian life under dogmatic conditions, are to be condemned as violators of religious equality,—this so-called religious equality is really resolved into a domineering assumption of the truth of one theory of church organization, and one theory alone. The upholder of the theory of a dogmatic church no more violates religious equality than the upholder of the theory of a broad church, so long as he sustains his church out of his own resources, and makes no appeal to the authority of the State to enforce its decrees. Nonconformity does not rest for its justification on the assertion of one creed against another, but on the conditions under which, in a free state, all creeds must be held. What is termed a “liberal” creed may be defended in a spirit as opposed to the genius of Nonconformity as an “illiberal” one. The essential characteristic of Nonconformity is its maintenance of a direct relationship between the soul and its God. The one appeal of the history of Nonconformity is to the power of the Holy Spirit. The very narrowness of many Nonconformist sects had its origin in the determination of the believer to be true and faithful to his own experiences, even although he should be left to stand alone against the world. The fact that religious experiences are too purely personal to be expressed for all Christians in one set of formulas, has not even yet been discerned; but the testimony of Nonconformity remains clearly given to the principle, that the religious life must be “hidden with Christ in God,” and that the Church must trust for its strength and glory to the spirit abiding within it, and cannot submit to the dictation, as it does not require the support, of any human authority. The precise amount of orthodoxy or heresy contained in the creed which may happen to be professed, does not touch the principle on which Nonconformity itself depends.

Would not, however, religious equality be practically established if within the Church of England subscription were abolished, and the door thrown open to every Christian doctrine which could find believers and advocates?

By this plan, would not all the formularies of faith current among various denominations receive a fair treatment and be free to exercise any influence they may possess? The same opportunities would be offered for the propagation of Unitarianism and Trinitarianism, Calvinism and Arminianism, and no creed would possess any privileges beyond those the inherent power of truth might naturally bestow.

The reply to this argument involves considerations connected with the distinguishing peculiarities of Christianity as a religion. Jesus Christ emphatically describes true worship as worship in "the spirit and the truth." "If a man love me, he will keep my words; and my Father will love him, and we will come unto him and make our abode with him." He entrusts the organization of his church and the establishment of a new order of civilization to the power of the Holy Spirit of God, quickening the souls of his disciples. So far as religious obligations are thrown upon an external authority and regulated by State policy, while administered by Government functionaries, the burden of individual responsibility is, to that extent, lightened.

To provide a church *for* a man is one thing; to arouse the life of the soul, so that, penitent for sin and glorified by aspiration, it needs must worship, is another. Whatever lessens the feeling that religion is a personal interest, and whispers a suspicion that God may be served by deputy, cherishes a state of spiritual pauperism and deadens the active energies of faith. A Christian church being absolutely dependent upon the Christianity of its individual members, is, we submit, of all institutions precisely the one which ought not to be given to a people by any corporate body of rulers, but to be founded and sustained by those who share the spirit which alone can fill it with the life divine.

The abolition of subscription in the Church of England would not establish religious equality. It would establish a non-subscribing Church as the national church, but *outside* of a national non-subscribing Church would be ranged all the sects by which Christendom is divided. Personally we belong to a non-subscribing church. We hold, with an intensity of almost passionate conviction, that within the church of Christ the human mind should have free scope

to grow, and that no unchangeable creed should task the faith of worshipers, seal the lips of preachers, and oppose obstacles to the light which has yet to break from God's most holy word. A very large number of Christians, however, reject the non-subscribing theory of a Christian church, and maintain the necessity of defining a dogmatic basis. Religious equality would not be secured by establishing the church to which we personally are attached, at the expense of the convictions of the rest of the community.

It would be as unjust to orthodox Nonconformists to pledge the authority and employ the resources of the State on behalf of a non-subscribing church, as it is to connect the dogmas of the Trinity and the Atonement with the law of the land.

It is perfectly true that in a non-subscribing church the most orthodox doctrines might be openly preached; but a non-subscribing church in which orthodox doctrines may be taught, is an institution entirely distinct from a church resting upon a dogmatic basis.

A church resting upon a dogmatic basis has its test of membership and its discipline. Its sacraments would be profaned if opened to the world. Its privileges are reserved for its saints. A non-subscribing church imposes no dogmatic test and exercises no excommunicating powers. Its sacraments are as open to all who will receive them, as the glories of heaven and earth. It claims no privilege for its members which it refuses to the human race. The establishment by the State of a non-subscribing church would be a violation of religious equality, because it would tender the support of the nation to those who accept one special theory of the Christian church, while throughout Christendom the widest possible divergence of thought exists. The principle of religious equality cannot be enlarged or narrowed to accommodate varying individual agreements or disagreements with any doctrines proposed to be favoured.

That part of the Nonconformist programme which refers to the Universities, requires no advocacy in these pages. It embodies the accepted policy of the more liberal members of all parties in the State, and indicates deficiencies in recent measures of reform, the correction of which is un-

doubtedly a matter of time more than of argument. The questions raised by the Elementary Education Act (1870) are more intricate and more controverted. The proposal that the School Board and the State should take charge of secular instruction, the religious education of each district being provided by voluntary effort, appears to us to be the legitimate result of Nonconformist history, and to stand or fall with the principles upon which Nonconformity depends for its existence. The State, as a State, cannot touch matters of faith without outraging the convictions of some portion of its citizens. The religion taught by an official as a matter of school routine will be feeble in its influence, compared with the teaching of those who are moved to undertake the work by the deepest feelings of their hearts. By the employment of the schoolmasters of the nation as the religious instructors of its youth, parents are relieved from responsibilities which it is of the highest importance that they should personally feel; and Christian churches are absolved from duties which it is one of the purposes of their existence to discharge. The practical effect of religious teaching in public elementary schools has not been to attach our people to Christianity, but to render them indifferent to religion itself. It is in evidence that a very small proportion indeed of the children that pass through the ordinary church schools of England, as men and women attach themselves to any denomination. The Bible lesson is numbered among other lessons, and its divine power is lost.

The exclusion of religious teaching from ordinary school work means the extension of religious teaching by agencies guided by the earnest religious men of the country, and sustained by that enthusiasm without which the soul can never be touched. A national system of secular education is admitted, by the very existence of a conscience clause, to be compatible with the religious education of the community. A conscience clause enjoins absolute and complete separation between religious and secular teaching. The point at issue is, whether this religious teaching (which must by law be separated from the secular) should be given by the ordinary teachers of the school, or provided by the voluntary efforts of Christian organizations. The precise advantage gained by employing the same

teachers and the same management to conduct the secular and the religious work, is in the possession of power to tax the community for the propagation of the creed of the party which happens to have a majority on the School Board. No contest in England turns upon the question whether religion should or should not form a part of education—on that point Nonconformist and Conformist are agreed; neither does any contest turn upon the possibility of separating the religious from the secular element—that point is decided by the conscience clause; but the issue challenged is, whether the masters of schools belonging to the nation shall be the servants of a sect.

The scholastic profession—a profession which ought to be as independent of theology as law or physic—will be practically closed by a theological test, so long as a dominant sect has the power of enjoining the teaching of its own peculiar creed in a public school, or any part of the work of national education is handed over to the charge of denominational committees. As matters now stand, it is possible for a suspicion of heresy to prevent the engagement of a teacher, as it has been already known to influence the appointments to inferior offices connected with School Boards. Under the present law, a thousand obstacles may be placed in the way of high-minded and independent men who have religious opinions of their own, for which they refuse to be responsible to the Board in authority over them.

It is notorious that the class of men entering holy orders has been lowered by the demand for subscription, and we anticipate the same result with respect to the “new sacerdotal caste” created by the Education Act. The note of sectarianism has been sounded by managers of training-colleges, who are bidding their pupils do their utmost when they become teachers to propagate the principles of the Church of England in national schools. At a meeting of the Worcester, Lichfield and Hereford training-college, the pupils were advised,* that when offers of Board Schools were made to them, they should accept the position, trammelled as they might find it in some respects, “*determined*

* Speech of Rev. G. D. Boyle, Oct. 1871.

to do their utmost towards impregnating those schools with those important principles which they would continue to learn at that institution."

Nonconformists charge the Education Act with containing provisions which directly violate religious equality. The Act gives a School Board power to enforce the teaching (subject to the conscience clause) of any dogmas it may declare to be the truth of God. Formularies and catechisms which can be proved in a court of law to be distinctive of particular denominations are excluded; but every doctrine contained in those formularies and catechisms may be openly and directly taught.

A School Board may select any one of the religions which the world contains, and compel the master of a public school to be its teacher, under penalty of dismissal from his post. It is urged that religious equality is not infringed, because whatever religious teaching may be given in a school must be such as the majority of ratepayers prefer, and this majority may be Catholic in one place, Church of England in another, Methodist in another, no sect having any advantage given it over others. We submit that it is a mistake to suppose that by this plan no favour is shewn to one sect more than another. *Favour is shewn to the sect having the largest number of adherents.* The sect which can win the majority of votes receives the marked and decided advantage of being able to employ public funds for the teaching of its own peculiar creed. Equality cannot exist when a majority may use the resources of a minority for its own sectarian purposes. A member of a minority is not placed on an equality with a member of a majority, when he is compelled to pay a tax for the propagation of a faith he rejects.

The limitation placed by the conscience clause to the power the majority is permitted to exercise, fails to reconcile with either civil or religious liberty the authority given to whatever sect may be locally strongest to teach its own dogmas in public schools. Even supposing that to those who do not attend religious instruction the Board school is really a secular school, the very fact that they are obliged to sit apart during the religious instruction proves that they are not on an equality with the other children attend-

ing the school. What right has any one sect to mark off the children of other sects, who merely happen to be inferior to it in number, as peculiar, in schools which belong to the whole town? The strictest conscience clause is but a thin veil flung over ecclesiastical assumption.

The payment of fees to denominational schools constitutes another step towards the subjection of the education of the people to sectarian control. Over denominational schools the representatives of the ratepayers have no power whatever; they cannot choose their teachers or their books; they have no right to enter their doors. The objection to the payment of fees for secular instruction to denominational schools does not imply that there is any evil in giving religious education in the same room at another time, but that public funds ought not to be entrusted to committees solely responsible to sectarian organizations. Ecclesiastical bodies are not the proper directors of public education. They have never proved themselves sufficiently free from the prejudices of party, or disposed to subordinate the chances of sectarian gain to the interests of unfettered scholarship.

The results of the payments of fees to denominational schools can only be seen in connection with the recent increase of grants in aid, which may amount to 50 per cent. When the schools are filled with rate-paid scholars and the grant in aid is earned, the amount of voluntary subscriptions required is reduced to the merest trifle. The returns of one school are before us, from which it appears that 700 children have been educated at the cost to the subscribers of only £60 per annum. Although the fees paid by the children may not cover the cost of secular instruction, the school is able to obtain larger grants from the Government on account of attendances and passes, and voluntary contributions are less and less required. It is impossible to separate the payment made for the secular teaching from the money expended on the sectarian propaganda carried on in a denominational school. The amount contributed from the rates helps to sustain the institution itself in the activity of all its branches. As a matter of fact, schools directly managed by the representatives of the churches with which they are connected, and

in which the exclusion of catechisms and formularies is not required, may be almost entirely supported out of the rates and taxes of the country.

The objection of those Nonconformists who believe that Christianity is prevented from fulfilling its highest functions by the interference of the State with religious teaching, and that the education of a free people ought not to be handed over to the charge of the priests and clergymen of any denomination, to an educational policy so directly opposed to their most sacred convictions, may surely be called "conscientious" in the sense in which it was a matter of "conscience" with the early Christians to refuse a sacrifice to the gods of Rome.

Undoubtedly, the plea of conscience urged against payments from the rates must equally apply to the application of Queen's taxes for the purposes of religious teaching. There can be no particular magic in a method of collecting money to change the character of the object for which it is expended. Nonconformists have gradually learnt to follow the logic of their own principles; and upon this point the Manchester Conference uttered no uncertain sound. The programme accepted by the Conference protests against any legislation which will permit religious teaching at the public expense, or give support to denominational schools.

The Government is not condemned because it has endeavoured to incorporate existing institutions with a national system, but for the very opposite reason. Instead of incorporating existing institutions with a national system, it has encouraged, strengthened and extended that which is denominational at the expense of that which is national. The Government did far more than recognize the schools it found upon the ground; it made distinct provision for the building of new schools upon the old sectarian basis, after the passing of the Act of 1870. Since this Act became law, 3230 building grants have been applied for by parties wishing to erect schools in which catechisms and formularies distinctive of particular sects may be taught. Of these grants, 82 were sought by Roman Catholics, 460 by Nonconformists of various denominations, and 2852 by the Church of England. Nonconformists are reproached

for not having themselves applied for grants as open to them as to Churchmen and Catholics. The reply is patent. The majority of English Nonconformists desire the establishment of a national system of education, and decline to extend their own schools in order that national schools may be built. It is part of the policy of a reactionary ecclesiasticism—the Protestant parallel to Ultramontane Catholicism—to offer to all sects terms of a character it is known that those who do not believe in the desirability of submitting national education to clerical management, will refuse to accept.

By giving the School Board power to teach any religion it chooses ; rendering possible the application of theological tests to masters of public schools ; and liberally applying rates and taxes to the support of schools under uncontrolled denominational management—the educational policy of the Government has, we contend, violated religious equality, and practically surrendered the education of England into the charge of the strongest ecclesiastical bodies.

Delay in amending the Education Act means the abandonment of all hope of possessing a national public school system. Vested ecclesiastical interests in education are day by day being established, which, if permitted to increase, will hold the country at their mercy. A new system of endowment is being upbuilt, which, if unchecked, will dangerously limit the development of the free religious life of England.

If believers in religious equality are content merely to wait and watch, they will find when too late that the religious life of the nation has been fatally checked, and that the masses of its people, instead of being touched by a Christianity taught powerfully through Christian agencies, will have dismissed religion as a school task to the limbo of forgotten lessons. We underrate the dangers which beset modern civilization. Statistics of pauperism and crime give but slight insight into the wildness of the passions beating at the heart of a state of society so respectable and so cultured in its outward adornments and behaviour as our own. To bring the power of religion to bear upon this barbarism, it must be divested of everything formal, dictatorial and mechanical. The Christian Church possesses

resources applicable to the moral and spiritual elevation of the people, which are now wasted by being devoted to work the School Board could better perform. The 20,000 clergymen who are said to have gone into the work of education are men of undoubted piety, and if relieved from the wear and tear of ordinary school management, would have time and zeal and strength to expend upon the waste and desolate places now left untouched.

The agitation carried on for the purpose of amending the Act has been charged with delaying education. No accusation, we believe, could be more unfounded. The Nonconformist members of School Boards throughout the country have been eagerly pressing for the erection of Board schools. The opposition has sprung from those who have wished to secure time to permit sectarian organizations to cover the vacant ground; and plans for denominational schools existing only upon paper have been reckoned as furnishing available accommodation. In almost every rural and suburban district, the clergy have resisted the formation of School Boards; while boroughs owe their establishment to the authority of town councils upon which clerical influence cannot easily be brought to bear.

Disputes upon concurrent endowment have not, on the part of Nonconformists, been permitted to interfere with education itself. The question whether it is better to leave children in the gutter or permit them to attend denomination schools, does not in any way indicate the alternative presented to the nation. It has always been open to School Boards to obtain temporary premises, pending the erection of their own buildings, and to the Christian churches of a town to supply religious instruction out of their own abundant resources.

It would not have retarded the progress of education for a solitary hour to have entertained no proposals for sectarian building grants after the passing of the Act; on the contrary, such a course would have taken away the temptation to delay the organization of Board schools and secured their immediate erection.

The demand that institutions subsidized by the State should, during the secular hours to which that subsidy is declared alone to apply, be managed by duly elected repre-

sentatives of the people, does not involve any limitation of the supply of schools.

To describe those who submit the Nonconformist programme to the country, as "hating the Church more than they love education," is to conclude that there can be no love of education apart from the recognition of sectarian motives and claims.

The organization of Nonconformity for the promotion of religious equality appears to us justified by its necessity. The averment of those who support the Nonconformist programme is, that the principles which have been guiding the policy of the great Liberal party, and by the strength of which Catholics, Jews and Protestant Dissenters, enjoy the common privileges of English citizens, have been forsaken, and that powers dangerous to human liberty have been both assumed by the Government and placed in the hands of whatever sect may be dominant in the several parishes and boroughs of the country.

They believe that the highest interests of Christianity and education alike are perilously threatened. What other resource is left than that the great Nonconformist bodies which have in past times been united in common sufferings, should again draw together and venture to claim, not a privilege for themselves, but an absolute and complete religious equality for every citizen of the empire?

A Nonconformist organization implies no antagonism to those liberal men who cannot be called "Nonconformists." It necessarily sympathizes with all who share its aims; and seeking for equality can assume no pre-eminence for itself. Undoubtedly some Nonconformists are opposed to the programme of the Conference—chiefly those attached to the Wesleyan denomination; but the fact remains that it has been endorsed by a large majority of the district and national organizations connected with the Nonconformist bodies of the empire; and it must therefore be recognized as asserting the principles and the policy which will be definitely maintained by whatever organized power there is in Nonconformity.

It is useless to disguise facts. The country is on the eve of a great struggle in which political parties will be recast. Sects and churches and governments will contend

against each other with that apparently hopeless confusion of aim and blindness of passion, which, while it will weary the thoughtful and sadden the peaceful, appears to be the condition under which alone the light of a divine order is permitted to break over a troubled world.

Among the resolutions passed at the Manchester Conference was the following :

“That after grave deliberation this Conference is compelled to conclude that the educational policy unfortunately adopted by Her Majesty’s Government, is hostile to the interests of religious liberty, since :

“(1.) Under the Elementary Education Act sums of money may be paid from the rates for the support of sectarian schools.

“(2.) By the grants in aid of denominational schools, which have been largely and unnecessarily increased, in addition to the payments made from the rates, sectarian organizations for education may be entirely sustained without private subscriptions, and, as the result, the education of the people is to a large and increasing extent given into the charge of the clergy of the Church of England and the priests of the Church of Rome.

“Every effort having been made to induce the Government to re-consider a policy which reverses the whole course of modern legislation, this Conference, believing that the cause of religious freedom is of more importance than any ties of party, appeals to the Nonconformists of Great Britain to declare that they will not accept as a satisfactory representative any candidate for a seat in the House of Commons who will not pledge himself to the amendment of the Education Act, in the sense, and to the extent, of the propositions adopted by this Conference ; and further, to make it clearly understood that, except under the pressure of great national exigencies, they will not give any such candidate their support.”

This resolution contains no empty threat. It will leave its mark on the history of England.

HENRY W. CROSSKEY.

V.—GOD IN NATURE.

IF we ask ourselves what was the earliest impression produced by the spectacle of the universe on the mind of man, we can no longer, like Milton, imagine him standing alone upon the grass of Eden, and answering with adoring thoughts the gaze of the vaulted sky. The solemn tones of the Puritan poet give forth quite another music from any that really lay at heart in the childhood of the world. Yet it is admitted on all hands, not less by those who ridicule than by those who revere the tendency, that, to the eye of primitive wonder, the visible scene around would at first seem to be alive; day and night to have in them the lights and shades of thought; summer and winter to be pulsations of a hidden joy and grief; the eager stream to be charged with some hasting errand; and the soft wind to whisper secrets to the forest leaves. This sympathy with the action of Nature,—this ideal interpretation of the world,—which looks through the physical picture of things, and is touched by more than their physical effect, is moreover a specially human characteristic, confessedly due, not to the endowments which we share with the other animal races, but to the higher gifts of a constitution in advance of theirs. It is therefore an enriching faculty, and not a deluding incapacity from which the happier brutes are free. Say what we will of the superstitions to which it may lay us open, who can contemplate its primitive manifestations without a profound, though it be now a compassionate sympathy? And when, among the pre-historic vestiges of man upon this earth, we find already a grotto for his dead,* where, after the farewell funeral feast, he shut them in with their weapons by their side and their provisions for their journey into the unknown fields, who does not feel in these simple memorials a pathetic dignity which other natures do not approach?

In the apprehension, then, of the human observer, using his most human faculty, this visible world is folded round and steeped in a sea of life, whence enters all that rises, and whither return the generations that pass away. This

* At Aurignac in Haute Garonne: see Lyell's *Antiquity of Man*, p. 181, seqq.

is religion in its native simplicity, so far as it flows in from the aspect of the physical scene around, and ere it has quitted its indeterminate condition of poetic feeling to set into any of the definite forms of thought which philosophers have named. Doubtless, it is an ascription to nature, on the part of the observer, of a life like his own: in the boundless mirror of the earth and sky, he sees, as the figures of events flit by, the reflected image of himself. But for his living spirit he could not move; and, but for a living spirit, they could not move. Just as, when standing face to face with his fellow, he reads the glance of the eye, the sudden start, or the wringing of the hands, and refers them home to their source within the viewless soul of another; so, with dimmer and more wandering suspicion, does he discern behind the looks and movements of Nature a Mind that is the seat of power and the spring of every change. You laugh at so simple a philosophy; but how else would you have him proceed? Does he not, for this explanation, go straight to the only Cause which he knows? He is familiar with power in himself alone: in himself it is Will; and he has no other element than Will to be charged with the power of the world. Is it said to be childish thus to see his own life repeated in the sphere that lies around him, and to conceive of a God in the image of humanity; to project, as it were, his own shadow upon the space without, and then render to it the homage of his faith? * The objection might naturally enough be urged by a disciple of Schelling or Cousin, who supposed himself able to transcend his personal limits, and take immediate cognizance of the Infinite and Absolute. But surely it comes ill from those who have carried to its extreme length the Protagorean maxim, that "Man is the measure of all things;" who have laid down as a rule that we know nothing but our own feelings and ideas; and who have construed back even the material world into an ideal reflex of the order and permanence of our sensations. † The objection, however, is as little considerate as it is consistent. For, if we are to conceive of Mind at all elsewhere than at home, where are we to find the base of our conception, the

* Mill's Logic, Book iii. ch. v. § 9.

† Mill's Examination of Hamilton, ch. ii. xi.; Grote's Plato, ch. xxvi.

meaning of the words we use, if not in our own mental consciousness? Not in religion only, but in every sphere of understanding, self-knowledge is the condition and the limit of other knowledge; and if there were laws of intellect, or affections of goodness, other than our own, they must remain for ever foreign to our apprehension, and could be no objects of intelligent speech. Be it an order of thought of which we see traces beyond us, or a purpose of righteousness, or an expression of power, we have no means of imagining it at all except as homogeneous with our own. Either, therefore, the structure of our highest faculties is unsound, and the very constitution of our Reason condemns us to Unreason; or else the likeness we see between the world within and the world without, in its idea and its causality, reports a real correspondency, the answering face of the Divine and the human, communing through the glorious symbolism between.

It is at all events acknowledged as a fact, that this religious interpretation of the world is natural to man. It therefore holds him, till it is dispossessed by some superior claimant, with a certain right of pre-occupation. Next, it must also be admitted that, simply as an hypothesis, it is adequate to its purpose; i.e. that, if tried through the whole range of the phenomena, it provides a sufficient cause for all. It may be open to an objector to say that an Infinite Divine Will, eternally acting through the universe, is *more* than we want to give account of what we find; but he cannot say that it is *less*. It supplies an inexhaustible fund of causality, equal to every exigency, and incapable of being thrown upon engagements which it cannot meet. It is only when you add on to it superfluous explanations of your own,—when you affect to know, not only the *power whence*, but also the *reason why*; when you presume to read the particular motives whence this or that has sprung; when you charge the lightning flash with vengeance, or treat a blighted harvest as a judgment upon sin; when you discuss the course of a comet, or a trembling equilibrium of the planets, as a preparation for the judgment-day; when, in short, you fill the fields of space with the fictions of your spiritual geography, and pledge them without leave to act out the situations of your drama, that you are sure to be brought to shame, and turned into the

outer darkness prepared for the astrologers. But, keep to the modesty of simple religious faith, which, however sure of the ground and essence of things, knows nothing of the phenomena, and lets Science sort them as it will; say humbly, "How this and that may be, I cannot tell, nor am I in the secret why it is not other; I only know it is from Him who shines in the whole and hides in the parts;" and, stand where you may in time or place, you hold the key of an eternal temple on which none can put a lock you cannot open.

If, then, the recognition of Divine Causality is admitted to be primary and natural to man, to be dictated by just the faculties which lift him above other tribes, and to be adequate to the whole field it proposes to embrace, how is it that in many a mind it is weakened by the spirit of modern knowledge, and meets there with beliefs and tastes which seem to be ill at ease with it, and by supercilious looks to take repose and courage out of it? Has anything really been found out to disprove it? Has any chamber been opened and found empty, where it was thought God was sure to be? Has any analysis reached the hiding-place of his power, and entered its factors on its list of chemical equivalents? Has any geologist succeeded, not only in laying out the order of phenomena into well-reasoned succession, but in passing behind phenomena altogether, so as to attest a vacuity in the sphere of real Being; and, after his long retreat through the ages, has he slipped out at the back-door of Time right into the Eternal, and brought word that there is no Mind there? Let us calmly review, one by one, the characteristic achievements and auguries of recent Science, so far as they are supposed to affect religious conceptions, and estimate what they have done to disturb the Theistic interpretation of the world.

The first grand discovery of modern times is the immense extension of the Universe *in Space*. Compared with the fields from which our stars fling us their light, the kosmos of the ancient world was but as a cabinet of brilliants, or rather a little jewelled cup, found in the ocean or the wilderness. Wonderful as were the achievements, and sagacious as were the guesses, of the Greek astronomers, they little suspected what they were registering when they drew up their catalogues of stars: skilfully as they often

read the relative motions and positions of the wandering lights of heaven, so as to compute and predict the eclipse, their lines of measurement fell short even of this first solar chamber of Nature; and, for want of the telescope, their speculative imagination soon lost itself in childish fancies beyond. The concentric crystal spheres, the adamantine axis turning in the lap of Necessity, the bands that held the heaven together like a girth that ties a ship, the shaft which led from earth to sky, and which was paced by the soul in a thousand years, except when the time was come for her to be snatched in the twinkling of an eye to the mortal birth;—these things, presented in one of the most solemn and high-wrought passages of ancient literature,* give us the standard of the Greek kosmical conception in its sublimest dreams. That Plato should deem that fair but miniature structure not too great for some sort of Personal management, that he should provide a soul to fill it, ever living and self-sufficing, thinking out its order and gleaming through all its beauty, and making it an image of eternal good;—this, it is said, is not wonderful: the theory was not wholly disproportioned to the scale of the phenomenon. But what has now become of that Night-canopy of his and all that it contained? It has shrunk into a toy; and with it, we are told, its doctrine must go too. That which he deemed a millennial journey for the human traveller has been measured for us by a messenger swifter than the flash of Plato's thought; a messenger that could run round the earth eight times in a second.† What would the Philosopher have said, had he known at once this fleetness of the light and the time it spends upon its way?—that the beams flung from the pole-star on the evening when as a youth of thirty he was detained in his sick-room from the last hours of Socrates,‡ could only just reach his own eye when, at four-score, he was about to close it in death? As for the paler rays of the milky way which he describes, many a one that started in the hour when Plato was born, we are too soon to see; for they are not yet half way. Is this stupendous scene, we are asked, inhabited and wielded by one Sole Will?

* Plato de Republ. 614 C—621 B.

† The speed of light is 192,000 miles per second. ‡ Plato, Phædo, 59 B.

Can we stretch the conception of Personality till it is commensurate with the dimensions of such a world? Must not the problem be flung in despair into the shadow of fate, to be scrambled for by the rude and nameless forces which can do we know not what?

To this vague apprehension, which seems to oppress many minds, thus much must be conceded; that a compact little universe, every part of which our thought can visit with easy excursions, and which can lie within our conception as a whole, is better fitted to the scale of our capacities, and less strains the efforts of religious imagination, than the baffling infinitude which has burst open before us. But ease of fancy is no test of truth; and the mere inability of panting thought to overtake the opening way is no reason for retracing the steps already made. To let our own incapacity cast its negative shadow on the universe, and blot out the divineness, because it is too great, is a mere wild and puerile waywardness. How does the *size* of things affect their relation to a Cause already infinite? The miniature kosmos which we owned to be divine is still there, with all its beauty and its good; only embosomed in far-stretching fields of similar beauty and repeated good. It is not pretended that the vaster quantities with which we deal introduce us to a different *quality* of things; that they take us into lawless regions, and turn us out from a kosmos into a chaos. On the contrary, the same simple but sublime physical geometry which interprets the path of the projectile, the phases of Venus, and the sweep of the comet which has no return, is still available in the most distant heavens to which the telescope can pierce; and the star-traced diagrams of remotest space are embodied reasonings of the same science which works its problems on the black board of every school. Nay, the very light that brings us report from that inconceivable abyss, is as a filament that binds into one system the extremes of the kosmos there and here; for when it reaches the telescope, it is reflected by the same law as the beams of this morning's sun; the prism breaks it into the same colours, and bends them in the same degrees. So confident do we feel that there is not one truth here and another there, that no sooner does a luminous ray out of the sky reproduce in its spectrum the same adjustment of lines and colours which

our incandescient chemicals have been made to paint upon the wall, than we pronounce at once upon the materials supplying the solar and stellar fires. Nor do the nebulae, composed of gaseous matter of various density, with brilliant nucleus and fainter margin, leave it doubtful that the laws of heat and expansion which have been ascertained by us here carry their formulas into those vast depths. It is plain, therefore, that in being thrust out beyond the ancient bounds we are not driven as exiles into a trackless wilderness, where that which we had owned to be divine is exchanged for the undivine; the clue familiar to our hand lengthens as we go and never breaks; and, with whatever shudder imagination may look round, reason can find its way hither and thither precisely as before. What indeed have we found by moving out along all radii into the infinite?—that the whole is woven together in one sublime tissue of intellectual relations, geometric and physical; the realized original, of which all our science is but the partial copy. That science is the crowning product and supreme expression of human reason; what then is the organism which it interprets and renders visible on the reduced scale of our understanding? Can the photograph exhibit the symmetry of beauty and the expressive lines of thought, if no mind speaks through the original? Can the dead looks of matter and force fling upon the plate the portrait alive with genius and serene with intellect? Unless, therefore, it takes more mental faculty to construe a universe than to cause it, to read the book of nature than to write it, we must more than ever look upon its sublime face as the living appeal of thought to thought, the medium through which the eye of the Infinite Reason gazes into ours and wakes it to meet him on the way. The kosmic tracks all have the same termini; whoever moves upon them passes from Mind to Mind; God thinking out his eternal thought on lines that descend to us, from Cause to Law, from Law to Fact, from Fact to Sense; and we, counting our way back with labouring steps, from what we feel to what we see, and from what is to what must be, till we meet Him in the eternal fields, where all minds live on the same aliment, the ever-true and ever-good. Whether, in the movement of reason, He descends to us or we ascend to Him, it is by the path of law that stretches across

the spaces of the world, and is in one direction the way-farer's track, and in the other the highway of our God. Is it not childish, then, to be terrified out of our religion by the mere scale of things, and, because the little Mosaic firmament is broken in pieces, to ask whether its Divine Ruler is not also gone? Do you fear because the earth has dwindled to a sand-grain? So much the more glorious is the field in which it lies; so much the more numerous the sentinels of eternal equilibrium, the brilliant witnesses of order, rank upon rank, that pass always the same word, "There is no chaos here." Do you pretend that the dimensions are beyond the compass of a personal and living Mind? How, then, has your own mind, as learner, managed to measure and to know it at least enough to think it something beyond thought? Cannot the creative Intellect occupy and dispose beforehand, any scene of which your science can take possession afterwards? And if it is too much for the resources of Mind, which at any rate is supreme among the things we know, how can it fail to be in higher measure beyond the grasp of anything else? Does the order of *one* solar system tell us that we are in the domain of intelligence, but the balance and harmony of *ten thousand* cancel the security, and hand us over to blind material force? Shall a single canto from the Epic of the world breathe the tones of a genius divine; yet the sequel, which clears the meaning and multiplies the beauty, take from the poem its inspiration of thought, and reduce it to a mechanical crystallization of words? Does Reason turn into Unreason as it fills angust fields and nears the Infinite? Such a fear is self-convicted, and cannot shape itself into consistent speech: it is the mere panic of incompetent imagination, which the steadfast heart will tranquillize and the large mind transcend. We are not lost, then, in our modern immensities of space; but may still rest, with the wise of every age, in the faith that a realm of intellectual order and purest purpose environs us, and that the unity of nature is but the unity of the All-perfect Will.

The second great discovery of modern Science is the immense extension of the Universe *in Time*. This also disturbs the hearts of men by the dissolving of many a venerated dream, and forces on them unwelcome and un-

wonted conceptions, the significance of which we must try to estimate.

If for this purpose we deign to consult the witness of history, and listen to other men's thought ere we venture to work out our own, we encounter at once a singular rebuke to the precipitancy of theological fear. As if to evince the perseverance of religious faith, and its ready adaptation to the intellectual varieties of mankind, a conspicuous proof presents itself on this very field, that one age may consecrate a belief which to another may appear simply impious. The imagination of Christendom has selected and drawn out from eternity two limiting epochs as supremely sacred,—the Creation and the Dissolution of the world. These two,—the opening scene of the Divine drama of all things and its catastrophe,—have enclosed for us the whole *terra firma* of humanity, nay, of physical nature itself, between opposite seas of awe and mystery. All the beauty and horror, the tenderness and wrath, the pity and hope, which piety can wring from the soul of genius, have been shed upon those moments to make them real by their intensity. The imagery of ancient hymns,—the “*Lucis Creator Optime*” and the “*Dies iræ, dies illa*,”—the masterpieces of Art in the cathedrals of cities, and still more perhaps the plebeian pictures by the road-side oratory,—the majestic Epics of Dante and Milton,—the glorious music with which Haydn ushers in the light of the first days and Spohr draws down the shadows of the last,—have deeply fixed these supernatural boundaries in the fancy and feeling of Christians. Yet these very conceptions, that the universe had come into existence, and that it would pass out of it, are treated by Aristotle as totally inadmissible and at variance with the Divine perfection:* and so strong was the reverential feeling of the ancient philosophy against them, that even Philo the Jew, in the face of his own Scriptures, was carried away by it, and wrote a special treatise to prove the indestructibility of the world. Far from beginning with Genesis and ending with a destruction of the heavens and the earth, both of them sudden alike, the Greek philosophical piety shrank distressed from pa-

* Arist. de Cœlo, I. 3, II. 1; Met. xii. viii. 1074 a. b.; Conf. Philo, de Incorruptibilitate mundi, 3.

roxysms of change, and never felt itself in the Divine presence, except where the evolution was smooth and the order eternal.* The more it retired from phenomena to their ground, and, while among phenomena, the more it dwelt with regular recurrences which might go on for ever, the nearer did it believe itself to the Supreme Mind. Its favourite symbols and abodes of the god-like were not the earthquake and the smoking mountain, with its "blackness and darkness and tempest and voice of a trumpet and sound of words;" but the sphere, most perfect of forms, because like itself all round; and the rotatory movement of the fixed stars, because self-sufficing and complete, without the varying speed and even reversed direction of the less sacred planetary lights; and the symmetry of proportionate numbers, and the rhythm of music, and the secure steps of geometric deduction: whatever is serene and balanced and changeless, and seems to ask least from causes beyond itself, is the chosen retreat of the Hellenic type of devout contemplation. The peculiarity has its origin in this; that while the Hebrew traced the footsteps of God in Time and History, the Greek looked round for Him in Space and its kosmic order; so that the one met the sacred fire flashing and fading in the free movements of humanity, the other saw it fixed in the unwasting light of the eternal stars.

It would seem possible, then, for the universe still to remain the abode of God, even though it should never, as a whole, have come into existence, but should have been always there; and that actually under this very aspect it has put on its divinest look to some of the greatest intellects of the human race. This may well reassure us if, for the doctrine of absolute creation, we are called to substitute entirely new conceptions of the genesis of things. A century ago, all the lines of research which pushed their exploration into the Past, bound themselves to meet at a starting-point about six thousand years away. Intent upon this convergence, they virtually predetermined their own track in conformity with it. One after another, as they followed the trail of their own facts, they found that they

* Θεοῦ δὲ ἐνέργεια ἀθανασία· τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶ ζωὴ αἰδίου. Arist. de Cælo, ii. 3.

were likely to overshoot their rendezvous, and must either twist the indications of direction from their natural sweep, or else demand a longer run. Even for the mere human phenomena, the allowance of history was evidently too small: along the great rivers, which were the earliest seats of civilization, were found memorials of ancient dynasties which could not be compressed within so narrow a chronology. Remains of Art, disinterred from surprising depths below annual sand-drifts and fluvial deposits, measured themselves back thousands of years too far. The genealogy and rate of change in languages asked for more room to work. And the races of mankind, especially if they were to claim a common ancestry, could not make out their family tree, unless it were a more venerable stock with roots in the soil of an older world. Meanwhile, the Naturalist, hitherto content to classify and describe the forms of life now upon the earth and in the waters, was introduced by his brother who had been taking notes among the rocks to an entirely new realm of plants and animals,—a realm which compelled him to arrange its kinds by a rule of succession, one after its forerunner, as well as by a rule of analogy, one like its neighbour: and hardly had organic nature, instead of remaining a mere picture of what is, become also a history of what has been, than, even before any attempt at measuring the interval, the beads of the chain declared themselves in numbers far too great for the threads on which they were to hang. A less indefinite reckoning, however, was not far off. The Geologist, by patient and irresistible induction, established the series of sedimentary rocks, and shewed that the crust of the earth, to a depth far exceeding the measure of our highest mountain chains, has been formed and re-formed, its continents depressed and elevated, its valleys scooped out, its sea-lines changed, nay even its oceans filled, its climates turned from tropical to glacial, by the agencies which are at work around us now, but which are so slow, that a single generation can scarcely see them stir. Within the millions of years which are thus gained, the Physiologist finds scope to move, and thinks better of the small causes of change at his command for deriving kind from kind, and bridging the chasms which seem to keep the families of creatures distinct. And he suggests a law, gathered from the art of man in modifying

plants and animals, and legible enough in many natural samples, at the touch of which the barriers between species give way ; the separating intervals become derivative ; and a provisional character is assumed by even the broadest distinctions, not excepting (as some will have it) that which parts the organic from the inorganic world. To complete this conversion of the kosmos born in a week into a growth through immeasurable ages, enters the hypothesis that the whole solar system was once an incandescent nebulous mass, whose rotation, as it cools, has flung off in succession its outer rings, and left them to condense in their orbits into the planetary spheres ; each, in its turn, to solidify round its molten centre into a habitable world ; till the sun alone retains its self-luminous glow. There is nothing to hinder speculative science from pushing the same analogies into the remotest stellar fields : and the resulting picture would be, of an eternal kosmogony, by uninterrupted development, with no starts from nonentity into existence, no leap from stage to stage of being ; but with perpetuity of the same methods and the same rates of evolution which have their play around us now.

For our present purpose, it is superfluous to draw any line between what is established certainty and what is conjectural vaticination in this picture. Suppose it to be all true, and consider what difference it makes to our religious conceptions.

The essence of the difference between the older and the newer doctrine lies in this,—that the causality which the former concentrates, the latter distributes : the fiat of a moment bursts open, and spreads itself along the path of perpetuity. Whichever way it acts, it is plain that the sum of its work is still the same, and demands neither more nor less in the one case than in the other. The element of time is totally indifferent to the character of the products it turns up : it takes as much power to grow a tree in a century as to create it in a night. Neither the magnitude nor the quality of the universe is altered by the discovery how old it is ; whatever beauty, whatever intellectual relations, whatever good, gleamed from it and reported its divine inhabitant to those who deemed it a thing of yesterday, are still there, only with glory more prolonged, for us who know it to be a less recent and a less perishable thing. It is not

degraded by having lasted so long, that we should set it down to a meaner source ; it is not dwindled or reduced, that we should give it to a minor power. We want, in order to render account of it, precisely what was wanted before ; and the only change is not in the cause, but in the date and manner of the effect ; in the substitution, for fits and paroxysms of volition, of the perennial flow of thought along the path of law ; a method which surely more accords with the serenity of perfect Mind. So long as we arrive at last at the symmetry, the balance, the happy adaptations, of the higher organisms, at the constitution of the eye for vision, and the hand for a designer's work, and the instincts that move blindly into partnership of harmony, there is not less to admire and esteem divine for its having been for ever growing richer and grander, and so having been long upon the way. If you suppose that the less can produce the greater, you leave the excess of the latter above the former without a cause ; if you admit that it cannot, then whatever you would require as adequate to the last term must already be present in the first.

This brings me to notice a singular logical illusion which seems to haunt the expounders of the modern doctrine of natural development. They apparently assume that *growth* dispenses with causation ; so that if they can only set something growing, they may begin upon the edge of zero, and by simply giving it time, find it on their return a universe complete. Grant them only some tiniest cellule, to hold a force not worth mentioning ; grant them further a tendency in this *one* to become *two*, and to improve its habits a little as it goes ; and in an infinite series there is no limit to the magnitude and splendour of the terms they will turn out. By brooding long enough on an egg that is next to nothing, they can in this way hatch any universe actual or possible. Is it not evident that this is a mere trick of imagination, concealing its thefts of causation by committing them little by little, and taking the heap from the divine store-house grain by grain ? You draw upon the fund of infinite resource to just the same amount, whether you call for it all at a stroke, or sow it sparse, as an invisible gold-dust, along the mountain-range of ages. Handle the terms as you may, you cannot make an equation with an infinitesimal on one side and an infinite upon

the other, though you spread an eternity between. You are asking, in fact, for something other than time; since this, of itself, can never do more than hand on what there is from point to point, and can by no means help the lower to create the higher. Time is of no use to your doctrine, except to thin and hide the little increments of adapting and improving power which you purloin. Mental causation is not then reduced to physical by diluting it with duration; and if you shew me ever so trivial a seed from which have come, you say, the teeming world and the embracing heavens, and the soul of man which interprets them in thought, my inference will be, not that they have no more divineness than that rudimentary tissue, but that it had no less divineness than they have spread abroad.

It is a common feature of every doctrine of development in time, that the course has been from ruder elements to more refined combinations, from comparative chaos to the kosmos we behold. That a solar system should succeed to a cloud on fire; that a red-hot earth should put on a decent crust, and get the water into its hollows, and the residuary atmosphere cool and pure; that the history of its life should begin with the mosses and the ferns, and should reach to man; constitutes a clear progression, and compels us to report, of our portion of the universe, that it is for ever looking up. If this discovery had been opened to Plato and Aristotle, would it have added to their religion, or subtracted from it? *Which* terminus of the progression would their thought have seized as the seat of the new light? Assuredly on the latest point of the ascent. As it was not in the raw material, but in the realized order of the world, that they read the expression of divine Reason, as the *end in view* can only come out at the last, thither it is that the eye of their philosophy would have turned; and they would have accepted the law of progression as enhancing the sacredness of the great whole, as intimating ideal ends beyond what they had found, as the sign of even more and better thought at the heart of things than they had dared to dream. "Did we not say," they would have asked, "that this kosmos was full of Mind, shaping it to such beauty as was possible, and directing it to the best attainable ends? and see here the very pressure and movement of this inner mind; for the beauty rises in glory, and

the ends are stepping on to more perfection." No one probably who is familiar with their modes of reasoning will doubt that this is the kind of impression which would have been made upon these Philosophers by the modern law of progression. But how do its popular expounders deal with it? By a singular inversion of attention and interest, they fix their eye on the other end of the succession, the crude fermentation of the earth's seething mass, and virtually say, "You think yourself the child of God; come and see the slime of which you are the spawn." Need I insist, that the antithesis is as false as the insinuated inference is mean; inasmuch as no secondary causation excludes the primary, but only traces its method and order? It is quite right to complete, if you can, your natural history from first to last. But if you would estimate the type or project of a growing nature, with a view to see whether it carries anything you can suppose to be divine, is it the more reasonable to look at the stuff it is made of, or at the perfection it attains to? If it *were* the work of God, which of these two would bear the stamp of His intent? There is no wonder that you miss the end in view, if you will look only at the beginning; and that the intellectual character of the finished product is not apparent in the lower workshops of nature where its constituents are mixed. As well might you expect to find the genius of a poem in the vessel where the pulp of its paper is prepared. Causation must be measured by its supreme and perfected effects; and it is a philosophical ingratitude to construe the glorious outburst to which its *crescendo* mounts by the faint beginnings of its scale. Would you think the aspect of things to be more divine, if the law were reversed, and creation slipped downward on a course of perpetual declension? Would you turn your present conclusion round, and say, "See how the higher creates the lower, and all must begin from God"? On the contrary, you would justly take alarm, and cry, "There is no heavenly government here; the tendency is through perpetual loss to chaos in the end; and if there were ever an idea within the aggregate of things, it is a baffled thought, impotent to stop confusion." Nowhere, surely, would atheism be more excused than in a world that runs to ruin. Would you then prefer, so far as piety is concerned, that the universe should be a system of station-

any good ; either without a tide at all in its affairs ; or, with periodic ebb and flow, rising for ever with a flood of promise, and for ever sinking with disappointing retreat ? Does the movement of Living Mind speak to you with power in this oscillating pendulum or this perpetuity of rest ? Or would they not rather throw upon you the silent shadow of an eternal Fate ? May we not say, then, that, of the three possibilities conceivable in the course of nature, that law of progression which is now registered among the strong probabilities of science, is the most accordant with the divine interpretation of the world ?

I conclude, then, that neither of these two modern discoveries, viz., the immense extension of the universe in Space, and its unlimited development in Time, has any effect on the Theistic faith, except to glorify it. A tissue of intellectual order infinitely wide, a history of ascending growth immeasurably prolonged, surely open to the human mind which can read them both, everything that can be asked for a spectacle entirely divine. No one indeed could ever have supposed that religion was hurt by this discovery, had not Christendom unhappily bound up its religion with the physics of Moses and of Paul. Setting aside any question of authority, and looking with fresh eyes at the reality itself, who would not own that we live in a more glorious universe than they ? Who would go to a Herschel and say, "Roof over your stellar infinitudes, and give me back the solid firmament, with its waters above and its clouds below ; find me again the third story of the heaven where the apostle heard the ineffable words" ? Who would demand of a Darwin, "Blot out your geologic time, and take me home again to the easy limits of 6000 years" ? Who, —I say not in the interest of science, but in the very hour of his midnight prayer,—would wish to look into skies less deep, or to be near a God whose presence was the living chain of fewer ages ? It cannot be denied that the architects of science have raised over us a nobler temple, and the hierophants of nature introduced us to a sublimer worship. I do not say that they *alone* could ever find for us, if else we knew it not, who it is that fills that temple, and what is the inner meaning of its sacred things ; for it is not, I believe, through any physical aspect of things, if that were all, but through the human experiences of the conscience

and affections, that the living God comes to apprehension and communion with us. But, when once He has been found of us, or rather we of Him, it is of no small moment that, in our mental picture of the universe, an abode should be prepared worthy of a Presence so dear and so august. And never, prior to our day, did the heavens more declare His glory, or the world present a fitter temple for Him who inhabiteth Eternity.

JAMES MARTINEAU.

VI.—THE BENNETT JUDGMENT.

A LEGAL tribunal has been occupied in discussing the precise changes effected in the Eucharistic bread and wine by the pronouncing of certain words over them. It has given a decision defining the doctrines of the Church of England on the subject. At first sight, it seems that a matter so utterly alien to modern life and modern thought can have no interest for Liberals. Our religion has passed long ago beyond the sphere of symbols or ceremonies: what have we to do with a dispute between two sacramental theories?

It is the purpose of this article to shew that the late Judgment has an important interest for us, as it must materially increase the liberties of Broad-churchmen in their own special controversies. We are far away from the doctrines actually disputed in Mr. Bennett's case; and the gulf that separates him from men who are living in the full life of the present age, may be measured by one extract from his works. In the "Plea for Toleration," one of the two books which formed the subject of the present prosecution, he says:*

"I am told there are instances of the celebration of Holy Communion actually *in the evening*! It is said that in upwards of a hundred churches in the diocese of London this practice prevails; but can there be within the reach of the imagination

* P. 75.

anything more dreadful than this? It was never heard of in the Church until these unhappy later days."

But the importance of the recent Judgment lies in its being the first of the kind for twenty years which has added new principles to the law. Ever since the Gorham case, all decisions on heresy have been mere applications of established rules of construction, resulting, as in the cases of Archdeacon Denison, Mr. Voysey, Mr. Heath, now in the condemnation, now—as in the *Essays*' case—in the acquittal of particular doctrines, but adding nothing to the general law. We shall shew that the Privy Council has now broken bolder ground, and established new rules which will cover other heretics than Mr. Bennett. It may be hoped that the clergy will be as quick to avail themselves of their freedom as they have been in other cases, for thus only can the ground be made good. One of the most striking results of the *Essays and Reviews*' Judgment was the unexpected frequency with which avowals of disbelief in literal inspiration and eternity of punishment were made by the clergy the moment that the legality of doing so was established. It became clear that there is a vast atmosphere of heresy in the clerical ranks, confined now by the creeds, but ready to burst through any safety-valve that the law may open. In the last century the Church abounded in Anti-trinitarian clergy: Mr. Stone was condemned for such views, and none of his brethren have spoken out on that doctrine since. If clerical candour vary thus closely with the state of the law, the Bennett Judgment may bring about strange revelations.

One remark only need be made before passing to the details of the decision. Several critics are embarrassed by finding Mr. Bennett acquitted for teaching doctrines which in *Liddell v. Westerton* and *Martin v. Maconochie* it was held illegal to act upon in public worship. Yet the distinction is clear: the doctrines may be held, because the Articles do not exclude them; they may not be embodied in worship, because the Church's ritual does not include them. For, in brief, a creed sanctions all that it does not condemn; a liturgy condemns all that it does not sanction.

Mr. Bennett's heresies may be divided, in his own words, into,

"I. The Real Objective Presence in the Eucharist.

II. The sacrifice offered by the Priest.

III. The adoration due to the Presence therein."

I. Mr. Bennett in the first and second editions of his "Plea for Toleration,"* had defended as a dogma, on which "the whole efficacy of the faith" depended "the real, actual and visible presence of the Lord upon the altars of our churches." In the third edition—but rather, we fear, from a feeling of its illegality than a sense of its palpable falsity—he omitted the word "visible," and altered the passage to "the real and actual presence of our Lord under the form of bread and wine upon the altars of our churches." Elsewhere† he speaks of this presence as "objective." Again he said:‡ "I adore, and teach the people to adore, the consecrated elements, believing Christ to be in them, believing that under their veil is the sacred body and blood of my Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ." In the third edition he alters this to,§ "I adore, and teach the people to adore, *Christ present in the sacrament under the form of bread and wine*, believing that under their veil is the sacred body and blood of my Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ." Mr. Bennett explained in his Preface to the edition in which these alterations appeared, that no change had taken place in his opinions, but that to avoid any misconstruction of his meaning he had adopted the new forms of expression as being a more definite statement. This explanation is accepted by both the Dean of Arches and the Privy Council; and they therefore throw out of consideration Mr. Bennett's previous statements, which both of them declare would inevitably have led to his condemnation. Are then his subsequent forms of expression innocent? The teachings of the Thirty-nine Articles are, that "The change of the substance of bread and wine in the Supper of the Lord cannot be proved by Holy Writ, but is repugnant to the plain words of Scripture, overthroweth the nature of a sacrament, and hath given occasion to many superstitions." "The body of Christ is given, taken and eaten in the Supper only after an heavenly and spiritual manner." "The mean whereby the body of Christ is received and eaten in the Supper is faith." "The wicked, and such as be void

* P. 3. † P. 10. ‡ P. 14. § We italicise the words varied.

of a lively faith, although they do carnally and visibly press with their teeth (as St. Augustine saith) the sacrament of the body and blood of Christ, yet in no wise are they partakers of Christ, but rather to their condemnation do they eat and drink the sign or sacrament of so great a thing." And in the Rubric appended to the Communion Service we read: "The sacramental bread and wine remain still in their very natural substances, and therefore may not be adored (for that were idolatry to be abhorred of all faithful Christians); and the natural body and blood of our Saviour Christ are in heaven and not here, it being against the truth of Christ's natural body to be at one time in more places than one."

Can these teachings be reconciled with those of Mr. Bennett? If Christ's body and blood are in heaven and not here, can it consistently be said that they are present here veiled under our bread and wine? If the presence of Christ in the sacrament be only heavenly and spiritual, a presence only to faith, leaving the bread and wine still in their very natural substances, and so no presence at all to the unfaithful eater—if this be so, can such a Presence be real, objective, actual? We may conjecture how indigantly the framers of the Articles would have denied it. Yet the Privy Council has pronounced these positions, which to plain men seem so contradictory, to be compatible with each other. Surely the mode of construction which can strain this part of the Church's creed so far, will not prove altogether powerless when employed to relax the fetters of Broad-churchmen.

Said the prosecutor's counsel in effect: Since the Church teaches that Christ's body is not here, the only way in which it can be spoken of as being present in the sacrament is by being present to the soul of the communicant. And when she denies "any corporal presence of Christ's natural flesh and blood" in the Eucharist, she uses the most sweeping language, language certainly including a "real, actual and objective presence." There can be no question as to the mode or manner of the presence; for no mode or manner of presence is conceivable which would reconcile the proposition that the true body of Christ is in the elements with the proposition that it is in heaven and not here.

These contentions may seem to the reader almost self-evident, but the Privy Council are determined not to be thus pinned down. "Their Lordships," they say, "are of opinion that these inferences, whether probable or not, are by no means of that plain and certain character which the conclusion they are asked to draw from them [the condemnation of the accused in a quasi-criminal proceeding] requires. The matters to which they relate are confessedly not comprehensible, or very imperfectly comprehensible, by the human understanding; the province of reasoning as applied to them is therefore very limited; and the terms employed have not, and cannot have, that precision of meaning which the character of the argument demands." And they say: "Mr. Bennett's assertion of a 'real, actual, objective presence' does not appear to us to assert either expressly, or by necessary implication, a presence other than 'heavenly and spiritual.' The Article, that 'the wicked eat not the body of Christ,' may suggest indeed an inference unfavourable to Mr. Bennett's statements, but cannot be said to be plainly contradictory of them or necessarily to exclude them."

In this part of the Judgment a new rule of law is laid down, making an important addition to the jurisprudence of heresy. Heretofore the rule has been, that a clergyman acts illegally in maintaining any doctrine inconsistent with the Articles or with propositions directly deducible from them: "the Court must never assume that anything found in the Articles was not intended to have full effect and operation."* But now the corollary is added, that in the case of such doctrines as are "very imperfectly comprehensible," the Court cannot draw any inferences from the Articles, but will condemn only such doctrines as impugn their very words. Moreover, in the case before us, the Privy Council have carried this so far as to refuse to consider the words, "real, actual, objective, without us, not within us only," as being compatible with the words, "heavenly and spiritual only;" and to refuse to consider the position that a body is "in heaven and not here," as plainly inconsistent with the position that it is here and in our hands. We confess we do not see how the presence of a body in a particular

* Dr. Lushington's Judgment, *Heath v. Burder*.

place can be regarded as "by no means a plain and certain" contradiction of its absence therefrom, except on the startling view put out by Dr. Newman in Tract Ninety. He there reconciled these theories of the Real Presence with the Church's teachings, by saying that the body may be present in the bread without being *locally* present, for "we do not know at all what is meant by distance or intervals absolutely, any more than we know what is meant by absolute time. . . . Why should any conventional measure of ours be the standard of presence or distance?" All England cried out at the time at these proposals to make words meaningless; but the Privy Council is prepared to go equal lengths, if it can thereby ensure a heretic's acquittal.

Surely the doctrines of the Trinity, the Atonement, the nature of Miracles, are at least as far from being perfectly comprehensible as the doctrines of the Eucharist. It will not be easy, then, to detect in any teachings which do not use the very language of the Church's formularies a "plain and certain" deviation from those dogmas.

II. Mr. Bennett had maintained that the communion-table is an altar of sacrifice, at which the priests "appear in a sacerdotal position, as occupied in the great Sacrifice which it is their office to offer,"* at the celebration of the Holy Communion, and that thus at such celebration there is an offering of our Lord by the ministering priest, in which "the mediation of Jesus ascends from the altar to plead for the sins of man."† The Thirty-nine Articles, on the other hand, say that Christ's crucifixion was the only satisfaction, and that "there is none other satisfaction for sin but that alone;" and that "the sacrifices of masses, in which it was commonly said that the priest did offer Christ for the quick and the dead to have remission of pain or guilt, were blasphemous fables and dangerous deceits." And therefore their Lordships declare that "it is not lawful for a clergyman to teach that in the Eucharist there is, or can be, any sacrifice or offering of Christ which is efficacious, in the sense in which Christ's death is efficacious, to procure the remission of the guilt or punishment of sin." How, then, can Mr. Bennett be acquitted? Their Lordships

* The Church and the World, 1867, p. 13.

† Ibid.

suggest that he may have used the word *sacrifice* only in a rare and improper sense. "By many divines of eminence the word 'sacrifice' has been applied to the Lord's Supper in the sense, not of a true propitiatory or atoning sacrifice, effectual as a satisfaction for sin, but of a rite which calls to remembrance and represents before God that one true sacrifice. . . . The distinction is clear, though it is liable to be obscured, not only in the apprehension of the ignorant, but by the tendency of theologians to exalt the importance of the rite, till the distinction itself well-nigh disappears." Still harder is it to distinguish between such a doctrine, if such be Mr. Bennett's, and the view which he repudiates as "making the idea of a sacrifice a chimera," viz., the view that the Eucharist is merely* "an act of memorial, an agape or love-feast, a solemn record of Jesus' passion and death." But between the sacrifice which is really a sacrifice, and which therefore the Church forbids Mr. Bennett to believe, and the sacrifice which is only an act of memorial, and which Mr. Bennett declares that he does not believe, their Lordships discern a possibility of a third sacrifice, which is a rite of remembrance; and in view of that possibility pronounce it "not clear that the respondent has so used the word *sacrifice* as to contradict the language of the Articles."

Mr. Bennett had explained his meaning pretty broadly. He had endorsed as "holy, comforting doctrine, true Catholic doctrine,"† the view that the Eucharist is a "ransom to the sinner." "Were it *only* a thankful commemoration of Christ's redeeming love, or *only* a showing forth of his death, or *only* a strengthening and refreshing of the soul, it were indeed a reasonable service, but it could have no direct healing to the sinner. . . . He drinks his ransom, he eateth the very body and blood of the Lord, the only sacrifice for sin. God poureth out for him the most precious blood of His only-begotten." These are Dr. Pusey's words; and in 1843 the University of Oxford suspended him for two years. Mr. Bennett adopts them to-day, and the Privy Council holds him guiltless. It can conceive a sense in which even these positions are in harmony with the Church's formularies. Yet if in "sacrifice" so many meanings can

* Church and the World, 1867, p. 10.

† Ibid. p. 11.

be found lurking, may we not hope that the words "inspiration," "miracle," "atonement," "Trinity," will prove equally elastic under the touch of the next Judicial Committee?

If the Articles may be thus evaded, the vague expressions of the Liturgy cannot be less pliable. It is only in the Liturgy that any references to personal devils or interferences with natural law occur. If a clergyman resolve Satan into a metaphor, or dissuade his flock from petitioning Heaven about the weather, need he now fear condemnation?

III. Mr. Bennett had taught the duty of worshipping the bread and wine in the following passage: "I am one of those who burn lighted candles at the altar in the day-time, who use incense at the Holy Sacrifice; who use the Eucharistic vestments; who elevate the blessed sacrament; who myself adore, and teach the people to *adore the consecrated elements, believing Christ to be in them.*"* In the third edition, the words which we have italicised were changed to, "to adore Christ present in the sacrament under the form of bread and wine."

Now what does the English Church say on this matter? The Rubric of the Communion Service says: "No adoration ought to be done either to the sacramental bread and wine there bodily received, or to any corporal presence of Christ's natural flesh and blood." And the Thirty-nine Articles say: "The sacrament of the Lord's Supper was not by Christ's ordinance reserved, carried about, lifted up or worshiped." Moreover, in the forms appointed by the Church for the celebration of this rite, she has, in the words of the present Judgment, "forbidden all acts of adoration to the consecrated elements; and has been careful to exclude any act of adoration on the part of the minister at or after the consecration of the elements, and to explain the posture of kneeling prescribed by the Rubric." Therefore, say they, if the charge against Mr. Bennett were that he *had* performed an outward act of adoration to the bread and wine, it would be clearly necessary to condemn him. But he is charged with asserting that they ought to be adored; and his confession that he *does* adore them, and teaches his

* Plea for Toleration, p. 14.

people to adore them, is not of itself such an assertion. "It is questionable," say their Lordships, "whether a confession of an unlawful act will amount to false doctrine." Mr. Bennett's acquittal on this head is based then on this rule : when the Church teaches that a practice is wrong, the only teaching that can be condemned as contrary to this is the directly reverse teaching, viz., that the practice is right ; a confession of adherence to that practice, or an exhortation to others to adhere to it, is not false doctrine.

We are not condemning this rule, but we point out that it is a new one, and must prove an important one. Henceforward a clergyman must stand free of all charge of heresy for saying, "The Church forbids such or such a practice. Nevertheless, I do it, and I recommend it to you." To admit a suspended heretic, a layman, a Dissenting minister, to the reading-desk or the pulpit—it is wrong to do it, but it may be recommended with impunity. To study heterodox books, to be present at schismatical services, to perform the Burial Service over the unbaptized—all these acts may be forbidden by the Church ; but to confess to having committed them, or to urge their commission, is no longer to be considered as amounting to false doctrine. Nay, some clergyman may dare to say, "I do not in my heart pray to Christ, and I urge you not to pray to him. Let us repeat the Church's forms of prayer to him, but repeat them as forms only." And will not this Judgment shield him from having this *confession* of an illegal act treated as an avowal of a heresy ?

But we must point out a further loophole devised by "some of their Lordships" for Mr. Bennett's escape. True, he adores the elements, and the Church teaches that they are not to be adored. But may there not be an outward adoration and an inward adoration also ? And may it not be that the Church has meant to condemn only one of these, and that Mr. Bennett has meant to practise only the other ? They admit that the word *adoration*, as used by Mr. Bennett, "seems to point rather to external acts of worship," but they nevertheless "doubt whether it may not be construed to refer to mental adoration ;" and then if it be construed in the directly opposite manner when it occurs in the Church's Formularies, any collision between them and Mr. Bennett will be avoided ! We again say, we do not

criticise this dexterous subtilty, but we trust their Lordships will prove equally facile when next a Broad-churchman stands at their bar.

Thus their Lordships, "not without doubts and division of opinions, have come to the conclusion that the charge [of teaching the adoration] is not so clearly made out as the rules which govern penal proceedings require. Mr. Bennett is entitled to the benefit of any doubt that may exist. His language has been rash; but as it appears to the majority of their Lordships that *his words can be construed* so as not to be plainly repugnant to the passages articulated against them," they give him the benefit of the doubt. The words which we italicise introduce into prosecutions for heresy an entirely new rule of construction, of great indulgence to the accused. Hitherto the practice has been to construe the Church's Formularies in their plain and ordinary sense, and to construe also in just the same sense the heretical passages which are accused of contravening them. (So, in the *Essays and Reviews*' case, the Privy Council say: "With respect to the construction of the passages extracted from the Essays of the accused parties, the meaning to be ascribed to them must be that which the words bear according to the ordinary grammatical meaning of language.") The Court has by the present Judgment altered its practice, and adopted the milder rule of attaching to a writer's words the most orthodox meaning into which they can be construed. It should not escape remark that a similar leniency is not practised even by courts of criminal law, although the reference in the Judgment to "the rules of penal proceedings" seems to indicate that their Lordships imagined it to be so. "Formerly," says Russell,* "it was the practice to say that the words of a libel were to be taken in the more lenient sense: but that doctrine is now exploded. They are not to be taken in the more lenient or more severe sense, but in the sense which fairly belongs to them. . . . The jury are to read the paper, stated to be a libel, as men of common understanding, and say whether in their minds it conveys the sense imputed."

Our review of this Judgment is now concluded. It is the misfortune inherent in law like ours, created by judicial

* Treatise on Crimes and Misdemeanours, I. 322.

decisions, that the grounds and principles of the law obtain no clear and authoritative statement, but are left to the labour of the private jurist to discover. As best we could, we have elicited in the present case whatever new rules stand implied in it. That they might be of as great power in the defence of a Liberal as they have proved to be in that of a Sacerdotalist, is clear. Had this decision been given before the Judgment on Mr. Voysey, it would have rendered it impossible for the Court in the latter case to rule several of the minor points as they did. One of the charges on which Mr. Heath was condemned in 1862, was that of having said that certain phrases were unscriptural, which admittedly were so: but those phrases happened to occur in the Articles, and the Privy Council held that to call language unscriptural which was to be found in the Articles, involved a denial of the Articles. So Mr. Voysey was condemned for saying that certain doctrines taught in the Articles had not been taught by Christ—though he did not deny that they were true, or were taught in the later books of Scripture. Contrast this strictness with the present Judgment, which strains every word and relaxes every rule that it may give a chance for the defendant's escape.

It may be said, and with some truth, that the Privy Council is not to be counted on as unerringly as other tribunals. It takes account, sometimes even avowedly, of considerations of policy or of history which they would disregard. It has gone so far as to reverse its own decisions ere now. And it will be added that the Broad-Church party, inferior in numbers and in political importance, will not inspire the Council with that leniency which was shewn so strikingly towards Mr. Bennett. It may be so; but, on the other hand, the tide may turn. The High-Church party have been under as great a cloud as we are. Doctrines identical with Mr. Bennett's were condemned in Dr. Pusey's case, and in Archdeacon Denison's. The University of Oxford suspended Dr. Pusey; Dr. Lushington condemned and deprived the Archdeacon.* To-day, the Privy Council,

* The deprivation was set aside merely on a technical error as to the time for commencing proceedings. Yet Mr. Bennett (*Plea for Toleration*, p. 66) can assert that "the case broke down: nothing could be shewn to prove that it was a false doctrine, or to dislodge the Archdeacon from the position;" and that it "set the seal of the English Church upon these doctrines."

of their voluntary grace, without hearing counsel or requiring argument in his favour, assoilzie an utterer of these heresies. Who knows whether this new licence may not prove fruitful?

COURTNEY KENNY.

Mr. Bennett has escaped condemnation, though only by a hair's-breadth, and the world has, for the present at least, lost the opportunity of knowing whether the Anglican party in the Church were capable of rising to the sincerity of secession. Our contributor, in the lucid exposition which precedes these remarks, has explained the character and importance of the strange Judgment which, after much delay and many consultations, the Supreme Court of Appeal has delivered. Speaking from another than the legal point of view, we are bound to say that it will not greatly raise the character of that tribunal with that part of the English people whose passions and prejudices are not concerned with the decision itself. It wears the appearance much more of a political compromise than of a calm and impartial exposition of the law. It seems to aim at once at the acquittal of the accused, and at a statement of the doctrine of the Church of England which to ordinary minds appears inconsistent with such an acquittal. The reproof of Sir Robert Phillimore's statements from the Bench, coupled with the affirmation of his Judgment, looks like a sop given to ecclesiastical prepossession. But, worse even than this, it is very difficult to reconcile with the new rules of law, the lax interpretations of this Judgment,—as compared with the tone and methods of earlier decisions,—the conviction, which every Englishman desires to retain, of the perfect impartiality of his courts of justice. Why such exact measure meted out to Mr. Voysey—so many loopholes of escape left to Mr. Bennett? Can it be that one was looked upon as only a solitary heretic, the other as the representative of a large and powerful party in the Church? Was the Ritualist menace of secession felt to be sincere, and the impression forced upon the minds of the Judges that almost any means were lawful to prevent a schism in the Church? These are the suspicions which are flitting through many minds, though few men care to utter them above their breath. The only form in which they come to

the light is a vague statement that the Committee of Council is justifiably guided in its decisions by considerations of policy as well as by maxims of law. Meanwhile the Anglican party openly exult in their victory, and the Evangelicals shew their bitter sense of defeat by feverish attempts to prove that it is no defeat at all.

It is worth while to notice a statement just made by the *Church Times*, the organ of the extreme Ritualists, which, if true, throws a new light upon the application of this Judgment to the Anglican party. The *Standard* had said: "We do not like to contemplate a sentence which might have involved men like Dr. Pusey, Dr. Liddon and Dean Hook, in the condemnation passed upon a rash, self-willed and indiscreet theologian like Mr. Bennett." Upon which the *Church Times*:

"Writers who talk in this fashion do not seem to be aware that the Court has not been trying Mr. Bennett at all, except, to use a favourite phrase of theirs, 'technically.' The real defendant has been Dr. Pusey; and if anybody has been 'a rash, self-willed, and indiscreet theologian,' if any one has 'escaped by the skin of his teeth,' it is the revered Canon of Christ Church. The case stands thus—Mr. Bennett, in a pamphlet written evidently from a full heart, and certainly with a hasty pen, let drop certain expressions which were undoubtedly contrary to the letter of the Thirty-nine Articles; but the moment his attention was called to them, he issued—such was his obstinacy, rashness, and self-will—a new edition in which for the objectionable phrases, others framed for him by Dr. Pusey were substituted; and therefore from the moment it was decided that the prosecution could not be maintained against the expressions in the first edition, the proceeding took the form of a prosecution of Mr. Bennett's learned adviser, whom the *Standard* names as one of the heads of the High-Church party as contradistinguished from the Ritualists."

So that, after all, this has been a trial of dialectic skill between Dr. Pusey and the Privy Council! The prosecutors thought, in the innocence of their hearts, that they were dealing, we will not say with an unguarded statement of Mr. Bennett's, but at all events with the natural, unforced expression of his opinions, fenced about by no greater caution than any right-minded man would use in speaking of such important topics. Nothing of the kind; they were invoking the judgment of the law upon a carefully-framed

form of words, drawn up by an aged Ulysses of the Church, made wary by a thousand perils past! The Ritualists have snatched the inestimable advantage of a decision upon a case of their own making; and all that they have to do in future is to avoid direct contradiction of the Articles; or, in other words, to pursue a course which this very Judgment, procured by their opponents, has mapped and buoyed and lighted for them. Our contributor very aptly compares with the spirit of this Judgment the method of Tract XC. That celebrated essay was written to prove that the Articles could be fairly interpreted in the sense of that very Catholic doctrine which all the world believed they had been framed to exclude. So now, if there are any doctrines upon which the Catholic and the Protestant Churches, the Church of Rome and the Church of England, have been commonly supposed to differ, they are precisely those of the Real Presence and the Sacrifice of the Mass. Henceforth these, with trifling differences much more of expression than of conception, may be held on both sides of the dividing line.

This Judgment is being quoted, both by those who advocate and those who dislike comprehension, as a great victory of the comprehensive principle. The *Times* has said, in a sentence which has been much in men's mouths, that henceforth Catholicism, Calvinism and Deism (to speak in general terms), may be preached with impunity from the pulpits of the Church of England. The statement is a little too broad; we have more than once pointed out that in all matters of *doctrine* little or no liberty has been accorded to the Broad-Church clergy, and that the trials of Mr. Heath and Mr. Voysey both ended in the deprivation of the accused. And again it is necessary to call to men's minds that a large part of the liberty which clergymen are supposed to enjoy, directly depends upon the forbearance of the Bishops, or the reluctance of any private person to take upon himself the invidious office of prosecution. Can there be any doubt that many a Broad-Church clergyman would find himself in great straits if his words were strictly watched and taken up? How many Anglicans, in their exultation at their unexpected victory, have gone far beyond the cautious expression as to the Eucharist which the Privy Council has just pronounced to be not illegal? That there is so little prosecution in the Church, that by many good men of all

parties the proceedings of the Church Association are regarded with dislike and contempt, is an honour to Churchmen, and a proof that there exists among them a real desire not needlessly to contract the borders of the Church. But these ecclesiastical Judgments, which any fanatic for orthodoxy, so he have money in his purse, may invoke at will, are a very precarious foundation for freedom. There are certain limits of doctrine which are not likely to be very boldly overstepped, so long as a clergyman knows that, as the result of an incautious sentence, any aggrieved parishioner, any fussy rural Dean, any disciplinarian upon the Bench, can subject him to a long and harassing and expensive legal contest, which may end in turning him out upon the world, with heavy costs to pay, and no resources but a reputation for heresy.

But we must needs repeat a truth which we have stated many times before, yet which seems to be as far as ever from general acceptance, that the liberty within the Church of England which is based upon Privy Council decisions, is, so long as the Creeds, Articles and Formularies of the Church remain unchanged, of little value in the interests of theological progress. It may give the Catholic party a still larger opportunity of secretly moulding the minds of those Churchmen who feel a natural attraction towards sacerdotal and sacramental religion. It weakens the hands of the Evangelical party, by permitting them to believe that their true resting-place is within the pale of a well-endowed Church, although they no longer supply its characteristic life, and stand in opposition to its best intellectual activity. But it still more fatally paralyzes the thought and speech of the Liberal clergy, by perpetuating their connection with forms of worship which are manifestly out of harmony with their convictions, which they are compelled to explain in a forced and unnatural sense, which mean one thing to the pulpit and another to the pew. What would become of chemical discovery if all chemists were compelled once a week, under pain of heavy penalties, to profess their belief in the theories of Priestley and Lavoisier, once the newest truth, now the landmarks of obsolete and corrected knowledge? Should we not have, just as we now have in theology, wonderful attempts to make new facts fit old theories, curious reticences as to cardinal ideas, cautious adumbra-

tions of fresh hypotheses? Should we not lose from this particular branch of physical research, just that eagerness in pursuit of truth, that fearless disregard of consequences, which make the moral consecration of science? No Church can be truly free until it is built up on a foundation of freedom. No Church can be honestly comprehensive, unless comprehension be, not an accident of its position, but a necessary condition of its existence. A Church with Thirty-nine Articles and three Creeds cannot lawfully embrace those to whom Articles and Creeds alike are only monuments of a bygone faith, not expressions of to-day's deepest belief. She will sap their strength, while she professes to nourish their souls. She will blur for them the distinctions between right and wrong, while she claims to be the very "pillar and ground of the Truth." And the same is the case, in greater or less degree, with every ecclesiastical communion which imposes any artificial restrictions upon liberty of thought, and fears to trust, as a bond of union, to the Godward affections of men. It is possible to sin against the only true theory of church union by a denominational name as well as by the most elaborate creed.

We do not then look for any real advantage to liberty in the Church of England from this Judgment. Even were its laxer principles of interpretation applied, in some future trial, to let off a Broad-Church heretic, the result would only be to strengthen, in the eye of the law and of public opinion, a position which is really indefensible, as well as full of subtle danger to those who hold it. True liberty can be attained, not by interpreting the formularies of the Church, but by reforming and simplifying them; and this is precisely the path in which just now no party in the Church seems willing to walk. But there is another point of view in which it is impossible not to look upon this Judgment with great regret and apprehension. It indefinitely strengthens the hold of the Sacerdotal party upon the Church. It leaves them in possession, to a certain extent, of the prestige, the revenues, the substantial influence, the numberless opportunities, of the National Establishment, with freedom to preach what is practically Roman Catholic doctrine. It is possible that a different decision might, in driving them out of the pale, have compelled them to shew themselves in their true colours, and have substituted for the social glamour of the

Church, the modified attractions of a sect. As it is, the existence of the extreme Ritualistic party within the Church has a tendency to raise the level of doctrine throughout the whole section of which they are the most decided part; and the result, it must not be denied, is a great Catholic reaction, which cannot be contemplated without sorrow and misgiving. We believe it to be inimical to social progress and civil liberty. We count it a foe to real theological learning. Its first result is to place theology in irreconcilable opposition to all other sciences, and thus to provoke a battle in which it cannot be the victor. But its worst effect is to place the priest between the soul and God, and to harden the intercourse between the human and the Divine Spirit into the physical narrowness of a sacrament. Perhaps, after all, it is best that Englishmen should once for all have vividly presented to them the contrast between a sacerdotal and sacramental, and a personal and spiritual religion. They have faced the alternative before; and when the issue is clear, we believe that they will make the same choice again.

CHARLES BEARD.

VII.—NOTICES OF BOOKS.

Edwin Wilkins Field: a Memorial Sketch. By Thomas Sadler, Ph.D. London: Macmillan. 1872.

THE subject of this Memoir presented to all who knew him an instance of the force of character amounting to genius, and leaving an impression far deeper than that made by his special abilities, many and diverse though they were. In the Law, or in Art—if his devotion to either had been exclusive—he could not have failed to attain fortune and the highest eminence. But he appears in the whole conduct and direction of his life to have preferred to exercise his fine intellect and his rich gifts in subordination to an unusually high sense of duty and to a noble ambition for public usefulness; and in so doing he undoubtedly accomplished the formation of high type of individuality. Although men of this kind may do less for their personal or family advancement, they do more than others

for the good of mankind. They afford to the world specimens of the kind of men of which the highest Christian element in a community must consist. A man may be said to have reached no mean eminence in whom self-culture and universal benevolence have been fully and equally developed; and if we add to these the finer qualities which attract the affectionate esteem of all with whom he had to do, we approach to a moderate estimate of Mr. E. W. Field. The outward events of such a man's life do not represent the whole character or include its best results; and of Mr. Field we may say that his real history is portrayed in men's hearts; and the picture is that of a noble manliness, conscientious, energetic, and inspiring to all who came under its power. No other man, probably, with the exception of professed religious teachers and great schoolmasters, exercised so much influence for good on the lives and careers of the young men about him. It would be difficult to estimate how many, like the writer of these lines, are able to say with pleasure and gratitude, that the course of their studies, their choice of and preparation for business, and, in other cases, the actual success of their lives, have received some help and direction from Mr. Field's advice or encouragement. And to do complete justice to his extraordinary influence and genial kindness, it must be added, that not a few are indebted to him for that more subtle kind of influence which opens the mind to the perceptions of beauty in nature and art, and to the enjoyment of the refined and ennobling pleasures of life. To give a very early instance of Mr. Field's characteristic influence, we may recal his annual summer visits to his father's school at Leam, which were anticipated and welcomed by all the boys scarcely less eagerly than the holidays themselves. Such visits were the occasion of increased diligence at work, of fuller mirth and energy in the play-ground and cricket-field, and of the boating or walking excursions in which Mr. Field was the leader. The associations at Leam were never forgotten by Mr. Field, as many a school-boy well knows who has since been made happy by his cordial recognition, or invited to partake of the hospitalities of Squire's Mount.

In Dr. Sadler's Memorial Sketch, agreeably and affectionately written, the particulars of Mr. Field's life are

enumerated under different heads ; such as Law Reform, Art, Religion, and the like ; and the arrangement is almost necessary in view of the wide distance between the several objects of his life. To borrow Mr. Field's own metaphor, Law Reform was his "horse," and Art his "hobby." He rode both to their substantial advancement. The changes, for the benefit invariably of the suitors and the public, and almost as invariably to the immediate pecuniary disadvantage of his own branch of the profession, which have taken place in law procedure in the equity departments during the last thirty or forty years, may in fact be taken as the history of Mr. Field's professional career. His ideas of improvement were always far in advance of the utmost that could be accomplished. The sphere was one in which it was all but impossible to engage popular help and sympathy, while the obstacles for the most part lay in the opposition and inertia of the very class of persons in and by whom alone the wished-for changes could be promoted. To any one slightly acquainted with the practice of the English law, the idea of a scientific method common to all the Courts must even now appear chimerical. Mr. Field was possessed by this idea, and all his efforts were directed to its accomplishment, and to the substitution of a simple and rational order for the conflicting and bewildering traditions of the Courts. In one of the pamphlets quoted by Dr. Sadler, Mr. Field says : "The object should be to assimilate ultimately the procedure of judicial establishments, and every step should be made that way. If there exist in procedure the subject-matter of a science, this must be the end to be looked forward to."

It is not least remarkable that a practical application of the principle which he so thoroughly thought out should have gone along on all-fours with his leading idea. In this circumstance is exhibited the unusual combination of ideas which to many appeared fanatical, with means of the simplest and most obvious kind. He even maintained that the means to be employed were mainly mechanical ; and on this principle he exerted himself most vigorously in favour of the New Law Courts, where, by concentrating the practical departments, a single and comprehensive system of procedure is likeliest to be worked out. However grand or imposing the long looked-for Palace of Justice

may be, its real purpose in Mr. Field's mind is the benefit of the suitor, and the cheapening and simplifying of the still costly and complicated processes of English jurisprudence. It would be a large ambition in any man to attempt to take Mr. Field's place in this great work; but whoever may attempt it, the rationale and the method will, we believe, be found in the maxims and suggestions scattered through Mr. Field's writings. In accepting the Royal appointment of Secretary to the Commission, Mr. Field exhibited the generous public spirit to which we have referred, by insisting on doing the work without any pecuniary remuneration.

The gratitude of our Unitarian and Free-Christian congregations will for ever be due to Mr. Field in connection with his efforts in obtaining from a Conservative Government the celebrated Dissenters' Chapels Act of 1844. Dr. Sadler, in one of the chapters of his *Memorial Sketch*, gives an outline of the history of this act of justice, the details of which are still fresh in the memory of our churches. On the completion of his labours, Mr. Field received a handsome present, and devoted the whole of it to the building of the Memorial Chapel at Kenilworth, of which his father was then the minister.

On the subject of Art, we are almost tempted to regard Mr. Field as an artist himself, and to assign to him a place among the modern water-colourists. Vigour and fidelity are his characteristics here also; but we should be wanting in a proper regard to his memory if we claim for him in respect to his "hobby" more than he would have modestly allowed. And yet his sympathy with artists was so complete, and so generally admitted by his numerous artist friends, that we cannot but regard him as in some sense one of their number. Patronage he would have disdained to exercise; but the encouragement and assistance which he actually afforded to artists, both individually and in their societies, was something better than patronage; and that they felt this was manifested by the old Water Colour Society on the occasion of their presenting him with a portfolio of drawings contributed by the whole body of the members of that Society in 1863. The establishment of the Slade Professorship of Art in University College is closely connected with Mr. Field; and the Trustees of that

fund must deeply regret his removal at a time when his help would have been of the greatest value. An intense love of nature and a highly poetical temperament led to Mr. Field's love of Art. He seems to have realized its æsthetic influence, and he is very earnest in recommending the study of it on the same principle. In a letter written in 1853, he says :

“There is one view of the subject almost peculiar to amateurs, —I mean the study of nature as operating to soothe a mind worn and torn by affairs ; *nature*, that is, as a balm and sovereignest remedy, and *art* as the truly efficacious mode of applying the remedy. This belongs not so much to artists, as the study then is the very life-struggle itself. But to amateurs, who have other duties as their main calling, art is a relaxation and a cordial only.”

There are also some fine things on the same subject in notes of an address delivered to the Hampstead Conversation Society. The portions of Dr. Sadler's Memorial about Mr. Field in his relations to Art are most interesting and suggestive. They convey a vivid idea of his conversation, its glow and vigour, and present the fineness of his nature on its intuitive and poetical side.

It is not difficult to step from this aspect of his character to that of his religious position. Religion was an integral and essential part of his nature. It was a saying of his, “What I care for most of all is religiousness ;” and he held by this characteristic expression in his views of other men's opinions. This position puzzled those who had been brought up under different auspices, and, among others, his friend Sir John Rolt, who said, “Mr. Field's toleration is indescribable.” And yet his religion was as real as any quality he possessed, if it was not rather the basis of his character. What Sir John Rolt called “toleration” would be called in the highest sense “charity,” if men were more in the habit of regarding religiousness as the substance, and opinions or creeds as the mere forms, of religion. Mr. Field was a true representative of our best English Presbyterianism, firm in his attachment to the freedom which he inherited and to the opinions he held by the conditions of his freedom. It is almost impossible to make this understood by the members of dogmatic sects and churches. We owe Mr. Field a large debt of gratitude

on this ground alone; for his firmness, consistency and devotion in all that related to our good old cause; and of all the invigorating and ennobling influences of his example and his memory, we could least spare those which belong to this side of his splendid character. His death, though it happened nearly twelve months ago, seems still recent in the hearts of his friends. His place in numerous spheres of activity it will be hard for a long time to supply; and the scenes of his active leisure hours by the Thames which he loved, and in other beautiful spots where he gathered his friends about him, will have a fond and melancholy, but not a joyless interest, as long as there are survivors, whether old or young, who cherish his friendship and his memory.

HERBERT NEW.

Recent Dutch Theology.

Professor Kuenen's great work on "The Religion of Israel"* belongs to a series of monographs on "The most Important Religions," and the author is careful to point out that this very fact roughly defines the mode of treatment that may be expected. The religion of Israel is *one* of the most important religions of the world, and must be treated in the same spirit as its sisters. However far it may tower above them, no generic difference between them can be recognized.

When Moses attempted to graft the highest Egyptian morality upon a purely Semitic religion, and to weld together a mass of semi-barbarous shepherd tribes, he undertook a task of enormous difficulty, and if he only partially accomplished it, the only wonder is that he did not altogether fail. The worship of sacred trees and stones, of the moon and stars, and of the sun-god, specially under his destructive aspects, prevailed among the mixed multitude of which the sons of Israel formed the nucleus. They were polytheists to the very bone. When Moses attempted to establish a confederation amongst them, and to secure through meetings of their chiefs some community of action and feeling, he only did what was natural in raising his God Jahveh to the position of the presiding God of the

* Dr. A. Kuenen. *De Godsdienst van Israël tot den ondergang van den Joodschen staat.* Haarlem: A. C. Kruseman. 1869-70.

confederation; but when he went further, and laid the basis of monotheism by forbidding the worship (though by no means denying the existence) of all other gods, he struck out an altogether new path which no foot had trodden before his. His task was accomplished with amazing skill, power, and even success. By adopting from the numerous worshippers of Saturn (Keivan) the institution of the Sabbath, and infusing into it his own religious ideas, he at once enriched his own religion and conciliated a powerful party amongst the tribes he had to deal with. His God Jahveh was one of the fire- or sun-gods, nearly related to Molech, but not to Baal,—a stern and unapproachable god. Moses did not forbid image-worship (though the Ten Commandments are in the main from him), but probably did not encourage or practise it. His own idea of God was far from spiritual, though highly moral, as he thought of Him as locally present in the Ark. A very small nucleus preserved the Mosaic tradition after the death of its mighty founder, and, thanks to it, the feeling of unity amongst the loosely connected tribes who had half acknowledged the power of Moses was never wholly lost.

Favoured by circumstances, these tribes gradually forced their way into Canaan between forty and sixty years after the “sons of Israel” had thrown off the yoke of Egypt; some pushed in with “the house of Joseph” across the Jordan; others worked up from the South, sometimes on a friendly, sometimes on a hostile footing, with other shepherd tribes. The Israelites gradually settled down in Canaan, some preserving the nomadic life, some turning to agriculture. Then commenced a struggle of two centuries’ duration between the Israelite and the Canaanite nationalities. Israel was victorious; some Canaanite and other tribes were insensibly welded into Israel, some were expelled or destroyed. Everywhere the Israelite nationality and Israelite religion emerged triumphant, and gave the tone to the whole, whatever might be the antecedents of the separate parts. Jahveh was the national God of the nation now formed on the soil of Palestine, and the great national sanctuary at Shiloh, with its officers, rose to an importance quite unknown before. Meanwhile two very remarkable forces had been at work contributing largely to this result,—Naziritism and Prophetism (*sit venia verbis*!).

The former was of purely Israelite origin ; the latter was originally Canaanite, but was gradually transformed into something very specifically Israelite. The reformation of Prophecy is largely due to Samuel. David was a vigorous and even admirable monarch, whose genuine attachment to Jahveh-worship we have no reason to doubt, who did not write the Psalms (or any of them), and who thought that God lived in the Ark ! Solomon was a man of no religion, and his temple was dedicated as a matter of course to the national God, but in a very unnational way, which helped to cause the revolt of a large portion of the nation, and a return to the more national and therefore more popular forms of Jahveh-worship at Dan, &c. Monotheism was as yet hardly thought of. Jahveh was the national God—nothing more. There was no more inconsistency in an Israelite worshipping Baal than there would have been in an Athenian's worshipping the Zeus of Elis. Things were brought to a crisis by Ahab and Jezebel attempting to make Baal the national God of Israel. In the contest which ensued, the nature of Jahveh was more dwelt on by his worshippers, the essential difference between him and Baal developed ; Jahveh issued victorious and—purified ! A gigantic step had now been made, from Elijah, who never said a word against steer-worship, to the prophets of the eighth century,—Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, &c. Before long, the Jahveh party began to feel keenly the evils of the local sanctuaries of Jahveh. The central sanctuary had been to a large extent purified of idolatrous elements ; not so the local “high places.” Hence rose the movement which culminated in the book of Deuteronomy and the reform of Josiah. The book of Deuteronomy was soon united with the prophetic narratives (Jehovistic document) which had existed at least since the eighth century B.C. The Jahveh party anticipated a full tide of prosperity and divine favour, except Jeremiah, who considered the reformation merely external. The national misfortunes were therefore a sore perplexity to all but him : he regarded them as the accomplishment of the long foretold judgment.

In the captivity, the prestige of all the prophets, but especially of Jeremiah, rose immensely. The intercourse with other nations, especially the Persians, enlarged the spiritual horizon of such a man as the Deutero-Isaiah ; but

meanwhile the priestly spirit, already seen in great strength in Ezekiel, gained the ascendant over prophecy. The book of Origins (Elohistic document) was written by some one deeply imbued with Ezekiel's spirit, but not by Ezekiel himself; and when the second temple had been standing some sixty years, Ezra arrived "with the law of his God in his hand." His first attempts were frustrated by many causes, and he devoted the years of forced quiet to the final reduction of "the Law," resulting essentially in the present Pentateuch, which was nevertheless subject to subsequent modifications. With the assistance of Nehemiah, he succeeded, in spite of the opposition of men such as the authors of *Ruth* and *Jonah*, and many of less exalted spirit, in imposing the Law upon his people. From this point the rise of the scribes is inevitable, for the Law must have interpreters. The religion which now gained a firmer and firmer hold of the Israelites, or rather Jews, was less *national* and more *individual* and *universal*, in spite of all its ceremonies, than that of the prophets had been; and the book of Psalms shews the beauty and earnestness of the religion of the second temple, to which, in spite of earlier elements, it essentially belongs. The scribes had made his religion the one thing which a Jew could not and would not desert. Parseeism affected Judaism, but only by developing kindred elements which existed already. Hellenism might have been a more powerful solvent but for the premature and mistaken effort of Antiochus (a goodnatured man, who had no conception of the hurricane he was about to raise when he tried to unite all his subjects under one religion), which made the Jews more stubbornly Jewish than ever. During this and the succeeding generations the Jewish sects arose. The aristocratic and governing classes were almost necessarily opposed to the intensely national party; so much so, that when the Hasmonæans really came into power, they passed over to the old aristocratic party and became Sadducees. Most of the priests and the aristocrats were Sadducees, i.e. conservatives. The Scribes and their friends were Pharisees, and these were the favourites with the people. The Essenes were an extreme product of the movement represented by the Pharisees. Pharisees and Sadducees had, however, common principles and recognized a common authority, that of the Sanhedrim; and the dif-

ference between them was by no means so great as is usually supposed.

In the time of the Herods, the Messianic hopes which had been stationary, though neither dead nor sleeping, since the composition of the book of Daniel, received a new and powerful development. The Scribes had taught every Jew to think himself a favourite of God, and the Jew therefore looked for some sign of God's favour: this he could not find in the privilege of studying the Law as his masters did. Judaism was too great and too proud to be a national religion any longer. One of three things must happen. The Jews must conquer the world, the world must stamp the Jews to death, or Judaism must throw off its limitations, call in "the lost sheep," and make itself the universal religion. In fact, the faithful historian of Israel can but draw a number of different lines, all of which converge to Jesus of Nazareth. Judaism in the narrower form survived him, but no longer as "one of the most important religions," and henceforth it has only a secondary interest.

To give in a couple of pages the results of a book of over 1000 pages, in which there is perhaps not a single superfluous word, is of course utterly impossible; and we have wholly omitted aspects of the development which cannot in any sense be considered secondary; but perhaps even what has been now said may be sufficient to excite an interest in this truly remarkable book. One of the most noticeable features of this work is the steady subordination, from the first page to the last, of hypothesis to research. The results given in the crude sketch above may appear rather astonishing; but we can assure our readers that the constant impression derived from the book itself is that of persevering, down-right work, and a rare degree of self-restraint in hypothesis and even dislike of startling results. Nearly allied to this is another very characteristic feature of Professor Kuenen's work, viz., his willingness to correct, to modify and even to withdraw his opinions, when he sees cause to do so. It is too common for scholars to treat all their peers as impertinent and incompetent meddlers. Professor Kuenen has not many peers; but he regards all who are engaged on the same or kindred subjects as himself as fellow-workers, not as rivals. He gladly avails himself of their labours, and generously acknowledges, and

sometimes seems unconsciously almost to magnify, his obligations to them. The result of these two closely-allied excellences is, that the reader enjoys a feeling of security too rarely to be indulged in safely, and is confident that he is under the guidance of a man who desires above all things to tell the truth, and who writes under a grave sense of the responsibilities of an author towards the public whom he undertakes to instruct, or the scholars he tries to assist.

These characteristics of Professor Kuenen's work will be best illustrated by a few examples, which will also give us the opportunity of directing a passing glance to some very interesting works.

In 1864, the well-known Dutch Orientalist Dozy, who had already contributed a work on Islam to the series of "The most Important Religions," published a kind of supplement to that work* under the title of "The Israelites at Mecca," &c., in which he undertook to demonstrate that the temple at Mecca was founded by Simeonite exiles banished in the time of Saul, and was consecrated to the Simeonite Baal; that in the times of the Babylonian exile a second Hebrew immigration joined the earlier settlers at Mecca, and that the perplexing phenomena of Hanifism are explained by traditions of these Hebrews; and, in fact, that the "*din Ibrahim*" which Mohammed professed to restore was originally not the religion of *Abraham*, but of *the Hebrews* (*Ibriïm*); though at an early date, long previous to Mohammed, a false combination of this name with the story of Abraham as heard from the Jews had given rise to the current interpretation. These positions are supported and illustrated with amazing learning and ingenuity, link after link of the chain is forged, and from first to last the interest and the wonder of the reader are kept almost painfully on the strain, till the whole at last takes shape, piece after piece drops neatly into its place with growing rapidity and certainty, and a symmetrical and fascinating positive result seems to be the outcome of what Dozy himself describes as "persevering study, accident, luck, or whatever you like to call it!" The reader of ordinary intelligence can readily follow and keenly enjoy Dozy's argument; but it can for the most

* *De Israelieten te Mekka van Davids tijd tot in de vijfde eeuw onzer tijdrekening.* Door Dr. R. Dozy. Hoogleeraar te Leiden. Haarlem.

part only be tested by those who are versed in Hebrew and Arabic philology, and we therefore offer no opinion as to its validity.

This work, though translated, I believe, into German, seems to have been for the most part either ignored or condemned by German scholars; but in England it was greeted as "a splendid specimen of modern criticism" by Colenso, who gave an account of it in Appendix I. to Part V. of his great work; and in Holland it seems to have been favourably reviewed by De Goeje in *De Gids*, and it very soon received the distinct though qualified adhesion of Dr. Oort and Dr. Kuenen.

A part (but not an essential part) of Dozy's theory, however, is that Baal = Molech = Saturn = Keivan, was the chief god of Israel, to whom ark and tabernacle were consecrated, and that Jehovism was post-Davidic as the national religion. It was chiefly to combat this position that Oort* and Kuenen† wrote.

Oort's pamphlet has been translated, with appendices and notes, by Colenso, and contains the luminous suggestion that the worship of local Baälim stood to Jahvehism something in the relation of saint-worship to monotheism in Catholic countries.

Kuenen's article suggests that the Simeonites were not fair representatives of Israel, and that though they worshipped Baal as chief God, Israel in general did not;—an idea which contrasts curiously with the opinion expressed by Land, Oort and Hooykaas, &c., that the Simeonites were zealots for the national Jahvehism.

Dozy's main biblical supports for this part of his theory are to be found in an obscure passage of Amos (v. 26), and in the sabbatical week, which he declares could only have risen from the worship of Baal-Saturnus; and both Oort and Kuenen direct their efforts chiefly to removing these supports by giving a different exegesis of the passage of Amos, and assigning a different origin to the sabbatical week.

In 1865, De Goeje once more took up the cudgels for his brother Orientalist, and in a masterly article in *De Gids*

* De dienst der Baälim in Israël. Leiden. 1864.

† De Baäldienst onder Israël, in Godgeleerde Bijdragen voor 1864 zesde stuk.

allowed that Oort and Kuenen had established their main point; that Jahveh, not Baal, had been the national God of Israel ever since Israel had been a nation; but maintained that their (divergent) interpretations of Amos v. 26 were both of them wholly untenable, and that an astrological origin must be assigned to the Hebrew week. He suggested that Saturn-worship might have prevailed among some of the tribes Moses incorporated.

As a last phase of this interesting discussion, Kuenen yields the astrological point and adopts De Goeje's hypothesis on the subject, and elsewhere allows that his exegesis of Amos v. 26 is on the whole hardly tenable in the face of De Goeje's objections.

If space allowed it, we might also shew how Kuenen in the *Theologisch Tijdschrift* for 1868,* while vigorously combating the opinions put forth by Oort in his very remarkable little book on "Human Sacrifices in Israel,"† yet acknowledges that it is only on the facts there co-ordinated that he has been able to erect his luminous theory of the original relationship between Jahveh and Molech.

The same Dr. H. Oort with whom we have now become acquainted, in conjunction with Dr. I. Hooykaas, known as the author of a history of Hebrew "Wisdom," and with the co-operation of Professor Kuenen, is engaged at present on a work which does all concerned in it the highest honour.‡ It is an attempt to make the Bible really accessible by re-telling its stories and histories, and appending to them, without the smallest reserve or reticence, the results of modern biblical criticism in a form suited to the capacity of young people of average intelligence and ability, but always keeping the moral and religious bearings of the narratives prominently in view. The tender and manly tone of piety and moral earnestness which throws a glow over this work (which will extend to six volumes when complete) is hardly a fit subject for review; and we can only say that the execution of the work is quite equal to its conception, and leaves nothing to be desired.

PHILIP H. WICKSTEED.

* Jahveh en Molech.

† Het Menschenoffer in Israël. Door Dr. H. Oort. Haarlem. 1865.

‡ De Bijbel voor Jongelieden, door Dr. H. Oort en Dr. I. Hooykaas, met medewerking van Dr. A. Kuenen. Harlingen. Vol I. 1871; Vol. II. 1872.

1. *Fragmenta Evangelica, quæ ex antiqua recensione versionis Syriacæ Novi Testamenti (Peshito dictæ) a Gul. Curetono vulgata sunt, Græcè reddita ... curante J. R. Crowfoot. Pars altera.* London: Williams and Norgate. 1871.

This second part completes the labour undertaken by Mr. Crowfoot, which renders possible an accurate comparison of the Syriac with the Greek Gospels, by putting the former into the same language as the latter. The Syriac version is in general extremely literal, so that when it presents any difference of construction, a corresponding divergency in the original Greek may fairly be assumed, and the Greek may be conjectured without much difficulty; though of course a Greek text thus restored has no claim to literal and verbal correctness. Its claim to consideration is that, if the Syriac Gospels edited by Cureton are of the second or even the third century, their reproduction in Greek must be an imitation of a Greek original of a still earlier age, and presumably older than the current Greek Gospels. Mr. Crowfoot has executed his task certainly with great care, and, as it seems to me, with some ability. Some of his corrections spring from rather too rigid a conception of the closeness of translation required. Thus the preposition *b* means primarily *in*, and secondarily but very frequently *by, through*, of the means or instrument, and would naturally represent both *ἐν* and *διὰ*. There is therefore no need to change the Greek *διὰ* into *ἐν*, as in John i. 3, *πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ ἐγένετο*, for the ordinary *δι' αὐτοῦ*. The first part, containing the parts of Matthew and Mark preserved in Cureton's MS., was briefly noticed on its publication;* this part contains Luke and John, and completes the work. The deviations of text are often remarkable, and always interesting. They can certainly be better appreciated through this Greek garb than through Mr. Cureton's English version; and this work is therefore really valuable to critics ignorant of Syriac.

2. *A Commentary [in Hebrew] upon the Books of Jeremiah and Ezekiel, by Moshch ben Shesheth.* Edited from a Bodleian MS., with a Translation and Notes, by S. R.

* Theol. Rev. Vol. VIII. p. 263.

Driver, Fellow of New College, Oxford. London: Williams and Norgate. 1871.

To the future historian of philology or of criticism, correct editions and translations of ancient grammatical commentaries will be exceedingly valuable; nor is it desirable for any critic, whether historian or not, entirely to neglect the examination of the stages by which philology has been raised from mere empiricism into science. The Rabbinical grammatical literature has no doubt kept alive an understanding and preserved the text of the Hebrew Scriptures, and is historically quite as important as the great Sanskrit grammarians. But just as the latter register with infallible faithfulness every fact of the language, yet note them in mnemonic formulas only, and never rise to the idea of a Philosophy of language, while the Europeans no sooner got hold of the most superficial knowledge of Sanskrit than they began to theorize on its principles of formation; so the Jewish commentators are satisfied to settle the form of a word, often by reference to analogous passages and with little consideration of the general sense of the passage, and to think of nothing higher than minute verbal exposition. While, therefore, their grammatical labours must be acknowledged as laying the foundation for all secure criticism, they can be regarded only as working out the rudiments successfully, and not as fulfilling what the present age treats as the duties of the commentator, which include the consideration of the full meaning of his author, his character, and his age. Moses ben Shesheth lived about A.D. 1200, and was a slightly older contemporary of David Kimchi. The Commentary here published is very brief, consisting of remarks on certain single words, sometimes not more than six in a chapter; discussing their punctuation, and stating their meaning by reference to other passages. It may be doubted whether much new light will be thrown by this Commentary on the difficult books it deals with, the main points being settled for us in grammars and lexicons. But it has at all events an historical interest; and it might be usefully employed as an introduction to the grammatical technology of the Rabbis, which is exceedingly puzzling. Mr. Driver has shewn complete mastery of this in his translation. It should be noted that he had to perform the difficult task of editing the work

from a manuscript. As he tells us that this is his first literary effort, I may be allowed to express admiration at his boldness in selecting a task of peculiar difficulty, and hope that his talents may produce other works of as high scholarship and perhaps greater utility.

RUSSELL MARTINEAU.

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1. *Student's Hebrew Lexicon: A compendious and complete Hebrew and Chaldee Lexicon to the Old Testament: chiefly founded on the Works of Gesenius and Fürst, with Improvements from Dietrich and other Sources.* Edited by Benjamin Davies, Ph.D., LL.D., Translator of Rædiger's Gesenius, or Student's Hebrew Grammar. 8vo. Pp. 701. London: Asher and Co. 1872.
 2. *Science and Humanity; or, a Plea for the Superiority of Spirit over Matter.* By Noah Porter, D.D., LL.D., President of Yale College. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1872.
 3. *The Rationale of Christianity.* London: Longmans. 1872.
 4. *Moses and Modern Science.* By James Elliot, formerly Professor of Mathematics in Queen's College, Liverpool. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1871.
 5. *What is Truth? An Inquiry concerning the Antiquity and Unity of the Human Race.* By Ebenezer Burgess, A.M., Member of the American Oriental Society, &c. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1871.
 6. *Deutsche Zeit-und Streit-Fragen.* Herausgegeben von Fr. v. Holtzendorf u. W. Oncken. Jahrgang I. Heft I. *Das Leben Jesu und die Kirche der Zukunft.* Von Dr. Heinrich Lang. Berlin. 1872. (London: Williams and Norgate.)
 7. *Das Leben Jesu.* Von W. Krüger-Velthusen. Elberfeld. 1872. (London: Williams and Norgate.)

1. Every one who knows Dr. Davies' literary work will expect to find in any product of his pen perfect accuracy and in the matter of Hebrew lexicography a very uncommon degree of acquaintance with all the words, forms and constructions of words, with which he has to deal. The work before us will not tend to diminish his reputation as a Hebraist. Also both printer and publisher have com-

bined with the author to produce a model volume in point of neatness, clearness and general accuracy. But the excellence of this Lexicon goes much beyond this. Dr. Davies, with his collaborators, has put into it a good deal of the newest results of continental Hebrew scholarship. He has also made use of his own independent research, which has been very considerable, extending over a lifetime of Hebrew study. Of some of this original work we are incompetent to judge. In opposition to the Sanskritists, Dr. Davies traces many words which have hitherto been classed as Persian to the Assyrian tongue. Still more words he assigns to an onomatopoeic origin. And on this point we must confess to some misgiving. Without doubt not a few words are justly so derived, yet the principle of onomatopœia needs to be used with greatest caution. One who becomes an adept at this method of derivation is in danger of himself suffering under the power of the magic wand by which he calls up words from the vasty deep. And this applies, we cannot help fearing, not only to the passion for onomatopœia, but to the power of seeing the hidden affinities of words from most distant tongues. Philologists will find in Dr. Davies' Lexicon much new matter on which to test these principles. Gesenius was fond of suggesting words from the Indo-Germanic family analogous to others from the Semitic, but Dr. Davies stands alone in the wealth of analogies at his command. A new feature of this work, which we can heartily commend, is the introduction of all the more difficult forms of words into their alphabetical place in the body of the Lexicon. Our general commendation of this work would not appear to be appreciative unless we subjoined one or two special criticisms. It must surely be a printer's error that *vav*, both in the table of alphabets and the word *Jahrè*, is represented by *w*. *Sarach* is called a mimetic root, and compared with Eng. *shrick* and Germ. *schrecken*. Yet *schrecken* is from *reeken*, *rücken*, to move back, and in old German *schric* is a leap. Of course, in the space allotted to each word in a small Lexicon, it would be impossible to discuss the various probable meanings of a problematic word, yet a Lexicon of the size of this ought to indicate in the case of such words that the meaning assigned is not the only one that has great names for it, or at all events that there is doubt about it. Too often only one

meaning is given, and that without the indication of any uncertainty. Take, for instance, the word *kiyoon*, which is rendered "the planet *Saturn*." Similarly, *the messenger of the covenant*," Mal. iii. 1, has subjoined to it the explanation, "i.e. the Messiah," only. It may be observed that in more than one controverted passage, especially where the Messianic interpretation is in question, such scholars as Ewald are not followed, and their interpretations are not mentioned. See, for instance, the words *pesach*, *mashîach*, *shîloh*. We have thus noted a few drawbacks to the general excellence of this really useful and valuable little work; and this we have done, not to disparage it, but as a mark of the high esteem in which we hold the labours of its author and editor.

2. A pretentious claim for superhuman knowledge in human minds; a quarrel with Mill, Spencer, Bain and Huxley; a demand for a philosophy based on the principle "that man must furnish the key to the mysteries of nature, he himself being the greatest mystery of all." We hope President Porter may considerably enlighten the world in his larger works, which we presume will proceed on this original method.

3. The Rationale of Christianity. An irrational book on "the scheme of redemption," the author of which would find abundant evidence of "the existence of the devil" could he imagine the feelings his anonymous production will provoke in the breasts of some unwary purchasers. Anonymous, pretty-looking books, made up of nonsense, ought to be put on some *index* for bearing such lying titles.

4. This little volume is the first instalment of a larger work which is designed to shew that the account of the creation in the Pentateuch is literally inspired throughout. Reviewers though we are, we cannot be doomed to the labours of a Sisyphus by any one who may choose to send a ten-thousandth volume into the world setting forth a new method of squaring a circle or of harmonizing Moses and Science. This little book shews painstaking and earnestness, and some scientific knowledge. But of Moses it shews ignorance and misconception; and accordingly it is a failure. We give one instance: "The spirit of God moved on the face of the waters." *Waters* here mean *dust*; though the author allows he does not know Hebrew.

5. Since on almost every branch of the inquiry into the origin, age and relations of the human race, the greatest naturalists and most independent scholars are very far from having attained undoubted results, works written by mere compilers, and especially when their purpose is to establish a foregone conclusion, cannot be held to be of any great value. Mr. Burgess has read a good deal on his subject, and his book contains some ill-arranged but not useless matter; but he is not an authority in point of first-hand knowledge, and is entitled to no confidence as a reasoner. For instance, he sees in "the confusion of tongues" "an adequate and complete explanation of the origin of diversity in human speech."

6. The title of Dr. Heinrich Lang's brochure is a little misleading. Though the issue of it is the life of Jesus, yet it is really a most able resumé of the results of the labours of F. C. Baur and his school on the New Testament and its times. Whoever wishes to see in brief compass what these results are, and what the theological and ecclesiastical *left* of Germany are aiming at, should by all means read this pamphlet. The author speaks with authority derived from his abilities and his position and history.

7. This second German book, which is really a Life of Jesus, is a much more difficult work to deal with. Its claim to originality is, that it is the result of a thorough-going application of the hypothesis that the religious life of the Old Testament found its end and perfection in Christ. The author thinks this principle yields more satisfactory results than can be obtained from any attempt to separate in the Gospels the genuine history from the alloy of myth. We do not share his opinion. His own application of his principle has not guaranteed its value. His Life of Jesus is a strange mixture of doubt and credulity, history and theology, criticism and unctuousness. A Life of Jesus for this century, written in the phraseology of the Old Testament and latter Jewish-Christian theology, is to us insufferable. As distasteful is criticism which rescues the miracle of the raising of a man who had been dead four days by insisting on the assertion that he was not dead, and that Jesus knew he was not, and was angry with his friends for persisting in thinking that he was.

J. FREDERICK SMITH.

"Judas," a Dream, &c.,* is a well-conceived and wrought-out protest against the doctrine of an endless hell, using Judas Iscariot as an extreme case whereby to test it. The writer is stirred up by hearing a truly orthodox discourse on the "Monster" who betrayed his Lord, and on the "blackness and darkness, with only sulphurous gleams of lurid light," which received him when self-slain he went to "his own place." In a life-like conversation, the author's pleadings for infinite love are skilfully pitted against a friend's plea for wrathful justice. On retiring to rest, or rather to unrest, our excited author "dreams a dream," in which is unveiled to him the redeeming force of divine love even on this the worst (but one) of sinners. Angels, who to the diseased insight of Judas seem to be fiends, bear him to his "own place;" to a grey, voiceless, dead desolation, a ruined soul in a ruined world. Here a merciful sleep banishes his dreadful memories; and tender visions of his better past waken him, softened in heart, with a cry of "mother" on his lips. That mother, heretofore invisible though present, is now unveiled to him, and teaches him the healing power of love. The dream ends with the sinner's reconciliation with his Master and his welcome into heaven. Just as the author has finished writing out this dream, two clerical friends come in; the one, an orthodox man; the other, a man though orthodox. Their characteristic comments close the book. "'Tis only a dream," says the first, to whom a dream meant mere nothingness; said the other, "Let us hope it may be true." We rejoice to meet with such wholesome, Christ-like teaching as this little book contains. It is an augury of better days. Here and there we have felt our author to be needlessly hampered by his taking the narratives as they stand and without criticism. This, however, is part of his plan. It appears most clearly in his note "On our Lord's treatment of Judas." That "On the responsibility of a Creator" is well worth careful study. We can confidently recommend the book as being full of interest and profit, in style as well as truth.

Similar views† of the Divine dealings with man, ham-

* Judas, or a Brother's Inquiry concerning the Betrayer. A Dream, &c. By Rev. H. H. Dobney. London: Longmans and Co.

† Summer Morning Songs and Sermons. By John Page Hopps. London: Trübner and Co. Manchester: Johnson and Rawson, &c.

pered, however, by no such unfavourable conditions as those just glanced at, are set forth by Mr. Hopps, whose outspoken yet deeply religious utterances make us feel more and more the *educative* value of free thought and free speech for both the intellect and the heart of man. He gives in seven sermons seven lessons taken from summer-time, alternated with snatches of song of great beauty. The "Lesson of the Leaves" is especially fine and true.

The Rev. J. Baldwin Brown offers to the public a handsome volume* containing fifty-two "brief sermons, such as could be read by any ordinary reader in ten minutes," selected from those preached in the daily course of his ministry, as likely to be useful in family devotions or to lay preachers. No one can read these sermons without being impressed by their earnestness, their practical piety and their great beauty of language. Nevertheless, we find in them much which perplexes the intellect and jars painfully with the sympathy otherwise aroused. There is no trace of a critical sense of Scripture. Indeed, Mr. Brown regards the Bible as a "unity from Genesis to Revelation;"† applies to Jesus the words, "Kiss the Son," &c., without apparent misgiving as to an at least doubtful translation; quotes "Daniel" as authentic history,‡ and 1 Cor i. 26 from our Authorized Version. He makes the astounding assertion that the Jews "saw incarnate God and cried, 'Away with him'!"§ and alludes to Judas in such a way as might have given rise to Mr. Dobney's Dream. Many of his utterances on the Atonement lack clearness, as that on p. 416, where we are uncertain as to how Mr. Brown understands the righteousness of Christ is made available for man. He is constant in his use of that wonderful substantive, "God-man," and even ventures on "God-manhood,"|| which is more wonderful still. He does not flinch from talking of the "man who is reigning on the throne," so entirely does he fuse the man into the God. His rhetorical powers sometimes run away with him and into inconsistencies, as, e.g., his dreadful description of the world,¶ and his words on natural goodness.** His wholesale disenfranchisement

* The Sunday Afternoon. By J. B. Brown, B.A. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

† P. 139.

‡ P. 169.

§ P. 21.

|| P. 85.

¶ P. 13.

** P. 346.

of the non-Christian world is in curious contrast with Paul's quotation, "For we are also his offspring." For beauty of language and justness of thought, the third, seventh, ninth, twelfth, twenty-first and forty-ninth sermons are very noteworthy.

"Christ the Consoler"* is a book of comfort for the sick, compiled by an unnamed author, to which a Bishop contributes a Preface. In it, as in Mr. Brown's volume, we note the tendency of modern orthodoxy to centre man's whole affection and almost worship on Jesus; but since the quotations are made largely from the Scriptures, the word "God-man" is not so freely used. The various seasons of sickness have in it their appropriate reflections and consolations selected from all quarters, Scriptures, Saints and Fathers. We must protest against such a piece of theological patchwork as can put, e.g., the words of wisdom (Proverbs viii.) into the mouth of Jesus. Do our orthodox friends never consider that by taking Scripture words from their context they change their meaning; and that by using such words as mere counters, applicable anyhow and anywhere, they are really robbing them not only of meaning, but of authority?

"Olrig Grange"† is a poem which both for merits and defects reminds us of Mr. Browning. Its subject is the unprosperous suit of Thorold, a young Scotch student, to Rose, a daughter of fashion, to whom three hundred a year was dreadful poverty. The author's plan is to let each actor relate his or her part in the whole, which is threaded together by contributions from "Herr Professor Kunst" as editor. No little skill is shewn by the way in which the prosperous love of the Professor for Hester (Thorold's sister) is alluded to rather than described, and yet is made to act as foil to the main incident. Rose's farewell to the man she loves yet fears to marry, with her unsparing self-knowledge and self-condemnation, and the triumph in her of love, even when most slaying love, is finely and powerfully set forth. Scarcely less excellent is the self-sketched father, the dabbler in science, who "thought he thought," but "only echoed still the common thought as might an

* Christ the Consoler. London : Longmans and Co. 1872.

† Olrig Grange. Glasgow : James Maclehose. London : Macmillan and Co.

empty room," and who plainly shewed how worldliness, like dry-rot, had eaten away all moral fibre from himself and his race. For beauty, we place Hester's speech foremost. The hero is the serious defect of the book. Despite some fine touches, we cannot feel much interest in him. He shines by a light of affection cast on him, not by his own. It is a mistake to warn us that he dies of over-work and not of a broken heart, when scarcely two pages back the editor has said :

"Yet life was strong, only it had no relish ;
And hope was broken ; and the springs of life
Being gone, he only longed to see the end
Of its hard jolting."

A broken hope and springless life surely come rather near a broken heart, and would have enlisted sympathies which over-work will not command. Nevertheless, "Olrig Grange" will give its author a high place amongst the poets of England.

The "Hymns of Modern Man"* are theological notes of a very "advanced" type, done into verse. Most of the ideas are such as we accept, but we cannot like the spirit or form in which they are expressed. The verse reminds us of "Alexander Selkirk," and becomes monotonous. The slashing criticisms upon the author's old beliefs jar painfully. For our fathers' sake we should respect the shrine even when we can no longer kneel therein. If "Modern Man" has nothing better to say to his Maker than that He is the "Great Unknown," the sooner he ceases from hymns the better. Mr. Noyes has powers equal to far higher flights.

The "Autobiography of John Milton"† is somewhat of a misnomer. Mr. Graham has gathered all the passages in Milton's works which bear in any wise upon his life, and has put them together so as to produce a Life of Milton in "his own words." The result, though interesting, is not satisfactory. We miss the historical setting, without which even Milton's jewels lose clearness and brilliancy.

R. P.

* Hymns of Modern Man. By T. H. Noyes, Jun., B.A., of Christ Church, Oxford. London : Longmans and Co.

† Autobiography of John Milton ; or, Milton's Life in his own Words. Edited by the Rev. J. J. G. Graham, M.A. London : Longmans, Green and Co. 1872.

Miscellaneous.

It is not easy to speak in terms of too high praise of the scientific method and spirit of Mr. Sanday's book,* so far as these are consistent with the somewhat artificial limitation which the author has imposed upon himself with regard to his subject. He says in his Preface: "I cannot think that it has not been without serious loss on both sides, that in the great movement that has been going on upon the continent for the last forty years, the scanty band of English theologians should have stood almost entirely aloof, or should only have touched the outskirts of the questions at issue, without attempting to grapple with them at their centre." And again: "There is no limit to the efficacy of scientific method, if it is but faithfully and persistently applied. If we could but concentrate upon theological questions a small part of that ability and that activity which is devoted in this country to practical pursuits, I have little doubt that in a quarter or half a century the whole position of theology, and with it necessarily of belief and practical religion, would be very different from what it is now." It is in the spirit indicated in these extracts that Mr. Sanday has undertaken the task of weighing the internal evidence as to the authorship and historical value of the fourth Gospel. He shews an intimate acquaintance with the literature of the subject. He is very careful, and for the most part successful, in avoiding allusions to controverted points of theology, and he speaks the language, not of the Creeds, but of the Gospel itself. While his own opinions are fairly and clearly expressed, he is studiously fair in stating and discussing those of others. In short—and we can give his book no higher praise—he treats the Gospel just as he would a Dialogue of Plato, the authorship of which was doubtful.

Mr. Sanday's standpoint is that of a conservative criticism. He believes the Gospel to have been written by John, the son of Zebedee, and to be an historical document of the highest value. Whatever difficulty is introduced into the question by the record of miracles and their ante-

* The Authorship and Historical Character of the Fourth Gospel, considered in reference to the Contents of the Gospel itself: a Critical Essay. By William Sanday, M.A., Fellow of Trinity College, Oxford. London: Macmillan. 1872.

cedent improbability, he does not consider to be equal to that involved in denying their possibility or explaining them away. He thinks that the sobriety of the Proem, compared with the wildness of such Gnostic speculations as, in the case of Basilides and Valentinus, manifested themselves in the first half of the second century, compels us to assign it to a comparatively early date. If its affinities are, on the one hand, decidedly with Philo and the school of Alexandria, it has points of likeness, on the other, with letters of Paul, the genuineness of which can hardly be disputed, at least by English critics. Going through the Gospel, chapter by chapter, he now endeavours to relieve or remove difficulties which have been raised by hostile critics, and now points out peculiarities which seem to prove that the author was an eye-witness of the events which he relates. Difficulties in regard to the historical sequence of events, he treats by an ingenious use of the generally accepted theory of the fragmentary character of the Synoptic tradition: once cease to consider the Synoptical Gospels as complete and orderly historical narratives, and it is easy to find room, as it were, in their interstices, for the new matter in the fourth Gospel, and thus to effect a hypothetical and at least probable harmony between them. Difficulties in regard to the discourses—the way, for instance, in which Jesus and John the Baptist and the author of the Gospel all speak the same language—Mr. Sanday meets by frankly confessing that the whole book has passed through the alembic of a powerful and original mind, and that the speeches contain a subjective element of undetermined extent. At the same time, he is not without success in the attempt to shew that some of the constituents of Christ's teaching which are usually considered most characteristically Johannine, may be traced in an imperfect and rudimentary form in the three Gospels. He looks upon the difference between the Synoptics and John as to the Paschal character and date of the Last Supper as irreconcilable, and consistently with his general view of the higher historical character of the fourth Gospel, decides in its favour. The last chapter he regards as by the same hand as the rest, but not as forming part of its "original or first draft." And on the whole, from the acquaintance manifested with Jewish ideas and customs, with Palestinian

topography, with both the Hebrew and the Septuagint text of the Old Testament, and from the Hebraism of the style and language, he concludes that the author must have been a Jew and a native of Palestine. Other indications go to shew that he was also a contemporary and an eye-witness ; while it may be admitted on both sides that the author of the Gospel, though nowhere positively stating that he was John the son of Zebedee, leaves room, almost designedly, for his identification with him. Mr. Sanday therefore rests, on the whole, in the old conclusion of the Church,—a conclusion tempered, however, by his theory of the Johannine discourses, which seems to preclude, on the one side, all idea of verbal inspiration, and, on the other, even that of accurate report. It would, we think, be a fair inference from his decision, that we may in future make a free historical, but only a cautious dogmatic, use of the Gospel.

The running commentary on the Gospel, into which Mr. Sanday's work practically resolves itself, is always thoughtful, often suggestive ; and we have to thank him for having worked out in a very admirable way his design of exhibiting the internal evidence. But in his limitation of the subject he secures for himself beforehand a certain possibility of success, and he triumphs as much by avoiding as by overcoming difficulties. As between the external and internal evidence, he puts the case thus :

“The subject of the external evidence has been pretty well fought out. The opposing parties are probably as near to an agreement as they ever will be. It will hardly be an unfair statement of the case for those who reject the Johannean authorship of the Gospel, to say, that the external evidence is compatible with that supposition. And, on the other hand, we may equally say, for those who accept the Johannean authorship, that the external evidence would not be sufficient alone to prove it. As it at present stands, the controversy may be considered as drawn ; and it is not likely that the position of parties will be materially altered. Thus we are thrown back upon the internal evidence ; and I have the less hesitation in confining myself to this, because I believe it to be capable of leading to a quite definite conclusion.”*

But does this statement exhaust the case? To us it seems to leave out of sight the cardinal difficulty of all, the

* Pp. 3, 4.

hinge on which the whole question turns, and that is the difficulty of reconciling the external and internal evidence in one conclusion. For accepting (for argument's sake) Mr. Sanday's estimate of the result of a careful examination of the Gospel, our chief *crux* presents itself when we ask, Can the author of this book be the fisherman of the Galilean lake? the Boanerges of the Synoptics? the author of the Apocalypse? The contact of Paul with Philo is easily conceivable; we know that not only was he an apt pupil in the highest schools of his own people, but familiar, to some extent, with Greek literature and thought; but the gulf between John and Alexandrine speculation must be crossed, if at all, by a purely hypothetical bridge. Mr. Sanday briefly, almost contemptuously, dismisses "the arguments which have been drawn from the Synoptists against the identification of the author of the fourth Gospel with the son of Zebedee," as proceeding "from a hasty and imperfect psychology;"* but he avoids the more important and difficult question arising out of the strong evidence for the Johannine authorship of the Apocalypse, and the proof thence arising, that at all events at the date of its composition the "Son of Thunder" had not yet been transformed into the "Apostle of Love." For ourselves, we have always regarded it as impossible that the Apocalypse and the Gospel could have proceeded from the same pen or the same mind; and the earlier the date given to the Gospel, the less room is left for any process of ripening and softening in the apostle's character which might be supposed adequate to account for the difference between them. Nor, again, does Mr. Sanday allude to the Epistles, which so clearly hang together with the Gospel; or to the significant fact that the second and third profess to proceed, not from the apostle, but from a certain nameless "elder."

We have not mentioned these well-known difficulties under the conviction that only one solution of them is possible, but simply to point out that the case, as Mr. Sanday puts it, does not provide for any solution of them at all. The completeness of his conclusion from the internal evidence, in fact, only brings them into greater prominence. Mr. Sanday's book may most usefully be read in conjunc-

* P. 296.

tion with Mr. Tayler's, as the latter takes almost as little notice of the internal evidence as the former does of the external. They are both admirable specimens of calm, impartial theological investigation; but the question to which they addressed themselves remains without certain reply, and perhaps can never receive it.

A curious contrast to Mr. Sanday's book is presented by an anonymous volume, entitled "*Paul of Tarsus*,"* with which we must confess ourselves both puzzled and disappointed. It is written from a liberal theological standpoint. It contains detached thoughts of some value, and passages of considerable rhetorical force. But it is altogether deficient in that firm historical grasp of the subject which is absolutely essential to its successful treatment. It nowhere attempts to tell the story of Paul's life, to interpret its motives and to clear up its difficulties. Although the main object of the book is described to be, to "enable the reader to realize more adequately what was the social and religious condition of the world in which St. Paul lived, and what it was that he sought to teach," we have looked in vain for any systematic and adequate description of the social state of the first century. The book is a collection of observations, hanging together with more or less connection, of greater or less value, sometimes theological, sometimes moral, sometimes historical. It is a significant fact that the book has no index, that its chapters succeed each other without titles, and that no means of reference is afforded from one part of the book to the other. Perhaps the attempt to construct an index, or to indicate the divisions of his work, might have taught the author that a collection of opinions does not make a treatise, and that a string of "passages" is not necessarily a book.

When there has been so much grumbling about the dulness and uselessness of sermons, it is refreshing to meet with an author who has found patience not only to read, but also to analyze, a hundred printed discourses.† The work has been very carefully done, but it may be doubted if the result is worth the trouble it has cost. A skeleton

* *Paul of Tarsus: an Inquiry into the Times and the Gospel of the Apostle of the Gentiles.* By a Graduate. London: Macmillan. 1872.

† *Outlines of Sermons.* Taken chiefly from the published Works of Unitarian Writers. London: J. R. Smith. 1872.

is valuable to the student of anatomy, but it gives the general public a very imperfect idea of the living animal; in like manner, the beauty and impressiveness of a good sermon depend on qualities which are for the most part lost in a mere abstract of the thoughts contained in it. It is difficult, in fact, to conceive of less attractive reading than such outlines; and even when the thoughts are themselves most valuable, they are robbed of much of their power by being offered in this bald and fragmentary form.

Mr. Voysey's utterances in successive volumes of the "*Sling and the Stone*,"* shew increasing vigour and even harshness of expression, without a corresponding increase of clearness of thought. The present volume includes the Lectures on Rationalism and the Bible which have been delivered in various parts of the country. Most of the rest are discourses preached at St. George's Hall. In all of them there is much that commands our assent, but there are also many blemishes. The strange way in which some of the words of Jesus are perverted into proofs of his imperfection of character, and the haste with which difficult critical questions are settled off-hand, are instances. However it may be with hearers, readers can hardly help wishing for more evidence of care in the preparation of discourses on such important topics, and of modest self-distrust in the formation of opinion and selection of evidence.

"*Ecce Episcopus*"† is a dissertation on the office of Christ and his relation to his disciples. It seems that nothing can be published on this subject now-a-days without a title beginning with "*Ecce*." The present work has nothing to recommend it, except the evident good intention and pious feeling of its author. Nearly half the little volume is composed of "*addenda*," which consist of stray thoughts on various subjects, such as might be written by any educated man for his own amusement, or in letters to his friends; but they contain nothing to fit them for a wider circulation.

* *The Sling and the Stone*. Vol. V. For the Year 1871. By Charles Voysey, B.A., of St. Edmund's Hall, Oxford; late Vicar of Healaugh. London: Published by the Rev. Charles Voysey, Camden House, Dulwich, S.E.; and Trübner and Co. 1872.

† *Ecce Episcopus*: the Bishop of Souls (1 Pet. ii. 25) and his Church. London: Longmans, Green and Co. 1872.

The question as to the Eucharist is fully gone into by Dr. Vogan in a ponderous volume,* a second and enlarged edition of a former work. It pleads for "the literal interpretation" of the words, "This is my body." But we are quite at a loss to understand what the author conceives this "literal interpretation" to be, for the multitude of words he uses fail to convey any intelligible idea. He opposes the conclusions of the Church of Rome, Luther and Dr. Pusey; yet he says: "Since our Lord said of the bread, 'This is my body,' the bread was his body; and since he said of the wine, 'This is my blood,' the wine was his blood. . . . The bread in the Eucharist is the body of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the wine is his blood, in the self-same sense, in the self-same degree, and in the self-same way, at this present moment as they were before he suffered."† The explanation proposed appears to be, that the bread and wine are the body and blood spiritually and mystically. A decided protest is offered against the supposition that the Eucharist is a sacrifice. The book contains useful matter in reference to the history of opinion on the subject, but the style is so verbose that it might have been reduced to half its bulk without diminishing the substantial matter it contains.

Dr. Mac Ivor has produced an interesting and valuable book,‡ by publishing, in an amended and enlarged form, sermons delivered in the chapel of Trinity College, Dublin. We wish that when he was altering and adding to these sermons for publication, he had altogether abandoned the sermon form, which is ill-fitted for the systematic treatment of critical and philosophical questions. Commencing with the supposition that man naturally seeks an object of worship, he shews that some assistance is needed to enable us to realize the Invisible, and that this has been successively given in the Jewish dispensation, in the Bible and in various phases of Christianity, but most of all in

* *The True Doctrine of the Eucharist.* By Thomas S. L. Vogan, D D., Canon and Prebendary of Chichester; Vicar of Walberton-with-Yapton; Rural Dean, &c. London: Longmans, Green and Co. 1871.

† Pp. 115, 116.

‡ *Religious Progress: its Criterion, Instruments and Laws. Being the Substance of Sermons preached in the Chapel of Trinity College, Dublin.* By James Mac Ivor, D D., M.R.I.A., &c. Vol. I. London: Longmans, Green and Co.

Christ. Space will not allow us to follow him in his treatment of even one of the many important questions with which he deals. Without concurring in most of his conclusions, we sympathize heartily with the free, candid and scholarly spirit manifested alike in his affirmative arguments and in his treatment of those from whom he differs.

A treatise on the Atonement* by one who thinks for himself must always deserve attention. Great weight is attributed in the volume before us to the Old-Testament idea of sacrifice as a guide to Christian truth, and throughout an unquestioning dependence is evinced on the letter of Scripture. The general conclusion is, that the penalty of sin is annihilation, and that those only escape this penalty who succeed in making Christ's death a "substitution" for their own. The warm, earnest tone of the writer, and his evident desire to procure spiritual good (according to his own view of it) for his readers, rather than to obtain a theological victory, command our respect and sympathy, while we totally dissent from the doctrines he advances.

So large a part of Miss Cobbe's "Darwinism in Morals"† consists of essays reprinted from our own pages, that we are precluded by the etiquette of reviews from entering at length into its merits. It will be enough to say that this volume includes some of its author's best and most permanently valuable work. Among the essays which have not appeared in the *Theological Review*, we may especially mention that on "The Devil" from the *Fortnightly*, and the two most interesting papers on "Unconscious Cerebration," and on "Dreams as Illustrations of Involuntary Cerebration," from *Macmillan*.—"Hymns of Duty and Faith"‡ is the title of a little volume of sacred poetry intended for private use, and including a large number of poems, new

* *The Sacrifice for Sin, as revealed in the Law and the Gospel. With a Critical Examination of certain Modern Views.* By J. M. Denniston, M.A., Author of "The Perishing Soul;" "Ancient Landmarks," &c. London: Longmans, Green and Co.

† *Darwinism in Morals, and other Essays.* Reprinted from various Reviews. By Frances Power Cobbe. London: Williams and Norgate. 1872.

‡ *Hymns of Duty and Faith.* Selected and arranged by R. C. Jones. London: Whitfield. 1872.

and old, with which it is supposed that the general reader will not be familiar. The name of the compiler, Mr. R. C. Jones, will be favourably remembered by many readers in connection with a previous volume of a like kind. It is hard to criticise such a volume as this; but we can do better, we can recommend it. There are few readers but will find here something to soothe and to elevate; while some of the lesser known poems may grow into permanent companions of the mind. To add to its other recommendations, the book is well printed, and presents externally a modest attractiveness of its own.—The Misses Rothschild have put out an abridged edition of their work on Hebrew History,* intended for use in schools. Of the scientific value of the narrative we say nothing in this place; the little book is written in a simple and interesting way, and will answer its purpose for those who desire to accept without question the Old Testament story as it is. At the same time we are glad to welcome a second and enlarged edition of a very different book, Mr. S. Sharpe's "History of the Hebrew Nation and its Literature,"† which has already been characterized in our pages.

E.

* The History and Literature of the Israelites, &c. By C. and A. de Rothschild. Abridged Edition. London: Longmans. 1872.

† The History of the Hebrew Nation and its Literature; with an Appendix on the Chronology. By Samuel Sharpe. Second Edition, enlarged. London: J. R. Smith. 1872.

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THEOLOGICAL REVIEW.

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I.—HERDER AS THEOLOGIAN.—II.

Johann Gottfried von Herder's Sämmtliche Werke: Zur schönen Literatur und Kunst (20 vols.); *zur Philosophie und Geschichte* (22 vols.); *zur Religion und Theologie* (18 vols.). Stuttgart und Tübingen. 1827—1830.

J. G. v. Herder's Lebensbild. Mitgetheilt von seinem Sohne Dr. Emil Gottfr. v. Herder. Erlangen. 1846. (Published Vol. I.—III. Part I. only.)

Weimarisches Herder-Album. Jena. 1845.

Ideen zur Geschichte der Menschheit von Johann Gottfried von Herder. Mit Einleitung und Anmerkungen herausgegeben von Julian Schmidt. 3 vols. Leipzig. 1869.

Der Cid. Nach Spanischen Romanzen besungen durch Johann Gottfried von Herder. Mit einer Einleitung über Herder und seine Bedeutung für die Deutsche Literatur herausgegeben von Julian Schmidt. Leipzig. 1868.

Herder als Religions-Philosoph. Inaugural Dissertation zur Erlangung der Doctorwürde von Heinrich Erdmann. Hersfeld. 1866.

Aus Herder's Nachlass. Herausgegeben von H. Düntzer u. F. G. v. Herder. 3 vols. Frankfurt. 1856-7.

THE limits beyond which this paper must not trespass compel us to exclude much that would have to be included in a full though brief account of Herder's theology. The principles and the results of his biblical exegesis, his historical surveys of ancient religions, his sketches and estimates of Christian ecclesiastical history, even his handling of particular Christian or ecclesiastical dogmas, with much besides that falls under the head of theology in its widest

sense, must here be passed over with scarcely a remark. As little can we touch on what is a more interesting part of our subject, the genesis and growth of Herder's theological opinions. From the previous biographical sketch, some light on this point may be obtained, yet only enough to shew that the great man's mind had a history in this respect well worth looking into with some minuteness. That sketch, while suggesting the need of further history, will, however, enable us to dispense with it in this survey. For it has at least shewn that Herder's mind was steadily progressive in its course, and that his latest productions were his ripest, and the truest expositions of the principles and beliefs of his mind and heart. However, to avoid all possibility of misapprehension, which might easily occur were this not observed, we repeat, Herder's final beliefs are the logical results of principles which underlie his earliest productions. His mental history was one unbroken process of development. When different periods of his life are compared, there may be contradiction in his language and feeling, yet still beneath the superficial discrepancy there is perfect harmony. His spiritual life is not a stock with a graft inserted, but one growing tree, springing from one seed and of one substance from root to branch. The comparison might be carried further. The tree of his spiritual life is of noble growth and just proportions, rising heavenwards and expanding with its height, at no period broken, torn, or smitten to the earth. Within our limited space, therefore, we shall give the beliefs and opinions which are found in his latest works, believing that by this procedure he will suffer least injustice, and the reader will get as satisfactory information as can be hoped for from a brief second-hand glance at a great man's thoughts.

Herder's definition of theology as *the knowledge of things divine and human*, is characteristic of the great humanist, and points out to us what special heads of his theology we have now to seize upon for review. They are his views of man, of God, and of religion, which is the relation of the two.

An error fatal to a true view of man is the separation of his nature into mind and matter. What either of these abstractions is we do not know, and the imaginary dividing lines of each disappear on closer inspection. The farther

science enables us to see into the mysteries of what has been called dead matter, the more are we surprised and enraptured to see that it is not dead but alive. And the life that we discover everywhere is the same throughout the entire series of its possessors. The whole universe is an ocean of infinite forces, which are an inscrutable mystery, whether they are manifested in what is called mind or in what is called matter. These forces are everywhere organic, there being no force without an organ, and no organ without a force.

As man must not be divided into parts, the one material and the other immaterial, as little may his mental powers be mapped out into faculties. The classifications of the psychologists are purely arbitrary. Intelligence, conscience and will, are not distinct powers, but manifestations of the mysterious bundle of forces that combine to constitute a man. Every act a man performs is equally a result of these forces. Knowledge is feeling intensified into greater clearness; knowledge is always attended by volition and volition by knowledge. Love is only a still higher form of knowledge.

Man is not only one within himself, but also one with the world that surrounds him. He is a child of the earth, a creature of the myriad forces amid which he lives and moves. He knows only that which he himself has in common with his mother earth. All our knowledge is analogical. We mirror ourselves in everything, and see only what can be mirrored in us. We are able to know things that resist pressure, that suffer irritation, that feel, that think and love; but the multitude of other things that have a thousand other sensations and perform a thousand other functions which have no correspondence with ours, we are altogether unable to know. Our highest knowledge, too, is but a combination of sense-knowledge. There is no such thing as an "innate idea," and no such faculty as "pure reason." Our knowledge, our morality, our religion, are of the earth and for man. What is true, or right, or God, for other beings than men, we, being men, cannot distantly imagine. Man's knowledge must begin with the knowledge of himself, proceed to that of others, and end with the knowledge of God in himself and others. His morality and religion must consist in reverence of himself,

of others in himself, and of God in all. Being thus bound up with nature, men are not free save only as they know and love their chains. Then they are free indeed ; and the freest, noblest men have been the first to acknowledge this.

Men, not angels, as we are, shut up within a man's world, we may well believe that outside our world lies an infinite region, peopled with infinite forces, all unknown to us. By five humble gateways all messengers that come from the world that is not ourselves must enter into the world that is ourselves. Well may we believe that were there more gateways and loftier, more numerous and greater messengers would come to us to tell us yet greater things. Why might we not have a thousand senses? Religious speculation suggests that the world is infinite and alive with infinite forces. What infinitudes of experiences may therefore lie beyond our perception! Wonderful is the sensorium of man ; how infinitely wonderful must be the sensorium of God ! Constituted as we are, it is doubtless happy for us that, placed in the midst of this awful infinite ocean of rushing, thundering forces, we are sheltered and defended by our want of senses to perceive and feel them. Happy is it for the sea-anemone that it is not conscious of the fury and does not hear the doleful roar of the great deep that gives it life and food. From this prison of our senses, which is also our strong castle and pleasant home, we indeed can dream (and who knows that the sea-anemone has not its dreams too?) that we hear the sound and feel the breathing of an infinite sea ; and, waking from our dream, we are thankful for our narrow home, and feel an awful peace at the suggestion of what may lie beyond it. We feel that the veil hanging round about us as men encloses a temple, and often our hearts tremble with the deeper feeling that there must be a more awful temple which this veil screens from us.

While the relativity and limitations of our knowledge effectually preclude the formation of a system of absolute philosophy, we can still discover with practical certainty a large number of facts about ourselves. Our history, our dwelling-place, our position in the series of terrestrial life, can be known, and hints can be gathered about even the dim future.

A wide and careful survey of the organisms of our earth leads us to the discovery of a predominant type to which they conform more or less closely in their growth or final structure. Notwithstanding their unlikeness, they yet present a wonderful similarity to one prototype. So obvious is the likeness of the skeletons of all land animals, that we are in danger of overlooking it. They all present the three great sections—head, trunk, and hands and feet; and the principal members of the same section are in all marvelously similar. You may take even the extreme individuals of this class—man at its head and the humblest animal at its base,—and still you will find a strange kinship, extending even to internal structure. Leaving the land animals for the amphibia, the birds, the fishes, the insects and the molluscs, the same prototype is there, but gradually fading away until it is lost in the vegetable and animal kingdoms. Further than this we cannot get; but the transitions we are able to follow render it probable that one principle of growth and structure is observed throughout nature, even in what men call dead matter. In the eye of the Eternal it is probable that the particle of ice and the flake of snow bear a lasting analogy to the formation of the embryo in the womb. As far as we are able to see, the scale of organization is from the stone to the crystal, from the crystal to the metals, from these to plants, from plants to animals, and from them to man, the powers and instincts of the creature at each stage growing more rich, till they finally combine in the form of man in as full measure as he can admit them.

The question arises: Does this likeness to one prototype which we find prevailing throughout nature indicate an artistic or a genetic relationship of organisms? Is it evidence of a historical process of evolution? or is it merely a plan according to which Nature has thought fit to bring forth her works? If creation is an infinite, eternal process, the latter alternative may be the true one. On so high a matter, too, a modest man may decline to accept the two questions as alternatives. Besides, a confession on such a subject, even if one has a decided opinion, is not always to be worn upon the sleeve for any fool to peck at. There can be no greater duty than to speak the truth if we speak at all, yet to speak at all sometimes involves the

omission of still more pressing and important duties ; and in that case the good man must hold his peace. There are also sound doctrines which the wise and reverent teacher will not preach "to those that eddy round and round." And cannot he preach them in language which the sober and attentive listener will understand, while the eddying ones will be unable to fathom it?

We pass on to the question of man's position in the family of his fellow-creatures. In vain did Buffon let loose the floods of his eloquence to overwhelm the facts that stand to shew, in the case of man and the ape, the uniformity of Nature's organisms. Both externally and internally the ourang-outan is like man ; both the skeleton and the viscera are the same. The ourang, too, has human habits, human virtues and human vices. Animal instincts have in him given place to reason. Neither dog nor elephant attempts to imitate man, but the ape is always doing so. He would make himself perfect if he could. But Nature interposes and forbids it. She plants an impassable barrier. It is with the spirit and after the method of a true philosopher, it is true, that Lord Monboddo endeavours to shew that this barrier is imaginary. Yet he has not made out his case. The poor ape itself may cast wistful eyes upon man's superior rank and condition, but it is doomed not to share them. The mental difference between man and the monkey depends on a structural difference. The degrees of the facial angles of men and monkeys are outward measurements of an inward intellectual distance. According to Camper's measurements, the angle in the case of monkeys ranges from 42 to 50 degrees, and in the case of men from 70 to 100. If, then, the difference of structure is one of degree only and not of kind, the question may well occur, Why should not this difference be got over? Why should not some exceptionally fine young ape attain the wished-for development of skull, that human angle of 70 degrees? For this reason. The development of the brain and skull depends on another radical and far-reaching difference between man and ape. When Nature said to man, Stand upright, she issued a fiat which included in it the formation of a new type of head, skull and brain. With this change of posture came the great change of physiognomy and cranium which separates man from the monkey. How Nature deli-

vered this transforming fiat, and how it took effect, she has not seen fit to tell us. Yet this may be observed, that the *habitus* of a creature reacts upon its structure, and Nature's method of working is from the centre to the circumference.

Together with the elevation of the animal to the posture and the position of a man, came other and eminently distinctive gifts. Pre-eminent among these were the use of the hand, the freer and more manifold application of the senses, and especially the power of speech. Anatomically, the latter gift followed the upright position; mentally, it was an indissoluble accompaniment of the first act of reflection. As soon as the mind acquired freedom and power to reflect, "That is so and so," with that act language was born in the soul, whether its outward expression was a gesture or a sound. Speech is therefore natural to man, and not a supernatural endowment needing to be taught by the gods. It is unnatural to animals, and cannot be acquired by them. In closest conjunction with the attainment of language is the development of reason. Language helps us to think, to meditate, to choose and to resolve. It is the medium of reason, and its conservator between man and man. And with reason come our highest spiritual treasures—freedom, sympathy, hope of immortality and religion.

The question of man's origin has not been fully answered. Whither point the partial answers that have been given, it is not difficult to gather. Still the crude assertion that man was once a monkey must be energetically negatived. A man was never a monkey, and a monkey will never be a man. Nature has thrown a decent veil of mystery over the birth of the human race. We may add to what has been said this only, that everything points to the interior of Asia as their cradle, and to one pair of parents as their progenitors. On this subject the Hebrews have preserved the oldest and most trustworthy traditions.

Man's erect posture, with its consequent physical development, is a victory over base animalism. His physical organization contains within it the law and the end of his personal and social progress. His senses no longer tend towards the earth; the hand is a finer means of education to him than the trunk is to the elephant; he can provide for himself weapons for his defence, but teeth and claws fail him for attack. He is formed for society and not for can-

nibalism. The free use of his hand, the elevation and wider range of his organs of sense, his more finely developed brain, and the consequent powers of reason and speech, shew that he is to be mechanic, artist, rational and voluntary agent. His build and all his gifts point him out as formed for society, and in society for love, sympathy, justice and truth. His build and his reason also lead him to the love of proportion and the fear of God. And the one word that expresses the sum of all these endowments and virtues of a man is *humanity*. This word represents the perfection towards which the powers and instincts that are found in man's constitution must ever increasingly advance.

If we compare the actual condition of mankind with the ideal of humanity to which they are called, the discrepancy at times appears to be very great and distressing. We have said, "at times;" for men who think and feel about actual and ideal conditions of things are not infrequently subject to times and seasons. In some moods, the mind is more open to the fact and the feeling that existence itself is a blessing, "a thing of beauty" and "a joy for ever;" that every form of life, and therefore of human life, is an unspeakable good; that men are happy now amidst strangely different circumstances; that one of the besetting sins of the civilized and morbid idealist is an unreal, inhuman and fanatical devotion to his weak, sectarian ideal. In other moods, a sense of the immeasurable value of the ideal prevails over the love of the actual. Then discontent at the failure of men to attain the ideal fills the soul with inexpressible sadness. On the one hand, we see men degrading themselves to the level of the beasts, and on the other stands the incarnate ideal of humanity. The contrast is too saddening for the sensitive, benevolent heart to bear. Now, as the one or the other of these moods predominates, the mind is predisposed, with less or greater eagerness, to listen to the promise of a life to come; and in proportion to a man's constitutional bent towards the actual or the ideal, will be the weakness or the strength of his hope in immortality. It will also be found that when this hope is dwelt upon fondly, inasmuch as it is a hope, and not knowledge, the form which the future life must appear under will vary considerably with the states of mind and the external occasions that call for the consideration of the subject. Now

we long to lose ourselves—this Ego which is the source of so much sorrow and sin—in the one eternal Life and Love.

“When then at last, my Genius, thou invert’st
The torch, I may ask thee for much,
Yet nothing for my Self. With that what gav’st
Thou me? My childhood, youth, or worn-out age?
Which all are gone, and gladly I would drink
The cup of Lethe.”

Careless about ourselves, we can be concerned only about the sure and certain hope that all that was pure and good and beautiful in our lives and work will survive death and perpetuate itself throughout all future time. Good deeds can never die; moral as little as physical force can ever lose itself. At other times, this indifference to a personal immortality must give way to the more human hope, even if it should be feared that this may be born but of a “dream.” What the outward form of the future personal existence will be, we can never even so much as dimly surmise; yet consciousness must go with us into the unknown land; and righteousness itself seems to demand that the present and the future life must be related to each other as the warp and the woof of the finished fabric.

We now leave man, with his origin and destiny but darkly, yet his earthly mission clearly enough, proclaimed. We approach another subject, and since, as Butler says, all things may be run up into mysteries, especially is it the case with this. The fact that God is, and that in Him we live and move, is the most certain of all facts; but the manner of His existence is wrapped in clouds and darkness. Still, we can get points of view from which light may be expected, and at all events thereby escape prevailing errors.

Man finds that he is part of a universe which appears to him to be of boundless extent. He knows of no other reason that can be rendered for the limits that are affixed to the various kingdoms of individual existences than that of possibility. As a whole the world is infinite, but its parts are limited. Life is endless, but lives fall under the divisions and restrictions of time and space. The fiat of creation is, Fill every available space with all possible forms of existence. Throughout nature play endless forces in endless forms of organization. Final causes, special ends, are not observable as laws of being. Yet the dominance of

order appears everywhere, and the prevalence of good. All things are linked together, and exist only as parts of a greater whole. Weak and destructive existences go down, their weakness and destructiveness being the negation of power and goodness, which is productiveness. Thus goodness, which is synonymous with the richest possible life, lies at the very heart of creation. Love of life, economy of existence for the sake of infinite abundance of it, is the great foundation-principle of the world. The manifestations of this highest possible production of life display a perfect wisdom. The highest power is thus at the same time the highest wisdom. Blind power can never be the strongest, but must succumb to a power that obeys order and necessity. Throughout the world, therefore, we behold revelations of infinite Power, which is at the same time Wisdom and Goodness. These revelations fill the soul with perpetual wonder and awe.

Mind and heart alike call out for God as the explanation and consecration of the world. They ask for an unchanging substantial reality to abide amidst and sustain the changing phenomena that move around us; for one primal, eternal force amidst the myriad forces of nature, which shall both constitute and explain their unity; for one universal, immanent cause to give rise to the great world of sequences or effects that constitute all we see. This that appears to us as dead matter, the more deeply we penetrate it, reveals itself as the living organ of mysterious forces; these thoughts and feelings that are born in this wonderful heart and brain come forth with the powers and in the robes that they have received from their mother earth; and both this matter, that is not dead but alive, and this thought, which is of the earth, seek their common origin and their common consecration in One who is the Life of all life and the Power of all powers.

The student of Nature sees that her God does not perform for her the offices which the watch-maker, or watch-winder, performs for his watch. Nature is not a machine; she is a living organization; and no mechanic working *ab extra* can create and inform with energy an organism. The lover of Nature—and it is only “the heart that loves her” whom she does not “deceive”—cannot allow that any part of her is without God, or is even merely shone upon by rays of

His distant glory, and has not in itself the wisdom, the goodness and the energy of Him who fills all things. The lover of God is equally unable to endure the thought that there is any force, any life, or good, or reality, in the world that is not God's, a manifestation and a part of Him. The mind and heart of the religious naturalist, the man who loves both God and Nature, will find God in Nature and Nature in God ; to him, all Nature must be divine, and all divinity natural. God is *natura naturans*, and the world is *natura naturata*.

Such a conception of God's relation to the world is not that which commonly prevails, and it renders not a few other common conceptions of Him wholly untenable. God is not a *person*. Personality is limitation, and is inapplicable to the Being who is infinite existence. *Soul of the world* is equally a figure of speech, and may convey more error than truth when used of Him in whose view the whole world is soul, and that which appears to us as body is instinct with His life. As little may God be thought of as acting with sovereign freedom, and not under subjection to the commands of a wise necessity. In nature we observe the dominion of necessity, by which things are what they are and could not be otherwise. And this necessity is wisdom, power and beneficence. Nature is but the manifestation of God. He also is subject to the laws of His own perfect, infinite Being. In looking into His works, we may expect to find traces of this necessity, but none of final causes and secondary purposes. When we imagine the Deity acting with special ends in view, we degrade rather than elevate the mode of His activity. Truly viewed, He reveals His whole nature in the humblest of His works. The true idea of God will also forbid us to think of Him as subject to the limitations of time and space. The notion is unendurable that God, after millions of ages spent in dreary loneliness, excogitated the world from His own substance, as a spider spins his web. The world is not an emanation of God, and of Him it cannot be said either that He began or that He ceased to create. Space and time are the conditions of the thought of creatures which exist under these limitations ; but the Creator stands in no relation to them. He fills the universe and eternity, but we are but atoms and creatures of a day. For us there is a *now* and a *then*,

a *here* and a *there*, but not for the eternal and infinite One.

With some changes in the phraseology, the system of Spinoza is the only philosophy that presents a conceivable idea of God, and His relation to the world. Spinoza's *una substantia* is the *ens realissimum*, and therefore the exact opposite of an empty abstraction. All life and thought have their basis and energy in Him. He is the one tree of life, and all lives are but branches thereof. He is the one force of which all other forces are the manifestation. He is the energy and the formative power of all organisms. It is true and ever to be borne in mind that we do not at all know what is the real nature of force; yet the assumption of its existence is a necessity, and conducts to extensive and rich views of things. Similarly, when we speak of God as the Force of forces, the one infinite, eternal Force, we do not profess to have fathomed the depths of His nature; far, far from this! And yet this idea of Him is in accordance with what we know of the world, is demanded by our intellect, and leads to fruitful and harmonious conceptions of the basis and nature of the universe. Let us, however, carefully note that the highest form of force with which we are acquainted is *thought*. That surprising idea of Lessing's, that it is one of the prejudices of man's mind to imagine that thought is the first and the highest of things, and to endeavour to derive all existence from that, is not very intelligible. "Certainly the highest Force must know itself, otherwise it would be a blind force, which could neither enjoy nor use itself, and would therefore want the most essential and truest reality."

As a fact, demonstrations of the existence of God convince no one; but if I am asked for one, it is this. The world is a great whole, in which there is order, a relation and correspondence of parts to each other, so that everything is conditioned. There must be a cause assigned for this. Chance, which is disorder, cannot be the cause of order. Mind, understanding, is met with everywhere, and must be the ground of things. Or, again: In thought there is a world of conceivable things, and these conceivables can be conjoined, and according to innumerable modes of composition. Yet, however varied the mode of combination be, the result is not madness, nor wild, lawless, chimerical phantasms, but

harmony, order, truth. This is a demonstration of the existence of God. "Between every subject and predicate we place 'is' or 'is not.' This 'is,' the formula of the parity and agreement of various ideas, the bare sign =, is for me a demonstration of God."

Immediately connected with the idea of God is the subject of man's relation to Him, or *religion*. Religion is the acknowledgment in feeling, thought and conduct, of the laws of our existence. It is the profound conviction of what we are as parts of the world, and what we ought to be and to do as men. This conviction is instinctive, a voice of conscience, our nature itself testifying what man is and should be. The religious man, therefore, is the conscientious man, with reverence and joy recognizing the will of God concerning himself in his own structure, and endeavouring with great painstaking to obey it by the development and perfecting of his nature. Thus the end of his religion is *humanity*, or the attainment of his true manhood. Irreligiousness is carelessness, lightness, inaccuracy, looseness in thought and conduct: religiousness is attentiveness, care, painstaking, in all observation, reasoning and action. To be and to do as becomes men in all things, is therefore not only the end of true religion, but the exercise of it. This brings us to the Christian religion.

In approaching this subject, one or two principles must be premised. First of all, it must be remembered that the essential religious faiths of mankind have their foundation in human nature, and owe their validity and necessity not to an external teacher or authority. Their value is intrinsic, not extrinsic. Accordingly it is comparatively a matter of minor importance to know who first saw and promulgated them; the essential thing is that they be but known. They may come to us through the medium of mythical narrative, and yet not suffer the slightest deterioration thereby.

It is further of greatest moment to recognize clearly the incomparably greater certitude that attaches to great religious faiths than to the best historical evidence. No historical fact has evidence for it sufficiently strong to warrant the elevation of it into a necessary article of religious belief. A religion, therefore, with claims to be universal, must not be based upon history, nor contain historical

articles, but must appeal to the heart of man for both its substance and its proof.

It is not a new principle, but only an application of those just advanced, to premise further, that a sacred distinction must be made between *the religion of Christ* and *Christianity*, between the religion of which the heart of Jesus was the altar and his life the sacrifice, and the religion of which he was the deified object and the metaphysical problem. The religion of Christ every religious man will share in a greater or less degree, but the Christian religion concerns men only as students of history.

A more detailed application of these principles to the Christian religion leads to a true appreciation of its nature and value.

First, it is not a necessary part of a true Christian's religion to hold this or that dogma concerning the character, person and work of Jesus. On the contrary, with the progress of the human mind dogmas about Jesus must diminish in importance. There is one true philosophy; and if Plato be the propounder of that, the essential point is not that I know or believe anything about Plato, but that I know and receive the philosophy which he did not create, but merely discover. Of still less importance than a knowledge and reception of the commonly received history of Plato, is the formation of an opinion on the mythical, traditional and critical questions of his birth, his sojourn in Egypt, and the relation of his teaching to that of Socrates. The same holds of all opinions about Jesus, whether they are historical or doctrinal. It was not the outward details of his life which were of universal import, but the inward reality of his religion, which by virtue of its universal import communicated itself to others and could not perish. That was invaluable, not on account of its historical origin, or its relation to one man among millions, but because it was the religion to which the race was destined to come, being the apocalypse of the religious nature of man. Whoever the founder of Christianity was, whether a Jew or a Chinese, the Son of God or the son of Joseph, he would long since have been forgotten had not his life and work contained the rule or maxim according to which all men are saved. Whether physiologists would give a certificate

of his death on the cross, how the disciples got the belief that he rose from the dead, what amount of truth may lie in the late traditions about his birth, the measure of historical conscience the preachers of his Messiahship possessed in applying to him the prophetic signs of the Messiah, —are all matters that belong to criticism and history, and have no religious importance. The gospel for the heart of mankind must be something infinitely greater than a local, temporal history. Much more must it be quite another thing than what the Christian religion is often debased to—a harrowing tale of a crucifixion. How would the “beloved disciple” have shrunk in pain and indignation from the sight of his glorified Master eternalized by so-called Christian art in the revolting form of a crucified martyr! Paul and John both exalt their Son of God beyond the poor limits and base humiliations of an earthly and Jewish history. For *us* it is even less needful to “know him according to the flesh.” It is his religion, and not his life, that saves us. Could it be proved that the whole gospel history is an invention, the Christian religion would not be affected thereby, and we should still thank the inventors.

Further, I am not bound as a Christian to accept as true all that there may be reason to believe that Jesus himself taught. Every speaker must speak in the language of his age and nation, and from the circle of ideas which prevail around him. Two thousand years have passed since Jesus of Nazareth spoke by the Lake of Gennesaret, and the Jewish temple was then standing. The expectation that his second coming would be in that generation he himself shared with his disciples.

Finally, men may have the religion of Jesus and yet not know him, or, knowing him, yet refuse to be called by his name. Jews are many of them, as such, members of his kingdom; and the religion of Jesus supplies us with no motive for attempting their conversion. Reason, equity, truth, kindness, love and religion, amongst whatever nations they are found, are the same. Christ’s religion, with or without his name, must act as leaven amongst all peoples. The historical gospels and faith in them are one thing; the gospel of Christ’s life, the influence of the work he began, the tone of feeling and spirit he imparted to his disciples,

are wholly another thing. In the future, that historical gospel must gradually lose itself in this essential, eternal, living gospel. Nothing depends on the Jewish name Jesus, or on anecdotes of his life in Galilee, or in Jerusalem long since in ruins. The exalted one himself can attach no importance to words and ceremonies that only perpetuate the memory of his poor earthly life. Paul was bold enough to foretel that Christianity was but a temporary institution, and looked for a time when Christ should resign the kingdom to his Father.

We have now arrived at the point of view from which may be made an unprejudiced survey of the teaching, character and work of Jesus.

The fundamental truth of the teaching of Jesus was, that God is our Father, with its corollary, that all we are brothers. The reception of this truth brings with it confidence in God and in ourselves. As sons of God, men must reverence themselves and live in subjection to the moral law within them. As sons of God, they bear the image of God, become partakers of His nature, manifest His character to the world, and are co-workers together with Him. They are representatives of God, the moral organs of his righteousness, as well as the sensorium of His thought. In the view of Jesus, the moral worlds of God and of men are so essentially one, that God can deal with them only as they deal with themselves and others. The moral government of God may be compared to a balance on which the deed and the consequence are always equal by a natural, irreversible law. It is thus in the power of every one to determine how God shall treat him, whether as a son or as a slave; and what God shall be to him, judge or father, tyrant or brother.

Common sonship to God constitutes men brothers, and makes the race divine. The more humanity men have, the more deeply will they feel the common tie. With the growth of humanity, independently of all set organization for the purpose, indeed without any knowledge of each other, men will everywhere work together for the common weal, and the law of their operations will be to do first the work that lies nearest at hand and has most need to be done. It must be especially the neglected, the suffering and the misguided, who will command the first assistance of the humane disciples of Jesus. It will be their duty to

fill up the gaps, as it were, and supply the deficiencies of creation. In this way they become the noblest organs of Providence—its eye, ear, wisdom, heart and aiding hand.

This work cannot be done without provoking the opposition of all forms of evil. A means of resisting and overcoming this opposition must be found. That can be no other than to suffer evil and to overcome it by good. The most powerful resistance is tenderness, patience, forgiveness, multiplied goodness and magnanimity. And this endurance of evil is the mightiest, steadiest energy of soul, and the very opposite of unintelligent pusillanimity.

The character of Jesus was in exact accordance with his teaching. It may be best described by the two denominations he bore, *Son of God* and *Son of Man*. His heavenly Father's will was the motive and the law of his life, and his own work was his Father's. This he performed as Son of Man, from the purest devotion and for the highest service of mankind. In his own person he shewed that the ills under which the race suffers are rather inward than outward, and that their cure is not to be sought from outward machinery, but from personal renovation. He saw that the evils from which men need to be redeemed are superstition, folly, vice, personal and national prejudices, evil customs, injurious habits, ill-will and slothfulness.

Hence the work of Jesus became the receptacle of his teaching and character. The Son of God and Son of Man, the teacher of the sonship of his brother man to their common Heavenly Father, commenced a work the entire purpose of which was to bring men to feel and live as *men* in the lofty sense of the word, that is, as sons of God, which he shewed them by his teaching, his character and his work, they were. The means for accomplishing this work which he chose was the training of a society of assistants, rather than the instruction of a number of disciples. His intercourse with his friends was an education of them which might serve as the type of an education for the human race. The instruction he gave was entirely practical, and consisted of a few great principles. His aim was to kindle in them the same spirit that lived in himself. He told them that if they possessed that, all else would follow. Thus Christianity was introduced to the world as a working institution, and not as a new school of

thought. In this respect, Jesus followed neither John the Baptist nor the Jewish rabbis. Hence it followed that the same truths which philosophers had taught, and generally in vain, he made the possession of the humblest of the people. The friends of Jesus in their daily lives made sacrifice for the welfare of others their law and practice; they felt and lived as a family of brothers and sons of God.

The teaching, character and work of Jesus throw light upon each other, and together form a consistent whole of mutually attesting parts. When, however, we approach the life of Jesus to examine the details of it, difficulties start up, and we find ourselves on ground that is often far from secure. The question of the nature and origin of the gospel histories would have to be dealt with here if we had space. We must barely touch on the subject.

The first Christian preachers were writers not by choice, but of necessity. The first Gospel was oral and not written. At first it was very limited in extent, and grew in circumference and fulness only with the exigencies of preachers and converts. In our present Gospels there are indications of the limits within which the first oral tradition ranged; which were the baptism and the ascension. Subsequently the narratives were extended in each direction. Matthew and Luke have transgressed the boundaries which Mark has observed. The principle that determined what was to form a part of the gospel-narrative and what was to be excluded, was the *canon of signs*, the received idea of what the Messiah must be, say and do. To a considerable extent these signs made the Messianic tradition. If the Messiah is to be a son of David; then his pedigree must be given. Is he to bring all nations together; then priestly philosophers come to do him homage at his birth. According to the prophets, the Messiah will preach to the poor, heal the sick, raise the dead; and the Gospels record his sermons and his miracles. The Gospel of John was written under the influence of a freer principle and a more exalted spirit. When the Palestinian Messiah could no longer satisfy the needs of the church and the world, John presented a picture of his Master as the Redeemer of the world, the eternal and glorified Son of God. In gazing upon the import of his Master's mission and dwelling on his glorification, he forgot his earthward side, and portrayed that only which was heavenly and divine.

Of the miracles of this history it is a trouble to a sensitive man, and withal a man in a prominent ecclesiastical position in the last years of the eighteenth century, to have to say much. And wise readers do not desire many words on such a matter.

The teaching and character of Jesus stand in no need of the testimony of miracles to prove their divinity. So long as my eyes can see the sun, I do not ask to hear the fiat of the Almighty, "Let there be light!" And if we stood in need of the testimony of miracles, narratives of miracles would not greatly help us. Faith in records of miracles rests on a very different basis from that on which faith in witnessed miracles rests. In the first case it is faith in records, and its certainty cannot be stronger than historical certainty. Besides, the ideas of the early Christians as to what constitutes a miracle differ greatly from ours. What is to us a natural event would be to them supernatural. Take, for instance, the resurrection of Jesus. It is as certain as history can make it, that the disciples believed that he died on the cross; and they knew that he lay in the grave, and after two nights and a day, wholly unexpectedly, was with them again. That unlooked-for re-appearance was wonderful to them, a miracle, which they could think of only as an extraordinary display of God's power and love. They were not acquainted with the difficulty physiologists find in determining the certain criterion of death. To them Jesus was dead; he had resigned his spirit into the hands of his Father. Yet if it could be proved that Jesus was not physiologically dead, and his resurrection be in that case restored to the class of natural events, the truly wonderful nature of the grand and un hoped-for surprise would remain as great, as far as the first disciples were concerned, as if his body had seen corruption, although in the scholastic sense there would have been no miracle.

The ordinary wonderful works performed by Jesus were such as required no supernatural assistance. The greater number of them were exorcisms and cures. The few that are supernatural and incomprehensible, such as the raising of Lazarus, must be left where they are in the Gospels. They were not for us, and we do not expect to see them repeated. If we receive the reports of them, we receive them on the authority of the narratives. Some of these

supernatural occurrences, however, did not appear so extraordinary to the Hebrew as they do to us. In fact, the language only is supernatural. When we read of angels ministering to Jesus, this is only a Hebrew mode of expressing the reception of great and unlooked-for comfort. It is further not to be doubted that the early church received a remarkable influx of natural gifts and powers, the effects of which were comparatively superhuman.

The idea that a wonderful work establishes a truth is wholly false. Jesus himself cautioned his disciples against this error. He also rebuked the miracle-seeking spirit of his age. It was in condescension to the weakness and degeneracy of the time that he consented to appear as miracle-worker. Certainly *we* do not need miracles. There is nothing that we cannot learn better without than with them. We pray, "From miracles, good Lord, deliver us!" They do not concern us. They are for those who can receive them. And as long as there is faith in them on the part both of the doer and the witness, they will be performed and believed.

We must here bring our review to a close. The treatment of any one of the many points on which a summary of Herder's views has been given, might have been indefinitely extended; and, we repeat, he has written much that is most valuable on branches of theology to which we have not been able to make even a reference. With regard to the foregoing reproduction of some of his ideas, we wish to defend ourselves from two misconceptions. Often there has been considerable haze, and often halting amidst several opinions. We can assure the reader that we have found the same fault, if it be wholly a fault, in Herder's works. Again, some of the opinions of Herder no one in our day is likely to acknowledge as his own, and a good many of those we have endeavoured to present we are not desirous to be thought to hold. If we had criticised at all, it would have been impossible to do even the poor measure of justice to Herder's richness and originality of thought which has been done. Although, however, we refrain from criticising Herder's particular views, we must be allowed to indicate what appears to us to be most characteristic, and at the same time most fruitful, in the drift and tendency of his thinking on theology.

That word of Goethe's about Hamann is the key to Herder's life and thinking. His profound insight into primitive poetry, whether as Hebrew Scriptures or German *Volkslieder*, arose from the fact that he was himself a man of primitive modes of thought and feeling. Carlyle says, in his account of Ludwig Tieck, "The true tone of that ancient time, when man was in his childhood, when the universe within was divided by no wall of adamant from the universe without, and the forms of the Spirit mingled and dwelt in trustful sisterhood with the forms of the Sense, was not easy to seize and adapt with any fitness of application to modern minds." Now, Herder was the great master who led the way back into this ancient time, whom Tieck and many others learnt to follow. And Herder penetrated the recesses of that time when sense and spirit were one, because this was the secret of his own inward life. The outward and the inward were in his case, as in few others, but aspects of a harmonious whole. In his philosophical and theological thinking, therefore, we find that he has a deep-seated, invincible repugnance to all disunion. A dualism between mind and matter, God and nature, understanding and reason, natural and revealed religion, he cannot endure. All his labours, as philosopher, theologian, critic, historian and scientific inquirer, have this as their aim, to bring man back to the point, whence he started as a child, of harmony within himself, and between himself and the universe around him. It is especially the predominance of this aim and tendency in all his writings which, in our opinion, renders them so exceptionally productive. Wide of the mark as some of his views are, he still knows in what direction the mark really lies, and the whole of the powers of his richly endowed nature are striving to attain it.

J. FREDERICK SMITH.

II.—MEMOIR OF JOSHUA PARRY.

A Memoir of the Rev. Joshua Parry, Nonconformist Minister of Cirencester. With some original Essays and Correspondence. By the late Charles Henry Parry, F.R.S. Edited by Sir John E. Eardley Wilmot, Bart., Recorder of Warwick. London: Hamilton, Adams and Co. 1872.

THIS is a disappointing book. Had it been printed for private circulation as a family memorial, its leaves might have been turned over with listless interest, mingled with admiration of the filial respect which, with records of events and dates scanty and scattered, has gathered together a few letters written and more received by the subject of the Memoir, together with some literary remains which their author had, perhaps judiciously, withheld from publication. Even when offered as now to the book-buying world, a critic must feel under restraint as he calls to mind that the author of the Memoir, like his ancestor, has passed away; and that the publication of the manuscript is due to the devotion of a widow, desirous that the fruit of her husband's labours should not be lost. Beyond correcting the press, Sir Eardley Wilmot takes no responsibility as editor save for a preface of three pages and the addition of a few notes. This preface pardonably (though questionably) describes Mr. Parry as an eminent theologian and scholar and a deep thinker and reasoner; and unpardonably (if Unitarian means anti-trinitarian) states that the 'Unitarian tendencies' of which he was suspected are discernible neither in his extant letters, nor in the 'Confession of Faith' which is found at length in the book. The character of the notes may be judged of if we remark that a printer's erratum in the name of Bourdaloue gives occasion for a short account of that orator; and that a casual allusion in the text to Voltaire's contemptuous estimate of Pope produces a note with the dates of that philosopher's birth and death. Acknowledgment is made to Mr. Jerom Murch, the historian of the western Presbyterian churches. So little use, however, does the editor make of Mr. Murch's information, and so little knowledge does he shew of the history of Nonconformity at either Cirencester or elsewhere, that he believes

the chapel at Cirencester of which Mr. Parry became minister in 1742, though then 'denominated Presbyterian,' to have 'rather belonged to the Independent sect.' It were heartily to be wished that Mr. Murch himself could have edited these MSS. For in the absence of that sympathy with Nonconformity which the biographer appears to have lost and which the editor can never have felt, it is little to be wondered at that, in spite of commendable intentions, scant justice has been done to the subject of the Memoir. In competent hands the volume might have been reduced in size, but it would have given us a better idea of the man and of his mind and work, of the class to which he belonged, and of the social aspects of the community in which he lived.

Joshua Parry was descended from an old Welsh family. He was born at Llangham, in the county of Pembroke, in 1719. His father and mother died in his infancy; and beyond the fact that he was at school at Haverfordwest, nothing seems to be known of his youth until, at the age of nineteen, he is found in London studying for the ministry at the academy of Mr. John Eames, a friend and assistant of Sir Isaac Newton. The devotion to learning of the Presbyterians of that day was scarcely less thorough than their devotion to conscience. Excluded from the Universities, they had set up private academies of their own. The youths who were being trained in these academies for the Nonconformist ministry, and the sons of laymen who were to be the leading members of their future congregations, had the inestimable advantage of receiving their higher education in the same classes; an advantage then and still possessed by the Church of England, but which the Nonconformists do not seem to have cared to retain. In his 'Retrospect of the Religious Life of England' the late Rev. J. J. Tayler has given an account of the course of instruction usual in these academies. In spite of fewer opportunities of access to books, and though necessarily less accurate and profound in certain kinds of learning, their courses in logic, metaphysics, ethics and natural philosophy, which prepared the pupil for the study of theology, were more diversified and liberal than those of the old Universities. Dr. Doddridge—himself at a later date the Principal of the largest and most eminent Nonconformist college of

its day—in two letters written in 1722 and 1723 bears remarkable testimony to the freedom of inquiry encouraged by the tutor of the academy in which he was being educated, about the time when Mr. Parry was with Mr. Fames.* The successors and descendants of these old English Presbyterians have been true to their free traditions; but it may be feared that in England at the present day no colleges save theirs exist in which theology is taught as a science, historically and freely. Had Dr. Charles Henry Parry known more of the character of the academies in one of which his grandfather was educated, he might have wondered less at the continuous refusal of Joshua Parry to conform.

Mr. Parry's first settlement was at Midhurst in Sussex, in 1741; but his stay there cannot have been longer than twelve months, for in the spring of 1742 he became minister of the Nonconformist congregation at Cirencester. Here he remained until his death in 1776; having consistently refused not only the 'valuable preferment' in the Church of England which, his descendant tells us, 'from the influence of his connections he might have obtained,' but also 'even situations connected, as it was believed, with his own particular views and sentiments on religious subjects, and such as were considered the most lucrative and honourable in the disposal of the Protestant Dissenters.' In 1748, he refused to succeed to Mr. Calamy in Crosby Square; and in 1757 withstood repeated invitations, first to act as assistant, and afterwards as successor, to Dr. Chandler at the Old Jewry, which was then looked upon as the See of Canterbury to the Dissenters.

The biographer feels some natural regret that his ancestor should have resisted these endeavours to remove him to the metropolis. The man himself was surely the best judge. The surroundings of his life were happy, and he was doing a modestly good and useful work. A scene of usefulness more conspicuous and extensive was held out to him; but his judicious reflection was, 'whether I in particular should be more useful there, is known only to Him who comprehends and regulates all events.' Nor must it be forgotten that the importance of the metropolis and that of the

* Diary and Correspondence, Vol. I. pp. 155, 198.

country towns were relatively less unequal a century back than they are now. The means of travelling were then so inconvenient, slow and costly, that many an older country town was itself a centre, social and literary. The metropolis had no monopoly of centralization and concentration in literature or even in fashion. And the position of the Nonconformists was relatively higher, socially and intellectually. Few of their country congregations but numbered neighbouring landed gentry among their members, and large numbers of the more highly educated and intellectual local aristocracy worshiped in their chapels. The Church was but slowly recovering from the state of things which followed on the ejection from it, in the reign of Charles the Second, of a large number of its most laborious, faithful and scholarly divines. The mantle of those men was on the Nonconformists, not on the Churchmen; and if any one doubts that the consequences of the ejection were still felt in the Church in the days with which we are now concerned, we commend him to a perusal of the ninth chapter of Southey's *Life of Wesley*, in connection with that part of Macaulay's third chapter in which the clergy of the Established Church in the middle and later years of Charles the Second's reign are described. Thus it came to pass that the minister of the Presbyterian chapel in a country town was often better bred and better educated than his neighbour in the parish church. Mr. Parry undoubtedly represented the highest class of Nonconformist ministers; and we feel all the more vexation that the *Memoir* is to be searched in vain for information about the outward forms of that Nonconformist life in which a very large share of the social and domestic virtues of England were preserved throughout the eighteenth century.

Mr. Parry's church at Cirencester was (and still is) one of those old English Presbyterian foundations by which judges and ecclesiastics have been so sadly puzzled. No *synodical* Presbyterian Church existed in England until it was formed by Scotchmen in the present century. The Ordinance of Parliament which in 1646 had substituted the authority of local, provincial and national courts for the authority of bishops and archbishops was carried into effect only in London and Lancashire. There was an attempt at it in Devonshire. But neither Presbytery nor Synod existed

at all in forty-nine at least of the fifty-two counties in England and Wales. In these forty-nine counties neither Presbyterianism nor Episcopacy was in force. Individual parishes managed their own affairs :

‘Cromwell’s Triers,’ quaintly says Baxter, ‘saved many a congregation from ignorant, ungodly, drunken Teachers ; that sort of men that intended no more in the ministry than to say a sermon as readers say their common prayers, and so patch up a few good words together to talk the people asleep with on Sunday ; and all the rest of the week go with them to the ale-house and harden them in their sin. And that sort of ministers that either preacht against a holy life or preacht as men that never were acquainted with it—all those that used the ministry but as a common trade to live by and were never likely to convert a soul—all these they usually rejected ; and in their stead admitted of any that were able, serious preachers and lived a godly life, *of what tolerable opinion soever they were.*’*

The Church actually established during the Commonwealth was, in short, an irregular body consisting of a few presbyteries and of a great number of independent parishes. The advocates of strict ecclesiastical organization will say that a state of things like this must have been a state of confusion. Yet the English Church lived through it those fifteen years. And no attentive student of the history of the time can fail to see that within that Church of the Commonwealth free thought, free inquiry and free speech found strength to rise and room to work, and mind and soul had at least a chance for life and growth.

A remnant of the clergy, thus established during the Commonwealth and ejected in 1662, became ministers among the nonconforming Presbyterian churches founded under the Indulgence of James II., and afterwards more legally under the Toleration Act of William and Mary. Among these churches no attempt at synodical government can be traced ; the assemblies occasionally called together (and in two instances meeting regularly) being simply consultative. Much useless conjecture has been wasted on their motives for retaining the name ‘Presbyterian.’ It had been the name of their party in the Established Church, and had never been dropped during the persecution. It

* Sylvester’s Life of Baxter, p. 72. 1696.

thus was to them an historical and even family name, and seems to have been tacitly retained, not deliberately adopted. The best English writers of the period do not use the word to imply government by presbyteries. Addison (quoted in Webster's Dictionary) defines Presbyterianism as that form of church government which invests *presbyters* with all spiritual power, and admits no *prelates* over them. It is often curiously forgotten that 'presbyterian' and 'presbytery' have a common etymological origin in 'presbyter;' and that a chief distinction between Episcopalian and Presbyterian was, that the one contended for three orders of clergy, while the other maintained the equality of all. It was of one of these so-called Presbyterian churches that Joshua Parry became the minister in 1742.

The period was eminently one of transition, be it looked at from the point of view of politics, of philosophy, of theology or of religion.

The fear of Jacobitism was creeping upon the land, like the edge of an approaching shadow. The alarm of the Nonconformists can be estimated only by those who know what it is to apprehend that the fruits of fifty years' progress are about to be torn away. We cannot pretend that this alarm had not a material as well as a moral element. The main strength of the Nonconformists was already among the mercantile and manufacturing classes and the best of the artizan class. In thirty years of peace, says Mr. Hallam, and 'especially under the prudent rule of Walpole, the seeds of our commercial greatness were gradually ripened. It was evidently the most prosperous season that England had ever experienced; and the progression, though slow, being uniform, the reign perhaps of George II. might not disadvantageously be compared, for the real happiness of the community, with that more brilliant but uncertain and oscillatory condition which has ensued. A distinguished writer has observed that the labourer's wages have never, at least for many ages, commanded so large a portion of subsistence as in this part of the eighteenth century.* Every consideration, material as well as moral, impelled the Nonconformists to hold to the House of Hanover. That which we may now set down with

* Constitutional History, Chap. xvi.

no disrespect as due to enlightened self-interest, was then, not inconsistently, attributed to loyalty to the Crown. We quote the following passage from Mr. Skeats' 'History of the Free Churches of England':*

'While the Jacobites and High-churchmen received the news of the Pretender's landing with satisfaction and delight, Dissenters of all classes at once rallied in defence of the Crown. As soon as the news of the event was received, the Committee of the Dissenting Deputies passed a resolution recommending the whole body of Dissenters throughout the kingdom to join with others of his Majesty's subjects in support of the Government. They next despatched a circular letter throughout the country, expressing their earnest desire that in view of the dangerous situation of public affairs Dissenters would act in the most zealous manner. This appeal was responded to with enthusiastic alacrity. Armed associations of Dissenters were formed in all parts of the kingdom; chapels were converted into parade-grounds, and ministers became voluntary recruiting officers.'

We doubt not that Mr. Parry, obviously a man of spirit, shared in this general sentiment. But the Memoir affords no more evidence of it than is comprised in an address to the King written by him for the inhabitants of Cirencester—in some verses, almost doggrel, on the 'character of a Jacobite'—and in what the biographer terms a 'humorous satire' on the same subject.

The ethics of Hobbes had never made much way among the more thoughtful Nonconformists; who on the contrary were largely influenced by Clarke's reproduction of the philosophical doctrines of Cudworth. Mr. Parry's essay 'on the Moral Sense,' printed at length in this volume, was probably left by himself unfinished and uncorrected; in fact, one of his own notes on it makes this almost certain. In that case, the essay is no fair subject of criticism. Otherwise, we might complain of a loose employment of philosophical terms, inexcusable even in that day in a writer who (on two occasions at least) quotes and refers to Locke.

It may be that the adoption of the philosophical opinions of Clarke had something to do in clearing the way to the adoption of his theological opinions also. Mr.

* Second Edition, p. 422.

Parry's 'Confession of Faith' (to which we have already made an allusion) clearly indicates that his own theological faith was that which is usually described, somewhat inaccurately but quite intelligibly, as high Arianism. This form of Unitarianism, under the influence of Clarke and others, is believed to have been largely prevalent in the Established Church at the time. The Exeter controversy had disclosed its existence among the Nonconformist clergy. Its spread, or at all events its avowal, among the latter class must have been greatly promoted by the celebrated decision at Salters' Hall in 1719; when, as was said, 'the Bible carried it by four.' It is remarkable how frequently this so-called high Arianism has been the outcome of a reaction against Calvinism; and with far fewer instances of an intermediate Arminianism than is generally believed. Illustrations may be found in the Church of Geneva, in a section of the Protestant Church of France, among the English Presbyterians (with whom we are now concerned), and, more lately, among the Presbyterians of the north of Ireland. It is remarkable also that, though the doctrine thus continually crops out of a decaying Calvinism, it never seems to have inherent strength to live through more than a single whole generation. This may be because it has no foundation in the facts of human consciousness, but has always rested on the letter of Scripture. Hence it falls with changing views of the authority of Scripture and of the nature of inspiration. For our own part, however, we are disposed to attribute its decadence in great measure to the craving of the human heart to find a human brother in Christ. This want is not met by either Arianism or Sabellianism. It may be met by Trinitarianism, with its doctrine of the 'perfect manhood;' or by the 'indwelling scheme' said to have been proposed by Watts and Doddridge; or by the strict humanitarianism of Priestley or Parker; or by the 'living union of God with humanity' of the later and more spiritual school of English and American Unitarianism. Into some one of these modes of faith both Arianism and Sabellianism seem to have uniformly lapsed.

A period of theological change is seldom a period of religious activity. Mr. Herbert Skeats, when discoursing on the first half of the last century, says graphically that it seems to have been impossible for the Christian men of

that generation to fight with the old force of Christianity while they were being fitted into a new armour of thought. The Dissenters had won a great battle for toleration. Enjoying their lately found security, they worshiped in peace, thinking little of the deadness and corruption around them. We fear that Mr. Mark Pattison* must be taken to be correct when he describes the thirty years of peace which succeeded the Peace of Utrecht as a period of decay of religion, licentiousness of morals, public corruption, profaneness of language—a day of rebuke and blasphemy; an age destitute of depth or earnestness—an age whose poetry was without romance, whose philosophy was without insight, whose public men were without character—an age of ‘light without love,’ whose ‘very merits were of the earth, earthy.’ When Joshua Parry went to Cirencester to live his quiet and honoured life there—preaching sober sermons to a moral people, discoursing rounded sentences under Lord Bathurst’s trees, bringing up children in the nurture and admonition of the Lord, and occasionally enlivening his life by a dispute with an Independent and Calvinistic brother—the great Methodist battle with sin had already begun. The influence of Wesley was felt most in the Established Church; that of Whitfield produced more religious and ecclesiastical changes among the Non-conformists. Whitfield republished Calvinism like a John the Baptist republishing the law and the prophets. He gave his name to no creed. He founded no church. Howell Harries was at work before him among the Calvinistic Methodists of Wales. Though a few places of worship where his labours collected large congregations still exist in England, these, as well as the religious societies forming Lady Huntingdon’s Connexion, have long been merged in the Independent denomination. At the time he began to preach, Independent dissent seemed to be dying out. In Lancashire and other northern counties it was little known at all; and in the midland and southern counties church after church was becoming extinct. Whitfield brought about a wonderful change. Few of his converts, either in the Established Church or among the Presbyterians, remained with either

* Essays and Review. Tendencies of Religious Thought in England, 1688—1750.

body. Multitudes of them had never belonged to any church at all. All these naturally became Congregational in their ecclesiastical form, without having at first any necessary connection with the old community of Dissenters who acquired the name 'Independent' in the time of the Commonwealth. They, with the remains of the genuine historical Independents, have now taken the place of the Presbyterians in forming the largest part of that great and powerful body of Nonconformists which overshadows and threatens the Establishment itself.*

A domestic and social, as well as political and ecclesiastical history of Presbyterian Nonconformity yet remains to be written. It was rumoured some years ago that the late Rev. Robert Brook Aspland had collected materials for such a work. If so, we heartily trust that the labour of preparing them for publication will not be left, as in the case of the book before us, to a third generation in the family. Meanwhile, we welcome even such slight contributions to a knowledge of that history as may be found in this Memoir of Joshua Parry.

W. J. LAMPORT.

III.—NEW ENGLISH LIVES OF JESUS.

The English Life of Jesus. By Thomas Scott. Published by Thomas Scott, Ramsgate. 1872.

Jesus the Messiah. London: Trübner and Co. 1872.

EVERY observer of the theological world in the present day must be struck by the general desire which prevails to obtain a clear conception of the personal history and individual character of Jesus. Attention is withdrawn from disputes as to his nature, to be fixed on the details of his earthly history. Attempts to write that history in a connected form are seen in the many volumes relating to it published within the last few years in our own language, to say nothing of the French and German writers who are

* See Hunter's Historical Defence of Lady Hewley's Trustees, pp. 27, et seq.

busy in the same path. Every different school of theology offers its contribution, the orthodox equally with the free-thinking. Whence does this wide-spread desire arise? In some cases, from the perception of the fact that modern criticism has proved that all parts of the Gospel narratives are not equally trustworthy, and the wish to shew that, when critics have done their worst, a complete self-consistent biography is still left to us: partly from a consciousness that the ordinary reader of the New Testament fails to obtain a connected idea of the incidents recorded, and the hope to supply this deficiency—the motive which has aforetime stimulated the persevering though unsuccessful labours of harmonists: often from the satisfaction felt in allowing the imagination to dwell on a character which has a charm even for those who are least willing to confess it. But more important than any or all of these causes is the great fact, that there is among Christians a growing sense of the religious value of the human life of Christ; and this is by no means confined to persons who look upon him as a man of like nature with themselves (among whom we might reasonably count on finding it), but manifests its presence and its power throughout a much wider circle. Those who regard the incarnation and death of the Saviour as the foundation of their faith, necessarily attach the highest importance to the portions of the records that satisfy them on these points. But even they find a lesson and a comfort in those features of the history that are exclusively human. It is not enough to have a creed or a code of morality and call this Christianity; men want a character to revere, an example to follow, a personal influence that may rouse and guide them; and, feeling this want, they try to meet it, when they seek, wiping off from the Gospels the dust of centuries, to see in them a picture of what Jesus was and did, in which the outlines shall be correct, even though the colours be somewhat faded.

The titles of two of the latest attempts to perform the task to which we have been referring are given at the head of this article. Both are written by men who think for themselves. While their tone and spirit, as well as some of their conclusions, are very different, they take nearly the same critical ground as their foundation-point. Both of them refuse all historical value to the book of Acts; but neither

of them dwells sufficiently on its fragmentary character, Mr. Scott satisfying himself with proving that it gives no support to the Gospel history, and the other writer regarding it as a misrepresentation of real events, written to injure Paul, by a Gentile advocate of the doctrine of the bodily resurrection of Christ. Both of them regard the fourth Gospel as of late date. "In the consideration of the personal history of the Messiah we are bound to disregard the testimony of the document bearing the title of 'The Gospel according to St. John.'"* But the one rejects and the other retains all he can of the history in the Synoptical Gospels; the one disbelieves and the other accepts the miracles; and, we are compelled to add, the one writes like an advocate determined to establish a foregone conclusion, the other like a calm inquirer anxious to avoid any one-sided view.

"Life of Jesus" is a misnomer for Mr. Scott's work. It is rather an attempt to shew that we possess no trustworthy materials from which such a work can be constructed. The conclusion arrived at is, that not one of the narratives "can be accepted as really historical;"† "in the most ordinary matters of fact the evangelists are not trustworthy historians;" "the Gospels are unhistorical in common things."‡ The proof of this depended upon is the assertion that the writers contradict one another, and that no one of them is consistent with himself. To establish this, their statements with regard to every part of the history of Jesus are examined in detail. The author performs his work with an unsparing hand, and is successful in pointing out many glaring discrepancies, and draws attention in a trenchant style to those difficulties in reconciling different parts of the narratives with which all who have studied the subject are familiar. All the most important of these, however, belong to one class, namely, contradictions between the statements of the fourth Gospel and those of the first three. It is evidently felt that in this lies the strength of the case, for even in the chapter entitled "Comparison of the Synoptic Gospels," there is frequent reference to the difficulty of reconciling their statements with those of John. To what then does all this amount? Merely to a recognition of that dissimilarity between the Synoptics and the fourth Gospel which

* Jesus the Messiah, p. 37.

† P. 186.

‡ P. 190.

has been remarked on by scholars in all ages, has received many interpretations, and has been especially the principal subject of every discussion as to the authorship of the "Gospel of John." Fully acknowledging that Mr. Scott makes out his case clearly and strongly in regard to these discrepancies—as, for instance, in reference to the last Supper—we yet demur to his conclusion, that because two testimonies disagree, we must reject both of them.* He himself, indeed, frequently intimates that he places more dependence on the Synoptics than on the fourth Gospel, but he also attaches weight to the discrepancies between the two as invalidating the testimony of all four Gospels. The better course would be, after shewing that we must choose between them and depend solely on one or other of these authorities, and indicating why the Synoptics are preferable, henceforth to confine the attention to these, in order to see if there are in them any material contradictions. This is what the author of "Jesus the Messiah" does. He carefully discriminates between the several narratives, attaching no value to John, and less to Luke than to Matthew and Mark.

But Mr. Scott finds contradictions in the first three Gospels themselves, which satisfy him that they are "not historical." By his dwelling on some of these, which are trivial and such as will always occur in the record of the same event by different narrators, the effect of the argument as a whole is seriously weakened. Thus the fact is dwelt on that in the narratives of the resurrection Matthew speaks of two women, Mark of three, and Luke of "the women," interpreted "seemingly a great number."† Such minor discrepancies can have no effect in weakening the evidence for important facts, and the very prominence that is given to them in Mr. Scott's book creates a distrust in the mind of the reader. But putting all these on one side, there still remain some antagonisms between different parts of the Synoptical Gospels which need explanation, and that explanation might be found if attention were paid to the important truth that those Gospels, as we now have them, are the result of a gradual growth, not each the production of one writer, but springing into being as different outgrowths of one and the same common origin, developments

* See p. 250, p. 114, and p. 346.

† P. 317.

in different directions from one set of facts. Mr. Scott is of course quite aware of this, and he sometimes hints at it; but he says, "with theories as to the origin of these narratives we have nothing to do,"* and speaks as though he conceived that each Gospel was written in its present form by its author,† though he also refers to oral tradition. But surely the suggestion of difficulties should be accompanied by the solution, if one can be found, and for this purpose some notice of the steps by which the Synoptical Gospels were produced would have been most useful. Whatever be the special theory adopted on the subject, every one will acknowledge that the process has afforded the opportunity for the introduction of legendary matter, and is at the same time sufficient to account for the various differences existing between the different accounts. To shew that some one narrative in Matthew or Mark is incredible, either from its want of self-consistency or for any other reason, does not necessarily cast discredit on all the rest. To shew that the record of one discourse has not been preserved in an unmutated form, need not discourage us from attempting to gain from other discourses a conception of what Jesus taught. If, in fact, we confine our attention to the Synoptics, bearing in mind that no one pretends to regard them as in their present form the entire work of apostles or apostolic men, we may rise from the study of Mr. Scott's work with a strengthened conviction that these Gospels give us a trustworthy representation of the impression which Jesus left on the hearts and minds of his followers, as it appeared in the accounts of his life and teachings which, floating about at first in oral tradition, gradually crystallized into a set form; and though they attracted some accretions and incurred some corruptions in the process, did not so far lose their original value but that we may still detect in them the inherent qualities of truth and beauty.

It is very probable that the author himself would to a large extent assent to this conclusion. Our only regret is that he did not accompany the work of destruction, which he does so thoroughly, with a fuller statement of what is left after all his pulling down, with more that is affirmative and constructive. His principal passage of this nature is the following:

* Preface, xiv.

† Pp. 140, 150.

"While the traditions at the beginning and end of the story are altogether unhistorical,—while of the nativity and infancy and of the events following the crucifixion we have no knowledge whatever,—there runs an element of historical truth through the Synoptic narratives of the ministry. We have before us in outlines sufficiently distinct the picture of one who in a highly artificial society dared to propound truths unwelcome to a dominant hierarchy, and to condemn a traditional ceremonial system which placed barriers between God and man. We have every reason to believe that the sincerity and boldness with which he announced the absolute righteousness and unfailing love of God impressed the multitudes who heard him with the sense of an authority wholly different from that of the Scribes and Pharisees, and that in the long series of his discourses he sought to convince his hearers that God cared for every one of them and willed to bring them all to their highest good. * * * The care with which in his many parables he strove by the most familiar images to kindle in dull and deadened minds the faint embers of a higher life, is evidence that he regarded none as beyond the healing power of the great Maker. The gentleness with which, while sacrificing no truth and weakening no divine law, he treated those whom a sacerdotal society despised or hated, attests his sympathy for all suffering, and his yearning to rescue all men from moral and spiritual degradation."* "The process has drawn out the image of one, of the facts of whose life we know indeed but little, but who stands out in himself pure, loving, gentle, and merciful to all men. We see before us one who embraced all the suffering and heavy-laden in the wide circle of his love, and who spoke of his mission specially as a charge to seek out and save that which was lost."†

What, then, is the use of the work of destruction? Why should one who rejoices to find this beautiful picture remaining, take so much trouble to shake men's faith in the history? The answer is, that the true value, the real meaning, of the life of Christ are overshadowed to those who receive as true what are only legends about him. The author's purpose is to shew that "we have solid historical grounds for asserting that Jesus never uttered those distinctive sentences which have served as a basis for the great fabric of sacerdotal and traditional theology."‡ In other words, the whole inquiry is intended to establish the truth that Christianity must be learnt from the picture of the life

* P. 345.

† P. 348.

‡ P. 446.

and teachings of Jesus as a whole, and not by any dependence on the letter of detached texts, or on gospel discourses taken as an authoritative test of truth. This is a most important teaching; and what seem to our ears unnecessary harshness and vehemence in its vindication, may be required to rouse the attention or secure the conviction of those whose minds have been long sealed against it by prejudice and habit. Every word of Mr. Scott's book bears the mark of the strong conviction of the writer that he is labouring for the advancement of God's truth, and in such a case too much zeal is better than too little; though a calmer and less partizan-like treatment of the subject, such as we find in "*Jesus the Messiah*," would be preferred by many readers.

There is some ambiguity in the phrase, "a narrative that is not historical." As Mr. Scott uses it, no narrative can be called historical that is not the work of an eye-witness and strictly accurate in all its details. But it is surely the experience of every one who studies any history, to be compelled to acknowledge that as to many minor points he is quite in the dark, and that even in relation to matters of importance he sometimes meets with conflicting evidence which obliges him to suspend his judgment; yet this does not prevent him from having a full assurance that certain historical personages have existed, or forbid his obtaining distinct impressions as to their work and character. In these respects, then, the gospel narratives are like other ancient histories, and Mr. Scott acknowledges that they are founded on historical truth. Yet he sometimes uses the word "unhistorical" as though it was synonymous with fictitious, and so it will be understood by many readers. In this sense it is not true that the gospel narratives are unhistorical; and an erroneous impression may be produced by the frequent use of the word, without a distinct understanding of the sense in which it is employed.

We cannot now devote as much attention as it deserves to "*Jesus the Messiah*." It contains many interesting passages, such as the inquiry whether Joseph, the father of Jesus, was a poor carpenter, or a builder, a man of substance, and the chapter concerning the resurrection of Christ; and throughout it bears marks of candid inquiry and careful study. The tone of the whole shews a full acquaintance

with Hebrew thought and feeling, the author appearing to have considerable sympathy with the reformed Jews of the present day. He is conservative in his tendencies, but capable of giving up (though with pain) long-cherished beliefs when convinced by evidence, to which his mind is always open. The least satisfactory point in the volume is the often-repeated assertion that Jesus is "the Messiah of prophecy." If this means that his career and character fulfilled the predictions of the Old Testament, it would be difficult to prove it except by giving to those predictions a very strained and unnatural interpretation. If the phrase has any other meaning, it might be advantageously exchanged for one more easily understood.

JOHN WRIGHT.

IV.—THE LEGISLATION OF THE PENTATEUCH.

A Historical and Critical Commentary on the Old Testament. By M. M. Kalisch. Leviticus, Part I., 1867 ; Part II., 1872. London: Longmans.

The Pentateuch and Book of Joshua critically examined. By the Right Rev. J. W. Colenso, D.D., Bishop of Natal. Part VI. The Later Legislation of the Pentateuch. 1871. London: Longmans.

Die geschichtlichen Bücher des Alten Testaments. Von K. H. Graf. 1866. Leipzig: Weigel.

THE critical examination of the historical books of the Old Testament, so largely stimulated and popularized in this country by Bishop Colenso's clear and painstaking work, has been hitherto far too exclusively directed to the well-known and interesting book of Genesis, to furnish that which all such criticism ought to aim at—a sound foundation for history. The usefulness of the work already accomplished for Genesis is indeed not to be gainsaid. To prove by arguments which any intellect capable of appreciating evidence can sift, that that book owes its origin not to one but to several authors, with various opinions and various

knowledge, and that, however ancient a few isolated sentences may be, its main writers lived many centuries after the events described, not indeed before the time of the Hebrew Kings,—is itself a work of heroic effort, the full significance of which may not be appreciated in the writer's own generation, but which at least will ultimately rank as one of the highest achievements of historical criticism. And like the book of Genesis itself, this result has not been attained at once and by the labour of one man, but by the successive work of many explorers during the space of more than half a century. But, when all this is duly recognized, it must yet be allowed that the problem respecting Genesis was after all somewhat simple on the one hand, and sure to attract public attention on the other. It was simple because the criteria of authorship, whether derived from style—the use or neglect of particular expressions—or from subject-matter and the ideas prominently brought out by the narrators, lay very much on the surface, and could not easily be mistaken or explained away when once pointed out. It was sure to attract attention on account of the universal familiarity with the book of Genesis, one of the most attractive as well as most important books of the Bible; so that a writer on Genesis speaks to readers quite conversant with his subject, who will understand his references even without the trouble of verifying them. Even if this familiarity with the book under discussion in the first instance makes enemies of readers who scarcely take the trouble fully to weigh the arguments for so novel a position, yet the seed has been sown in many minds which will not let it die. But, supposing that the new theses respecting Genesis have been propounded and established, the mind cannot rest there. Much more remains to be done, to which that already achieved is but an incitement. Of five books bearing in common belief (though not on themselves) the name of Moses as author, the first has been proved to have been produced in a very much later age, or rather ages; what of the other four? If the Hebrews, who originally made no division into five books, attribute the whole Pentateuch to Moses, and they are proved wrong as to the first section, is it not likely that they are wrong as to the remainder? If so, we must subject the four later books to the same examination which has furnished some reliable

results as to the first. The historian desires such investigation far more in the case of the later books ; for the whole book of Genesis deals with what he cannot but regard as a mythic age, only touching reliable historical ground in a few of its final chapters, and entirely anterior to the appearance of Israel as a nation. On the other hand, with the Exodus begins the semblance of history, which is carried on throughout the life of Moses ; and alongside of the history is placed a still more voluminous system of legislation, purporting to be given by Moses, and to be the code of rules of life to which the people were bound by the Covenant at Sinai, and which they subsequently observed through the whole course of their history. To the historian a clear perception of the date, origin and authenticity of this legislation is of paramount importance. He cannot indeed write a page of the subsequent history without knowing whether this legislation was in force or not ; and to be in doubt about it involves far more serious consequences than any dilemma as to the book of Genesis.

Yet it is just here that difficulties surround the critic in greater force. In Genesis there had always been a tangible distinction between the early and the later writers. The former called the God of the Hebrews Elohim ; the latter, JHVVH [Jehovah ; the probable correct pronunciation is Jahveh]. In Ex. vi. the sacred name JHVVH is divulged ; and the writer who had previously correctly abstained from using a name supposed to be unknown, could after that have no reason for restricting himself to the older one ; so that after this point the two writers use the same name of God ; and one, indeed the chief, distinction between them is lost. It is true that minute analyzers of the respective styles of the Elohist and Jhvhist in Genesis, like Colenso and Kuenen, discover several dozen characteristics of each, which may serve as criteria in the absence of the chief, and by these something may be achieved in the later books. But these characteristics, though applicable to the one book of Genesis, where they stand under correction from the more reliable criteria, could not be treated as reliable throughout four other books, treating of a great number of subjects and requiring a very extended vocabulary. Other distinctions, again, drawn from the ideas commonly present to the narrator of stories like those of which Genesis consists, may

find no application to a book of legislation ; for example, the appearance of God himself or angels to the patriarchs, of which the Jhvhist is so fond. And besides, legal language does not afford scope for much diversity of style. Thus many of our former helps abandon us, or must be used only with great caution. And at the same time, we lose all that encouragement to the work which it derived from popular interest. Genesis is known to every one ; but Leviticus to how many ? It is emphatically *the* book to be avoided by most readers, as containing only an obsolete code of laws and directions respecting the exact mode of conducting sacrifices which have been for ages discontinued, with many details of a peculiarly unsavoury kind. Therefore the zeal which burnt so high for investigation of the Pentateuch at the outset, is naturally cooled at the aspect of the difficulties and disagreeables of the third and fourth books. However, he would be unworthy the name of a critic who was really overcome by these difficulties ; and the book of Leviticus has been treated by Dr. Kalisch more fully, with deeper research and more good sense, than by any other recent scholar. I desire to call especial attention to Dr. Kalisch's Commentaries on the Old Testament, and chiefly to the two last volumes, on Leviticus. For the investigation of the Law he has qualifications such as are possessed by few, if any, living scholars. His Jewish birth, at the outset, makes him perfectly familiar with the system he has to discuss ; his education, with the Rabbinical interpretation and tradition ; yet his temperament is quiet and judicial, and prompts him to set forth the case with perfect impartiality, and decide upon the evidence and not from affection. Leviticus indeed was a book demanding such an investigation, which would then be done once for all, respecting the Levitical legislation. It is probable that Dr. Kalisch saw that the right place for such an exposition was in connection with Leviticus, and therefore gave no hint of his present advanced views when preparing his Exodus. This is, however, to be regretted, because he has passed by the legislation contained in Exodus, leaving us without any exposition of his views as to its age, such as he has given in Leviticus. Now that he has boldly spoken out in his Leviticus, and fairly broken with the "sound" and Mosaic Jews as well as with the corresponding class of Christians,

let us hope that his future volumes will conform to the standard of this, by which alone they can be worthy the regard of scholars. Before concluding our estimate of Dr. Kalisch as a writer, we must notice a tendency to undue prolixity and to an unnecessary accumulation of evidence in his dissertations, which would sometimes be more effective if somewhat freely pruned.

In dealing with the Levitical Legislation, it is first to be noted that we may mark off Deuteronomy as a distinct work, forming a code of law complete in itself, but different from, and indeed inconsistent with, the Levitical laws of the three preceding books. I shall not dwell on this point, because it is sufficiently notorious, and any reader even of a translation may convince himself of the fact by carefully reading the dry, precise and terse words of Leviticus and Numbers, and then comparing with them the eloquent, enraptured and prolonged denunciations, exhortations and affectionate warnings of Deuteronomy. The wonder is how the one writer can put so much in so few words, and how the other can expand a noble thought over so many ; and again, how the first, with his exalted conception of the necessity of holiness, can conceive it to consist in material and external ceremonies ; how the second confers even on perfectly material stories a spiritual significance of which we should have thought them unsusceptible. But, leaving the difference of thought and style to be tested by actual comparison, the chief points of the difference of the legislation must be indicated. The Levitical law separates the tribe of Levi to minister in sacred things to the priests, who are of the family of Aaron, the eldest descendant of Levi ; the Levites have certain cities assigned to them out of each of the tribes. The Deuteronomic law knows no difference between Levites and Aaronite priests, calling them "the priests the Levites," "the priests the sons of Levi," or "the priests the Levites, the whole tribe of Levi," and allowing these Levites to do things which the other law allowed only to the priests,* while they have no cities of their own, but are poor and houseless, and worthy of compassion with the widow and the orphan.† The Deuteronomist, more-

* Numb. iii. xviii. xxxv. ; Deut. xvii. 9, xviii. 1, xxi. 5.

† Deut. xiv. 27, 29, xvi. 11, xviii. 1—8, xxvi. 12.

over, mentions no feast days, but the three oldest, the Pass-over, feast of Weeks or Pentecost, and feast of Tabernacles or of Ingathering; and does not allude to the most important event in the Levitical sacred year, the day of Atonement, nor to the scape-goat belonging to it. Again, the laws of Tithes in Deuteronomy differ essentially from those in the Levitical books. The former allow to the Levites only the tithes of vegetable produce, not of the flocks and herds, and prescribe the collection of these every third year, when they are to be eaten not by the Levites alone, but by these at a repast in the town where the central sanctuary was, as guests with the remainder of the population, including the destitute—the stranger, the fatherless and the widow; and of course no allowance to the Aaronites out of the tithes is mentioned.* The Levitical system, on the other hand, demanded not only the tenth of all vegetable produce, including wine and oil, but also of the annual increase of the flocks and herds—cows, lambs and goats; such tithes to be eaten by the Levites in whatever town they lived in; but reduced by a tenth which they must make over to the Aaronite priests.†

It is impossible to harmonize these systems. They agree in acknowledging a ceremonial religion, and in the names and nature of certain of the festivals connected therewith; in the existence of a sacrificial system and a sacerdotal tribe; but when we look into the details of any one of these heads, we find the most puzzling discordance. They seem to represent the same system at two very different periods of development. Our next task, therefore, ought to be to discover the date of one, and if possible of both systems. We begin with Deuteronomy, as affording the most obvious suggestions in its historical allusions. These are couched in the form of revelations of a distant future, but are of that explicit and detailed character which betrays the fact that they are written after the event, and that the name of Moses as speaker is simply used by the anonymous writer as Merlin, Solomon, Ossian, &c., in other literatures. Passing over allusions to earlier times, we find‡ distinct permission to establish monarchy, and rules prescribed for the

* Kalisch, *Lev.*, Part I. p. 605.† *Ibid.* p. 604.‡ *Deut.* xvii. 14—20; 1 *Kings* x. 26, 28, 29, xi. 1—3.

king, including this, that each king on his accession "shall write him a copy of this law [i.e. Deuteronomy] in a book out of that which is before the priests the Levites," and "that he shall not multiply horses to himself, nor cause the people to return to Egypt, to the end that he should multiply horses. . . . Neither shall he multiply wives to himself, that his heart turn not away." The reference is clearly to Solomon, both as regards the importation of horses and the polygamy, and the reason assigned for the latter prohibition agrees also with the historian's testimony that "his wives turned away his heart after other gods."* The threat of bringing drought over the land reminds us strongly of the description of that in the reign of Ahab.† Deportation to a strange country and enslavement are so distinctly threatened, that we must assume the real writer to have known such an event. Some of these passages might refer to any such deportation; but others point unmistakably to the Babylonian captivity, and shew that captivity to be still continuing, since not a ray of light illumines the gloom of the close of the faithless nation's history.‡ These facts, and the extraordinary extent of the coincidences with the language of Jeremiah, a striking and peculiar writer, have induced many critics to refer the composition of the book to that prophet. This idea is further strengthened by the fact that Jeremiah was a priest and son of the High Priest Hilkiah, and that he was also a prophet; for the peculiar character of Deuteronomy could not be stated more accurately than by describing it as a conception of ceremonial and legislation in the interest of priests, yet in an exalted spiritual and prophetic tone, unattainable by any mere priest. Moreover, the reference to the humiliation of a re-

* 1 Kings xi. 4.

† Deut. xi. 17; 1 Kings xvii. 1.

‡ Deut. xxviii. 36, by specifying that the king shall be carried into exile with the people, cannot refer to the Assyrians, 2 Kings xvii. 4, and almost necessarily must refer to the Babylonians, who carried off Jehoiachin and Zedekiah, 2 Kings xxiv. 15, xxv. 7. In xxviii. 49—52, the Deuteronomist describes the attacking nation in very nearly the same striking terms as Jer. v. 15—17 the Babylonians. xxix. 27 [28], "as it is this day," shews the exile to be still continuing; xxx. gives a hope that through thorough penitence freedom may be regained; but its purely hortatory tone and the absence of any historical allusion shew it to be as yet only a hope. The reference to Egypt in xxviii. 68 is verified in the person of Jeremiah, who with many others went to Egypt instead of being carried as slaves to Babylon. See Jer. xlii. xliii.

turn to Egypt "by the way whereof I spake unto thee, thou shalt see it no more again," accords strikingly with the facts of Jeremiah's life. Thus we should be compelled to place the composition of the book a little after 586 B.C.

However, this is not all. It may be possible to bring Deuteronomy into yet closer connection with history by consulting the historical books. In the eighteenth year of Josiah king of Judah, Hilkiah the High Priest finds a "book of the Law" in the house of Jhvh; he shews it to a scribe, Shaphan, who reads in it to himself, and then to the king. The latter is greatly shocked at its contents, because he finds duties there enjoined on kings and people which neither he and his predecessors nor the people have performed. But he follows this up by a vigorous Reformation of religion, including abolition of all sorts of idolatry and witchcraft, and destruction of all their implements; and then by a Passover held with great solemnity. Of the contents of the book we can best judge by the immediate action of Josiah. He had all the images and vessels belonging to the worship of idols brought out of the Temple and destroyed; and he then defiled, or made unclean and therefore unsuitable for any even idolatrous worship, the various altars and high-places that had been so used, and turned out the idolatrous priests. Also familiar spirits, wizards and the machinery of witchcraft in Jerusalem and Judah, he put away. After this purification of the land he held a Passover of peculiar solemnity in Jerusalem.* Now the strongest warnings against idolatry in the Pentateuch, and the only ones that coincide at all in language in describing the particular forms of idolatry, are contained in Deuteronomy.† There is therefore a striking resemblance between the effect produced on Josiah by reading this hitherto unknown book, and that which Deuteronomy would have produced; and it is difficult to say what other part of the Pentateuch would have impressed him similarly. For it certainly was only a short document which in those days of rare and difficult writing and reading could have been fully read out to the people. It has therefore been accepted

* Idolatry, 2 Kings xxiii. 4, 6—8, 10—16; witchcraft, v. 24; passover, vv. 22, 23.

† Deut. iv. 23—28, xii. 2, 3, xvi. 21, 22; compare Deut. iv. 19 and 2 Kings xxiii. 4, 5, and Deut. xviii. 10—12 and 2 Kings xviii. 24.

by some of the clearest-headed scholars, as Graf, Colenso and Kuenen, as a result of historical criticism that may be treated as settled, that Hilkiah's Book of the Law is Deuteronomy, or at least a portion of it. And if so, it must have been only written shortly before the so-called "finding;" it could not have lain *beside* [not *inside*] the ark during the reign of all the kings since Solomon without being well known to their high priests and themselves. Moreover, it is so evidently intended to suit the circumstances of Josiah's reign, that we must suspect it to have been put there in order to be found by Hilkiah. If so, by whom more likely than by Hilkiah's own son, the priest and prophet Jeremiah, who became prophet just five years before? Yet that he was the author, and the book found was Deuteronomy, appears contradictory to our previous conclusion as to the date of that book. But there are signs of accretions to the original Deuteronomy. The only passages which seem to demand a date after the fall of Jerusalem are contained in ch. xxviii. and xxix.; and these chapters, which consist entirely of exhortations, hang on very loosely to those preceding them. The original Deuteronomy would terminate very properly at the end of ch. xxvi. The later chapters may well have been added by the original author at the later date claimed for them.

We now turn to what we may call the Levitical Law, contained in Exodus, Leviticus and Numbers. The great increase in power and authority claimed by the Levites in these books above that in Deuteronomy, has been already pointed out. To decide which legislation must be the older, we must ask—which accords with the facts of history? Had the priests and Levites their highest power in the early ages, and did their authority wane as the people waxed in numbers and presumably in culture? or is the reverse true, that sacerdotalism gained its power gradually, and was most powerful towards the close of the history? Surely it is evident that the latter is true, and the former false. Dr. Kalisch, after enumerating various privileges of the Levites which in the historical books we find actually in practice, adds:

"But all these facts are very far from establishing the existence of a Levitical organization like that described in the Pentateuch. They shew indeed a growing influence of priests and Levites, and render their ultimate power intelligible; but it must

he urged that many of these facts and incidents belong to a very late period of Hebrew history, and that the greatest part of them is derived from the Books of Chronicles, an unreliable source, compiled at a time when the Levites had attained their highest hierarchical authority, and written with the purpose of strengthening and glorifying it.* It is this source alone which attributes to David the division of the priests into 24, and of the Levites into 4 classes, and which mentions, under Hezekiah, a complete distribution of offices and duties among the whole tribe."

He then points out characteristic features of the Levitical legislation, the observance of which is either not borne out or contradicted by the facts of history. Such is the office of High Priest, one of the most important features of the legislation. Yet the first High Priest named in history is that Hilkiah in the reign of Josiah towards the end of the monarchy, of whom we have previously spoken; and we find the further anomaly of *two* priests, not called *high*, but performing the chief sacerdotal functions, of *equal authority*,† whereas by the Law only one high priest was possible. Again, the line of high priests was changed with Eli and again with Zadok, the law of hereditary succession being unknown or not observed. A still more striking fact is that the law in Numbers xxxv. 1—8 respecting the cities to be given to the Levites appears *never* to have come into operation. Levites are mentioned in the history as dwelling all over the country, and no single hint of Levitical territorial possessions is to be found. Again, sacrifices are in the history recorded to have been offered by a great number of non-Levites, especially Kings, against the law: by Gideon, Saul, David (whose sons are curiously called "priests"), Solomon and Uzziah. After adducing many similar unobserved laws, he concludes thus:

"In fact, all the Levitical ordinances of the Pentateuch are so continually contravened, almost during the whole period from Joshua down to the completion of the Temple and considerably beyond it, that their existence during this time cannot be admitted. The discrepancies prove irrefutably that the priesthood was then freely permitted to all Israelites, especially such as were distinguished by birth or social position."

* Wherefore I have never in the preceding pages quoted Chronicles as an historical authority.

† Zadok and Abiathar, 2 Sam. xx. 25.

It was not till the time of the Babylonian exile, and especially of the return, that the priests earned the gratitude of the whole nation by their patriotic leadership, energetic conduct of difficult negotiations, and organization of the national defence ; and then for the first time it is conceivable that they obtained sufficient recognition of their power to be able to lay down the whole system of sacrifices and regulate the privileges of their order on the lofty scale which we find in Leviticus and Numbers. The Levitical legislation reflects clearly the addition to the power and to the ceremonial duties of priests and Levites which appears not earlier than the times of Ezra and Nehemiah ; and the books containing it must therefore be later than Deuteronomy.

But we have not yet reached the period to which the finished Levitical legislation can be referred ; for, as Kalisch says :

“The contemporaries of Nehemiah (about B.C. 440) were unacquainted with the Law of Moses ; when the people heard it read, they wept, exactly as, about 200 years before, king Josiah had wept when portions of Deuteronomy were read to him ; and they were grieved for the same reason—because they had not lived in accordance with the precepts of that Law.”*

Still more important, however, is the evidence with regard to the Day of Atonement, one of the most important, as it is certainly the most solemn as well as unique, days in the Levitical holy year. This day is the tenth of the seventh month, intervening between the Feast of Trumpets on the first and the Feast of Tabernacles on the fifteenth.† Now one of the first acts that the first company of Jews who returned from Babylon with Zerubbabel (B.C. 538) performed, was to assemble at Jerusalem at the beginning of the seventh month, and, although without a temple, to build an altar and offer from the first day of the month the customary sacrifices ; and to observe the Feast of Tabernacles on the fifteenth.‡ But the Day of Atonement is not alluded to.

“Why was the intervening tenth day omitted, which, if celebrated even partially in the striking manner of the Law, must have produced a powerful impression upon the minds of men

* Neh. viii. 9.

† Lev. xvi. 29, xxiii. 24—34.

‡ Ezra iii. 1—6.

providentially released from a land of bondage, and just restored to their old homes, to commence a new and uncertain life full of struggles and dangers? No historian would, at that peculiar juncture, have failed to record the celebration of the Day of Atonement—if a celebration of any kind had taken place.”*

At a still later date (B.C. 445) a still more curious fact comes to light—that when the solemn reading of the Law took place, the Law as then read cannot have contained the directions of Lev. xvi. on the Day of Atonement; for the people, though on hearing the directions for the Feast of Tabernacles they took care to celebrate that in due form on the fifteenth, yet took no notice of the tenth; yet they had a solemn fast somewhat resembling the Atonement, though without its peculiar feature, the goat offered to Jhvh, and the [scape-] goat to Azazel, on the *twenty-fourth*. The date of course is entirely un-Levitical, and shews that at least one prescription of the Law had not at that time, when the people were animated with such extraordinary zeal for the performance of all their religious duties, been inserted in Leviticus. The fact of the performance of a somewhat similar fast suggests, however, the probability that the Levitical ordinances were only gradually developed and finally fixed at a very late date; as also, that the dates of feasts and fasts may have been fixed and altered again by the priests.

One more fact of some importance remains to be noticed. By the Levitical law, the Levites entered upon their work at either thirty† or twenty-five‡ years of age, retiring at fifty—this discrepancy is itself noteworthy; but in the history we find that at the return from captivity, when as we have seen the first serious effort to establish the full Levitical law was made, they were appointed from twenty years of age “to set forward the work of the house of Jhvh.”§ This may indeed be accounted for by the supposition that a greater number was required on that pressing emergency than could be obtained of the full age; but this is only a guess, and scarcely a probable one when it is considered that a clear departure from a known law would have been noticed and excused by the priestly writer.

* Kalisch, Leviticus, Part II. p. 270.

† Num. iv. 3, 23, 30, 35, 39, 43, 47.

‡ Num. viii. 23—26. § Ezra iii. 8.

The general result of the inquiry is, then, that Deuteronomy represents an earlier, simpler and less minute system of religious and ceremonial duties, such as may have been enforced in Josiah's time, while the book was not completed till Jeremiah was in Egypt; that the Levitical code comprised in Leviticus and Numbers cannot have been entirely completed even in the earlier days of Nehemiah, and may (with Kalisch) be probably assigned to about B.C. 400. If so, the Hebrew tradition which ascribes to Ezra the revision of the whole Pentateuch gains some probability; only that we might reasonably suppose him to have done more than revise; he may have collected old usages and added new ones, with respect to the regulation of sacrifices, tithes, and the duties of priests and Levites, so as to be himself rather author than reviser. Even his work, however, remained to be supplemented by further precepts which were unknown in his day.

Simple and probable as this general result appears, there are many points left by no means clear, and which we have not scope fully to investigate. If we take modern conclusions as to the composition of Genesis for granted, the fundamental text of that book and up to Ex. vi. was written about the time of Samuel, and probably (thinks Bishop Colenso) by Samuel; the later or Jhvhistic passages being filled in during David's reign, between 1060 and 1010 B.C., as Colenso thinks, or possibly as late as 750, as Kuenen suggests. Now history and legislation are hopelessly blended in Exodus; and there is no clear pause in the former, which we could plausibly accept as the termination of the earlier writer's work. If the Levitical legislation was compiled as late as I have endeavoured to make probable, there must be a conclusion of the earlier writers and a beginning of this, *somewhere*. The determination of this point is rendered peculiarly difficult by the fact that the Levitical writer is scarcely distinguishable by style from the Elohist, and has therefore hitherto been assumed to be the same. Graf, Kuenen and Colenso, who see that he must be different, are all puzzled how to answer this question. Nevertheless, the critical acumen of Colenso, who in his last part has carried out the minute investigation of differences of style among the various writers to a far greater extent than any predecessor, has determined what verses of Exodus must belong

to each writer. The result, stated broadly, is, that the latter Levitical writer begins at Exodus xxv. ; there being some verses by him in the preceding chapters, and some by the earlier writers—especially the historical part of Numbers—after that point. This result, on the whole, is eminently satisfactory in face of the difficulties of the case. There are many minor difficulties which cannot be touched upon here ; but it is an immense gain to our knowledge of the Pentateuch to be enabled to place the so-called Mosaic legislation in its right place in the world's history, and to find in it nothing so abnormal as an ecclesiastical system devised and written down centuries before the existence of the sanctuary and the priestly tribe for whom it was intended, but only a code prepared and gradually enlarged by that priestly tribe as their influence extended, so that its final touches were only put in at the very end of the history contained in the Hebrew canonical books. The question *how* it thus increased, and what part of the Levitical system is the oldest, cannot be further pursued here ; and there are many important questions connected with the main one, as that of the construction of the Tabernacle and of Solomon's temple, which may perhaps be treated in another article.

RUSSELL MARTINEAU.

V.—THE BAMPTON LECTURE ON DISSENT.

Dissent in its relation to the Church of England : Eight Lectures preached before the University of Oxford in the Year 1871 (Bampton Lecture). By George Herbert Curteis, M.A., late Fellow and Sub-rector of Exeter College, Oxon ; Principal of the Lichfield Theological College, and Prebendary of Lichfield Cathedral ; Rector of Turweston, Bucks. London : Macmillan. 1872.

MR. CURTEIS has made an earnest, an intelligent, a charitable, and yet only a partially successful attempt to understand Dissent. It is a good thing that he should have made it : for the Church of England to cast about for terms of

reconciliation with Independents and Methodists is a more practical step towards the re-union of Christendom, than her recent coquetry with orthodox Greece, or her offer of sympathy with Döllinger and his Old Catholics. "How to deal with the Dissenters," is now a question often discussed at Church Conferences and Diocesan Synods, where, if little desire is shewn to meet schismatics half way, they are no longer treated with contempt, and the advantages of a return to Church communion are at least courteously put before them. And yet while we offer such a book as this the heartiest welcome, and warmly recommend it to the careful perusal of our readers, we are bound to confess that it has only confirmed our deep and unwilling conviction of the gulf which in England yawns between Church and Dissent, and of the difficulty of spanning it by any broad and lasting bridge. If a man like Mr. Curteis, of wide and various reading, of broad Christian sympathies, with a vivid sense of the evils of a disunited Church, with an eager desire to understand and appreciate the Nonconformist position, is yet so little able to grasp its characteristic idea and chief justification,—what are we to hope from the rank and file of his Church, who, with narrower minds and colder hearts than his, hold up the standard of her authority in uncompromising hands? Nor is this difficulty on one side alone. A Churchman's ignorance of Nonconformity may be fairly paralleled by Nonconformist ignorance of the Church. It is possible to be as stiff in conservative prejudice with regard to the bare details of Dissenting worship, as to the colour of a robe or the attitudes of a consecrating priest. And we must honestly own that whatever desire for re-union has been manifested hitherto, has been nearly all on the side of the Church. Methodist Conferences, Congregational and Baptist Unions, are not in the habit, so far as we know, of even discussing the possibility of healing the divisions of Protestant England. When to the seventy-five sects which already exist, they have succeeded by their political action in adding a seventy-sixth,—larger, richer, more learned, more powerful, than all the rest,—they will be content. The triumph of Dissent will be complete when everybody dissents from everybody else, and Conference and Convocation stand in precisely the same position before the law. The consummation may be inevitable, even desirable; but

it hardly appears to be the realization of Christ's ideal of the "one flock and one shepherd."

Mr. Curteis' theory is something of this kind : The object of Christ's life and teaching was the establishment of the kingdom of God. This kingdom he identifies with a visible, organized Church, having fixed limits, powers, privileges. He boldly applies to the Church, as it has actually existed and still exists, the parables of the gospel in which the character of the kingdom is defined. He insists on the external, recognizable unity of the Church as one of its essential features ; it is not merely an unseen communion of faithful souls, of which the bounds are known to God only, but an organization patent to the senses of men. To use Mr. H. B. Wilson's nomenclature,* he maintains the "multitudinist" against the "individualist" theory of the Church ; it is not a "cœtus fidelium" alone, a collection of "the saved," but includes human beings of every age and every degree of religious attainment ; it is the field in which the wheat and the tares grow together, the net which holds fish of every kind. And the Church, so looked at, is a living and growing organism, surviving through century after century, divinely inspired and directed, satisfying all lawful wants of Christian souls, and sufficient for the true religious needs of every age. Though Mr. Curteis gives instances of the wise and conciliatory fashion in which the Church has sometimes dealt with differences of opinion which might have grown into dissensions, we do not gather that he would hold the Church of England blameless in all the controversies out of which the Protestant Nonconformity of our own day has grown. On the contrary, he states, in his last Lecture, the necessity of making "a candid and honourable confession of past errors and sins in our method of managing controversies, and in the relations we have assumed towards Dissent."† But at all events she now opens arms of welcome to her alienated children. She cannot contemplate any modification of her Creeds, for these belong to all the past and the whole of Christendom. But if Nonconformists will only look at the matter rightly, there is really nothing to stand in their way : "Every denomination" "has a banner and a camping-ground of its own within the broad

* *Essays and Reviews*, p. 145 et seq.

† P. 409.

area of the Church of England ;” even the Unitarians may recollect that the definitions of the Nicene Creed were made in the interests of monotheism, of which Athanasian doctrine is a chief bulwark. Let bygones be bygones ; the Church is still with us in her old authority and attractiveness ; and if her clergy will but waken to a keener sense of duty, and lay before the people the full compass and beauty of her system, they will again crowd her gates. Why should we longer spend in internecine quarrels the strength which ought to be put forth with one mind and one will, if Christianity is not to break itself in vain against heathenism, if religion itself is not to go down before the advance of science ?

Such is Mr. Curteis’ theory ; but it is quite open to any Dissenter who may be not unwilling to consider terms of reconciliation, to ask, Is it also the theory universally held and authoritatively set forth by the Church of England ? To take a parallel case : there is no doubt as to what doctrinal and practical obligations a man incurs when he is received into the Roman or the Greek Church : the doctors of either communion clearly give one accordant decision : Dr. Newman finds himself equally at home in the diocese of Birmingham and in the diocese of Baltimore, beneath the shadow of Nôtre Dame and under the dome of St. Peter’s. But there is much in the details of Mr. Curteis’ theory which his own co-religionists would eagerly and almost angrily repudiate. He delivers himself of a most clear and vehement protest against that subjection of the conscience to the text of Scripture which he holds to be of the essence of Puritanism, saying many wise and noble things of the superiority of the living conscience, led by the Spirit of God, to the dead letter. But is there any substantial difference in this respect between orthodox Dissenters and those evangelical Churchmen who are still the most numerous, if no longer the most active and powerful, party in the Establishment ? And when he proceeds to enthrone, in the place of Scripture, Catholic tradition and the teaching of the Church, what will prevent Dean Close and Mr. Ryle from stigmatizing his theory—no matter how moderately stated and ably defended—as flat Popery ? The fact is, that the forces which have produced Dissent without, have also been at work to stir up dissension within,

the Church of England ; and the essentially irreconcilable principles of the authority of the Church, the authority of Scripture, and the authority of the individual Conscience, are there fighting out their battle, with more or less logical justification, for their temporary possession of the field. Of course it is easy for Mr. Curteis to shut his eyes to the unwelcome fact, and to assume that his own principle is that which is alone characteristic of the Church, and will inevitably swallow up its rivals. But a Dissenter of the orthodox type would certainly reply to Mr. Curteis' invitation : " I am accustomed in my own communion to stand on a fixed ground of religious theory, to hear a clear statement of theological doctrine : is it to Sacramental or Evangelical belief that you ask me to subscribe ? Is Scripture or the Church to be the ultimate standard of appeal ? " And, on the other hand, a Nonconformist from a creedless church might answer : " I note and approve the practical comprehensiveness of your Church : it is a good thing that Christians differing in opinion should live and worship together, even with some jealousies and bickerings ; but I hold that comprehension on a basis of creeds which were meant to be exclusive is illogical and untruthful ; and I dare not leave the open plain where alone the Free Church of the Future can find a home."

But even if we take Mr. Curteis' theory to express far more universally than it does the mind of the Church of England, it is one which will not bear examination. Granting for a moment the identity of the visible Church with the kingdom of God, and admitting that the organized communion which it was the object of our Lord's earthly life to found must still be in existence somewhere, can there be any doubt that, upon the historical ground, the Church of Rome, or the Holy Eastern Church, has overwhelming claims to our allegiance ? The theory that the Anglican Church has a right to exercise over the consciences of Englishmen all the authority that a Church can possess, consistent with deference to the decision of a General Council, is precisely that which Dr. Newman, in the ablest, the most eloquent, the most sarcastic book he ever wrote, the " Lectures on the Anglican Difficulties," has not only overturned, but absolutely pulverized. This is the very *via media* in which the great Oxford Doctor tried in vain to walk ; in which

Keble died, and Pusey still lives, having walked in it all their lives ; but which, if only it be pursued long enough and with sufficient good faith, inevitably leads to Rome. Mr. Curteis ingeniously puts in the very strongest light the continuity of the Church in England before and after the Reformation, by counting English Romanists among Dissenters, and representing them as separating themselves from the Church of their native country on the question of the Papal Supremacy. But giving him the full benefit of this representation, it is difficult to see how he would trace back the apostolical succession from Archbishop Tait to Peter or to James. With help of Rome, the line is clear enough. It is easy to object that many links of the chain are not strong enough to bear the burden sought to be laid upon them ; but the chain itself indisputably stretches from the Popes of the second century, who lie buried in the catacomb of St. Callixtus, to Pius IX. Do the partizans of Anglican authority appeal to the mission of St. Augustine ? This is only to put a little further back the point of attachment to the Roman tradition. Do they utter vague phrases as to an earlier conversion of Britain, and the church with which the Roman missionaries held their conference under the oak by Severn shore ? The air breathed by St. Alban and St. Joseph of Arimathea is hardly that in which historical criticism will live. Apart from Rome, Anglican Christianity finds it impossible to connect itself by any visible succession with the apostolic age. And if the claims of Churches are to be settled by an appeal to historical pedigree, the pretensions of direct are preferable to those of collateral descent.

We are relieved from the necessity of going more minutely into this matter by the fact that Mr. Curteis nowhere seriously sets himself to prove the truth of his theory, but everywhere takes it for granted. And to a large extent it is probably true that Dissent is not a matter of conscious ecclesiastical theory at all. Mr. Curteis quotes Mr. Brewin Grant as saying, "Nonconformists are in general simply conformists to the societies in which they were born : " how can it be otherwise ? Dissenters, not less than other men, are subject to the magic of early associations, and much of the subtle strength and sweetness of religion is bound up for them with the accidental form in which they first received

it. If it is possible to be a good Christian within the Church's pale, without being able to trace all the intricacies of her middle way between Rome and Geneva, why need we suppose that every Dissenter is a conscious and deliberate schismatic? There is much in the recollection of an honourable Nonconformist ancestry, extending over years when Nonconformity brought with it its pains and perils: the type of a mother's piety or a father's integrity may go for something: even the service which Churchmen think so bare and cold touches the hearts that have been moulded under its own influence. Perhaps these half-unconscious forces are most powerful with the finest spirits: men to whom religion is a matter of indifferent habit or an element of social respectability, slip easily into conformity, while the transition is hard and slow for one who leaves a home of the soul for what may prove, after all, a cold and inhospitable land. There are others, again, whose connection with a Dissenting church dates from a spiritual revolution in their own lives: they had been nominally Christians before—no matter of what type—and all at once, under the spell of some prophetic word, have passed from darkness to light, from weakness to strength, from the world to God. And if it be so, what in comparison with so great a thing are theories of the Church? How persuade such an one that the apostolic succession is not to be found in the sect to which he has attached himself, when he feels all the reality and vividness of the apostolic work in himself? Such is, in great degree, the secret of Methodist success, especially in rural parishes. "The rector is all very well,—a charitable, good man in his way" (a Methodist, no ill-wisher to the Church, might say); "but he preaches above the people's heads, and uses fine college words, so that they go and they come away much as they were before." Then comes some rough enthusiast, quite untaught, terribly unrefined, but speaking the people's language, uttering the people's thoughts, with a tongue of fire: they are melted and they are moved: a new affection fills their hearts, a new force sways their lives; and soon, to a few sturdy souls, the hideous brick Bethel that rises in the back lane is more than all the stately and ancient beauty of the parish church. Work of this kind the Church of England has never yet succeeded in doing, except for the few years during which such men

as Grimshaw of Haworth and Fletcher of Madely helped Wesley to set her discipline at defiance; and for a large, and not the least worthy, part of the working classes, especially in the country, there is practically little choice between irreligion and some form of Dissent. Then, again, the fact that, whether for good or evil, Nonconformity offers far more scope to lay influence and activity than the Church, constitutes a strong attraction to a certain class of minds. It is true that you may be a churchwarden, with unlimited power—the money being forthcoming—over the washing of the surplice, the ringing of the bells, and the regulating of the clock: you may even be a member of a newly-constituted ruridecanal or diocesan synod, and help to pass resolutions which are precisely worth the paper on which they are written; and you may share with Dissenters and Catholics the dignity of legislating for the Church of England in the House of Commons: but, except in the last case,—which properly belongs rather to the political than to the ecclesiastical system of the country, and is looked upon with shame and anger by all High-churchmen,—little more than the form of influence is granted to the laity of the Church. The proposal to admit them to representation in Convocation is fiercely disputed, and opinion in regard to it might well be taken by an outsider as a test of Churchmanship. We know much that might be said on the other side of the domination of ignorant and tyrannical deacons, of cheesemongers in the seat of authority, and ministers at the mercy of their drapers; though even this medal has its reverse, and many congregations might be found where the relation between pastor and people,—each of whom can sever the connection at pleasure,—is determined by the most courteous forbearance and the most delicate respect. But, after all, it is a false and inadequate theory which identifies the clergy with the Church. The perfect ecclesiastical system of the future will find place and work for all those gifts of the Spirit which are dispensed, without respect of persons, upon layman and cleric alike.

Another point on which it is worth while to dwell somewhat more minutely, is the relation of the Church of England to the two great political parties which alternately direct the destiny of the country. There can be no doubt that the Nonconformist layman who holds strong Liberal

opinions, for the sake of which he is willing to work and make sacrifices, learns to look upon the Church as a strong and persistent force on the other side. It is not that many of those with whom he is accustomed to work are not Churchmen; it is not that clergymen who will vote for a Liberal candidate may not be found, though few and far between, and most of a somewhat tainted orthodoxy. But it is a "note" of Churchmanship to be Conservative. There is an old alliance between the Church and the Tory party, and even Mr. Disraeli finds it advisable to declare himself "on the side of the angels." Whenever such prevailingly clerical constituencies as Oxford and Cambridge are called upon for an opinion at a crisis of public affairs, the answer is always given on the side of privilege and exclusion, in the rejection of such men as Peel and Gladstone, in the election of such as Hardy and Hope. Look at the list of the Committee for securing the election of a Conservative county member: it will include seven-eighths of the rural clergy, while only one or two reverend names can with difficulty be gathered to grace the rival document. We once heard an eminent Liberal, himself a Churchman, somewhat naively lament the absence of the clergy from a great political meeting in which he was taking a part: "I recollect," he said, "how the clergy were all against us at the time of the Anti-Corn-Law League; but they came round afterwards, and so they will again." So Mr. Curteis, of whose sympathies with all well-ordered progress we entertain no doubt, having "come round" himself, seems to look back upon English history with the happy conviction that the Church has all along been upon the right side. He reminds us that John Hampden was a sturdy Churchman. He more than once calls attention to the fact that the Long Parliament was a Parliament of Churchmen, which, considering that Dissent had no separate existence till 1662, it very well might be. It is true that when he descends from general phrases to particular facts, he is far too honest and well read to conceal or distort the truth, and himself supplies the answer to much that he has elsewhere said. "The Church of England had made her last public utterance only six months after the opening of the Long Parliament, in the shape of those incredibly foolish and servile canons of 1640, which have since been by universal consent consigned to

oblivion. In them, forgetful of her lofty calling to identify herself with no political parties, but to harmonize and reconcile them all, and especially to soften the harshness of privilege and repress the lawlessness of power, she had (on the contrary) thrown her whole weight into the scale of privilege and power.* And the instructed Nonconformist feels that it has always been so. It was so in the reigns of Henry and Edward, Mary and Elizabeth, when, for the great body of the Anglican clergy, the caprice of the sovereign was the rule of faith. It was so when Laud perished before his master; when Oxford carried her plate to pay his troops; when "Eikon Basilike" became almost the Bible of the Cavaliers; when the passionate loyalty which had been poured out upon the grave and decorous Martyr was transferred without diminution to his dissolute and reckless son. At the Revolution, the Church never moved till her own privileges and revenues were attacked. Filmer and South promulgated from the Universities the doctrines of abject political submission; and again, when the storm had passed by, it was a "note" of Churchmanship to refuse the oaths, and to retire into passive rebellion with Sancroft and Ken. Church and King have been associated words for more than three centuries—a fact in which stout old Tories still exult; but it is idle at this time of day to claim for the Church of England at once the praise of consistent loyalty and steady patriotism, or to deny that Puritanism first, and Dissent afterwards, have always taken the side opposed to privilege. And the association of ideas still continues. In many cases, Nonconformity in religion and Liberalism in politics are felt to stand and fall together. The Church of England must exhibit a quite new appreciation of popular rights, an entirely fresh ardour for social and political progress, before it can make itself acceptable to a large number of those who are now outside its fold.

These are some of the unacknowledged reasons which, if they do not make men Nonconformists, at least help to keep them so. But Nonconformity, as a whole, undoubtedly takes its rise in a tendency of mind to which Mr. Curteis hardly, as we think, does justice. He insists, with justifiable iteration, upon the unity of the Church; he points

out that divisions—much less dissensions, rivalries, jealousies—cannot form part of Christ's idea of the Church; he enlarges upon the necessity of mutual explanation, concession, self-obliteration, among Christians; he expatiates upon the superiority of submission to the law of a Church, over subjection to the majority of a sect. Much of what he says is precisely what English Dissenters most need to note and inwardly digest: their divisions upon trifling matters of doctrine and discipline are a scandal to Protestantism: any self-willed teacher looks upon any ecclesiastical grievance, any doctrinal caprice, as reason enough for founding a fresh sect, and the mystic body of Christ is maimed, as the most foolish of French ministers went to war, in very "lightness of heart." But over against the claims of unity, and not always to be reconciled with them, are the claims of personal truthfulness to conviction. What is to become of the men who, with a deep awe of God upon their souls,—the God who requireth truth in the inward parts,—and the knowledge that in the last resort religion is not a matter of human association, but the communion between the finite and the infinite Spirit, find their deepest belief contradicted by the Creeds, and cannot join in the common worship without taking upon their lips what seems to them to be a lie? When once this point has been reached, submission to the authority of the Church is no longer possible, except at the cost of all sincerity and self-respect; the charm of unity begins to lose its power; the new-found convictions must have free course and honest expression, cost what they may. No doubt it is very easy to exaggerate the importance of truths to which our own minds have freshly awakened; conscientiousness may harden into scrupulosity; trifles of observance may be magnified into serious occasions of discord; it is possible to make a needless sacrifice of unity to truth, as, on the other side, of truth to unity. But when Churches, sternly immovable, will neither widen their doctrinal basis nor relax the bonds of discipline to make room for the freer play of men's minds, what is left—unless schism be in every case a sin—but to come out of them? If the result be in part the development of sectarian life in its inevitable hardness and narrowness, as well as the creation of divisions which soon grow into dissensions, let not all the blame fall upon the conscientiousness which voluntarily

resigns the joys of church fellowship, but let some at least lie upon the ecclesiastical unyieldingness which made the resignation necessary. And against the shortcomings of Nonconformist life, of which we have ever been deeply conscious, must, in common fairness, be set the preservation of a high ideal of the obligations of the individual conscience to theological truth, without which the moral life of England would at this moment be far lower than it is. To love the master of a school more than truth, is the reproach of a philosopher. If in religion, too, it is easy to forget allegiance to truth in devotion to a Church, is the blame less deserved?

It is this stern and uncompromising faithfulness to religious truth which makes the charm, and in some sense the justification, of Puritanism. Mr. Curteis sees nothing in it but an attempt to Calvinize the Church of England, which would have replaced by something far harder and narrower the compromise effected at the Reformation; and so far as he sees, he is probably right. This generation has no reason to regret that in 1649 the whole country was not organized on the Presbyterian model, or that a little later the Independents did not stamp their impress upon the national faith and worship: the very function of Puritanism, under all circumstances, is to be in opposition—to maintain neglected principles, to manifest unpopular virtues, to compel the recognition of forgotten truths. And in this office lies almost the necessity of a certain scrupulosity, stiffneckedness, love of extremes, insistence upon trifles; just as to the Puritan eye the easy and suave virtues of prosperous and established churches always have a savour of laxity and indifference about them. But it is impossible to deny that from the first the Puritans were desperately in earnest with religion. At a time when other men were vibrating between old faiths and new, or groping anxiously for some compromise between them, they alone knew what they believed and what end they desired to attain. The result a generation later proclaims the same fact: it was before the onset of men, the deep fire of whose faith often blazed up into fanaticism, that the gay and dissolute Cavaliers went down at Newbury and Marston Moor and Worcester,—the men with the belief upon the lip, before the men with the belief in the heart. That man is nearer to God than any church; that religion is essentially not a corporate or organized com-

munion with the Deity, but the personal contact of spirit with spirit ; that a human soul finds strength and peace in proportion as it can *itself* lay hold of God, whether within or beyond the pale of any Church ;—these were the half-unconscious principles which lay behind Puritanism and made its strength. It was, says Mr. Curteis, a prosaic thing ; it had no imagination ; to it, the sign of the Cross savoured of Popery, and the surplice was not comely ; it was impatient of the Book of Common Prayer, and thought that there were other and more effectual ways of rising to the presence of God than on the wings of Cathedral service. To prove that Puritanism and the highest flights of imagination are not incompatible, it surely needs only to name the name of Milton ; but we join issue with our author on his whole conception of the connection of imagination with religious feeling. We are not indifferent to the charm of religious art : to wander eastwards through Canterbury Cathedral, as nave and choir and chapel, each holier than the last, rise upon the sacred steps once trodden by so many reverent feet ; to stand upon the sea-tossed floor of St. Mark's, and to feel the wonder and the mystery of the East glow in the dim mosaics of the walls and shine from the shadowy vaults overhead ; to listen in the vast nave of St. Peter's as the strange pathetic music peals from the chapel of the choir, and light after light goes out, till at last are left only the perennial lamps round the tomb of the Apostles ; to watch in the minster which Norman William built, and where his bones are laid, the acolytes casting their censers into the air, and to hear the musical clang of their falling chains mingling with the strong melody of those Gregorian tones, which have borne to heaven the praise and supplication of so many centuries of Christian Europe ;—these are things that can never be forgotten. But is it a proof of the strength and readiness of the religious imagination to be able to picture vividly God, and the realities of the unseen world, when all surrounding circumstance conspires to help the soul, and every sense is an inlet of holy association,—or when, perchance, in some poor upper room two or three are met together, and yet, without the spell of art, God is felt to be very near ? The dullest soul that stands before Raffaele's Transfiguration, for a moment at least sees with his bodily eyes a not unworthy presentation of

Christ ; but we should not praise his religious imagination in comparison with that of one who, out of the depths of his own love and reverence, can call up an image of the Master, and by whose side ever lives and moves a Divine Form, whose beauty, though marred and wasted, is yet more than that of the sons of men. So religious art, fit help for feeble spirits, runs the risk of becoming presently their hindrance, and men who say that they find God easily beneath a vaulted roof, may come to miss Him beneath a flat ceiling ; or, to change the metaphor, they have been wont to mount heavenwards in a balloon, and their own souls have no wings. The Puritan conception of God and heavenly things was surely vivid enough ; it seems scarcely fair to reproach the Puritans that they needed no external helps to attain to it. Again in this, as in so many other matters, it is hard to hit the mean ; and protests are apt to run into the extreme. But when in our own day we watch the constant tendency of all forms to harden and narrow upon the meaning which they enshrine, of all symbols to supplant in men's minds the things they symbolize,—the way in which the material supersedes the spiritual, and what can be seen takes the place of what faith can discern only dimly and far off,—it is impossible not to have some sympathy with the Puritan protest against modes of worship which then were far fuller than they are now of the associations of a degraded and superstitious Christianity.

Mr. Curteis finds it especially difficult to understand why such Unitarians as Mr. Martineau should have any sympathy with Puritanism, or take a pleasure in tracing their spiritual descent up to the ejected divines of 1662. For one thing, most men of any nobleness of nature take a pride in the pedigree which is actually their own, and would scorn to lay claim to another and more brilliant with which their connection was less assured. And there can be no doubt that modern Unitarianism has its historical affiliation upon the original Dissenting stock, and owes all its logical consistency and outspokenness to the reluctance of the old Presbyterians to tie up their foundations by doctrinal trust-deeds. Again and again orthodox Nonconformists have urged, in favour of such trust-deeds, that to leave speculation and preaching absolutely free leads, directly and surely, to what they call Socinianism ; while it is to be remarked

that tendencies to a Unitarian type of belief which have manifested themselves within the Church, have been prevented from spreading, and in a very few years have been strangled, by the influence of subscription and the daily use of the Creeds. Mr. Curteis is quite right in pointing out a fact, which most Unitarians are now beginning to forget, that in many important particulars their sympathies would naturally be engaged on the side of the Church rather than on that of Dissent. Like the Church, they are "multitudinist," not "individualist," in their theory of ecclesiastical communion; they have no "church," no peculiar and elect people within the congregation; they impose no tests upon the laity (and much less upon the clergy) in regard either to church government or church discipline; the church is to them, not an assembly of the saved, separate from the world, but an educational society, into which little children are born, where young men and young women grow up, by which sinners are borne with that they may be reclaimed, and the weak are strengthened, and none are cast out. And this has the directest influence upon life: in their relation to literature, to science, to public duty, to the occupations and amusements of society, Unitarians take up another position from that of most Dissenters, and stand by the side of educated Churchmen, incurring the charge of want of spirituality, accepting the reproach of worldliness. Then it is undeniable that the freedom of thought and speech upon which Unitarians lay so great stress is (whether with logical consistency or not) oftener manifested within the limits of the Church of England than in connection with Dissenting churches, and that a Unitarian who conformed, still speaking his mind, would find himself more at home in the Church than in the company of Mr. Dale or Mr. Spurgeon. Mr. Curteis alludes, too, to the Lady Hewley Suit, and to the Dissenters' Chapels Act, which a Parliament of Churchmen passed in opposition to the eager solicitations of orthodox Nonconformists; nor is the allusion without instruction. But in spite of all this, in spite of the great value which some Unitarians at least set upon the outward and visible as well as upon the spiritual unity of the Church, and of their eager desire to escape from ecclesiastical isolation, they are obliged, so long as the Articles and Creeds of the Church remain what they are, to take their reluctant

stand upon the side of Nonconformity. They leave to other Dissenters, whose doctrinal position does not greatly differ from that of the Church, the task of justifying their own separation ; with themselves, Dissent is simply a matter of personal honesty. The controversies which lie between them and the Church do not regard nice points of theological belief, or details of ritual, or trifles of old prejudice, but go down to the very roots of Christian faith. To worship habitually with the Church, or in any other way than as an occasional testimony to a common Christian brotherhood, would be to bear witness to that which they believe to be untrue. And it is this attempt to realize the ideal of theological honesty, even at the cost of affection and fellowship which otherwise they would hold justly dear, that makes their bond of sympathy with a Puritanism to whose theology they have a deep repugnance, and from whose method of life they are widely separated.

We have already said that Mr. Curteis, like most Churchmen who have attacked the problem of reconciling Dissenters to the Church, proposes very little that is practical. He admits the evil, but hardly suggests a remedy. He thinks that the Church should make a frank confession of error and shortcoming in times past. He is strongly of opinion that the clergy have not done, and are not doing, their duty in the recommendation and inculcation of Church principles. He is desirous that Dissenters should be made to see that the ground occupied by the Church really comprises every spot on which they have pitched their own tents of separation. But beyond, perhaps, some trifling modifications of discipline and organization, he sees the need of no change, and proposes none ; nor is it possible that, with his view of the Church, her history and her prerogatives, he should propose any. If only she could be strengthened by the accession of all Nonconformists, he discerns a brilliant future before her ; there is absolutely no difficulty in the way of her reconciliation with science and philosophy ; and her manifest destiny is to be the mediatrix of Christendom, the centre round which the undivided Church of a coming age will grow. Again, in relation to this flattering prospect, we are unable to take up the position which would be occupied by most Nonconformists ; we might be willing to accept a form of church organization which they

would reject, and our protest is against a theology with much of which they would heartily agree. We do not suppose that the reconciliation of science and philosophy with theology is by any means so easy a thing as Mr. Curteis seems to think, or that any line can be drawn between the results of speculation and the truths of revelation which thinkers will agree to respect. On the contrary, we are compelled to look upon the whole system of theology of which he is the able and cultivated advocate, as utterly out of harmony with the spirit of the age, and destined to deadly conflict with it. It is not with us a question of finding bulwarks of monotheism in the Nicene Creed, or of putting a meaning consistent with ordinary human notions of morality upon the doctrine of the Atonement, or of twisting the petitions of the Litany into accord with philosophical conceptions of Providence. We meet the Catholic theory of the Church, face to face, with a flat denial. What Mr. Curteis would call developments, we brand as corruptions of the faith; his Catholic tradition is to us a gradual overlaying, in the hands of ignorant and prejudiced men, of the divine germs of truth which dropped from the lips of Christ into the careless keeping of his disciples. We admit the defects of Scripture, but we cannot go to the Church to have them repaired; on the contrary, nothing is plainer to us than that the sublime theism, the simple and strong morality of Jesus, suffered detriment even at the hands of his first hearers, and before three centuries had brought the Council of Nicæa, had grown into somewhat strangely unlike itself. And therefore if, in the age which is drawing on, an age already intoxicated with the triumph of physical discovery, the religious instincts which we believe to be perennial in the heart of man are to receive satisfaction, we cannot think it will be in connection with any Church which holds to the three Creeds, and indulges the hope of uniting Rome and Moscow in one Christendom with herself. To fall back upon the first affirmations of Theism; to leave the Divine Nature enshrouded in its own indefinable mystery; to unite all history of human faith and speculation in the conception of one Holy Spirit, "the light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world;" to base acceptance with God upon the manifestation of those manly

virtues which are also the meeting-point of the nature of God and man ; to link piety towards God with goodwill towards men in indissoluble bonds ; and to look for a joy in the coming life which is no more than the continuation and development of all noblest energy and purest happiness in the life that now is ;—this, if any faith, holds in it the promise of the future. And its first author and best expounder is he who called his disciples to him on the Mount, and “taught them as one having authority.”

The signs of the times in regard to the coming fate of churches are, in truth, not easy to read. While men’s religious opinions (we speak chiefly of England) are undergoing the most marked and solvent changes, their relation to churches remains almost the same : if we except the passage of converts from Canterbury to Rome, never has there been less transference of strength from one communion to another than of late years. Creeds and confessions are held more loosely, denominational names have a less exact meaning, the Church of England exercises the attraction which cannot be absent from an institution which stands so near the centre of the national life, and the sects about hold their own, without increased numbers or a keener vitality. There is indeed the tendency, which Mr. Curteis represents in a refined and moderate form, towards Catholic ideas of the authority of the Church, and the relation of present to past Christianity : it would be strange indeed if an order of things which has grown into what it now is through eighteen centuries, and has largely determined the form of European civilization, should pass away without a determined rally of its defenders. But opposed to this is another tendency—at present, we believe, half unconscious—which produces in the minds of thoughtful religious men an indifference to all forms of ecclesiastical organization. Such do not wilfully rebel against the special form with which they find themselves associated, but as little do they deliberately choose another. They hang loose to churches, they are indifferent to sectarian triumphs, they wait for what is coming, and do not care to anticipate the future by over-hasty action. It is not religion of which they are careless, but the institutions which are its social husk ; they think the careful drill of a sect, which is the necessary preliminary to its victory,

a poor substitute for the free motion and play of the spirit. They see that, at least in social matters, it is not organization that wakens life, but life that produces organization ; they are afraid lest the Church should become a vast and languid frame, animated by but a feeble heart. So their attitude in regard to the ecclesiastical questions of the day is one of suspense ; they remain Churchmen or Dissenters as the case may be, taking care only that their position is one which nourishes the religious life within them, and is not without its occasions of duty. Their allegiance is given to some Church of the future yet unborn, and their effort is to prepare the way of its appearing.

The process of sectarian disintegration has probably, among educated men at least, reached its term. Single congregations are here and there being formed, out of connection with any church, and held together by the ministry of some able man ; but while they multiply, they shew no tendency to coalesce, and their chief significance is the proof which they afford that there are religious people who can live tranquilly beyond the limits of any church or sect. But there is another kind of disintegration going on, of which the end is not yet. The men of whom we have spoken above, in sounding for themselves the depths of religious experience, are finding out that intercourse with God must be personal before it can be social ; that through the life of the single soul is the way to the life of the accordant Church, and that it is the former which gives the law to the latter. Has it hitherto been the case that the Church has moulded the disciple, furnishing his belief, prescribing his worship, indicating the path in which he should walk ? In the time to come it will be the life of the disciple that will stamp its impress upon the Church, and men will worship and work together in obedience, not to a law and an organization imposed from without, but to the leading of the Spirit of God in their own hearts. We need to go back, as it were, to the first elements of church association, to rebuild the edifice out of its original materials. And that the Church, so rebuilt, will stand on another foundation than the old, requires no proof. No longer will the attempt be made to enforce upon all minds the acceptance of one system of belief drawn out into many details ; no longer will the necessity arise of securing some adequate measure

of liberty by the lax interpretation of precise statements ; no longer will unity be accessible only through unfaithfulness to truth, or truthfulness stand with forbidding front in the way of unity. When men have learned that the true ground of all human association lies, not in what they believe, but in what they love and hate, and trust and shun, then may we hope that on the crumbling ruins of all existing Churches will rise the immovable foundations of the Church whose children will find their strength and their joy in loving God and serving man, and hastening, by work and patience and prayer, the slow coming of the kingdom of heaven.

CHARLES BEARD.

VI.—THE LIFE AFTER DEATH.

Christ in Modern Life. By the Rev. Stopford Brooke. 8vo. London. 1872. (Sermons 12, 13, 14, 15.)

The Contemporary Review. April, May, June and August, 1872.

New Theories and the Old Faith. By the Rev. J. Allanson Picton. London: Williams and Norgate. 1870. (Appendix A.)

EARTHLY minds, no less than heavenly bodies, seem constrained to pursue their walk by a compromise between opposing forces. Our orbits lie half-way between the tracks which we should follow did we obey exclusively centripetal Selfishness or centrifugal Love, the gravitation of the senses or the upward attractions of the soul. Especially is this compromise observable in the case of our anticipation of prolonged existence after death. Not one man in a thousand lives either as if he relied on these hopes, or renounced them ; as if he expected immortality, or resigned himself to annihilation. The average human being never gives entire loose to his passions on the principle, "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die ;" but he constantly attaches to the transient concerns of earth an importance which, if death

be a prelude to a nobler existence, is not merely disproportionate, but absurd. The sentiments he entertains towards God are not such as might befit an insect towards him who is preparing to crush it ; but neither are they those of a son to a Father, into whose home on high he is assured ere long of a welcome. He mourns his departed friends not altogether with despair, but with very little of the confident "hope of a joyful resurrection" which his clergyman officially expresses while he commits their bodies to the ground. He awaits his own demise with regret or resignation nearly always measured by his happiness or misery in the world he quits, rather than by his expectations of one or the other in that which he is about to enter ; but he rarely contemplates the possibility of final loss of consciousness, or fails to project himself eagerly into interests with which, in such contingency, he can have no concern whatever. In a word, he lives and dies so as to secure for himself pretty nearly the maximum of care and sorrow, and the minimum of peace and hope.

It is in a certain degree inevitable that some such indecision should pertain to our feelings regarding the Life after Death. Our belief that such a life awaits us is derived (as I hope presently to shew), not from any definite demonstration such as is furnished to us by the logical understanding, but from the testimony of our moral and spiritual faculties, which varies in force with the more or less perfect working condition of those faculties at all times. Yet there can be few thoughtful men or women amongst us who do not desire some more equable tenure of the priceless "Hope full of Immortality." If, during the years of multifold youthful enthusiasms or of world-engrossed middle age, the threat of death seemed dream-like—so full was our life!—and the further Hope beyond, a dream within a dream too faint and filmy for thought to seize upon it, such capacity for indifference inevitably passes away with the shock of a bereavement, an illness, or the symptoms of failing strength, and we marvel how it has been possible for us to forget that interests so near and so stupendous yet hang for us all undetermined in the balance. Or if in the vivid ecstasy of early religion it happened to us to think that the joy of once beholding the face of God was enough, and that we were content to die for ever the next hour, even this experience

after a time makes annihilation seem doubly impossible, and prompts the question, which has but one answer,—

“ *Can a finite thing, created in the bounds of time and space,
Can it live, and grow, and love Thee, catch the glory of Thy face,
Fade and die, be gone for ever, know no being, have no place ?*”*

And as the wrong and injustice of the world by degrees force themselves on our awakening consciousness, we learn to appeal with confidence to God, if not on our own behalf, yet for all the miserable and the vice-abandoned, that He should open to them the door of a happier and holier world than they have known below.

And for mankind at large, the solution of the problem of Immortality which will be generally received in the future reconstruction of opinion must prove of incalculable importance. Should the belief in a life after death still remain an article of popular faith after the fall of supernaturalism, then (freed, as it must be, of its dead-weight of the dread of Hell) the religion of succeeding generations will possess more than all the influence of the creeds of old, for it will meet human nature on all its noblest sides at once, and insult it on none. On the other hand, if the present well-nigh exclusive devotion to physico-scientific thought end in throwing the spiritual faculties of our nature so far into disuse and discredit as to leave the faith in Immortality permanently under a cloud,† then it is inevitable that religion will lose half the power it has wielded over human hearts. The God with whom our relations are so insignificant that He has condemned them to terminate at the end of a few short years,—the God whose world contains so many cruel wrongs destined to remain unrectified for ever,—the God who cares so little for man’s devotion that He *will* “suffer his Holy One to see corruption,”—that God may receive our distant homage as the Arbiter of the universe, but it is quite impossible that He should obtain our love. Nor will the results of the general retention, or loss, of the faith in a future life on the Morals of mankind, be less significant than those affecting their Religion. They will not, I believe, be of the kind vulgarly apprehended. The fear of

* Hymns of Faith and Duty. Edited by Rev. R. C. Jones. Hymn, p. 216, by E. B.

† See Mr. Brooke’s remarks on this subject, p. 194.

Hell has been vastly over-estimated as an engine of police ; for the natures which are capable of receiving a practical check to strong passion from anticipations only to be realized in a distant world, are (by the hypothesis) constituted with singularly blended elements of imagination and prudence, the furthest possible from the criminal temperament. And the hope of Heaven has been probably even less valuable as a moral agent, having spoiled the pure disinterestedness of virtue for thousands by degrading Duty into that "Other-worldliness" which is only harder and more selfish than worldliness pure and simple. But though the loss of the bribes and threats of the life to come would tend little to lower the standard of human virtue, it would be quite otherwise as regards the final closing of all out-look beyond this world, and the shutting up of morality within the narrow sphere of mortal life. We need an infinite horizon to enable us to form any conception of the grandeur and sanctity of moral distinctions ; nor is it possible we should continue to attach to Virtue and Vice the same profound significance, could we believe their scope to reach no further than our brief span. Theoretically, Right and Wrong would come to be regarded as of comparatively small importance. Practically, the virtue which must shortly come to an end for ever would seem to the tempted soul scarcely deserving of effort ; and the vice which must lie down harmless in the sinner's grave, too mere a trifle to waste on it remorse or indignation. Life, in short, after we had passed its meridian, would become in our eyes more and more like an autumn garden, wherein it would be vain to plant seeds of good which could never bloom before the frosts of death ; and useless to eradicate weeds which must needs be killed ere long without our labour. Needless to say that of that dismal spot it might surely soon be said,

"Between the time of the wind and the snow
All loathsome things began to grow ;"

and that when winter came at last, none would regret the white shroud it threw over corruption and decay.

Nor ought we to hide from ourselves that, under such loss of hope in Immortality, the highest forms of human heroism must needs disappear and cease to glorify the world. The old martyrs of the stake and the rack, and

modern martyrs of many a wreck and battle-field and hospital, have not braved torture and death *for the sake* of the rewards of Paradise, but they have at least believed that their supreme act of virtue and piety did not involve the renunciation on their part of all further moral progress and of all communion with God throughout eternity. It is not easy to see how any virtue is to help a man to renounce virtue, nor even how the love of God is to make him ready to renounce the joy of His love for ever. Deprived, then, of its boundless scope, human morality must necessarily be dwarfed more and more in each successive generation, till in comparison of the mere animal life (which would inevitably come to the front) the nobler part in us would dwindle to a vanishing point, and the man return to the ape.

What are the probabilities that the faith in Immortality may escape the wreck of the supernatural creeds, and what are the spars and rafts, if any such there be, to which individually we may most safely cling? To answer these questions it is necessary to cast a glance around us on the present attitude of thinking men on the matter. The books whose names I have placed at the head of this paper (and among which I would specially direct the reader's attention to Mr. Stopford Brooke's admirable Discourses, 12, 13, 14, 15)* give some hint of the currents of thought now passing over us; but there is little doubt that before long a much larger share of attention will be given to the subject, and that it will form in truth the battle-ground for one of the most decisive struggles in the history of the mental progress of our race. Our standpoint at this moment is somewhat peculiar. We are losing the old ground, and have not yet found footing on the new.

The delusion which has prevailed so long in England, that we acquire such truths as the existence of God and our own immortality by means of logical demonstration, appears to be slowly passing away. We hardly imagine now, as English divines from Paley to Whately habitually took for granted, that if we convince (or "vanquish") a

* A miserable pseudo-scientific treatise, *Le Lendemain de la Mort*, by Louis Figuier, has already run through four or five editions in as many months. Simple readers ask for bread, and the Frenchman drops into their mouths a bonbon.

man in argument concerning them, his next step must infallibly be to embrace them heartily, as the Arabs did Islam, at the point of the sword. Especially we begin to perceive that we have been on a wrong track in dealing with the belief in a Future Life; nay, that we have been twice misled in the matter. The old popular creed having presented the doctrine to us as a matter of historical revelation, we were first trained to think of it as a fact guaranteed by a Book, and, accordingly, of course to be ascertained by the criticism of that Book. Our eternal life was secure if we could demonstrate the authenticity and canonicity of certain Greek manuscripts; but, were the Bible to prove untrustworthy, our only valid ground of hope would be lost, and the Immortality (which, in the face of Egypt and India, we were complacently assured had been only "brought to light through the gospel") would be re-consigned to the blackness of darkness. From this primary mistake those who think freely in our day are pretty nearly emancipated. The "apocalyptic side of Christianity" has ceased to satisfy even those religious liberals who still take its moral and spiritual part as absolutely divine; and the halting logic which argued from the supposed corporeal resurrection of the Second Person of the Trinity to the spiritual survival of the mass of mankind, has been so often exposed, that it can scarcely again be produced in serious controversy.*

* That the Death of Christ—not his supposed Resurrection—furnishes a strong argument in favour of Immortality, will be shewn by and by. Is it not probable that the great myth of his bodily revival owes its origin simply to the overwhelming impression which the scene of the Passion must have made on the disciples, transforming their hitherto passive Pharisaic or Essene belief in a future life, into the vivid personal faith that such a soul could not have become extinct? In a lesser way the grave of a beloved friend has been to many a man the birthplace of his faith, and it is obvious that in the case of Christ every condition was fulfilled which would raise such sudden conviction to the height of passionate fervour. The first words of the disciples to one another on that Easter morn may well have been: "He is not dead. His spirit is this day in Paradise among the sons of God." It was the simplest consequence of their veneration for him that they should feel such assurance and give it utterance with prophetic fire. In that age of belief in miracles, this new-born faith in the immortality of a righteous soul was inevitably clothed almost immediately in materialistic shape, and by the time the Gospels were written it had become stereotyped in traditions which we can class only as Jewish ghost-stories.

If this conjecture be admitted, we are absolved equally from the acceptance as historical of the monster-miracle of the New Testament, and from the insufferable alternative of recourse to some hypothesis of fraud, collusion or mistake. It cannot have been on any such base or haphazard incident that the reliance

While we have escaped, however, from the error of supernaturalism, a second and no less fatal mistake has risen in our way. The prevalent passion of the age for physical science has brought the relation of Physiology to the problem of a Future Life altogether into the foreground of our attention, as if it formed the only important consideration; and of course on this side there was never any hope of a successful solution. Apologists of vivisection made it indeed their excuse that those modern Sworn Tormentors were "seeking the Religion of the Future" in the brains of tortured dogs; but no one, I presume, ever seriously expected any other result than that which we behold. No *ossiculum luz*, no "infrangible bone" such as the Rabbins averred was the germ of the resurrection-body, no "indestructible monad" such as Leibnitz dreamed, has come to light; and no "grey matter," or "hippocampus," or multiplied convolutions of the human brain, are found to afford the faintest suggestion of a life beyond mortality. The only verdict which can be wrung from Science is, that the cessation of all conscious being at death is "Not proven." She recognizes a mysterious somewhat termed "Life," whose nature she has yet failed to ascertain, and concerning whose possible changes she is therefore silent. And further, having proved that no force is ever destroyed, she admits that it is open to conjecture that the force of the human Will may have its "conservation" in some mode whereby conscious agency may indefinitely be prolonged. But beyond this point, Science refuses to say one word to encourage the hope of Immortality. She remains neutral even when she forbears to utter oracles of despair. Nay, rather is she no prophetess at all, but may better be likened to some gaunt sign-post beside the highway of life, pointing with one wooden arm to the desolate waste, and with the other to fair fields and fresh pastures, but giving no response to our cry of anguish, Whither have our beloved ones gone?

Nor will the analogies of Nature help us better than the physiological analysis of our own frames. The "fifty"—nay,

of Christendom has rested for eighteen centuries. Even with its blended note of human error, it is after all the reverberation of that earthquake which rent the hearts of those who watched on Calvary and tore the veil of mortality from their eyes, which has ever since echoed down the ages and still sounds in our ears.

rather the five thousand—seeds, of which “she scarcely brings but one to bear,” and the wrecks of the myriad forms of animal life which lie embedded in the rocks under our feet, reveal the lavishness of her waste. All the sweet old similes in which our forefathers found comfort—the reviving grain “sown in corruption and raised in power”—the crawling larva endued with wings as Psyche’s butterfly—fail, when seriously criticised, to afford any parallel with the hoped-for resurrection of the human soul. Nay, Nature seems constantly to mock us by reviving in preference her humblest products, and bringing up year after year to the sunshine of spring the clover and the crocus and the daisy, while manly strength and womanly beauty lie perishing beneath the flowers ; hid for ever in the hopeless ruin of the grave.

And, lastly, there are certain arguments which may be classed as Metaphysical, which were once generally relied on as affording demonstration of a future life. The value of these arguments, from Plato’s downwards,—that the idea of a dead soul is absurd ; that the soul being “simple” and “one” cannot be “dissolved ;” that being “immaterial” it cannot die, &c.,—is extremely difficult to estimate. It is possible they may point to great truths ; but it is manifest that they all hinge on certain assumptions concerning the nature of the soul and the supposed antithesis between mind and matter, which we are learning each day to regard with more distrust ; in fact, to treat as insoluble problems. In this direction also, then, it is not too much to conclude, we cannot hope to find a satisfactory answer to our inquiry.

When we have dismissed the expectation of obtaining the desired solution either from a supernatural revelation or from physics or metaphysics, where do we stand ? We are left to face, on one hand, a number of very heavy presumptions against the survival of consciousness after death ; and, on the other hand, the sole class of considerations which remain to be opposed to them.

The presumptions against survival are so plain and numerous, that none of us can fail to be impressed with their force. There is, first, the obvious fact that everything we have seen of a man perishes, to our certain knowledge, in his grave, and passes into other organic and inorganic forms. The assumption is, physiologically, baseless that

something—and that something his conscious self—lives elsewhere. And starting from this baseless assumption, we find no foothold for even a conjecture of *how* he is transferred to his new abode, *where* in the astronomical universe that abode can be, and *what* can be the conditions of existence and consciousness without a brain or a single one of our organs of the senses. The fact that injuries to the brain in this life are capable of clouding a man's mind and distorting his will in frenzy or idiotcy, presses severely against the assumption that the entire dissolution of that brain will leave intellect and volition perfect and free. Nor do even these enormous difficulties exhaust the obstacles in the way. If man be immortal, he must have become an immortal being at some point in his development after the first beginning of physical life. But to name even a plausible date for so stupendous a change in his destiny is utterly impossible; and the new theory of Evolution saddles us yet with another analogous difficulty, namely, to designate the links in the chain of generations between the Ascidian and the Sage, when the mortal creature gave birth to an heir of immortality.* It is almost impossible to over-

* For an extremely interesting and ingenious discussion of these scientific difficulties, see p. 200 of "New Theories and the Old Faith," quoted at the head of this article. Mr. Allanson Picton says: "Let us recal the suggestion that every creature existence is made up of two factors, viz. a definite portion of universal substance, and the arrangement of force, i. e. the body, which marks out and limits that substance. If physical science has established any doctrine at all, it is that nothing, whether it be substance or force, is ever annihilated. Neither of the factors, then, in animal existence can utterly perish. The forces which have defined its life return into nature's order, as the distributed type of the printer returns to the fount. But what of the substance which these forces isolated from the universe? . . . It is surely conceivable that, if the definition and isolation of creature individuality through bodily organization became sufficiently intense, it might survive the shock of death, and henceforward be sustained by more ethereal forces. Supposing such a speculation valid, then the whole development of animal creation might be regarded as a continued *nisus* to give permanence by definition to finite forms of universal substance. . . . Where there has been no individuality in mortal life, there can be no *individual* immortality. . . . Only where the isolation has grown defined enough to give a strong sense of detachment from nature may the creature life, still self-conscious, survive. The application of such speculation to the development theory will now be obvious. It is not necessary to suppose that the anthropoid predecessors of mankind were all annihilated up to a certain generation, and then suddenly bloomed into immortality. There is no more reason against conceiving various kinds or degrees of immortality, from complete absorption to beatific contemplation, than there is against the acknowledgment of various degrees in the definition of existence between the barnacle . . . and the man."

state the weight of these and other presumptions of a similar kind against the belief in a Life after Death. Let it be granted that they are as heavy as they could be without absolutely disproving the point in question and making the belief logically absurd. They render at all events the fact of immortality so *improbable*, that to restore the balance and make it probable an immense equiponderant consideration becomes indispensable.

Where is that counterweight to be found? What can we cast into the scale which shall outweigh these presumptions? Certainly nothing in the way of direct answers to them, nor of plausible hypotheses to explain how the conditions of future being may possibly be carried on. Confronted by the challenge to produce such hypotheses, we can but say, with one of the greatest men of science of the age, that "the further we advance in the path of science, the more the infinite possibilities of Nature are revealed to us;" and among those possibilities there must needs be the possibility of another life for man. Beyond this, we cannot proffer a word; and it must be some consideration altogether of another character which can afford anything like a positive reason for believing in immortality in opposition to the terrible array of presumptions on the other side. That consideration, so sorely needed, is, I believe, to be found—nay, is found already by the great mass of mankind—in FAITH,—faith in its true sense of Trust in Goodness and Justice and Fidelity and Love, and in all these things impersonated in the Lord of Life and Death. Not the Supernatural argument, nor yet the Physical, nor the Metaphysical, but the *Moral*, is the real counterpoise to all the difficulties in the way of belief in a life beyond the grave.

That this is the true ground of whatever confidence we can rationally entertain on the subject, is, I think, clear on very short reflection. It has been but partially recognized, indeed, that such is the case; and the teachers who have undertaken to demonstrate immortality on natural grounds, have very commonly presented their moral arguments as if they were purely inductive, and belonged to the same class of logical proofs as we have sought for in vain in physics and metaphysics. But their syllogisms, when carefully examined, will invariably be found to involve a

major term which is not a fact of knowledge, but only a dogma of faith. They conduct us half-way across the gulf by means of stepping-stones of facts and inductions, and then invite us to complete our transit by swimming. They open our cause in the court of the Intellect, and then move it for decision to the equity-chamber of the Heart. A few pages hence I shall hope to give this assertion full illustration. For the present it will be sufficient to remind the reader that the arguments usually drawn from the general consciousness of mankind, from the many injustices of the world, from the incompleteness of moral progress in this life, &c. &c., all involve, at the crucial point, the assumption that we possess some guarantee that mankind will *not* be deceived, that justice *will* triumph eventually, and that human progress is the concern of a Power whose purposes cannot fail. Were the faith which supplies such warrants to prove irresponsible to the call, the whole elaborate argument which preceded the appeal would be seen at once to fall to the ground. If, then, the strength of a chain must be measured by that of its most fragile link, it is clear that the value in sum-total of all such arguments, however multiplied or ingeniously stated, is neither more nor less than that which we may be disposed to assign to simple Faith. It is a value precisely tantamount to that of our moral and religious intuitions—to the value (as I hope presently to shew) of *all* such intuitions culminating in one point together. But beyond this, it is nothing.

This conclusion, however distasteful it may be to us, is one which eminently harmonizes with all we can learn respecting the method of the Divine tuition of souls. There is one kind of knowledge which the Creator has appointed shall be acquired by the busy Intellect, and which, when so acquired, is held in inalienable possession. There is another kind of knowledge which He gives to faithful and obedient hearts, and which even the truest of them hold on the precarious tenure of sustained faith and unrelaxing obedience. The future world assuredly belongs to this latter class of knowledge. It is, as one of the greatest of living teachers has said, "a part of our religion, not a branch of our geography." Why it is so, and why our passionate longings for more sense-satisfying information cannot be indulged,

we can even partially see; for we may perceive that it would instantaneously destroy the perspective of this life, and nullify the whole present system of moral tuition by earthly joys and chastisements. The mental chaos into which those persons obviously fall who in our day imagine that they have obtained tangible, audible and visible proofs of another life, supplies evidence of the ruinous results which would follow were any such corporeal access to the other world actually opened to mankind.

Let us then courageously face the conclusion which we seem to have reached. The key which must open the door of Hope beyond the grave will never be found by fumbling among the heterogeneous stores of the logical understanding. Like the one with which the Pilgrim unlocked the dungeon of Giant Despair's Castle, it is hidden in our own breasts—given to us long ago by the Lord of the Way.

This essay is not the place, even were I possessed of the needful ability, to determine the true "Grammar of Assent" as regards such Faith as is now in question. I must limit myself to addressing those readers who are prepared to concede that spiritual things are "spiritually discerned," and moral things morally; and that the human moral sense and religious sentiment are something more than untrustworthy delusions. To those who doubt all this, who believe in food and houses and railways and stocks and gravitation and electricity, but not in self-sacrificing Love or Justice or God, I can say nothing. The argument has been shewn to have no standpoint on any grounds they will admit. That they should disbelieve in immortality, is the perfectly logical outcome of their other disbeliefs. It would be entirely inconsequent and irrational for them to believe in it.

Assuming, then, that I address men and women who believe in God and Justice and Love, I proceed to endeavour to shew how—even should they stand appalled by the difficulties of belief in Immortality—they may yet oppose to those difficulties moral arguments so numerous and irrefragable, that the scale may well turn on the side of belief. I hope to shew that, by many different but converging lines, Faith uniformly points to a Life after Death, and that if we follow her guidance in any one direction implicitly, we are invariably led to the same conclusion. Nay, more: I think it may be demonstrated that we cannot stop short of this

culmination and afterwards retain intact our faith in anything beyond matters of sense and experience. Every idea we can form of Justice, Love, Duty, is truncated and imperfect if we deny them the extension of eternity; and as for our conception of God, I see not how any one who has realized the "riddle of the painful earth," can thenceforth call Him "good," unless he believe that the solution is yet to be given to that dark problem hereafter.

The following are some of the channels in which Faith flows towards Immortality.

I. There is one unendurable thought. It is, that Justice may fail to be done in time or in eternity. This thought makes the human soul writhe like a trampled worm. Other ideas are sad, even agonizing, but this one cannot be borne. No courage, no virtue, no unselfishness, will help us to bear it. The better we are, the more insufferable it is. To receive it into the soul is madness. On the other hand, every threat besides, however sorrowful or terrible, if it be but overshadowed by the sense, "It will be just," becomes endurable—nay, is followed by a sort of awful calm. Could we even feel certain that our guilt merited eternal perdition, then the doom of Hell would bring to us only dumb despair. Something greater than ourselves within us would say to the wailings of our self-pity, "Peace! be still." But let us only doubt that there is any Justice here or hereafter, let us think that Wrong and Tyranny may be finally triumphant, and Goodness and Heroism ultimately defeated, punished and derided, and lo! there surges up from the very depths of our souls a high and stern Remonstrance, an appeal which should make the hollow heavens resound with our indignation and our rebellion.

The religions of the world, well nigh in the proportion in which they deserve to be called religions and not mere dreams of awe and wonder, are the expressions of the universal human aspiration after Justice. Even the Buddhist creed (whose acceptance by the myriads of Eastern Asia for two millenniums gives the lie to so many of our theories, and seems to shew human nature different under another sky)—even this abnormal creed insists that Righteousness rules everywhere and for ever; even when it teaches there is no righteous Ruler on high, or "peradventure he sleepeth"

in the eternal slumber of Nirvana. The doctrine of "Karma,"—that every good and every evil action inexorably brings forth fruit of reward or fruit of punishment in this life or some other life to come,—is the confession of three hundred million souls, that if they can endure to live without God, they yet cannot live without Justice. Nay, it is more. It is evidence that human Reason can accept such a blank absurdity as the idea that the unintelligent elements may bring about moral order, sooner than the human Spirit can rest satisfied that such moral order is nowhere to be found. Gravitation and electricity may weigh self-sacrifice and purity in their balances, and the winds and waves may measure out the punishment of cruelty and falsehood ; but Virtue cannot be without reward, nor can the crimes which human tribunals fail to reach, escape retribution for ever.

The shapes which this desire of Justice assumes in the earlier stages of human thought are, of course, rude and materialistic in the extreme. Men cannot expect from Nemesis, or Karma, or Jehovah, higher justice than they have begun to apprehend as the law of their own dealings. But everywhere throughout mythology, history and poetry, we may trace the parallel lines of the moral growth of each nation, and the corresponding development of its belief that over and above human justice there is a Justice-working Power, personal or impersonal, controlling all events, and making war and plague and famine, the earthquake and the storm, the punishments of crime ; and health and victory, length of days, abundant wealth and numerous progeny, the rewards of virtue.

The obvious failure of the exhibition of any such overruling Justice in multitudes of instances, has commonly driven the bewildered observers to devise explanations more or less ingenious of each particular case, but rarely, if ever, to the much more logical course of abandoning the expectation of such Justice. Half the myths of the elder nations are nothing more than hypotheses invented to justify Providence and explain consistently with equity some striking inequality in the distribution of prosperity and adversity. As Negroes and Canaanites underwent more cruel oppressions than other races, their supposed progenitor Ham must have incurred some special curse. As women endure peculiar sufferings, and are, in early times, altogether enslaved

by men, so Eve must have merited the punishment of bringing forth children in sorrow, and being "ruled over" by her husband. As the cities of the Plain were overwhelmed by a terrific convulsion, so it was certain Sodom and Gomorrah were more wicked than Memphis or Thebes. In Grecian fable, the calamities which befel the house of Œdipus presupposed

"The ill-advised transgression of old Laius ;"

and even such trivial matters as the blackness of the crow and the chatter of the magpie might be traced to the punishment of a human offender transformed into the bird whose whole race thenceforward, like that of Adam, was destined to bear the penalty of "original sin."

Nor do the monuments of the graver thoughts of mankind bear less emphatic testimony than mythology to the universal desire to "see Justice done." Beginning with the Vedas and Genesis, Homer and Herodotus, we may trace the straining effort of every writer to "point a moral" of reward and punishment, even when the facts to be dealt with lent but faint colour to the lesson, that perfidious chiefs will always be defeated, and good kings crowned with victory and prosperity. The story of ruined cities is always told in the same spirit :

"They rose while all the depths of guilt their vain creators sounded ;

They fell because on fraud and force their corner-stones were founded."

In every age and nation, epics, dramas and popular legends, wherever they may be found, either directly aim to represent what we have significantly learned to name "Poetic Justice," or pay the idea still deeper homage by founding the tragedy of the piece on the failure of Justice. Never is the notion absent, either from the ethical poets, such as the author of "Job," Euripides, Dante or Milton, or from those who have followed the principle of Art for Art's sake—Æschylus, Shakespeare and Goethe. Each of us in the course of life exemplifies the cycle of human thought in the matter. In childhood we read History with impatient longing for the triumph of patriots and heroes and the overthrow of their oppressors, and we prefer ancient history to modern because it seems to offer a clearer field for the vindication

of ethical ideas. In youth we find delight in the romances which exhibit Virtue as crowned with success and wickedness defeated ; and it is invariably with a mingled sense of surprise and indignation that we fling down the first tale which leaves us at its conclusion with our legitimate anticipations of such a *dénouement* unsatisfied. To this hour the play-going public, which represents the youthful-mindedness of the community, refuses to sanction any picture of life wherein, ere the curtain falls, the hero is not vindicated from all aspersion and the villain punished and exposed. Only far on in life and in literary culture do we begin, with many misgivings, mournfully to recognize the superior verisimilitude of tales which depict Virtue as receiving no reward, and Guilt no punishment, in this world.

The question, "How mankind has come to possess this confidence in Nemesis?" will of course be answered differently according to our various theories of the origin of all moral sentiments. Dr. Johnson ascribes our passion for justice to the simple source of Fear lest we should personally suffer from injustice,—an hypothesis which would be highly satisfactory, provided, in the first place, we were all so good that we had everything to hope and nothing to dread from justice ; and, secondly, provided our interest in justice never extended backward in time and far off into distance, immeasurably beyond the circle of events in which we can ever have personal concern. The theory which would accord with the general neo-utilitarian doctrine now in fashion would be a little more philosophic than this. Our modern teachers would probably tell us that our expectation of justice is the result of the "set" of the human brain, fixed by experience through countless generations. As our sense of Duty is, on their showing, derived from the repeated observation of the utility of virtuous actions, so, on the same principle, our expectation of Justice must come from numberless observations of instances wherein justice has been illustriously manifested. It is, indeed, easier to see how the constant association of the ideas of guilt and punishment, virtue and reward, formed by such observations, should produce the expectation to see one always follow the other, than it is to understand how the observation of the Utility of Virtue should impress upon us the solemn categorical imperative, "Be virtuous." The expectation of

Justice might be merely an intellectual presumption of the same character as our anticipation of the recurrence of day and night, or any other phenomena associated in unbroken sequence. The sense of Duty is a practical spur to action, whose relation to its supposed origin of long-observed utility remains, when all is said, a "mystic extension" of that prosaic idea altogether unaccountable.

But there is unfortunately a difficulty in the way of availing ourselves of this easy solution of the origin of the universal expectation of Justice. It is hard to see how the "set of our brains" towards such expectation could have been formed by experience, considering that no generation seems to have been favoured by any such experience at all. To produce such a "set," it would (by the hypothesis) be necessary that the instances wherein Justice was plainly exhibited should be so common as to constitute the rule, and those in which it failed exceptions too rare to hinder the solid mass of conviction from settling in the given direction. Like a sand-bar formed by the action of the tides and currents, our "set of brain" can only come from uniform impressions, and were the angle of pressure to shift continually, it is clear it could take no permanent shape whatever. Now, does any one imagine that such uniform and perspicuous vindication of Justice in the course of events, has been witnessed by mankind at any age of the world's history? Is there anything like it impressed upon our own minds as we read day after day of public affairs, or reflect on the occurrences of private life? Are we accustomed to see well-meant actions always followed by reward, and evil ones infallibly productive of failure or disgrace? Even at the present stage of moral advance in public opinion and in righteous legislation, can we flatter ourselves that things are so arranged as to secure the unvarying triumph of probity, veracity, modesty, and all the other virtues, and the exemplary overthrow of fraud, impudence and selfishness? Suppose a cynic to hold the opposite thesis, and maintain that we are continually punished for our generosity and simplicity, and rewarded for cunning and hypocrisy, should we be able to overwhelm him with a mass of instances to the contrary, ready at a moment's notice in our memory? Can we imagine (as a single illustration of the subject) that the thousands of adul-

terating tradesmen and fraudulent merchants in England at this moment would pursue their evil courses so consistently, did daily experience really warn those sagacious persons that "Honesty is the best policy"? Of course, as we recede towards times when laws were far less just than they are now, and oppression and violence were far more common, the scene becomes darker and less hopeful. Looking back through the vista of the historic and pre-historic ages, the probability of finding a reign of Astræa when Right always triumphed over Might, becomes necessarily "fine by degrees and beautifully less," till we are driven to the conclusion, that, if we owe the set of our brains towards Justice to the experience of our ancestors, that "set" must have been given when Justice was rarely manifest at all, "and the earth was full of violence and cruel habitations." The share which the purely physical laws have had in punishing moral offences has doubtless been always what it is now, and that share, to all our knowledge, is extremely obscure. If health and longevity are the frequent accompaniment of one class of virtues, disease and death are equally often incurred by another; nor is there any sort of token that abundant harvests or blighted fields, prosperous voyages or tempest-driven wrecks, have any relation to the moral character of the mariner or the agriculturist; or that from the observation of such events for sixty centuries, a theory of morals could possibly have been evolved. Practically, it is obvious that men do not see wickedness and infer punishment, but rather when they see punishment they infer wickedness. A thousand tyrants had been more cruel than Herod, and yet had never been "smitten by God" with the portentous disease of which the Idumæan died. A hundred invaders before Xerxes had trampled on the necks of conquered nations, but no Nemesis had deserved a temple for rebuking their pride; no Hellespontine waves had risen in tempest to destroy their fleets.

It is not Experience, then, it never could be experience gained in such a world as ours, which has impressed on the brain of man its "set" towards the expectation of Justice, or inspired its string of accordant aphorisms, that "the wicked will come to a fearful end," that "murder will out," that "honesty is the best policy," and that "the righteous" man is never forsaken, nor his seed destined to

“beg their bread.” From some other source remote from experience we must have derived an impression which we persistently maintain, and endeavour to verify in defiance of ever-recurring failure and disappointment. What that source may be, it does not vitally concern the present argument to determine. Probably the expectation may most safely be treated as the imperfect intellectual expression of a great moral intuition, forming an ultimate fact of our moral constitution. All such deep but dim intuitions, when rendered into definite ideas, are necessarily imperfect and liable to error. We err both as to the time and the form in which they are to be fulfilled. We feel that Justice ought to be supreme; but when we translate that sentiment into an idea, we fondly picture the great scheme of the universe developed within the sphere of our vision. Like children possessed of a magnet, we imagine the pole to which it points may be found in the neighbouring field. Our magnet is true enough; but

“—— the far-off Divine Event

Towards which the whole creation moves,”

is beyond our horizon. And, similarly, we give to our spiritual intuitions materialistic forms which are far from rendering them veraciously. The concrete, the visible, the tangible, are inevitably the earliest expressions even of our highest sentiments. We feel the Majesty of God, and picture Him seated on a throne. We feel His Justice, and the myth of a Day of Judgment rises before us. In like manner, our intuitive expectation that virtue will be rewarded, clothes itself in all manner of carnal shapes of crowns and riches; and our expectation that vice will be punished, in similar shapes of pain and infamy. At a further stage of human thought, when the anticipation of physical reward and punishment in this life has been of necessity postponed to, or supplemented by, those of another world, we substitute the almost equally materialistic rewards of Elysium and Paradise, or penalties of Jehanum and Hell. It needs a long course of progress to get beyond such ideas, and learn to render spiritual sentiments spiritually, and moral ones morally only. It militates nothing against the veracity of the original profound intuition of Justice, that hitherto men have thus mis-translated it into the promise of a speedy settlement of the

Great Account in the gross earthly coin of physical good or evil, here, or hereafter. That intuition will doubtless be far more perfectly fulfilled in the grander scope of eternity, and by means of the transcendent joys and sorrows of the spiritual life. When we have advanced far enough to feel that all other good and evil are as nothing in comparison of these, it will be easy to see how the Supreme Justice may use those tremendous instruments in its ultimate dealings with merit and demerit ; and reward Virtue—not with the dross of earthly health or wealth, or of celestial crowns and harps—but with the only boon the true saint desires, even the sense of union with God ; and punish Vice—not with disease and disgrace, nor with the fire and worms of hell—but with the most awful of all penalties, the severance of the soul from Divine light and love. No one who has obtained even a glimmering of the meaning of these spiritual realities can hesitate to confess that his soul's most passionate craving after Justice may be superabundantly fulfilled in such ways—even in worlds not necessarily divided into distinct realms of reward and punishment, but where, as in another school and higher stage of being, our spiritual part shall have freer scope and leave the carnal in the shade.

We now proceed to the next step of the argument, which as yet makes no appeal beyond experience. We assume that mankind at large anticipates and desires that Justice may be done. *Is it done in this world?* We have seen that it is not outwardly or perspicuously vindicated,—is there, nevertheless, room left to suppose that it possibly may have been fulfilled in ways hidden from us, such as the satisfaction of a *mens conscia recti*, or the misery of secret remorse?

The answer to this question has been commonly evaded, or the question itself blinked, under what I conceive to be a most mistaken sense of reverence to God. Sometimes we are told it is not for us to say what is Justice ; and sometimes we are reminded how little we can guess the hidden joys and pangs of our fellow-creatures, and how easily these may counterbalance all external conditions. I do not think the case is so obscure as is alleged, and I am quite sure that reverence for God never requires us to close our eyes to facts. What is in question is not any abstract or *occulta Justitia*, but precisely *our idea of Justice*—that expectation

which, by some means or other, has been raised in the hearts of men from the beginning of history till now. Is *that* fulfilled, or room left for its fulfilment, in this world? I do not hesitate to affirm that it is not fulfilled—and that in thousands of cases there is no room left wherein it can possibly be fulfilled up to the hour of death. No retribution which could satisfy it has had space to be exhibited. The tyrant with his last breath has crowned the pyramid of his crimes and died with the smile of gratified cruelty on his lips. The martyr has expired in tortures of body and of mind. Nothing that can be imagined to have been experienced of remorse in the one soul, or of joy in the other, would rectify the balance.

Two classes of readers will demur to what I have to say on this topic. One will take the injustice of the world to be so notorious a fact as to need no elaborate proof, and will resent as superfluous any attempt to establish it. The other will be shocked by the naked statement, and may even contradict it with impatience. Let us clear up our position a little. What a well-developed sense of Justice requires for its satisfaction is, that no one being shall suffer more than he has deserved, or undergo the penalty of another's guilt. It is nothing to the satisfaction of such Justice that nine hundred and ninety-nine persons are treated with exactest equity, if the humblest and meanest bears sufferings disproportioned to his deserts; nor if the punishment which A has merited falls upon B, and the reward of the virtue of C be enjoyed by D. A single instance of positive injustice done to a single individual would suffice to decide the point. Justice is not fulfilled on earth if there has been one such case since creation.

Now will any one dispute that such cases have occurred, not singly, but by hundreds and thousands? Of course there are innumerable instances, seemingly of crying injustice, in which, could we see behind the scenes and know all the bearings of the matter, we should find no injustice at all. But there are also other instances in which, rationally speaking, it is certain there was injustice, and no further knowledge conceivable could alter our judgment. With all reverence I will endeavour to state one such case, about which there can be little obscurity.

Jesus Christ was assuredly one of the holiest of men.

He died in undeserved tortures, and at the supreme hour of his agony he cried out in despair, "My God, why hast thou forsaken me?" Instead of flooding his departing soul with the rapturous vision which might have neutralized all the horrors of the cross, it pleased the Father, whom he loved as no man had loved Him before, to withdraw all consciousness of His presence, and to leave him to expire in darkness and doubt. That ancient story, stripped of all its misleading supernaturalism, seems to me the sufficient evidence that God reserves His justice for eternity.

It is not only the crimes and merits of the death-hour to which Justice fails to mete due measure upon earth. Nothing is more obvious than that men are continually doomed to suffer for the evil-doing of others, and that the good which one has sown another reaps. Health and disease, honour and ignominy, wealth and poverty, everything we can name in the way of external good and evil, come to us more often by the virtue and vice of our parents and neighbours than by any merit or demerit of our own.

Again, the enormous inequality in the distribution of penalties for similar offences, leaves a huge mass of injustice which it is impossible to suppose is often providentially rectified in this life. For myself, I do not hesitate to say that the intolerable cruelty with which sins of unchastity in women are visited all over the world, in comparison of the immunity from disgrace enjoyed by profligate men, decides for me the question. Could we realize the reflections of many a poor wretch banished from her home for her first transgression, and driven on helplessly, scourged by hunger and infamy, deeper and deeper into ruin, till she lies wrecked in body and soul,—could we understand her feelings as she compares her lot with that of the man who first tempted her to sin, and whose fault has never stood in the way of his prosperity or reputation,—we should then learn somewhat of how the supposed Justice of the world appears from another side from that on which the happy behold it.

In a world where such things happen every day, is it possible to maintain that Providence trims the balance of Justice on this side the grave, or that the inner life's history, if revealed to us, would rectify any apparent outward inequality? The horror of such cases lies precisely

in this: that the hideously excessive punishment of the one sinner consists in the fact that she is forced helplessly into the deepest moral pollution; while the light penalty of the other leaves him life-long space for restoration to self-respect and virtue.

When we go back from our own age of comparative equity to darker times, or pass to the contemplation of the wrongs suffered in semi-barbarous countries, the impressions of injustice multiply and deepen. We think of the hundred thousand hapless creatures burnt to death for the impossible crime of witchcraft; the victims of bigotry or statecraft who have languished out their lives in the dungeons of the Inquisition, of the Bastille, of every castle which frowned over the plains of mediæval Europe; of the myriads who suffered by that huge mockery of justice, the question by torture; of the untold miseries of the slaves and serfs of classic and modern times; and, finally, of the crowning mystery of all, the woful sufferings of innocent little babes and harmless brutes;—and as these things pass before us, instead of doubting whether Justice sometimes fails, we begin to doubt whether all history be not the record of its failure, and, like Shelley, we are ready to talk of “this *wrong* world.”

What does Faith say now? Surely she stakes her whole authority on the assertion that there is another life where such failures of justice will be rectified? The moral argument for Immortality drawn from the consideration of its necessity to give ethical completion to the order of Providence, is quite irrefragable. Either moral arguments have no practical validity, or in this case, at all events, we may rely upon the conclusion to which they point. Man’s noblest and most disinterested passion—a passion which may well be deemed the supreme manifestation of the Divine element in his nature—will, if death be the end of existence, have proved a miserable delusion; while God Himself will prove to have created us, children of the dust, to love and hope for Justice; but Himself to disregard Justice on the scale of a disappointed world.

I have devoted so large a space to this particular line of considerations in favour of a Life after Death, because I conceive that it has hardly received all the attention it deserves, or been generally stated as broadly as is requisite to exhibit its enormous force. We are not unfrequently

reminded that our personal sense of Justice is unsatisfied in this world ; but it is rarely set forth that it is the sacred thirst of the whole human race for Justice which is defrauded if there be no world beyond. We are often exhorted to hope that the Lord of Conscience will not prove Himself less just towards us than He requires us mortals to be to one another. But we are not bidden resolutely and with filial confidence to say—the more boldly so much the more reverently—Either Man is Immortal or God is *not Just*.

II. Another line of thought leading to the same conclusion lies parallel with the above, but can here be only briefly indicated. Creation, as we behold it, presents a scene in which not only Justice fails to be completed, but no single purpose, such as we can attribute for a moment to a good and wise Creator, is thoroughly worked out or fulfilled. If we take the lowest hypothesis, and say He meant us merely to be happy—to have just such a preponderance of pleasure over pain as should make existence on the whole a boon and not a curse—then it is clear that there are multitudes with regard to whom His purpose fails ; as, for example, the poor babes who come into the world diseased, and who die after weeks or months of pain, without enjoyment of any kind. And if we take a more worthy view of the purpose of creation, and suppose that God has made us and placed us in this world of trial to attain the highest end of finite beings, namely, virtue and union with His own Divine spirit, then still more obviously, for thousands of men and women, this blessed purpose is abortive ; for their mortal life has ended in sin and utter alienation from God and goodness. If God be wise, He cannot have made his creatures for ends He knew they would never reach ; nor if He be good, can He have made them only for suffering, or only for sin. There is no escape from the conclusion to which Faith points unhesitatingly, namely, to a world wherein the beneficent designs of God will finally be carried out.

As the preceding argument appealed to the Justice of God, so this one hinges on His Goodness and His Wisdom. It is essentially a Theistic argument, as distinguished from the Pantheistic glorification of intellectual greatness. The Pantheist says that a philosopher ought to be immortal, for he is the crown of things. The Theist says that a tortured

slave, a degraded woman, *must* be immortal, for God's creature could not have been made for torture and pollution. To minds which have been wont to ponder on the theme of the meaning and purpose of creation, this ground of faith in Immortality is perhaps the most broadly satisfactory of any. Having once learned to think of God as the Almighty Guide who is leading every soul He has made to the joy of eternal union with Himself, it becomes simply impossible to lower that conception, and think of Him as content to "let him that is unjust be unjust still," and permit His rebellious child to perish for ever with a blasphemy on his lips.

III. Again, the incompleteness and imperfection of the noblest part of man, compared to the finished work which creation elsewhere presents, affords ground for the presumption that that noblest part has not yet reached the development it is intended to attain. The green leaf gives no promise of becoming anything but a leaf, and in due time it withers and drops to the ground without exciting in the beholder any sense of disappointment. But the flower-bud holds out a different prospect. If the canker-worm devour it ere it bloom into a rose, we are sensible of grievous failure; and a garden in which all the buds should so perish would be more hideous than any desert. The body of a man grows to its full stature and complete development; but no man has ever yet reached his loftiest mental stature, or the plenitude of moral strength and beauty of which he is capable. If the simile be just which compares the physical nature to a scaffolding, and the spiritual to the temple built up within it, then we behold the strange anomaly of a mere framework made so perfect that it could gain nothing were it preserved to the fabulous age of the patriarchs, while the temple within is never finished, and is often an unsightly heap. The "City of God" cannot be built of piles never to be completed, nor His Garden of Souls filled with flowers destined all to canker ere they bloom.

IV. Human love also urges on us an appeal to Faith which has probably been to millions of hearts the most conclusive of all. We are fond of quoting the assertion, that

"Tis better to have loved and lost
Than never to have loved at all."

But its truth may very much be questioned, unless we can trust that the "many waters" of the Dark River "cannot quench love," and that we shall surely rejoice still in that light of life upon the further shore. Intense love becomes torture if we believe it to be a transient joy, the "meteor gleam of a starless night," and fear that it must soon go out in unfathomable gloom. To think of the one whose innermost self is to us the world's chief treasure, the most beautiful and blessed thing God ever made, and believe that at any moment that mind and heart may cease to *be*, and become only a memory, every noble gift and grace extinct, and all the fond love for ourselves forgotten for ever,—this is such agony, that having once known it we should never dare again to open our hearts to affection, unless some ray of hope should dawn for us beyond the grave. Love would be the curse of mortality were it to bring always with it such unutterable pain of anxiety, and the knowledge that every hour which knitted our hearts more closely to our friend also brought us nearer to an eternal separation. Better never to have ascended to that high *Vita Nuova* where self-love is lost in another's weal, better to have lived like the cattle which browse and sleep while they wait the butcher's knife, than to endure such despair.

But is there nothing in us which refuses to believe all this nightmare of the final sundering of loving hearts? Love itself seems to announce itself as an eternal thing. It has such an element of infinity in its tenderness, that it never fails to seek for itself an expression beyond the limits of time, and we talk, even when we know not what we mean, of "undying affection," "immortal love." It is the only passion which in the nature of things we can carry with us into another world, and it is fit to be prolonged, intensified, glorified for ever. It is not so much a joy we *may* take with us, as the only joy which can make any world a heaven when the affections of earth shall be perfected in the supreme love of God. It is the sentiment which we share with God, and by which we live in Him and He in us. All its beautiful tenderness, its noble self-forgetfulness, its pure and ineffable delight, are the rays of God's Sun of Love reflected in our souls.

Is all this to end in two poor heaps of silent dust decay-

ing slowly in their coffins side by side in the vault? If so, let us have done with prating of any Faith in heaven or earth. We are mocked by a fiend. Mephistopheles is on the throne of the universe.

V. Another and very remarkable moral argument for Immortality was put forth some years ago by Mr. Newman, and has never (to my knowledge) attracted the attention it deserves. It cannot be stated more succinctly than in his own volume of "Theism" (p. 75). After describing our pain at the loss of a friend, he continues :

"But if Virtue grieve thus for lost virtue justly,
 How then must God, the Fountain of Virtue, feel?
 If our highest feelings, and the feelings of all the holy,
 Guide rightly to the Divine heart, then it would grieve likewise,
 And grieve eternally, if Goodness perish eternally.
 Nay, and as a man who should live ten thousand years,
 Sustained miraculously amid perishing generations,
 Would sorrow perpetually in the perpetual loss of friends,
 Even so, some might judge the Divine heart likewise
 Would stint its affections towards the creatures of a day. . . .
 Would it not be a yawning gulf of ever-increasing sorrow
 Losing every loved one, just when virtue was ripening,
 And foreseeing perpetual loss, friend after friend, for ever,
 So that all training perishes and has to be begun anew,
 Winning new souls to virtue, to be lost as soon as won?
 If then we must not doubt that the Highest has deep love for
 the holy,
 Such love as man has for man in pure and sacred friendship,
 We seem justly to infer that those whom God loves are death-
 less ;
 Else would the Divine blessedness be imperfect and impaired.
 Nor avails it to reply by resting on God's infinitude,
 Which easily supports sorrows which would weigh us down ;
 For if to promote Virtue be the highest end with the Creator,
 Then to lose His own work, not casually and by exception,
 But necessarily and always, agrees not with his Infinitude
 More than with his Wisdom, nor more than with his Blessed-
 ness.
 In short, close friendship between the Eternal and the Perish-
 ing
 Appears unseemly to the nature of the Eternal,
 Whom it befits to keep his beloved, or not to love at all.
 But to say God loveth no man, is to make religion vain ;
 Hence it is judged that 'whatsoever God loveth, liveth with
 God.'"

In the five ways now specified, the moral arguments drawn from the phenomena of human life and sentiment, and from all that we may conjecture of the Divine purposes, lead up indirectly to the conclusion that there must be another act of the drama after that on which the curtain falls at death.

There remain some other lines of thought converging towards the same end which cannot now be followed out; as, for example, the ennobling influence of the belief in Immortality; which Faith refuses to trace to a delusion. Space only can be reserved to touch briefly on the two forms in which mankind possesses something like a *direct* consciousness of a Life after Death, and in which Faith therefore speaks immediately and without any preliminary argument. These two forms are: 1st, the general dim consciousness of the mass of mankind that the soul of a man never dies; 2nd, the specific vivid consciousness of devout men that their spiritual union with God is eternal.

VI. The first of these forms of direct faith is too familiar a topic to need much elucidation. The extreme variability of its manifestations in nations and individuals makes it difficult to estimate its just value, and to decide whether we have a right to treat it as a mere tradition, or as the *quasi*-universal testimony of the soul to its own natural superiority to death. It may be remarked, however, that the belief, when examined carefully (e.g. as in Alger's admirable History of the Doctrine of a Future Life), bears very much the characteristics we should attribute to a real and spontaneous instinct, and not to any common tradition,—such as that of a Deluge,—disseminated by the various branches of the human family in their migrations. The belief begins early, though probably not in the very earliest stage of human development. It attains its maximum among the highest races of mankind in the great primary forms of civilization (e.g. the Egyptian, Vedic-Aryan and Persian). It projects such various, and even contrasted ideals of the future world (e.g. Valhalla and Nirvana), that it must be supposed to have sprung up indigenously in each race, and by no means to have been borrowed by one from the other. Finally, the instinct begins to falter at a later stage of civilization, when self-consciousness is more developed, and the practice of arguing about our beliefs takes the place of more simple habits of mind,—a stage which we may perhaps

exactly mark in Roman history when, as Cicero tells us (*De Naturâ Deorum*), "there were some in his day who had begun to doubt of Immortality." All these characters would certainly form "notes" of an original instinct in the human soul testifying to its own undyingness, and are not easily accounted for on any other hypothesis.

It will be observed that this Consciousness of Immortality, and the Expectation of Justice, spoken of above, are entirely distinct things. Though confluent at last, they have remote sources. It is at a comparatively late stage of history that the Expectation of Justice projects itself beyond the horizon of this world, and at an equally late one when the Consciousness of Immortality crystallizes into a definite idea of a state of Rewards and Punishments.

Direct reliance on this Consciousness of Immortality, when it happens to be strongly developed in the individual, is probably the origin of that robust faith which we still find, not rarely, among persons of warm and simple natures. Those amongst us who lack such vivid instinct may yet obtain, indirectly, a ground of confidence from the observation of its almost universal prevalence, implying its Divine origin and consequent veracity. That the Creator of the human race should have so formed our mental constitution as that such a belief should have sprung up and prevailed over the whole globe, and yet that it should be from first to last a mistake, is an hypothesis which Faith cannot endure. The God of Truth will have deceived the human race if the soul of a man dies with his body.

VII. Lastly: the most perfect and direct faith in Immortality is assuredly that which is vouchsafed to the happy souls who personally feel that they have entered into a relation with God which can never end. It is hard to speak on this sacred theme without appearing to some irreverent, to others fanatical. I can but say that there are men and women who have given their testimony in this matter whom I think we do well to trust, even as prophets who have stood on Pisgah. "Faith in God and in our eternal union with Him," said one of them, "are not two dogmas of our creed, but one." That inner experience which is the living knowledge of the one truth, brings home also the other. At a certain stage of religious progress, we cannot doubt that the man learns by direct perception that God loves him,

and that he is "in God and God in him," in a sense which conveys the warrant of eternal life. As humbler souls find their last word of faith to be that of Marcus Aurelius, "Thou wilt do well for me and for the world,"—such a man has the loftier right to say with assurance: "Thou wilt guide me by Thy counsel and afterwards receive me to glory. Thou wilt not leave my soul in hell, nor suffer Thine holy one to see corruption."

Perhaps the knowledge of his immortality has come to the saint in some supreme hour of adoring happiness. Perhaps it has come when the clouds of death seemed to close round him, and, instead of darkness, lo! there was a great light, and a sense of life flowing fresh and strong against the ebbing tide of mortality, a life which was the same as love, the same as infinite joy and trust. It matters not whence or how it came. Thenceforth there is for him no more doubt. The next life is as sure as the present, and God is shining over all.

Such, for a few blessed souls, seems to be the perfect "evidence of things not seen." But can their full faith supply our lack? Can we see with their eyes and believe on their report? It is only possible in a very inferior measure. Yet if our own spiritual life have received even some faint gleams of the "light which never came from sun or star," then, once more, will our faith point the way to Immortality; for we shall know in what manner such truths come to the soul, and be able to trust that what is dawn to us may be sunrise to those who have journeyed nearer to the East than we; who have surmounted Duty more perfectly, or passed through rivers of affliction into which our feet have never dipped. God cannot have deluded them in their sacred hope of His eternal love. If their experience be a dream, all prayer and all communion may likewise be dreams. In so far as we have faith in such prayer and communion, we can believe in the high experience of the saints, and so in the immortal life to which it witnesses.

FRANCES POWER COBBE.

VII.—THE GENERAL SYNOD OF THE REFORMED CHURCH OF FRANCE.

I.

ABOUT 1560, if we may believe the historians, France reckoned among her population a third of Protestants, and these Protestants were the choice portion of the nation: the burgesses of the towns, half of the nobility, three-fourths of the educated and learned. Religious wars and persecutions, at a later period the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, and the large emigration which it provoked, diminished to an enormous extent the number of French Protestants. Some years ago, they were more than one million in a population of thirty-eight millions. Now that Alsace and a portion of Lorraine, where a numerous Lutheran population had gathered, have been violently torn from their mother-country, there do not remain in France more than from 750,000 to 800,000 Protestants, of whom 70,000 to 80,000 are Lutherans, and the rest of the Reformed Church. On the other hand, it may be said that they continue to form a picked section of the nation, and this from the double point of view of intellectual and of moral development; while in physical well-being and in resources they are above the average. They are, however, too few in numbers for the questions which divide them, or the domestic history of their churches, greatly to arrest public attention. Meanwhile the present year has been marked, as regards French Protestantism, by a circumstance sufficiently striking to arouse the attention of the whole nation, and to induce journals of all shades of opinion, Republican and Monarchist, Catholic and Freethinking, to take account of it. Paris has seen the assembling of a General Synod of the Reformed Church; and if the fact has been of sufficient importance to engage even Catholic attention, it has for stronger reasons created a lively excitement among Protestants—and this with justice; for the meeting of this Synod will probably lead to results of great consequence to the Reformed Church.

II.

The ancient Reformed Church of France was for a century governed by national Synods which met more or less regu-

larly from 1559 to 1659, in which year the last of them, assembled at Loudun, received notice from Louis XIV. that the *Great King* would no longer allow similar meetings. Since then, the Reformed Church,—scattered and nearly destroyed by persecution, reconstituted *in the wilderness* by Antoine Court, reinstated by Louis XVI., and, above all, by the Constituent Assembly of '89, in possession of liberty of conscience and worship, united finally to the State by Napoleon I., who without consulting its wants and wishes gave it a new organization,—has never had an official representation. An officious attempt at a Synod, made in 1848, met with no success, and the Synod of 1872 is the first since 1659 which has assembled with the sanction of the State. In some respects, therefore, the convocation of this Synod was an act of reparation and of justice; although the decree of November 29, 1871, by which the President of the Republic directed its assembling, is far from having been received with joy by all French Protestants. A great number of the Consistories, and some of those of most importance, Nismes, Lyons, Havre, and others, put forth lively protests; some others shewed a great unwillingness to be represented at the Synod;—a fact strange at first view, but one which an attentive study of the question easily makes intelligible.

In the first place, it must not be thought that the French Government, in convoking the Synod, has to the smallest extent given up the authority which, according to the strict letter of the law, it exercises over the Reformed Church. It has kept for itself the last word. None of the decisions of the Synod are valid so long as they have not received the sanction of the civil power; none of them have been, or will be, put into practice, so long as the Government, that is to say, the National Assembly, the President of the Republic, the Council of State, each in its own department, shall withhold their approval. It is, then, a manifest exaggeration to represent the convocation of the Synod as equivalent to a revolution which was to place in the hands of the representatives of the Church the power formerly exercised by the State. In law, as in fact, it has been nothing of the sort; the State has been willing to consult the Church, but in no degree and in no fashion has renounced its power.

In the second place, the convocation of the Synod was the work of one of the two parties which divide the Church, and from this very fact was naturally displeasing to the other.

Napoleon I., in 1802, imposed on the Reformed Church, which made the mistake of accepting it in silence, an organization essentially arbitrary and aristocratic, placing it entirely under the hands of the civil authority. To cite only one feature : no change in doctrine was possible except with the consent of the State. Such a stipulation was worthy of the Cæsar who, some years later, caused to be prepared under his own inspection a catechism which was intended to prescribe the religious teaching of his Catholic subjects ! But manners are stronger than laws, and the officers of the administration of public worship would have covered themselves with ineffaceable ridicule if they had seriously meant to meddle with the dogmatic beliefs of the Protestants. It may be said that they never tried it. On the other hand, the law of 1802 had constituted no dogmatic authority in the Church except the *Particular Synods* (*Synodes particuliers*), which were to be formed of delegates from bodies of five Consistories. These Synods have never met. Lastly, the old confession of faith of La Rochelle was already, in 1802, almost entirely abandoned ; no one then signed it ; no one has signed it since ; so that, in fact, from 1802 to 1872, the Reformed Church of France has had neither confession of faith nor any dogmatic authority whatsoever. People, elders and pastors, have enjoyed absolute liberty of belief ; no catechism for the religious instruction of the young has been compulsory ; no creed has been imposed in the ordination of new pastors. The Church has not the less prospered on this account ; but there have resulted from it very great differences of opinion, and, in the last resort, the formation among French Protestants of two great parties, the one wishful to preserve what remains of the doctrines of the past, even if possible to give them new life,—the other, with all its might calling for progress, looking forwards and not backwards, open to all the innovations and ready to accept the discoveries of modern theology ; the first drawing its inspirations in England from among the Evangelicals ; the second in Germany from among theologians of the advanced school. It has become an established custom to call the first party by the name Orthodox, the second by that of

Liberal ; and although these designations, at any rate the former, may be inexact, they are too deeply rooted in common language for it to be possible to change them.

The quarrel between these two parties, which was already lively under Louis Philippe, became still more eager under the second Empire, when a decree of 1852 conferred on the laity, under conditions, however, sufficiently stringent, the right of nominating the lay members of the consistories, who from 1802 had nominated themselves, or had themselves made up their numbers at each vacancy.

For a long time the orthodox party have demanded the assembling of a General Synod, and this for the avowed end of putting limits to the complete liberty which the Church enjoyed, but which this party called licence and disorder, and of placing a bar to the progress of a liberal theology which it treated as negative in its character. The liberals could not look favourably on such designs, and, without at first declaring themselves opposed to Synods, they had on various occasions, by the voice of numerous consistories, expressed the opinion that the re-establishment of the Synodal system ought to be postponed to calmer times. The Government of the Empire, assailed by contradictory demands, had maintained the *status quo*, and no one believed in the early convocation of a General Synod, when all at once the decree of the 29th of November last, taking the whole Church by surprise, ordered the assembly to take place.

It is no secret that this decree was obtained from the actual Minister of Worship, M. Jules Simon, at the pressing instance of the leaders of the orthodox party, and of M. Guizot in particular ; nor is it more of a secret that M. Thiers hesitated long before signing the decree. He has himself declared this to the members of the Consistory of Paris who went to thank him for it ; he did not conceal from them his repugnance to ecclesiastical assemblies, which generally only do mischief—for example, as he observed, the last Council of the Vatican ; and a little later, on receiving a deputation from the Consistory of Nismes, he added that in a manner the decree had been forced on him.

The circumstances, therefore, under which the Synod was convoked justified the distrust of the liberal Protestants.

The mode of nomination of members of the Synod, as it had been determined by the decree of November 29, equally justified it.

In order to fix the number of members of the Synod, the decree takes as a basis the number of pastors in office, and not the number of the population; so many members are to be nominated for so many pastors, not for so many of the laity. But this arrangement is altogether to the advantage of the orthodox party. The mass of liberal Protestants is to be found to the south of the Loire, in Poitou, Saintonge, Languedoc, les Cevennes, Vivarais, Dauphiné, among the descendants of the Camisards; there the Protestant population forms compact groups, and each pastor counts, on an average, 1000 to 1500 people under his care. The mass of the orthodox is to the north of the Loire, where the churches are relatively later in date and the Protestant population very scattered, so that the average number of parishioners does not exceed 600 to 800 for each pastor. To reckon the number of the members of the Synod by that of the pastors, is to secure to the scattered orthodox of the North a representation relatively more numerous than that which the less scattered liberals of the South would have. In this way a majority in the Synod was secured to the orthodox, while, if the numbers of the laity alone were examined, the two opinions might balance one another, if indeed the liberals would not have the advantage.

To this first and very serious reproach against the decree of November 29, another has to be added. Each parish of the Reformed Church of France is administered by a Presbyteral Council formed of the pastor, or pastors, and a certain number of laymen, elders, elected for six years by the parishioners. Several parishes together form a District governed by a Consistory, the members of which, in part at least, are nominated by the Presbyteral Councils. The decree orders to be nominated by these consistories certain bodies which it marks by the name Particular Synods, but which in reality are small electoral colleges, each one composed of five pastors and five laymen; and these colleges, to the number of twenty-one, have been charged with the duty of choosing the 108 members of the General Synod. It is, therefore, an election at the fourth degree,—one which,

from that very fact, could not result in a very faithful representation of the Church.

This vicious mode of nomination has produced very singular results. In several of the 21 synodal districts there have been found one or two liberal consistories associated with four or three orthodox consistories, or one or two orthodox consistories with four or three liberal ones, and in these cases the minority has not been able to obtain any representative at the General Synod. Some of the most important churches of France, Marseilles, Lyons, St. Etienne, Nancy, Havre, have thus been deprived of all representation. In all, out of 103 consistories, there have been 27 unrepresented, comprising nearly 160,000 Protestants ; and in these numbers the liberals stand for two-thirds, the orthodox for one-third only.

Thus the decree of November 29, in determining the number of the members of the Synod by the number of pastors, and in fixing the limits of the 21 synodal districts, secured a majority to the orthodox. Before any nomination, by a simple examination of the synodal districts, it might be known in advance that the Synod would reckon, out of 108 members, 46 or 48 liberals, and 60 or 62 orthodox ; while the modification of two or three of the districts would have been sufficient to change this result, take away from the orthodox their majority, and give a majority of some votes to the liberals. In fixing them as it had done, the Government determined in advance what was to be the dominant spirit of the future assembly ; and without, perhaps, taking due account of the matter, lent the support of its authority to one of the parties before it.

We can understand now the distrust of the liberals, and the protests with which they received the decree of November 29. Some of them entertained for a moment the thought that it would be best to refuse to take any part in the Synod. But after mature consideration, it was resolved that the liberal party should accept the conflict to which they were invited ; and when the Synod was opened on the 6th of June in the Temple du Saint-Esprit, no one had failed to answer the summons ; all the districts had chosen their delegates. On the 10th of July, the session was brought to a close ; two great debates had almost entirely

occupied it, and it is of these discussions that we are going to attempt some account, meanwhile begging the reader's pardon for these long, but indispensable, preliminaries.*

III.

Is the Reformed Church of France, which has no Confession of Faith, to establish one? This is the chief question on which the discussions of the Synod have borne. No one thought of putting on one side the dogmatic questions which in France for so many years have actively engaged every mind. Only the liberals asked that each of the fractions of the assembly should limit itself to setting forth its beliefs in a manifesto, to be submitted to the free judgment of the laity; and it is this purpose which on their side they have adhered to. As may readily be supposed, the assembly was not divided into two parties only, the liberals and the orthodox, the left and the right; each of these parties itself included various shades of opinion. It was possible, without much trouble, to distinguish among the orthodox, the extreme right, the pure orthodox; then the bulk of the party; and lastly, a right centre, much more moderate in its orthodoxy, less numerous, but a section which had sometimes the rare courage to vote with the left. Among the liberals only two sections were to be discerned: the left properly so called, counting 30 to 32 votes, and a small group, a little less advanced, the left centre, which counted at most 14 votes. Each of these two groups resolved to present its own manifesto. That of the left is as follows:

“Summoned to represent at the General Synod a large number of our brethren, we owe it to them to declare in this assembly what we desire and what we are.

* Under the necessity of abridgment, we pass over in silence some discussions of less importance—for example, a debate which was raised at the time of the verification of representatives' powers. We shall say a word presently about a long discussion on the question of the constitution and powers (*attributions*) of the Assembly. We will only remark that the Synod chose for its President, or Moderator, M. le Pasteur Bastie, of Bergerac; for Vice-presidents, M. Louis Vernes (pastor) of Paris, and M. de Clausonne (layman) of Nismes; for Secretaries, MM. P. Gaufrès, Vesson, and Borel, pastors, and MM. de Marichard, de Cazenove, and Chatonet, laymen. MM. de Clausonne, de Marichard, and Borel, represented on the Committee the liberal element.

“We belong to the liberal party of the Reformed Church of France.

“Faithful to its principles, we make use of the liberty, common to all its children, of being Christians according to our inward persuasions, under our own sole responsibility. The faith which joins us to God, being the supreme good, the rule of our life and of our resolutions, can rest only on God. No human will, individual or collective, can have dominion over our consciences, or dictate to us the duties or the thoughts for which we alone have to answer.

“In handing down to us the inheritance of this liberty, our great Reformers have taught us to seek in the Holy Scriptures the pure knowledge of the Gospel. Nowhere, indeed, does God speak to man a language more distinct, more majestic, or more sweet ; nowhere do we learn to know men of faith and devotion like the prophets of Israel, or the Apostles of Jesus Christ ; nowhere appears more brilliantly the image of that first Christian society, the members of which, filled with the spirit of Christ, formed but one heart and one soul ; nowhere, finally, with such lustre and holiness does that Son of Man reveal himself, whom the voice of all his disciples has proclaimed Son of God and Saviour of souls.

“But it is not for us only that the light of the Gospel shines ; it is for all the brethren with whom God has surrounded us. We owe to them, and wish to give to them, in conformity with our best traditions, the example of an austere piety, of moral energy, of the domestic virtues, of devotion to the good of all, and of zeal for moral progress, such as is derived from Christianity and leads us back thither ; an obligation all the more sacred that the misfortunes of our country ask at this moment every effort and every sacrifice.

“To render this devotion more efficacious, and to preserve the spirit of union so often invoked by our fathers, we desire to continue to form but one religious society with our brethren of the Reformed faith, and, if it be possible, with those of the Confession of Augsburg whom our disasters have left on this side of the frontier. Enough of divisions and schisms have afflicted the Church, which ought be one flock under the leading of one Shepherd. But Protestant union does not exclude differences, even serious ones, between brethren or groups of brethren ; and, in fact, such differences exist among us. Nevertheless, there is no fear lest they should compromise the unity of a Church, where the same road conducts believers to the same truth ; where, under favour of the same liberty, they all draw from the same

source of light, the Bible, find there the same Master, Jesus Christ, the same Father, God, who calls them to the same hope, life eternal, and to the same vocation, deliverance from sin, the perfecting of charity and justice.

“Ad. Bosc, A. Carenou, L. Causse, J. J. Clamageran, T. Colani, Ath. Coquerel fils, Et. Coquerel, F. Corbière, G. de Costelongue, Denfert-Rochereau, E. Fontanès, P. Gaches, E. Gachon, A. Gardies, M. J. Gaufrès, T. Gibaud, A. Grotz, A. Lombard, P. de Magnin, A. Ollier de Marichard, A. Maroger, Martin-Paschoud, E. Paris, F. Pécaut, L. Pinchinat, A. Pintard, G. Planchon, B. Rives, J. Steeg, A. Viguié.”

Next follows the manifesto of the left centre.

“As members of the Christian Reformed Church of France, and delegates to the General Synod, we feel the need of giving account to our colleagues and to our co-religionists concerning our principles of faith and liberty.

“We are members of the church built upon the only foundation which can be laid, Jesus Christ (1 Cor. iii. 11); and we say, as Simon Peter, to Jesus, *Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God* (Matt. xvi. 16); we give thanks to God because *He so loved the world that he gave his only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life* (John iii. 16).

“We have drawn this faith directly from the Gospel, and we wish, in accordance with the direction of our Lord, to *search the Scriptures, which testify to us of him* (John v. 39). It is a natural and sacred right; it is the method which our illustrious Reformers have taught us.

“In virtue of this principle and this rule, we wish, in conformity with the precept of the Apostle, to seek after justice, faith, charity and peace, with those who call upon the Lord out of a pure heart; we desire, in particular, to form only one religious society with our brethren of the Reformed faith, and, if it be possible, with those of the Confession of Augsburg whom our disasters have left on this side of the frontier.

“We are ready to co-operate in the Synod in every measure which can be proposed for the true welfare of the Church; but we explicitly repudiate every thought of schism. Our line of conduct is that which St. Paul traces for us: *I beseech you to conduct yourselves in a manner worthy of your calling, in all manner of humility and sweetness, with a patient spirit; bearing*

with one another; taking care to preserve the unity of the spirit by the bond of peace (Eph. iv. 1—3).

“Ph. Corbière, Camille Lamarche, Camille Rabaud, Ed. Sayons, Gache, Cambon, J. Larnac, A. L. Montaudon, G. de Clausonne, Auguste Maroger, Rivet, Borel, Pelon, Jalabert, Alfred Gardies, Ath. Coquerel fils, E. Gachon, Viguié, J. Martin-Paschoud.”

The two declarations which we have just read sufficiently characterize the two groups of members who signed them. They have in common a great concern for liberty of conscience, for the right of Protestants to differ on matters of dogma; they agree in looking upon the Gospel less as an assemblage of doctrines than as a principle of the higher moral and religious life; they are inspired by the spirit which dictated to Jesus the Sermon on the Mount, far more than with that which animated the Reformed Confessions of Faith. They differ only by shades of thought and feeling, the one insisting more upon the personal union of the Christian with God Himself, the other upon the part which the person of Jesus plays in the religious life of the believer. Both are given as the rapid and concise, but spontaneous, expression of the faith of the subscribers; neither of them aspires to become the doctrinal rule of the Church, a function for which they would both be unfit; but they well express that which Christianity is in our days to a fair half of French Protestants; and this will be their title to remembrance.

The orthodox party looked at matters in a quite different light. Animated with the desire of placing a bar to the progress of liberal ideas, it wished to endow the Church with a genuine confession of faith, destined to serve as a dogmatic test. For this purpose, it was not content with expressing its own convictions; it advanced the pretension to sum up the faith of the whole Church. But union was far from prevailing among the members of the party. The doctrines of the extreme right keep close to strict orthodoxy; those of the right centre approach nearly to those of the left centre; and between the two, all intermediate shades of belief are to be met with; so that the members of the party, it is said, had much difficulty in coming to an agreement. After long debates, they succeeded in producing a short formulary, which was proposed by M. le Professeur

Bois, of the Faculty of Theology at Montauban. The text is as follows :

"At the moment of resuming the succession of its Synods, interrupted for so many years, the Reformed Church of France feels the need, before all things, of rendering thanks to God, and of testifying its love to Jesus Christ, its divine Head, who has sustained and consoled it throughout its trials.

"It declares that it remains faithful to the principles of faith and liberty on which it is founded. With its fathers and martyrs in the Confession of La Rochelle, with all the churches of the Reformation in their various symbols of faith, it proclaims :

"The sovereign authority of the Holy Scriptures in matters of faith ;

"And salvation by Jesus Christ, only Son of God, who died for our offences, and rose again for our justification.

"It preserves therefore, and it maintains, as the ground of its teaching, of its worship, of its discipline, the great Christian facts, represented in its sacraments, celebrated in its religious rites, and expressed in its liturgies, especially in the Confession of Sin, in the Apostles' Creed, and in the service of the Holy Supper."

It is seen that this document in no respect resembles the two preceding. Its authors have repeated to weariness that it did not claim to express the whole Christian faith (a point in which it is distinguished to its disadvantage from the old confessions of faith), but only the minimum of faith,—that which is indispensable to be believed in order to be considered as Christian and Protestant. To this it has very justly been answered, that this *minimum* was also a *maximum*, the maximum of belief on which the party had succeeded in coming to an agreement.

The liberals also had made no pretence of condensing the whole Christian faith into a few lines ; but they had said what was in their eyes essential, and had not limited themselves to giving a minimum.

The confession of faith proposed by M. Bois resolves itself, when closely examined, into a single dogma, that of the Supernatural,—the idea that the Deity has thought fit at certain epochs to suspend, or to violate, the laws which in His wisdom He had imposed on the universe ; that He has conferred on certain men, or on certain writings forming the Bible, a special inspiration ; that He has worked

miracles. At least, this dogma is the only one that comes clearly out of the terms employed. To proclaim salvation by faith in Jesus, without saying in what salvation consists, and what is the faith that saves ; to declare that the Church maintains the great Christian facts, without enumerating those facts, and without even shewing whether are meant the historical facts recounted in the Gospels, or the moral facts, sanctification, regeneration, &c. ; this is to use expressions so vague as to suit liberalism and orthodoxy equally well, and to afford a basis for dogmatic systems of the most opposite kind.* On the contrary, the faith in the Supernatural, in Miracle, is clearly expressed in the assertion of the sovereign authority of the Holy Scriptures, and, above all, of the Resurrection of Jesus Christ. The Supernatural is, then, the only dogma on which the representatives of orthodoxy have succeeded in putting themselves into agreement ; on all other questions, they have not been able, as it appears, to come to an understanding. It may doubtless be said that the acceptance of this dogma draws with it, as a legitimate consequence, the adoption of orthodox opinions ; but the fact remains, that these opinions have not been formulated by the members of the Synod ; and it is quite evident that many systems, many very different Orthodoxies, could be built up on this single foundation.

The confession of faith of the right is, moreover, more remarkable for what is not, than for what is, to be found in it.

The old Calvinism of the ancient Reformed Church of France rested completely upon the dogma of Predestination, so clearly laid down in the Confession of Faith of La Rochelle (Art. xii.). The authors of the new confession of faith have tried hard to connect themselves with the past by affirming

* The ambiguity here is in some respects intentional. The orthodox party, for strategic reasons, makes a great point of maintaining the Creed falsely called the *Apostles'* ; but the majority of the orthodox no longer believe either in the descent into hell, or in the resurrection of the flesh ; so much so that, in the Particular Synod of Bordeaux, it was proposed by a very orthodox member to "revise the Apostles' Creed"! The Confession of Faith turns the flank of the difficulty by presenting the Creed as a summary of the great Christian facts. There is a mental reservation that the descent into hell and the resurrection of the flesh are not "Christian facts," and consequently that no one is bound to believe in them. In this manner the Creed is preserved that it may furnish a weapon against those who reject the supernatural,—the miraculous birth, &c.

their respect for the document of La Rochelle ; but at the same time they reject it, by entirely abandoning the capital dogma of the old Calvinism.

The orthodoxy, less logical, less complete, more modern, which in England marks the *Evangelicals*, and in France what has been called the *Revival*, the orthodoxy of such men as Gaussen, Malan, Bost, Adolphe and Frédéric Monod, has been treated but little less ill. It held the Atonement as its central dogma. The blood of Christ washing away the sins of man furnished the constant theme of its most eloquent preachings. But the confession of faith of the right says nothing about the Atonement. If it does not deny, still it does not affirm it. It quotes, it is true, this passage from St. Paul : " Jesus who died for our offences, and rose again for our justification," and in this it is possible to see the Atonement, but it is possible to see there also something quite different ; while it is known that of this famous and obscure text exist a hundred different interpretations. The authors of the confession of faith have not cared to point out which interpretation they adopt. Other dogmas, not less important, are equally passed over in silence. Not a word about eternal torments ; not a word about the Holy Spirit ; not a word about the Trinity, which many of the French orthodox of our time reject. Just as little about the deity of Jesus Christ ; they give to Jesus the title of " Only Son of God," but they do not care to say that he is God. This omission is one of the most significant. The French Catholics have for the most part no religious faith ; but they have preserved a vague remembrance of the catechism which their Curé made them learn when they were children. They know that for the Church, the Host, which is the body of Jesus, is God and is to be adored ; when the priest carries the viaticum to a sick person, it is for them, " le bon Dieu qui passe." In a word, the deity of Jesus Christ is in their eyes the fundamental dogma of Christianity, or rather Jesus is the God of the Christians. Thus every day the free-thinkers tell the Protestant liberals who reject the deity of Christ, that they are not Christians, and that they are wrong in pretending to be so. How strangely must they be surprised to see the orthodox majority of the Synod, in a document which pretends to set forth the faith of the Reformed

Church of France, pass over in silence this fundamental dogma!

We must add that this document omits in the same way to speak of regeneration, of sanctification, of the life eternal—in a word, of the duties, feelings and hopes which form the inner life of a religious soul. It is too dry and too cold to produce any impression of edification, and its dogmatic poverty is remarkable. We do not know with what feeling English orthodoxy, the great friend of our French orthodox, and one that has often afforded them both, morally and materially, the most efficient, and at the same time the most legitimate aid, has followed the debates of the Synod; but it appears to us that the readers of the *Record* must be strangely scandalized at seeing their friends abandon in this way nearly all the dogmas which constitute for them “the truth as it is in Jesus.”

In limiting its positive affirmations to the single article of the Supernatural, the orthodox party not only obeyed the requirements of its position; it made at the same time a strategic move. Many of the liberals in France still believe in the Supernatural, without, however, assigning to it the same supreme importance as the orthodox; and in proclaiming only this single dogma, and in insisting upon the resurrection of Jesus Christ, it was hoped to detach from the left at least the whole of the left centre, and thus to cut the liberal party in two. Then the orthodox would have presented themselves before the Church with a large majority, and might have said with some apparent justice that a formula adopted by 75 or 80 members, out of 108, well expressed the faith of Protestants. This hope fell to the ground. The left centre had no wish to betake itself to the right, and, for a disagreement in detail on one particular article, to break the fraternal bond which for so many years has existed between all the liberals. Moreover, it refused to allow that the shadowy manifesto proposed by M. Bois did really express the faith of the Reformed Church of France; and, as it had said in its own declaration, it was not willing to assume the responsibility of a schism which would have sundered the Church, and which would become inevitable if the proposed confession of faith should acquire the force of law. Accordingly, at the moment of the vote the two parties found themselves united and compact; 61

votes were given for the proposed confession of faith, 45 against it. M. Colani, late Professor in the Faculty of Theology at Strasburg, M. Clamageran, late Assistant to the Mayor of Paris during the Prussian siege, MM. les Pasteurs Pécaut, Fontanès, Viguié, Ath. Coquerel fils, and others, contended against the confession of faith on the side of the liberals. They were attempted to be answered by M. Bois, M. le Pasteur Delmas, of Bordeaux, and, above all, by M. Guizot. In this debate, the most remarkable which has for a long time taken place in France on religious questions, the defence, by common consent, was very inferior to the attack. M. Guizot himself—whether age, which has not calmed his ardour, has diminished his force, or whether he felt himself ill at ease in the maintenance of so bad a cause—fell far short of what was expected from him. One of the most eminent and most justly honoured writers of the French press, M. Scherer, Deputy for the department of Seine-et-Oise, has noticed in the *Temps* (July 18, 1872)* the striking superiority of the liberal speakers over the orthodox.

“It would be unfair to pretend,” he says, “that in an assembly like the Reformed Synod, the distinction between the left and the right absolutely corresponds to a distinction between educated and ignorant men; but, on the whole, it is correct to say that the liberal party is composed of men who have tried to reconcile a profound religious feeling and a sincere attachment to Protestant traditions with serious study and complete liberty of research. It is a long step, we are bound to acknowledge, from the audacious, incisive, superficial talk of the greater part of the pleaders for orthodoxy, to the impassioned language of men, who, on the opposite benches, represented a heroic, perhaps a hopeless, attempt to unite the piety of the heart with the most perfect independence of the scientific intellect.”

IV.

It still remained to be seen on whom the confession of faith, carried in the Synod by the narrow majority of 16 votes, would be imposed. The right, in spite of many demands, had always refused to give an explanation on this

* Of all the French journals, the *Temps* is the one that has given the most exact, the most complete, and the most impartial accounts of the deliberations of the Synod.

point, upon which its members were far from being agreed. Logic would have demanded that this confession of faith should become the dogmatic rule of the whole Church. After having said, This is the faith of the Church, it would have been natural to add, No one shall be a member of the Church except on condition of adhering to this faith. This was done in former times in France in the case of the Confession of La Rochelle, which all teachers, deacons, elders and pastors, were obliged to sign. But the members of the right well knew that if they attempted to impose on all a formulary voted by a majority of sixteen, they would raise a general insurrection. Retreating from one position to another, the Synod successively decided that the confession of faith should not be imposed on the electors, nor on the elders, that is to say, the members of Presbyteral Councils and Consistories, nor on the members of future Synods, nor even on the pastors actually in office. Thus, after having voted that this formulary expressed "the faith of the Church," it was allowed that any one might be a member of the Church, a member of a Consistory or Synod, or even a pastor, without accepting this faith: a glaring and happy inconsequence, which unfortunately was not carried to its full length.

Beaten in several successive votes, the extreme right, which would have wished to impose the confession of faith on all, ended by rebelling. It declared, according to report, that it would make a schism if nothing was granted to it, if the confession of faith remained in the condition of a dead letter and was inflicted upon nobody. It gained the concession that it should be imposed upon future pastors; that is to say, a formal adherence to this confession of faith, or to those which in the future later Synods shall adopt, is to be required from young men who wish to enter the gospel ministry. Failing this adherence, ordination will be refused to them, their career will be broken off, their studies lost.

To this the left could not agree; it could not sacrifice any portion of the Church's liberties, which were entrusted to its defence; it could not allow all access to the ministerial office to be closed for the future to the liberals; it could not concede that, while renouncing the essentially evangelical principle of a universal priesthood, in order to establish between the laity and the pastors a distinction opposed to

the equality of all men before God, a yoke should be laid on the future leaders of the Church which the laity would not have borne. This is the position which was eloquently defended, in the name of the left, by M. le Pasteur Viguié, President of the Consistory of Nismes, by M. Planchon, Professor at the School of Pharmacy in Paris, and by the illustrious Colonel Denfert-Rochereau, the defender of Belfort, who is not only a brave soldier, but also a liberal, enlightened, confirmed Protestant, one whom all the members of the Church of France are proud to reckon in their ranks.

The right had hoped that on this occasion the left centre would go with it. M. Jalabert, Dean of the Faculty of Law at Nancy, and M. le Pasteur Rabaud, of Castrès, relieved it of this illusion; and though the proposition to impose the confession of faith on future pastors was adopted, the majority was as weak as in the case of the adoption of the formulary itself.

V.

After doctrine comes ecclesiastical organization. The existing constitution of the Reformed Church of France dates from 1802, and was imposed on the Church, as we have said, by the sovereign will of Napoleon I. Although considerably improved by a decree issued in 1852 by Louis Napoleon, then Prince President, it still presents many faults and many omissions, and on all sides the desire to amend it has long made itself felt.

In the existing condition of things, the Consistories, formed, as we have seen above, by the union of a certain number of parishes,* are the highest ecclesiastical authority; they exercise a very extensive power within their jurisdiction, and above them there is only the Government, the Minister of Worship. But they are isolated; no legal tie connects them with one another. From all this arise serious grievances. Fault is found with the existing organization in that it too much sacrifices the parishes, and places them too completely in the hands of the consistories,—a point which has often led to grave conflicts; and on the other side, the isolation of the consistories, and the want of a general representation, deprive the Church, considered

* This number varies from two to eleven. Some consistories even are exceptionally composed of a single parish, and yet enjoy the same powers as the others.

as a whole, of all unity, and hand it over unarmed to the ministerial power, a power generally impartial and well-meaning, but one which is none the less foreign to the Church.

These reproaches are just, and the liberals, as well as the orthodox, asked for a new organization; but the agreement ceased when they entered upon the details of the modifications to be adopted. The liberals would have given to each parish, to each separate community, great independence; they wished that dogmatic authority should reside in the council of the parish; that each separate church should be free to name, and even under certain reservations to dismiss, its pastor, to choose for itself its hymn-book and its liturgical forms. After having thus as far as possible assured the full liberty of faith, they asked for an annual General Synod, elected if possible directly by the laity,—if not, elected at the second degree only,—thus representing as directly, as exactly as possible, the whole Church with all its diversities, and able to manage its general interests, to speak in its name to the Government, and in case of need to defend its cause. Between the parish Council and the General Synod they wished indeed to place an intermediate body, Consistory or Particular Synod, serving as transition and link, but on condition that the powers of this body should be exactly defined and curbed, so as not to allow any encroachment on the rights of the parishes.

The orthodox party meant matters quite differently. Full of recollections of the past, it wished to restore, as far as possible, the ancient constitution of the Reformed Church in the time of Henry IV., an organization which was perhaps good in its season, though even that is very doubtful, but which very certainly has had its day, and now answers neither to the condition of our intelligence, the necessities of our epoch, nor the situation of a Church connected with the State. To the love of the past was joined in the minds of the orthodox majority of the Synod an ardent desire for centralization and authority. Thus the project of a new organization which this majority has voted forms one of those vast administrative machines, with artistically toothed wheel-work, which perform their work regularly and without too much jolting so long as they receive a strong impulse from above, but the effect of which is to kill all inde-

pendence, all spontaneity and all life ;—something like the strong administrative and political organization which Louis XIV., and subsequently Napoleon I., gave to France, of which France was for a long time proud, even to the extent of believing that she was on this account the envy of all Europe, and with which she is now out of conceit, recognizing in it one of the most real causes of her late disasters. It is mournful to see the Reformed Church, which up to this time has escaped the abuses of a centralizing and autocratic system, adopt it at the precise moment when the country is making efforts to throw it off.

According to the project of the Synod, the Reformed Church will possess a hierarchy of four superimposed bodies. At the base is the Presbyteral Council, governing the parish; above this, the Consistory; above the Consistory, the Particular Synod; and at the head of all, the General Synod.* In this hierarchy only the Presbyteral Councils are elected by the laity at large; the Councils afterwards nominate the members of the Consistories and of the Particular Synods, and it is the Particular Synods that nominate the members of the General Synod. Thus the part of the laity is reduced to a minimum; their only vote is in the chapter for choosing the administrators of their own parish; as to all the rest, they are passed over. In a country of universal suffrage like France, this is a curious anomaly.

The plan takes no account of the numbers of the Protestant population in the different parishes. In order to fix the number of the members of the Consistories, of the Particular Synods, and of the General Synod, it takes as a base, like the decree of November 29, the number of pastors. We have already said how far this base is unjust, and favours the orthodox party to the injury of the liberals.

A still more serious point, if possible, is the way in which this project settles the powers of the different bodies which are to form the future Protestant hierarchy. Instead of clearly distinguishing them, it confounds them with one another as if on purpose. All these superimposed bodies have nearly the same functions, and it is always possible to appeal from an inferior to that which is immediately above it. Let us take as an example the nomination of a pastor.

* There are in existence 508 Presbyteral Councils and 103 Consistories, and there will be 20 Particular Synods.

The Presbyteral Council nominates, but the Consistory has the right of a veto. If it refuses to accept the pastor elected, the Presbyteral Council can appeal in the matter to the Particular Synod; and when this has decided, the court, whether it be Council or Consistory, against which it has pronounced, will be able to appeal to the General Synod. The orthodox party reckons justly upon always having a majority in the General Synod; things have been arranged with a view to this; it is for this purpose that it has retained the number of pastors as the basis of calculation for the number of members of the Synod; and the division of districts fixed by the decree of November 29, which is so unfavourable to the liberals, has been adhered to in the new arrangement. By a majority of the General Synod, the orthodox party will always be master of the nominations of pastors, and will always be able, if it wishes, to refuse to a liberal parish the pastor whom it may have chosen.

It will be the same with all other business whatsoever; nothing will be really settled until after it has been successively discussed and examined by each of the four superior bodies; and the orthodox party believes, not without reason, that by managing the General Synod it will always in every matter have the last word.

Another point which no less disturbs the liberals is, that the plan confers on future Synods the most extensive dogmatic authority. "The Particular Synods watch above all," it is said, "over that which concerns the celebration of worship, the teaching of doctrine, and the conduct of ecclesiastical affairs." Such an article must have the effect of establishing in the Reformed Church what it has never had for a century, genuine ecclesiastical courts passing judgment in suits concerning heresy. We shall perhaps see before long some liberal pastor, in possession of the confidence and affection of the great majority of his parishioners, denounced to the Particular Synod by a single worshiper; this Synod opening an inquiry, examining the preaching and the religious instruction of the pastor attacked, then in its turn denouncing him to the General Synod, which will be able to decree his deprivation, against the wish of the larger number of the members of his church. We do not say that that will happen everywhere, or even often; but it will be possible, and is even now probably being pre-

pared in some churches, where ardent orthodox believers have been of late years in vain demanding from the Government the dismissal of liberal pastors.

VI.

Such is, in sum, the work of the Synod; a Confession of Faith, of extreme theological meagreness, which asserts in reality only a single dogma, that of the Supernatural, and thus marks the degree in which ancient orthodox doctrine is decayed, even among those who put themselves forward as its defenders; and a plan for a new organization essentially autocratic and centralizing. What does the Church think of all these projects? They cannot please the liberals, and it is probable that they are not very satisfactory to many of the orthodox. The different communities of which the Reformed Church is composed have for too long assumed the habits of a large independence easily to bend themselves to the yoke which it is wished to lay upon all. Many Consistories are probably little disposed to give up into the hands of the Synods the rights which they hold by the existing law; and the Presbyteral Councils, which hoped for independence, are to find themselves less free than ever. In any case, it would be well to know what the Church thinks of the scheme elaborated by the Synod. Accordingly the liberals asked that it should be submitted to the Church. They wished that the Synod should refer its project to the Councils and Consistories, and should thus ask the opinion of the Church, expressed by means of its official and elective bodies. They wished that this should be done not only on this occasion, but always, on all grave questions; they called to recollection that this is the method in many Presbyterian Churches, notably in the Reformed Church of the Netherlands; they remarked that in every association where the supreme authority resides in a single assembly, consultation of this kind is the best means of preventing the power of that assembly from degenerating into despotism.

The right would not hear of it. Before all the debates of which we have spoken, at the opening of the session, the Synod had discussed at length the question of its own powers, and the majority had settled the point by assuming for the assembly sovereign and absolute authority, constituent power. It thought to remain faithful to this deci-

sion by refusing, in four successive divisions, to take the opinion of the Church, by consulting the Councils and Consistories.

VII.

But it is not sufficient to declare oneself sovereign in order to be so in reality, and the Synod has been obliged to acknowledge that, in presence of the State, its pretended autocracy vanishes, that none of its resolutions is definitive, none valid, so long as it is not sanctioned by the Government, which alone can give it practical force. The right, therefore, divided its scheme into two parts. On one side it placed the articles which constitute a modification of the existing laws ; on the other, those of less importance, which may be considered as regulating the execution of the first. The whole has been referred to the Minister of Worship. The modifications and rehandling of the scheme which he may demand have to be awaited. The Synod will have to take cognizance of these changes, and it is adjourned with this view to the month of November. But according to general opinion, this date is too early, and it is not thought that the second session can take place before the spring, or even the summer of 1873. It is indeed very probable that the Minister will ask the opinion of the Council of State, a proceeding which will entail a long delay.

When at length the Synod and the Minister shall have come to an agreement, all will not be over. The scheme will have become definitive, but it will still be only a scheme ; or rather there will be two,—a scheme of law and a scheme of regulation. The first will have to be submitted to the National Assembly, the second to the President of the Republic ; it will be necessary, before they have practical force, for the National Assembly to vote the first, and for the President of the Republic to promulgate by decree the second. The National Assembly is animated, in a large majority of its members, by very catholic sentiments, and it is extremely difficult to foresee the reception which it will give to a project of law of this nature. It is, moreover, very possible that the present Assembly may have brought its mission to a close, and have dissolved itself, before this matter can be submitted to it ; and no one can guess what will be the tendencies of the next.

It is clear that the orthodox party is still sufficiently far

from the end to which it aspires, and that the future is still big with uncertainty. That which is passing at this moment is, moreover, of a nature to make the Government reflect.

VIII.

One thing at least is certain; that the liberal party could not at any price accept the scheme of law of the Synod. To submit to it would be, on its part, suicide. In imposing on future pastors its confession of faith, the Synod closes the doors of the evangelical ministry to all the liberals; it thus condemns the liberal churches to a speedy failure of pastors, to die of slow inanition, for want of the spiritual nourishment which suits them. This is to bring about a situation absolutely intolerable, one that the respect they owe to themselves, not less than the interests of their safety rightly understood, forbids them to accept. As regards the liberal pastors actually in office, the Synod has chosen to leave them at peace; it did not venture to ask them to sign its confession of faith, well knowing that they would refuse, and that the Government would never decide to deprive them in a body; but it has placed them in a humiliating position, forbidding them to consecrate to the sacred ministry the young men who will not accept the confession which they have themselves rejected, and holding suspended over their heads, should they continue freely to profess their opinions, the threat of prosecution for heresy, and deprivation. Can it be conceived that men of spirit and faith should accept such a position? Certainly not, and the liberal party is shewing clearly at this moment that it has no intention of bending its head. Already several consistories have protested, and have demanded that the Government, which has the full right to do so, will take the step which the Synod has failed to take—that is to say, refer the whole plan to the consideration of the Councils and Consistories, and officially ask their opinion. No one can tell what course the Government will adopt; but this is certain, that if it does not listen to the objections which reach it from all sides, if it sanctions the projects adopted by the Synod without introducing into them important modifications, it will provoke in the Church a schism of the gravest nature; and we shall see the ancient Reformed Church of France dissolve itself,

in order to give birth to two new Churches, one liberal, the other orthodox.

This solution was indicated as possible, even before the opening of the Synod, by the Minister of Worship, M. Jules Simon, in a letter which he addressed to M. Martin-Paschoud, one of the pastors of Paris, and which has been published in all the religious journals. To many minds it seems the simplest and best solution. They take into account that it would put an end to a painful strife; and that, provided a fair division of churches and ministerial appointments were made, it would lead to a settlement of the deplorable conflict which for ten years has divided into two camps the Reformed Church of Paris. They add that the liberals have everything to gain by the separation; that disembarassed of the orthodox, delivered from the anxieties of conflict, and able to apply their energies in other directions, they would rally to themselves in great numbers men whom Catholicism displeases or repels, and who are in search of a religious faith in harmony with the progress of modern science.

There is certainly much truth in all this; but we must not hide from ourselves that the great mass of the Protestant population sees things quite differently, and that the prospect of a schism, of a separation which would cut the Church in two, is profoundly repugnant to it. The Protestant people, especially those in the south of France, hold strongly to their ancient religious institution, which reminds them of a past, cruel and glorious. Their Church is the Church of the martyrs, of the galley-slaves, of the prisoners of the Tower of Constance, the Church of the desert, the Church which was so long "sous la Croix;" and they do not understand why it should disappear to make room for new institutions.

Then the Protestants are not numerous in France; 750,000 to 800,000 at most, including the Lutherans. It is not many in the midst of a nation of from thirty-six to thirty-seven millions. On all sides Catholicism presses upon them; and everywhere, where the Protestant population is scattered, Catholic propagandism is very brisk. A natural instinct of self-preservation tells the Protestants that, in a situation in some respects so disadvantageous, they must, in order to hold their own, close their ranks, be united, and march together.

Finally, this suggested separation would be encumbered in practice with difficulties of more than one kind. In the great churches of the cities, where there are generally several pastors, often holding different opinions, these difficulties would not be insurmountable; but in the country places, what is to be done? Out of 508 parishes of which the Reformed Church consists, 438 have each only one pastor; and in the greater part of these 438 churches, both of the opinions in question have their adherents. Up to the present time, in the vast majority of cases, liberals and orthodox have known how to live in peace. If the separation were to take place, how should we proceed? Whose would remain the single church, the single appointment of pastor? To the side which could reckon a majority of adherents? Then the minority would see itself despoiled of a patrimony which its gifts and its zeal had helped to form. Can we believe that it would not murmur, or that this sort of spoliation could be effected without exciting complaints, quarrels, profound ill-will, and that, justifying the fears which M. Thiers expressed to the Consistory of Paris before the assembling of the Synod, it would become for the Government a fruitful source of embarrassment?

However this may be, schism is inevitable if the Government sanctions, without serious modifications, the projects of the Synod. The whole responsibility will rest upon the orthodox party, which will have provoked it. The liberals, who have done everything to avoid it, will sorrowfully but courageously submit, certain that, whatever may happen, the future is theirs.

One fact, indeed, comes out in the strongest light from what has just passed in the Reformed Church of France, and from the debates in the Synod. This is, that the day of confessions of faith is irrevocably past. In order to produce one, orthodoxy has been obliged to toss to the winds all but a single dogma, and could not establish even this without arousing in the Church a formidable crisis. It is folly to wish to retrace the course of the ages, and to give new life to what is dead. In our days, when thought is everywhere awakened, when science has searched into every corner of the Bible, and brought light into the obscurest problems of criticism and opinion, two systems are alone possible: either division, multiplicity of sects, each one

having its own *credo*, and destined itself to split into infinite sections ; or union, on the ground of full independence of religious beliefs. Such is the dilemma which puts itself before all the Churches. Nearly everywhere men comprehend that it must be so. The Churches which still have confessions of faith are forced to enlarge their borders. The Established Church of England has come to interpret its Thirty-nine Articles in such a way as to exclude neither the most advanced liberals, nor those of its members who fall back upon Catholicism ; it has hunted from its bosom neither Bishop Colenso nor Dr. Pusey. Churches like the Reformed Church of France, which has long enjoyed the great happiness of living under a rule of full liberty, can never again set up a confession of faith, however meagre, without exposing themselves to destruction.

ETIENNE COQUEREL.

VIII.—EVOLUTION AND RELIGION.

The Place of Mind in Nature and Intuition in Man. A Lecture. By James Martineau. London : Williams and Norgate. 1872.

Mr. Martineau on Evolution. By Herbert Spencer. An Article in the *Contemporary Review* of June, 1872.

Fragments of Science for Unscientific People. By John Tyndall, LL.D., F.R.S. London : Longmans. 1871.

THE recent demands which Science has made upon Theology are essentially different from those which in bygone years excited the alarm and indignation of second-rate divines, and drew forth from the pulpit and the press such copious streams of unsubstantial rhetoric. During these earlier contentions, the most powerful masters in theological thought either held aloof or threw their influence into the scientific scale, viewing with complacency, if not with gratification, the annexation by victorious Science of a territory most rightfully its own. Not so is it at the present hour. The attitude of Science now is no longer that of noble self-defence, as in the days when it refused to admit

the right of the Pentateuch to adjudicate upon physical questions, but has assumed in the teachings of many of its leading expositors an unmistakable appearance of defiant aggression. Exulting in their easy conquests, they virtually say to theologians: "You have most vexatiously opposed and harassed us in times of less enlightenment, and now the season of retribution has arrived; it is our turn to bid you be gone; you have no *locus standi*, save in the realms of emotion; the entire sphere of the Knowable is ours, for we can demonstrate, beyond the possibility of error, that your so-called science is devoid of all reality, an empty pretension, whose very presence is a contravention of the laws of thought." Under these circumstances, it is impossible for the champions of spiritual philosophy to avoid mingling in the fight. No theological Achilles can linger in his tent, however much aggrieved by vulgar narrowness in many of his allies, while such fatal violence is being done to the convictions which he holds most dear.

Science will find it no easy matter to sustain its claim to the exclusive possession of truth and firm conviction. Already have Professor Huxley's jaunty incursions into metaphysical and theological fields called forth some stalwart resistance; and in one passage of arms at least, that with Dr. Stirling, we cannot think that he comes off entirely unscathed. In philosophical warfare, however, Professor Huxley makes no pretensions to leadership, and appears to borrow from Mr. Spencer's armoury most of the weapons which he wields with such sportive dexterity. To the recent encounter in the intellectual lists of Mr. Martineau and Mr. Spencer especial interest attaches. When the publication of "First Principles," ten years ago, called forth the article on "Science, Nescience and Faith," it became manifest that these two writers held the supremacy in their respective schools, and since that date each of them has greatly extended his reputation on both sides of the Atlantic. A disputation between such men at such a crisis deserves careful study, for from this single combat one would hope to be able to form some reasonable forecast of the character and probable issue of the engagement which now seems impending, along the whole line of thoughtful *savans* and divines, concerning the validity of supersensual beliefs in general. We have been disappointed, however, in Mr.

Spencer's rejoinder, in the first place because it deals principally with matters that lie outside of Mr. Martineau's main argument, and in the second place because it gives no indications of any approach towards a basis of possible reconciliation, although such auspicious signs are, as we hope to shew, clearly visible in the writings of one at least of the most ardent supporters of the Evolution theory. To explain what we mean by our first complaint, it is necessary to attempt a rough sketch of what we suppose to be the general drift of Mr. Martineau's Lecture. His main object appears to be to shew that each successive stage in the process of development is in no way involved in or necessitated by the attributes observable in the stages below it. These lower powers continue, indeed, their activities into the higher planes of being, but, over and above them, each advance implies a new controlling or inspiring action of the Divine Mind, and accordingly it is proved that the admission of Mr. Darwin's law of Natural Selection, or of Mr. Spencer's views respecting the hereditary accumulation and consolidation of experience, lessens not at all the necessity of recognizing a new constructive agency and an ideal guidance in the organic world, or a unique rational and moral illumination in the sphere of humanity. Would we understand the full worth and meaning of these several accessions of property and faculty, Mr. Martineau shews that the true method is to study them, not in their inchoate dawning, but in their ripe unfolding, that so we may avoid the error, often committed by recent English psychologists, of confounding the new principle with the earlier conditions amid which it takes its rise. If the facts of physical and psychical development are thus studied, we shall discern "the impossibility of dispensing with the presence of Mind in any scene of ascending being, where the little is becoming great, and the dead alive, and the shapeless beautiful, and the sentient moral, and the moral spiritual."

It appears from a paragraph in the Lecture that Mr. Martineau further holds (at least Mr. Spencer so understands him) that the Theistic position is interested in maintaining the falsity of a speculation in which some chemists indulge; namely, that our so-called elementary bodies have been gradually built up by variously complicated molecular

arrangements of the assumed atoms of some one elementary substance ; and, again, that Theism has a like interest in anticipating the perpetual failure of such experiments as those of Dr. C. Bastian respecting the spontaneous generation, under suitable chemical and physical conditions, of very simple and indefinite vital forms. We are not sure that the sentence just written fairly represents Mr. Martineau's opinion. The denial of the possibility of Abiogenesis does seem to be the obvious meaning of the words in the text, yet we find a difficulty in reconciling this denial with Mr. Martineau's teaching in the article on "Nature and God ;"* where he appears to recommend the Theist to leave the settlement of the conditions of the Divine manifestation in nature to the researches of those scientific men to whose provinces they respectively belong. We have hitherto understood Mr. Martineau to insist on the following as the essential fact : that the passage from physics to chemistry cannot be made without involving the incoming of some higher power which controls and modifies the operations of mechanical force ; and that similarly in the passage from chemical to vital activity we must draw upon the Divine resources for a superadded constructive power which exerts a controlling tension upon the lower mechanical and chemical forces, and subordinates them to the expression of a more complex idea. But we cannot discover any reason why this doctrine should militate against the possibility of a primitive homogeneity of substance, or fix any point of time as that at which the higher differentiating power begins or ceases to operate. It is at least just conceivable that man may be able to arrive at some idea of a primitive substance, and of the varieties of molecular structure to which its allotropic forms may be due. And with regard to the doctrine of Abiogenesis, we can see no objection to supposing that the higher degree of Divine Causality requisite for superadding to complex chemical affinities the controlling energy of life, may be in process of exertion now, if ever and wherever fit conditions present themselves, as well as in those primeval ages, to some moment of which we must needs, it seems, refer the miracle.

As in our view these questions affect no link in the

* See "National Review," Oct. 1860, p. 495.

main chain of Mr. Martineau's cogent reasoning, we regret that Mr. Spencer should have spent one-half of his brief article in ably contesting his opponent's real or supposed opinions upon them. We should have felt greater thankfulness if he had shewn us more clearly than he has done in his *Biology*, how it is possible on purely mechanical principles to bridge over the chasm between the inorganic and the organic worlds, and explained in what essential features his doctrine of "physiological units with inherited tendencies" and of "organic polarity" differs from the "unreal" conception of a "nisus formativus" or an "idée créatrice," which it is intended to supersede.

Mr. Spencer's doctrine of the hereditary transmission of organized experiences is, we think, a real addition to psychological science, and throws light upon many facts before inexplicable; but we have never been able to gather from the study of his writings, how it can be applied so as to successfully explain the faintest sense of obligation. His vast genius for generalization enables him to map out districts in each of the territories of science with admirable skill and clearness; but when we come to the border-lands which separate kingdom from kingdom, faculty from faculty, then the all-devouring passion for unity leads him to ignore all natural divisions; mountains vanish, rivers are dried up, by the cunning magic of his dialectic; and the traveller who ventures under his guidance to retrace the course of Evolution, misses all the picturesque variety and poetic meaning of nature, is haunted by a depressing sense of unbroken uniformity, and, instead of sympathetic voices from earth and heaven, hears but the monotonous whirr of the ever-revolving machinery of Unknowable Necessity.*

* There is one point of criticism in Mr. Spencer's review in which we are much interested, that, namely, in which he seeks from Mr. Martineau a more explicit statement of his doctrine on the relation of the Divine Will to the physical forces. Since Sir J. Herschel wrote the oft-quoted passage in his *Astronomy*, in which he identifies our ideas of Cause and Will, and assigns all the forces of nature to the action of a *Consciousness* and a *Will* existing somewhere, the doctrine of the Correlation of Forces has introduced, as it seems to us, some elements of perplexity into this subject. In the passage referred to, Sir John Herschel appears to regard the relation between our will and the muscular force we exert, as exactly parallel to that subsisting between the Will of God and the physical forces. Do, then, either we or the Divine Mind *originate* force, or simply *originate a fresh mode in the manifestation* of the force previously existing? In a review article, republished in 1866 in his "Familiar Lectures

We had hoped that further reflection and a consideration of the criticisms which the doctrine of the Unknowable has elicited, would have led Mr. Spencer so far to modify his theory as to really open a way for that reconciliation of Science and Religion which he seems to have at heart. Assuredly the scientific view of Evolution is by no means necessarily associated with this Agnosticism ; and we should have thought that Mr. Martineau's acute remark, that the very fact of our knowing that the Unknowable exists, places Him and us on terms of co-relation, and so establishes the possibility of mutual cognition,—coupled with that of Mr. Calderwood (in reference to Sir William Hamilton's doctrine), “ that a relative knowledge may be had of that which in a certain sense is beyond all relation,”—might have induced Mr. Spencer to go so far as to admit that, as we have a relative knowledge of Nature, which, though relative, always holds good and never disappoints our expectation, so we may have a relative knowledge of the Cause of Nature, which, though equally relative to ourselves, shall hold good in all the possible situations in which we may be placed, so as never to disappoint the trusts and aspirations of any religious soul. Such a view of God as only relatively known, and known chiefly through the conscience and the affections, would, we think, afford a basis of harmony ; it would provide

on Scientific Subjects,” Sir John returned to this question, and then distinctly affirmed that we must originate *some* force, for “without the power of changing, at least temporarily, the amount of dynamical force appropriate to some one or more material molecules, the mechanical results of human or animal volition are inconceivable.” In this case, then, by far the greater part of the force which we seem to exert is exerted directly or indirectly by God, and only a very minute portion by ourselves, though this little may suffice, as Sir John says, “to bring the origination within the domain of acknowledged personality.” Dr. Tyndall, however, and we believe most of the leading physicists maintain that our personality originates no force whatever, all force which we exert being derived from the process of oxidation within the body, and therefore from the sun. If this view be true, the volitional influence we originate is a purely *mental* or *ideal* one, and may perhaps resemble the vital energy which seems to dominate over the chemical and physical forces in the construction of a vegetable or animal body ; for this latter controlling energy seems neither to add to nor take from the forces which it co-ordinates, and therefore, like the soul, is not amenable to scientific detection. If this is a tenable view, does the Divine Mind exercise a like *ideal* control over all the forces of nature ? In that case, the objectivity which Mr. Martineau's theory sets over against God will perhaps be force rather than matter, and this force will not enter our consciousness. We may be allowed to hope that either Mr. Martineau or Dr. Carpenter will some day clear up this perplexity.

an adequate Cause for science, a Spirit of Infinite Love for the affections, a God of fathomless Perfection for the aspirations of the soul. We could not define the Divine Nature ; we could not dogmatically say that He does not embrace "modes of being as far transcending intelligence and will as these transcend mechanical motion ;" we can only say that, if it be so, we cannot know Him in these higher modes, but that we do know Him just in the way and just so far as our necessities, our happiness and our culture require ; and that, further, this adequate knowledge is of such a kind that we may build upon it with the perfect assurance that we are building upon the Rock of Ages, in whom there is and can be no delusion.

This view of religion, which takes from the reason only the great axiom of Causality, and derives its living elements from the perceptions of the Conscience and the Heart, would surely contain that minimum of theology and that maximum of emotion which Huxley and Tyndall desiderate. Such a religion is quite compatible with the proven facts of Evolution ; nay, some divines already admit their willingness to accept on fair evidence, and even to welcome as a boon, these recent speculations of Science. We know, too, that many of the leading Evolutionists, while assailing Theology quite spitefully, have yet only words of reverence and affection for Religion and Worship. It is much to be regretted, then, that Mr. Spencer, who is evidently a man of earnestness and devotion, has not been able to aid in paving a way which may bring liberal Theology and devout Science into harmonious relations. The deferential attitude of all parties towards Religion widely distinguishes this epoch from the days of Materialism in the last century ; and though, no doubt, much of this deference is only polite affectation, yet we do believe that there is a deep and growing craving for an earnest faith which will not have to be laid aside when a man enters upon his scientific researches, or takes active part in social and political work. Such a faith is assuredly shaping itself in the souls of men, and the Evolution doctrine is exerting, we believe, an influence, destined to be both great and good, upon this unfolding of grander religious ideas and more fruitful religious activity. Evolution must, however, disencumber itself of Mr. Spencer's chief philosophical dogmas before this mutually ad-

vantageous alliance between it and Religion can be possible. To make this more clear, let it be permitted us to indulge in a little allegory. We may picture Science as making loving overtures to Faith, and Faith, wearied with the many theological suitors whose wrangling has robbed her of her peace, willingly agreeing to seek quiet and sympathy in the well-ordered abode to which Evolution invites her. Faith has, indeed, often heard this self-same Evolution spoken of as a very ugly and terrible fellow, whose society would surely rob her of her purest joys ; but her first acquaintance with him has revealed nothing so objectionable. In his company she has scanned the lovely scenes of earth, and at eventide gazed with a calm and holy delight at the starlit heavens. She has listened to his wondrous story : how from the formless mist came central stars and circling planets, and heard with awe of the marvellous doings of that Protean force which, bounding from the ethereal waves of sunlight, works its daily miracles of beauty and of might, clothing the earth with ever-varied verdure, and imparting energy to every form of nature and of art that moves upon its surface. Especially does he point out the perfect unity of the work, how completely this texture of the universe, which is to her the ever-changing garment of God, is a continuous fabric woven without seam. He explains how the matter and the forces, or possibly the forces alone (for matter is but the assumed abode of force), which combine to fashion the mineral kingdom, the groundwork of this structure, are also the constituents of all organic and sentient creatures, which are thus linked on to the lower realms in unbroken continuity, or else dovetailed so exquisitely thereto that no human skill avails to detect the points of combination. "Is, then," Faith asks in amazement, "this wondrous fabric of the universe, this web covered with such richly significant yet ever-shifting embroidery, composed of nothing but certain unbroken and unending threads of force?" "Yes, these threads of force, the nature of which it is to be or to occasion motion under certain definitely varying modes, to which we give such names as Heat and Light and Electricity, do by their simpler or more complex actions and inter-actions give rise to all that is, or ever will be." "How simple, yet how grand, is your conception !" Faith exclaims. "How ineffably great

must be the wisdom which designs these transformations and combinations!" At the word "design," a frown clouds the usually placid countenance of her instructor. "Design!" he exclaims: "where have you learned to talk of any feature in the orderly development of the universe in such an unmeaning and childish fashion? These mischievous theologians have, I see, perverted your innocent mind. You must entirely unlearn all their meaningless jargon, and never dream of recognizing any such thing as purpose or intention in the phenomena of nature. Have I not told you how I dislike and repudiate all the fictions that appertain to Theology?" These words fall with a harsh and grating sound upon the ear of Faith. She asks in timid perplexity, "Do you forbid me the little theology which is implied in apprehending a Divine Mind, most wise and most benevolent? Surely you will allow me to assign this lovely nature which embosoms us to an adequate Cause?" "Certainly! my doctrine not only permits but explains the necessity of assigning everything finite to a Cause that is Infinite, everything dependent to a Cause that is Absolute; but we never call this Theology; the word smacks of obsolete superstitions." "The name is of no consequence," replies Faith, greatly reassured; "you recognize that spiritual reality in nature which the eye of the soul discerns, whose influence the poet describes when he says:

‘And I have felt
A presence that disturbs me with the joy
Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime
Of something far more deeply interfused,
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
And the round ocean, and the living air,
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man;
A motion and a spirit that impels
All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
And rolls through all things.’”

"Probably," is the reply, "Wordsworth does refer to the Ultimate Power whose reality we are discussing; but he is decidedly incorrect, in that case, in using the word 'felt,' for his feelings are themselves a part of the stream of phenomena, and as such can give no information whatever of the Power to which these phenomena are due. *That* this Causal Power is, we are obliged by logical necessity to

assert ; *what* it is, by an equal necessity we can never know. We call it the Infinite, the Unconditioned, the Absolute, or, again, the Unknowable. Wordsworth is guilty of another basal error when he speaks of 'spirit.' This allusion, likewise, sound philosophy has dissipated. Man must needs set Spirit and Matter over against each other as distinct existences ; to do so is an inevitable condition of human consciousness. Reflection, however, shews that these contrasts lie purely in the region of phenomena. Seeing, then, that the antithesis has no meaning apart from the conditions of human cognition, to apply to the Ultimate Reality man's conceptions either of matter or of mind is a futile attempt to invest the Unknowable with incompatible attributes. If it pain you to learn that I am not a Spiritualist, you will surely find adequate compensation in the thought that I am equally free from the reproach of Materialism." Faith, however, finds but poor comfort in this latter clause. Be his creed Materialism or Agnosticism, she fears it is in either case equally effectual in undermining the foundations of that conscious sympathy with the Spirit of Love, the reality of which is the very essence of Religion's life. Once more she pleads her cause : "Surely this Power is not altogether Unknowable ! Was it not some perception of His attributes which inspired Wordsworth to speak of man as

'One not forbidden to recline
With hope upon a Will Divine ?'

"Wordsworth speaks as a poet : he is expressing aspirations and wishes, rather than stating a fact of actual experience, or one that admits of observation. And, indeed, there are many features in nature that can hardly be assigned to a benevolent will. However, let the poet by all means give free play to imagination and hope, only he must carefully avoid theological errors, and never pretend to knowledge in a sphere where knowledge is impossible. With truth have my expounders said : 'The Positive Philosophy allows Phantasy and Feeling a wide latitude in the region of the Unknowable, on the simple condition of not presenting their products as a contribution to knowledge.'"

We may now drop the allegory, in the course of which we have endeavoured not to misrepresent the points at issue between Mr. H. Spencer and the religious consciousness.

It is evident that the proposed alliance between Religion and Science cannot be entertained for a moment on the basis that Science is to have a monopoly in the kingdom of truth and reality, while Religion is to be relegated to the sphere of fancy, there to divert herself as best she can. It is neither as a fantastic plaything, fit only for the hours of mental relaxation, nor as a spiritless slave, passively reflecting the dicta of a master, that the faculty of spiritual discernment can live in harmonious relations with the faculty whereby we attain to scientific truth. If these two are to enter into peaceful and healthful co-operation, it can be then, and then only, when each is willing to accept as well as to give, to interchange ideas with mutual confidence in each other's trustworthiness, with the sympathetic conviction that only by taking sweet counsel together can they attain to that higher wisdom which is needful to appease and gratify the restless cravings of the soul.

It is evident that so long as the doctrine of Continuity remains implicated with the theory of the Unknowable, it is utterly impossible for the pulpit, even in its most liberal and philosophic utterances, to furnish that curious pabulum of emotion, *minus* thought and conviction, which alone can satisfy the claims of Evolutionist devotion. This being the case, an interesting question arises as to the quarter whither the *savant* will have recourse for that nutriment which is to satisfy his thirst for religion. For if it should turn out that the choicest spirits among the Evolutionists are covertly cherishing ideas and convictions at variance with the Agnostic hypothesis, and are worshiping at a shrine only nominally different from that at which intelligent Theists adore, we shall then obtain both valuable indirect testimony to the recognized validity of some religious ideas, and a well-grounded hope of a final satisfactory adjustment of the relations of Science and Religion.

There is probably no living teacher who is better qualified to mediate between the theologians and the men of science than Professor Tyndall, a man of rich and varied endowments, admirable at once for his scientific genius, his rich imagination, and his genial and noble sympathies. We can hardly fancy a nature of this stamp abstaining altogether from the forbidden lore of the Unknowable. Mr. Spencer's "First Principles" may have convinced his judgment that

to dabble in such mysteries is as futile as the old pursuits of astrology and alchemy; yet we feel assured that his causal appetite, his moral sentiments and his spiritual aspirations, will lead him oftentimes to endeavour to pierce the veil of the phenomenal, and gain some satisfying glimpse of that Causal Energy whose more subtile handiwork he has himself done so much to reveal to mankind. Let the Professor tell us then in his own words what is his substitute for the rejected sphere of Theology, and whither it is he wends his way in what we (who still cling to some theologic fancies) may call his choicer and holier moods.

"The position of Science is already secured, but I think the Poet will have a great part to play in the future of the world. To him is given for a long time to come to fill those shores which the receding of the theologic tide has left exposed; to him, when he rightly understands his mission, and does not shrink from the tonic discipline which it assuredly demands, we have a right to look for that heightening and brightening of life which so many of us need. He ought to be the interpreter of that Power, which as

‘Jehovah, Jove or Lord,’

has hitherto filled and strengthened the human heart.”*

Poetry, then, is to supplant Divinity: the Prophet is discarded, but the Bard may assume his mantle and his inspiration. Here clearly the philosophy of Nescience is abandoned; for what higher function or privilege can prophet or preacher desire than to be permitted to be in some faint degree “the interpreter of that Power which has hitherto filled and strengthened the human heart”? We will further ask the reader to renew his acquaintance with another exquisite passage in the Fragments, of which we will give some portions. Musing one summer day in sadness on a weathered crag of the Matterhorn, his reflections go back to that “nebulous haze which philosophers have regarded, and with good reason, as the proximate source of all material things.”

“Did that formless fog contain potentially the *sadness* with which I regarded the Matterhorn? Did the *thought*, which now ran back to it, simply return to its primeval home? If so, had

* Fragments of Science, p. 105.

we not better re-cast our definitions of matter and force ; for, if life and thought be the very flower of both, any definition which omits life and thought, must be inadequate, if not untrue. * * * When I look at the heavens and the earth, at my own body, at my strength and weakness of mind, even at these ponderings, and ask myself, Is there no being or thing in the universe that knows more about these matters than I do, what is my answer ? Supposing our theologic schemes of creation, condemnation and redemption, be dissipated ; and the warmth of denial which they excite, and which as a motive force can match the warmth of affirmation, dissipated at the same time ; would the undeflected human mind return to the meridian of absolute neutrality as regards these ultra-physical questions ? Is such a position one of stable equilibrium ?”*

These questions betray a mind quite outside the dogmatic range of the Synthetic Philosophy, and reveal the writer as standing in a far more sympathetic, although as yet still distant, relation to the teachings of Professor Martineau, a kindred genius who has invested his expositions of mental philosophy with the same poetic halo as that which Professor Tyndall has thrown around his path of physical discovery. The latter writer does not perhaps directly admit the postulate which Mr. Martineau lays down as the basis of all fruitful negotiations between Science and Faith, the truth “that Mind is first and rules for ever ;” yet he appears distinctly to avow that life and thought are not evolved at a later date by any process of cerebral secretion, but must needs have been at hand during the whole course of Evolution, as a haunting presence with each material atom, a spiritual energy side by side with every physical force. We do not see how, if this position be once taken up, it is possible to stop short of supposing the constant presence at every point of space and every moment of time of all the perfections that life and thought can manifest, or which can blend in man’s ideal.

“For where He cometh, all things are,
And He cometh everywhere.”

The doctrine that for every fresh kind of excellence in the manifested result, you must predicate the eternal presence of an at least corresponding competency in the Ulti-

mate Cause, we take to be the leading idea of Mr. Martineau's Lecture, and it appears to us identical with Mr. Tyndall's conception, which we have just been considering. If then life, and all that life implies of Will, Intelligence and Love, have been constantly present during the unfolding of the grand Drama of Natural Evolution, we need not wonder why the successive scenes have been so beautiful, nor why the plot has been arranged with such prospective skill; and when it is considered that we share in some finite and reflected way these Divine Perfections, an adequate reason is assigned why we should be able in limited measure to unravel the process, and gradually to penetrate to its deeper meanings.

CHARLES B. UPTON.

IX.—NOTICES OF BOOKS.

The Autobiography of Satan. Edited by J. R. Beard, D.D., &c. Williams and Norgate. 1872.

THE literature of Demonology has within the last few years been enriched by several learned and thorough works, throwing much light upon some of the darkest and gloomiest periods of human history. France and Germany also have seen bold literary men, who have published "Memoirs of the Devil" of a light and romantic character; but the idea of using an autobiographical narrative for a serious and exhaustive demolition of the faith in a personal Spirit of Evil, must be regarded as an original idea of the learned author whose name is so familiar to all readers of modern liberal theological literature. I cannot say that I look upon the form which Dr. Beard has chosen as happy in its results; for as the object of the work is systematically to disprove the existence of a Devil, and to shew the imaginative origin of a belief in him, the autobiographical style is unpleasantly unreal, and has to be dragged in every now and then to remind the reader of the elaborate fiction on which the work is based. The editor himself seems constantly to forget the framework of his book, and lets his own opinions and the results of his varied reading find expression in the Devil's

words, till we cannot help saying that if the *Autobiography* of Satan gives a fair description of the Devil and of his real character, the Prince of Evil is not only "a gentleman," but a learned theologian well versed in biblical criticism, a practised student of exegesis, and a thorough Church historian, besides being well-read in curious byways of popular legendary story. Nay, there is no avoiding the conclusion that he is a benevolent and highminded philanthropist, full of the most devout and loving sympathies for all mankind.

But apart from this defect, which is the inevitable result of the mistake of writing a history of the origin, development and decay of the doctrine of a personal Devil in the form of an autobiography, there is very much to praise in the tone of the work; while it will be unnecessary to say that Dr. Beard has given another proof of the great range of his reading and the surprising accumulation of his literary materials. Every quarter of the globe is made to bear witness to the universal belief of men in evil spirits, while the origin of this faith is traced from the first dim creeds of fetish worshipers to the full horror which seems to have rendered human life a constant scene of terror when belief in witchcraft ruled the most civilized nations of the world. If we have any fault to find with the historical sketch, it is that this latter period is too lightly treated and too speedily passed over; for it is not possible to describe in darker colours than the records of the times justify, either the superstitious dread which rendered the great mass of the people wretched, or the inhuman cruelties which were inflicted upon the unfortunate victims of popular credulity. Thousands confessed, amid tortures of various kinds, that they were guilty of communications with the Devil of so absurd a kind, that we cannot understand how men of high cultivation and intelligence could be so misled by prejudice. It is humiliating to see a man like Henry More believing in such vulgar forms of witchcraft as our author shews him to have accepted, even after Bekker had published his "*World Bewitched*" (p. 330). And a more startling proof of his credulity might be adduced even than the stories quoted in the *Autobiography*, as in his "*Antidote against Atheisme*," 2nd ed., London, 1655, p. 186, he brings forward no mere hearsay evidence: "To

confirm this truth of apparitions, if we would but admit the free confessions of witches concerning their imps, whom they so frequently see and converse withal, know them by their names, and do obeisance to them, the point would be put quite out of all doubt, and their proofs would be so many, that no volume would be large enough to contain them. But forsooth these must be all *melancholy old women* that dote and bring themselves into danger by their own *phantasies* and *conceits*. But that they do not dote, I am better assured of, than of their not doting that say they do. For to satisfie my own curiosity, I have examined several of them, and they have discoursed as cunningly as any of their quality and education." When so wise and liberal a thinker as the great Platonist could be thus deceived, need we be surprised that among the people the dread of sorcery should have rendered life a constant source of misery and gloom?

Dr. Beard devotes a considerable portion of his work to the consideration of the connection of the Bible with the popular superstition he contests, and is, I think, very successful in shewing that its grosser forms have no scriptural foundation. That the Jews did not at all suffer from belief in witchcraft cannot of course be denied, but that they had no faith in a being like the Devil of the middle ages or even of early Christian days is absolutely certain. The Satan of the Old Testament is, according to the words of Renan, quoted with approval by Dr. Beard (p. 85), "an angel more disposed to mischief than the others; fault-finding, and given to scandal; he is not the Spirit of Evil existing and acting in and of himself." But most important and valuable does the work of Dr. Beard appear to me in his vindication of Jesus Christ from all participation in a belief in a Spirit of Evil. No doubt the superficial and uncritical reader of the New Testament will be surprised to hear that any one could assert that not only is there no proof of Jesus having believed in the existence of a Devil, but that such a belief is in itself contradictory to what undoubtedly was the very essence of his teaching. Much of the chapter on the New Testament is deeply suggestive, and those who read it carefully will in so doing learn, as indeed we may say of all the sections which treat on biblical questions, how the Bible can be at once freely and reverently treated. If we venture to think that Dr.

Beard might have strengthened his case at all, it would be by more clearly pointing out how we have good reason to regard as belonging to Christ absolutely nothing beyond the logia contained in Matthew and some of the parables ; while even the demoniac cures, and what is derived from them, bear strong evidence of the mythical process which has gradually removed the man Christ Jesus from the realm of humanity. There are of course so many problems still to be solved in the criticism of the Synoptical Gospels, that absolute certainty as to what is historical and what mythical cannot yet be attained ; but Dr. Beard's careful though popular review of the evangelical teaching about Satan and Satanic agency cannot be overlooked without loss by any future writer on this topic. Dr. Beard has collected much curious information from many quarters, some even of a kind so trivial as to contrast unfavourably with the general tone of the work, and to suggest at times grotesque and ludicrous ideas. No doubt this has been done to lighten the general sadness of the phase of human error which he is successfully attacking ; but I think modern ballads and Lancashire stories might have been left out of the work with advantage. Notwithstanding such faults, which are, however, matter of minor consequence, there can be no doubt that Dr. Beard has written a book which is not only replete with information not easily accessible to the general public, but cannot fail to promote wiser views of Providence and religion, by aiding the destruction of a rapidly disappearing error, as well as by attacking and exposing the still dangerous aims of Sacerdotalism, which has thriven on the misery and torture caused by a belief in the existence of a personal Devil.

S. A. S.



INDEX TO VOL. IX.

- ALT-KATHOLIK MOVEMENT IN GERMANY, THE, 65.
BENNETT JUDGMENT, THE, 389.
BUDDHISM, RECENT PUBLICATIONS ON, 293.
CHRISTIANITY AND MODERN SCEPTICISM, 258.
CHURCH DESIGNS FOR CONGREGATIONS, 103.
COLENZO ON THE PENTATEUCH, PART VI., 197.
CONFESSION, AURICULAR, IN THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND, 17.
DENOMINATIONAL DIFFICULTY, THE, 113.
DEVELOPMENT OF OPINION IN THE EARLY CHURCH, PART I., 1. PART II., 161.
DISSENT, THE BAMPTON LECTURER ON, 487.
DRUNKENNESS AND LEGISLATION, 273.
EVOLUTION AND RELIGION, 561.
FRANCE, THE GENERAL SYNOD OF THE REFORMED CHURCH OF, 536.
GOD IN NATURE, 373.
HERDER AS THEOLOGIAN: PART I. BIOGRAPHICAL, 179. PART II. THEOLOGICAL, 437.
ISLAM IN INDIA, 221.
JESUS, NEW ENGLISH LIVES OF, 467.
LETTER TO THE EDITOR, 158.
LIFE AFTER DEATH, THE, 506.
MAURICE, FREDERICK DENISON, 345.
NONCONFORMIST PROGRAMME AND POLICY, THE, 356.
NOTICES OF BOOKS, 122, 405, 574.
PARRY, JOSHUA, MEMOIR OF, 458.
PAUL AND THE NERO LEGEND, 246.
PENTATEUCH, THE LEGISLATION OF THE, 474.
PHILOSOPHY, THE INTUITIONAL, IN A NEW FORM, 319.
SAINT-SIMON AND ENFANTIN, 39.
THEISM, ATHEISM, AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL, 207.
-

- “Absolution in the Church of England,” reviewed, 17.
Act, the Education, reviewed, 113.
Acton, Lord, “Sendschreiben an einen deutschen Bischof des Vaticanischen Concils,” reviewed, 65.

- Alabaster, Henry, "The Wheel of the Law, or Buddhism illustrated," &c., reviewed, 294.
- AMBERLEY, VISCOUNT, author of article, "Recent Publications on Buddhism," 293.
- Augustine, "City of God," noticed, 154.
- Bahādur Syud Ahmed Khan, C.S.I., "Essays on the Life of Mohamed," reviewed, 221.
- Barrett, Thomas S., "A New View of Causation," noticed, 149.
- Beal, Samuel, "A Catena of Buddhist Scriptures from the Chinese," reviewed, 294.
- BEARD, CHARLES, B.A., author of article, "Drunkenness and Legislation," 273. Author (joint) of article, "The Bennett Judgment," 389. Author of article, "The Bampton Lecture on Dissent," 487.
- Beard, J. R., D.D., "The Autobiography of Satan," reviewed, 574.
- Bersier, Eugène, "The Oneness of the Race in its Fall and in its Future," noticed, 156.
- Bisset, Andrew, "Essays on Historical Truth," noticed, 149.
- Booth, Arthur J., "Saint-Simon," &c., reviewed, 39.
- Brahmoism. "Lecture in reply to the Query, 'What is Brahmoism?'" noticed, 157.
- Brooke, Stopford, M.A., "Christ in Modern Life," reviewed, 506.
- Brown, J. B., B.A., "The Sunday Afternoon," noticed, 425.
- Brown, William, "The Tabernacle," &c., noticed, 148.
- BUDDHISM, RECENT PUBLICATIONS ON, 293. Its leading thought, all existence a source of pain, 293. Nirvāna, its cure, 294. Spread of Buddhism, 295. Buddhist Scriptures, 296. Translations by Beal, 297. By Alabaster, 298. Incarnation of Gāutama, 301. His secular life, 301. Complete enlightenment, 303. His death, 304. Legendary character of his life, 306. The four truths of Buddhism, 311. Its religious brotherhood, 313. Its morality, 316.
- Burgess, Ebenezer, A.M., "What is Truth?" noticed, 420.
- Caird, John, D.D., "Christian Manliness," noticed, 157.
- Carpenter, J. E., M.A., translator of "The History of Israel," by Ewald, noticed, 155.
- CATHOLIC, A LIBERAL, author of article on "The Alt-katholik Movement in Germany," 65.
- CATHOLIC: THE ALT-KATHOLIK MOVEMENT IN GERMANY, 65. Its literature, 66. Distinction between Romanism and Catholicism, 67. Old Catholics and Ultramontanes, 68. Catholic reaction, 69. German Catholics and the Index Expurgatorius, 70. Döllinger, 73. Attitude of Rome, 73. Council of the Vatican and the Pope's Infallibility, 75. Reception of the dogma, 79. First manifesto of the Old Catholics, 82. Döllinger excommunicated, 86. Congress at Munich, 89. The validity of excommunications tested, 91. Action of the States, 93. Programme of the Congress, 95. Alt-katholik organization, 98. Future of the movement, 101.
- "Christ the Consoler," noticed, 426.
- CHRISTIANITY AND MODERN SCEPTICISM, 258. Questioning spirit of the age, 258. Over-condensation of the Duke's style, 259. His mistakes, 260. Authority of the Scriptures, 261. Lack of plain-speaking, 264. Christianity identified with orthodoxy, 265. Distrust of the teachers of orthodoxy, 265. Dissatisfaction with dogma, 267. With St. Paul, 267. Future of Christianity, 269. Ideal of Christ, 270. "Colourless Christianity," 271.
- "Christianity. Rationale of," noticed, 420.
- "Church and the World," reviewed, 17.

- CHURCH DESIGNS FOR CONGREGATIONS, 103. Problems to be solved in church buildings, 104. Value of the old type, 108. A plan suggested, 109. Another, 111.
- Clarke, J. Freeman, referred to, note, 211.
- COBBE, FRANCES POWER, author of article, "Auricular Confession in the Church of England," 17. Author of article, "The Life after Death," 506.
- Cobbe, Frances Power, "Darwinism in Morals, and other Essays," noticed, 435.
- COLENSO ON THE PENTATEUCH, PART VI., 197. Result of critical method in the study of the Bible, 197. Bishop of Ely on the numbers of Israelite warriors, 200. Difficulties common to all old literatures, 201. Found in the Pentateuch, 202. Its dates, 203. Its authors, 204.
- Colenso, J. W., D.D., Bishop of Natal, on the "Speaker's Commentary," noticed, 130. "The Pentateuch and Book of Joshua critically examined," Part VI., reviewed, 474.
- "Concile, La dernière Heure du," reviewed, 65.
- CONFESSION, AURICULAR, IN THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND, 17. Inherent moral character of the act of confession, 17. Modern revivers of the confessional, 18. Its advantages, 21. Disadvantages, 22. Mechanical view of religion, 22. Enervation of the moral constitution, 28. Deseccation of the inner spiritual life, 31. Balance of disadvantages, 37. True confession, 37.
- Contemporary Review for April, May, June and August, 1872, reviewed, 506.
- CONWAY, MORGUE D., author of article on "Theism, Atheism, and the Problem of Evil," 207.
- COQUEREL, ETIENNE, author of article on the "General Synod of the Reformed Church of France," 536.
- CROSSKEY, HENRY W., author of article, "Nonconformist Programme and Policy," 356.
- Crowfoot, J. R., "Fragmenta Evangelica," &c., reviewed, 418.
- Cupland, W. C., B.A., B.Sc., "Aims of the Church," noticed, 157.
- Cubitt, James, "Church Designs for Congregations," reviewed, 103.
- Curteis, George Herbert, M.A., "Dissent in its Relation to the Church of England," reviewed, 487.
- Dale, R. W., M.A., "The Politics of Nonconformity," reviewed, 113.
- Darwin, Charles, M.A., "Variation of Animals under Domestication," "Descent of Man," reviewed, 319.
- Davies, Benjamin, Ph.D., LL.D., "Students' Hebrew Lexicon," noticed, 420.
- Denniston, J. M., M.A., "The Sacrifice for Sin, as revealed in the Law and the Gospel," noticed, 435.
- DENOMINATIONAL DIFFICULTY, THE, 113. Elementary Education Act, 113. The so-called "compromise," 113. A false issue raised, 115. Separation of religious from secular education in money as in time, 118. Objections answered, 119. School-board "established" religions, 121.
- DEVELOPMENT OF OPINION IN THE EARLY CHRISTIAN CHURCH, Part I., 1. Two assumptions which hinder the understanding of the New Testament literature, 1. Origin of the Gospel according to Matthew, 2. Of Mark, 5. Of Luke, 7. Of John, 9. Of the Acts, 11. Epistles of Paul, 11. Epistle to the Hebrews, 14. Apocalypse, 14.
- DEVELOPMENT OF OPINION IN THE EARLY CHRISTIAN CHURCH, Part II., 161. The "end of all things," 161. Order of historical development, 162. Key-note of the Christian system, 163. First stage of development: Paul and John, 164. Second stage: reaction, 165. Third stage, 169. Religion and its historical accompaniments, 172. Real value of the Scriptures, 176. Leads to catholicity of spirit, 178.
- DISSENT, THE BAMPTON LECTURE ON, 487. Mr. Curteis' earnest attempt to understand Dissent, 487. His theory, 489. Its weakness, 491. The Church

- and political parties, 495. Importance of unity, 497. Faithfulness to truth more important, 498. Unitarians and Puritanism, 500. And the Church, 501. Sectarian disintegration, 505.
- Dobney, H. H., "Judas, or a Brother's Inquiry concerning the Betrayer," noticed, 424.
- Dodds, Marcus, M.A., translator of Augustine's "City of God," noticed, 154.
- Döllinger, J. J. von, "Erklärung an den Erzbischof von München-Freising," reviewed, 65.
- Dozy, Dr. A., "De Israëliten te Mekka," noticed, 415.
- Driver, S. R., "A Commentary on Jeremiah and Ezekiel" (translated), noticed, 418.
- DRUNKENNESS AND LEGISLATION, 273. Change in the "Teetotal" controversy, 273. Statistics, 278. Drinking trade a monopoly, 279. Its difference from other trades, 281. Its regulation, 281. The Permissive Bill, 282. Objections to it, 283. Licensing, 287. Profits of the trade, 288. Restriction, 289. Value of the old Temperance movement, 290. Causes of drunkenness, 291. Means of counteracting these, 292.
- E., author of notices of books, 154, 428.
- "Ecce Episcopus," noticed, 433.
- "Ecclesia," edited by H. R. Reynolds, D.D., noticed, 142.
- Elliott, James, "Moses and Modern Science," noticed, 420.
- EVOLUTION AND RELIGION, 561. Demands of science on religion, 561. Martineau and Spencer, 562. Relative knowledge of the cause of nature, 566. Poetry as a substitute for theology, 572.
- Ewald, H., "The History of Israel," noticed, 155.
- FRANCE, THE GENERAL SYNOD OF THE REFORMED CHURCH OF, 536. The Reformed Church in 1560, 536. Its synods, 537. Its position in 1802, 538. In 1871, 539. Mode of representation, 540. Its results, 541. New Confession of Faith, 542. Protest against, by the "Left" wing, 543. By the "Left" centre, 544. Ambiguity in the Confession of Faith, 546. Its omissions, 548. Orthodox strategy, 549. Its failure, 550. Rebellion of the extreme "Right," 551. Ecclesiastical organization, 552. Dogmatic authority, 555. Resistance of the Liberals, 558. Schism possible, 560.
- Friedrich, Dr. J., "Documenta ad illustrandum Concilium Vaticanum," reviewed, 65.
- G. W. C., author of notices of books, 135.
- Galton, Francis, F.R.S., "Hereditary Genius," reviewed, 319.
- GOD IN NATURE, 373. Ideal interpretation of the world, 373—adequate to its purpose, 375. How affected by scientific researches, 376. As to space, 376. As to time, 380. Does growth dispense with causation? 385.
- Graf, K. H. von, "Die Geschichtlichen Bücher des Alten Testaments," reviewed, 474.
- Graham, J. J., M.A., "Autobiography of John Milton," noticed, 427.
- Gratry, A., "Letters to Mgr. Deschamps," reviewed, 65.
- Gresley, William, "The Ordinance of Confession," reviewed, 17.
- Harwood, Annie, translator of "The Oneness of the Race," noticed, 156.
- HERDER AS A THEOLOGIAN, 179. Influence of Goethe and Kant, 180. Of Herder, 180. His life, 181. His views of the pastoral office, 185. At Nantes and Paris, 187. At Bückeburg, 188. Visit to Heyne, 190. At Weimar, 190. Tour in Italy, 193. His failing health, 194. His death, 196. His definition of theology, 438. Nature of man, 439. Relation of man to the animal world, 442. The fact that God is, 445. Man's relation

- to Him, 449. The religion of Christ and Christianity, 450. First Christian preachers, 454. Key to Herder's life and thinking, 457.
- Higginson, Edward, "Ecce Messias," noticed, 144.
- Hopps, John Page, "Summer Morning Songs and Sermons," noticed, 424.
- HOWSE, EDWARD S., B.A., author of article on "Saint-Simon and Enfantin," 39.
- Hubbard, M. G., "Saint-Simon," reviewed, 39.
- Hunter, W. W., LL.D., "Our Indian Musalmans," reviewed, 221.
- Hutton, Vernon, "A Help to Repentance," reviewed, 17.
- ISLAM IN INDIA, 221. Importance of the question, 221. Mahomedan charges against the Government, 224. Our position in India, 228. Religious and political hatreds, 230. "Duty" of religious war, 231. English mistakes in education, 238. Hindu and Musalman, 240. Religious endowments in India, 244.
- J. R., author of notice of books, 141.
- Janus, "The Pope and the Council," reviewed, 65.
- "Jesus the Messiah," reviewed, 467.
- JESUS, NEW ENGLISH LIVES OF, 467. Mr. Scott's work, 469. Use of the work of destruction, 472. "Jesus the Messiah," 473.
- Jones, R. C., B.A., "Hymns of Duty and Faith," noticed, 435.
- JUDGMENT, THE BENNETT, 389. Importance to Liberals of the late Judgment, 389. The real objective presence in the Sacrament, 391. Sacrifice offered by the priest, 394. Adoration due to it, 396. Conclusion, 398. A compromise, 400. Of little value to theological progress, 403. Unlawful liberty, 404.
- K., author of notice of books, 122.
- Kalisch, M. M., "A Historical and Critical Commentary on the Old Testament," Part II., reviewed, 474.
- KENNY, COURTNEY, author (joint) of article on "The Bennett Judgment," 389.
- Kenrick, John, "Letter to the Editor," 158.
- Kirkman, Thomas P., M.A., F.R.S., "Church Cursing and Atheism," referred to, note, 207.
- Krüger-Velthusen, W., "Das Leben Jesu," noticed, 420.
- Kuenen, Dr. A., "De Godsdienst van Israël," "De Baäldienst onder Israël," noticed, 410, 416.
- LAMPORT, W. J., author of article on "The Denominational Difficulty," 113. Author of article, "Memoir of Joshua Parry," 458.
- Lang, Dr. Heinrich, "Deutsche Zeit und Streit Fragen," noticed, 420.
- Langer, Dr. J., "Das Vaticanische Dogma," reviewed, 65.
- Lees, W. Nassau, "Indian Musalmans," reviewed, 221.
- Liano, von Henry St. A., "The Church of God and the Bishops," reviewed, 65.
- LIFE AFTER DEATH, THE, 506. Faith and doubt, 506. Need of the faith, 508. Transition stage, 510. Presumptions against survival, 513. The moral argument their real counterpoise, 515. Existence of God's justice and love assumed, 517. Justice must triumph in time or in eternity, 518. It is not always done here, 525. Goodness must be fully worked out in time or in eternity, 529. Is not always worked out here, 529. Imperfection, 530. Love's appeal to faith, 530. Grief for lost virtue, 532. Dim natural faith in immortality, 533. Testimony of saints, 534.
- Lowe, Robert, M.P., "Speech at Halifax," reviewed, 113.
- Lyall, A. C., author of article on "Islam in India," 221.

- M'Ivor, James, D.D., "Religious Progress: its Criterion, Instruments and Laws," noticed, 434.
- "Man, the: the Mighty God," noticed, 147.
- MARTINEAU, JAMES, author of article, "God in Nature," 373.
- Martineau, James, "Why Dissent?" noticed, 156. "The Place of Mind in Nature and Intuition in Man," reviewed, 561.
- MARTINEAU, RUSSELL, M.A., author of notice of books, 420. Author of article, "The Legislation of the Pentateuch," 474.
- MAURICE, FREDERICK DENISON, 345. His influence, 345. A check on sacerdotalism, 348. His strength and weakness, 349. His intolerance, 354. Purity and nobleness of his life, 355.
- MONRO, C. J., M.A., author of article on "St. Paul and the Nero Legend," 246.
- Morel, Conway, "Authority and Conscience," noticed, 127.
- Murphy, James J., "Sermons on various Subjects," noticed, 148.
- NEW, HERBERT, author of notice of books, 405.
- NONCONFORMIST PROGRAMME AND POLICY, 356. The Education controversy, 356. Formation of a Nonconformist party, 357. The Roman Catholics, 359. True meaning of the claim for religious equality, 360. The Comprehension theory, 361. The Universities, 363. The scholastic profession, 365. Religions "established" by school boards, 366. A national scheme of Education rendered less possible, 369. The imminent struggle, 371.
- Noyes, J. H., B.A., "Hymns of Modern Man," noticed, 427.
- "Olrig Grange," noticed, 426.
- Orr, John, "Liberalizing Ideas in Religion," noticed, 157.
- Oort, Dr. H., "De Dienst der Baälim in Israël," "Het Menschenoffer in Israël," noticed, 416, 417.
- OWEN, JOHN, author of article on "The Intuitionist Philosophy in a New Form," 319.
- "Papal Infallibility," by an English Catholic, reviewed, 65.
- "Pardon through the Precious Blood," reviewed, 17.
- PARRY, JOSHUA, MEMOIR OF, 458. General character of the book, 458. Birth of Parry, 459. His life, 460. Cromwell's Triers, 461. Presbyterians, 462. Politics of Parry's day, 463. Its philosophy, 464. Its theology, 465.
- Parry, Charles Henry, author of "Memoir of Joshua Parry," reviewed, 458.
- PAUL, SAINT, AND THE NERO LEGEND, 246. Interest of Apocalyptic riddles, 246. "Man of Lawlessness," 247. Nero's death, 248. Genuineness of the Second Epistle to the Thessalonians, 249. Idea of the Man of Lawlessness taken from Daniel, 251. Vitellius the "restraining agency," 252. Claims for Vespasian as Antichrist, 254. Paul's outlook for the fall of Jerusalem, 257.
- "Paul of Tarsus," by a Graduate, noticed, 432.
- PAUL, C. KEGAN, M.A., author of article, "Christianity and Modern Scepticism," 258.
- PENTATEUCH, LEGISLATION OF THE, 474. Usefulness of Bishop Colenso's labours, 474. Genesis, 476. Levitical legislation and that of Deuteronomy, 479. Date of Deuteronomy, 481. Of levitical law, 482. Day of atonement, 484.
- PHILOSOPHY, THE INTUITIONAL, IN A NEW FORM, 319. Revival of extinct modes of thought, 319. Doctrine of innate ideas, 320. Experimental philosophy, 321. Inherited predilections or "pre-determinations," 322. Physiological theory of innate ideas, 328. Its results, 330. On theology, 336. On ethics, 341. On social science and legislation, 348.
- Pieton, J. Allanson, M.A., "New Theories and the Old Faith," reviewed, 506.

- "Pontifical Decrees on the Motion of the Earth," reviewed, 65.
- Porter, Noah, D.D., LL.D., "Science and Humanity," noticed, 420.
- PRESBYTER ANGLICANUS, author of notice of books, 127. Author of articles, "Colenso and the Pentateuch," 197. "Frederick Denison Maurice," 345.
- Priestley, Joseph, LL.D., F.R.S., "A History of the Corruptions of Christianity," noticed, 155.
- Quirinus, "Letters from Rome on the Council," reviewed, 65.
- R. P., author of notice of books, 424.
- Reinkens, Dr. J., "Die Päpstlichen Dekrete vom 18 Juli, 1870," reviewed, 65.
- Rogers, Captain T., R.E., "Translations from the Burmese," referred to, note, 212.
- Rothschild, C. and A., "The History and Literature of the Israelites," noticed, 436.
- S. A. S., author of notice of books, 574.
- Sadler, Thomas, Ph.D., "The Relation of Jesus Christ to the Religion of this Age," noticed, 157. "Edwin Wilkins Field, a Memorial Sketch," reviewed, 405.
- SAINT-SIMON AND ENFANTIN, 39. Sketch of the life of St. Simon, 39. His works, 44. His disciples, 45. His fundamental thought, 45. Sketch of his argument, 46. His "Nouveau Christianisme," 48. Enfantin, 50. His life, 51. His co-workers, 53. Their propagandism, 55. Close of his career, 63.
- Samuelson, James, "Views of the Deity," &c., noticed, 141.
- Sanday, William, M.A., "The Authorship and Historical Character of the Fourth Gospel," noticed, 428.
- Sbarbaro, Pietro, "Della Liberta," noticed, 136.
- Scepticism, Modern. Christian Evidence Society, noticed, 151.
- Schulte, J. F. Von, "Die Stellung von Concilien Päpste," &c., reviewed, 65.
- Scott, Thomas, "The English Life of Jesus," reviewed, 467.
- Septuagenarian, "The Problem of the World and the Church reconsidered," noticed, 151, 258.
- "Sermons, Outline of, chiefly Unitarian," noticed, 432.
- Sharpe, Samuel, "The History of the Hebrew Nation and its Literature," noticed, 436.
- SMITH, J. FREDERICK, author of article, "Herder as a Theologian," 179, 431. Notices of books, 151, 420.
- Somerset, Duke of, "Christian Theology and Modern Scepticism," reviewed, 258.
- Spencer, Herbert, "Principles of Psychology," reviewed, 319. "Mr. Martineau on Evolution," *Contemporary Review*, reviewed, 561.
- TAYLER, J. J., author of articles on "The Development of Opinion in the Early Christian Church," 1, 161.
- THEISM, ATHEISM, AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL, 207. Changed attitude of thinkers towards Atheism, 207. Atheism *v.* Anti-theism, 208. Orthodoxy and Buddhism, 208. Provisional Atheism, 211. Existence of evil, 213. Solutions of Theodore Parker, 213. Of Miss Cobbe, 214. Question between the Theist and the Atheist, 216. Our ignorance as to the final cause of evil, 217. What good end does evil serve? 218. Science daily enlarging knowledge of this, 219. Theism not yet free from dogmatism, 220.
- Tondini, Casarius, "The Pope of Rome and the Popes of the Oriental Orthodox Church," noticed, 154.

- "Tracts for the Day," reviewed, 17.
Trevelyan, G. O., M.P., "Five Speeches on the Liquor Traffic," reviewed, 273.
Tyndall, John, LL.D., F.R.S., "Fragments of Science for Unscientific People," reviewed, 561.
UPTON, CHARLES B., B.A., author of article, "Evolution and Religion," 561.
Vogan, Thomas S. L., D.D., "The True Doctrine of the Eucharist," noticed, 434.
Voysey, Charles, B.A., "The Sling and the Stone," noticed, 433.
W., author of notices of books, 149.
"Wheel of the Law," note, 208.
Wicksteed, Philip H., M.A., author of notices of books, 410.
Wilkins, Augustus S., M.A., "Phœnicia and Israel," noticed, 122.
WORTHINGTON, THOMAS, author of article on "Church Designs for Congregations," 103.
WRIGHT, JOHN, B.A., author of article, "New English Lives of Jesus," 467.

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